美國、中國和中東大國競爭
查斯·弗裏曼 2022-11-09
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East
作者：Projects International, Inc. 主席查斯·弗裏曼 (Chas Freeman)。他是一位退休的美國國防官員、外交官和口譯員，獲得過無數崇高榮譽和獎項，也是一位受歡迎的公眾演說家，並著有五本書。
對俄克拉荷馬大學大衛·L·博倫國際研究學院的致辭
布朗大學沃森國際與公共事務研究所訪問學者
視頻來自新罕布什爾州埃克塞特，2022 年 11 月 9 日
這是官方的。 拜登政府同意特朗普政府的觀點，即世界事務中發生的幾乎所有事情都可以用兩個相互關聯的零和競賽來解釋。 一個是地緣政治的，如“大國競爭”。另一個是意識形態的，如“民主與威權主義”。
所謂“中東”是西亞的一個次區域[1]，占據非洲、亞洲、歐洲交匯的戰略空間。 它見證了赫梯人和埃及人之間爭奪統治地位的地緣政治競爭。 希臘人和波斯人； 羅馬人、希臘羅馬人和帕提亞人； 阿拉伯人和波斯人； 阿拉伯人、土耳其人和希臘羅馬人； 歐洲人、土耳其人和阿拉伯人； 英國人和法國人； 美國人和蘇聯人。
它也是世界上最具爭議的三種宗教的誕生地，它們之間有著悠久的意識形態戰爭曆史。 印歐多神教和猶太教的基督教分支之間發生了決定性的戰鬥，基督教世界也派十字軍與猶太教的一神論後代伊斯蘭教作戰。 最近，包括馬克思列寧主義在內的歐洲-大西洋治理理想在那裏相互鬥爭，並尋求取代本土伊斯蘭和部落傳統，但取得了有限的成功。
但在很大程度上，當代中東局勢反駁了華盛頓當前的外交政策教條。 該地區現在發生的事情幾乎不能用大國競爭或民主與意識形態之間的較量來解釋。 獨裁主義。 包括美國在內的大國已經失去了對該地區的控製。 沒有人再試圖對其強加新的治理體係。
令人震驚的是，華盛頓在某種程度上已經與中東所有關鍵角色疏遠了。 除了極少數例外，該地區的國家現在都在做出自己的決定，而不是試圖為美國觀眾粉飾自己的決定。 美國在土耳其失去了大部分影響力，與伊朗不和，現在與沙特阿拉伯關係緊張。 華盛頓與巴勒斯坦建製派不再有富有成效的聯係。 由於價值觀的分歧、與俄羅斯和中國打交道時對國家利益的不同考量以及美國國內的政治兩極分化，美國與以色列的關係變得日益複雜。 與四十年來相比，埃及不再那麽尊重美國的觀點。 阿拉伯聯合酋長國已成為世界級的自私現實政治實踐者，確保美國與其之間的關係是赤裸裸的交易性的。 事情就是這樣。
失去在該地區影響力的不僅僅是美國。 英國和法國——前歐洲帝國主義列強——曾經在“中東”發號施令。現在，他們覺得有義務服從他們以前的領地，這樣他們就可以出售足夠的武器和彈藥，以保持他們的軍火工業生產線的開放。 他們和其他外國供應商試圖利用軍售向該地區國家施壓，結果隻是促使他們多樣化采購並開始發展自己的軍事工業。
在遭到歐盟（EU）的拒絕後，土耳其放棄了長達兩個世紀的重新定義其歐洲身份的努力。 安卡拉正在前奧斯曼帝國的空間裏與俄羅斯和中國一起尋求獨立的、盡管不穩定的路線，並追求泛伊斯蘭主義和泛圖蘭主義。 土耳其與歐盟、北約和美國關係的惡化表明西方在許多領域的影響力顯著削弱，而不僅僅是在中東。 西方不能再指望土耳其支持或默許其對以色列-巴勒斯坦問題、敘利亞、伊拉克、伊朗、俄羅斯、高加索、巴爾幹、希臘、塞浦路斯、埃及、利比亞、海灣合作委員會國家、阿富汗、伊斯蘭合作組織成員國、北約或馬格裏布的政策。 這對全球和區域都有巨大影響。
在西方長期在該地區的外交目標上，土耳其不再與北約其他國家、華盛頓、倫敦、巴黎或柏林保持一致。 土耳其的政策使保護以色列的任務變得更加複雜； 排除俄羅斯在中東和黑海地區的影響力； 並反對伊朗。 土耳其非但沒有加入美國/北約在烏克蘭問題上與俄羅斯的代理人戰爭，而是出於自利的目的發揮了斡旋作用，並利用俄羅斯的困境來提振其經濟。
與此同時，美國與伊朗的關係仍然十分敵對。 華盛頓呼應耶路撒冷、利雅得和阿布紮比的政策偏好，而不是從自己的國家利益推斷政策。 以色列和海灣阿拉伯國家鼓勵並助長了美國在冷戰後伊拉克和敘利亞的戰略失誤。 這些錯誤促使伊朗在新月沃地建立了勢力範圍和代理人勢力，讓以色列和海灣阿拉伯人都感到被包圍。
短暫的“聯合全麵行動計劃”解決了以色列對伊朗核計劃的近乎歇斯底裏的情緒，但沒有解決海灣阿拉伯國家對其地區霸權願望的更直接的擔憂。 以色列對伊朗核突破的擔憂和海灣阿拉伯國家對包圍的焦慮導致美國政界人士施壓廢除該協議，美國政界人士也這麽做了。 不出所料，伊朗現在已經恢複了之前中斷的對以色列半秘密核計劃的模仿。 具有諷刺意味的是，以色列卻讓其在其周邊地區的核壟斷地位受到質疑。
美國當前伊朗政策的特點是無意識的惡意、道貌岸然的製裁以及間歇性的軍事對抗和襲擊，這無助於削弱伊朗的地區影響力。 美國最新的核態勢評估報告判斷，伊朗並未尋求核武器，但以色列和拜登政府繼續威脅采取軍事行動，阻止其獲得核武器。 這隻會給德黑蘭施加壓力，要求其擁有核武器。 美國對朝鮮采取的類似政策的結果表明，基於“最大壓力”的做法更有可能促使伊朗建造核武器洲際彈道導彈以遏製美國，而不是威懾美國。
與此同時，美國對伊朗在霍爾木茲海峽的挑戰的反應始終低於海灣阿拉伯國家的預期。 因此，毫不奇怪的是，在向卡塔爾施壓，要求其無視地理因素、限製與伊朗的合作，但無果而終之後，沙特阿拉伯和阿聯酋認識到了自己與伊朗打交道的必要性，與其建立了外交對話，並開始與其進行有節製的和解。
近年來，美國與沙特的關係因雙方的幻滅以及雙方都感覺對方背叛了自己而受到影響。 9/11 事件在美國根深蒂固地仇視伊斯蘭教，而沙特阿拉伯則對美國將沙特視為恐怖分子巢穴的刻板印象感到不滿。 對沙特版伊斯蘭教的批評者不斷湧現，經常將沙特的傳教活動與本土宗教極端分子聯係起來。 沙特阿拉伯的 bedoukratiya 製度——一種基於部落治理規範的政治製度，由酋長或埃米爾致力於通過協商、共識和慈善進行統治——對於民主理論家來說總是難以理解。 現在，它已經被王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼（也稱為MbS）的更明顯令人反感但改革主義的獨裁統治所掩蓋。
盡管本·薩勒曼實施了西方長期以來呼籲的改革，但沙特人仍然堅持聖經規範，從而在沙特王國實現了驚人的快速社會自由化。 然而，與此同時，美國價值觀已經演變為強調無拘無束的女權主義、對性別複雜性的認可以及接受性自由作為“人權”的核心概念。美國堅持要求外國人遵守這些新製定的美國規範。 與許多其他非西方人民一樣，大多數沙特人認為美國最近的“覺醒”做法是不道德的，美國要求他們受到尊重，因為他們是傲慢自大的行為。 盡管沙特王國變得更加“西化”，但沙特價值觀與美國價值觀之間的差異仍然存在。
期望從一位被你譴責為道德敗壞者並試圖排斥的外國領導人那裏獲得政治恩惠是很奇怪的。
過去，出於與美國的友誼，沙特經常會同意做一些違背自身短期利益的事情。 但在缺乏這種友誼的情況下，它堅持把自己的利益放在第一位也就不足為奇了。 拜登總統最近要求沙特阿拉伯調整石油產量水平以降低汽油價格並幫助民主黨候選人參加中期選舉，這既是無能又是妄想。 [2] 關於沙特應該在與中國和俄羅斯的競爭中支持美國的論點毫無吸引力。 兩者都不威脅海灣地區的任何國家。 與歐洲和日本以外的世界上大多數國家一樣，沙特認為俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭是非法的，而是由北約東擴和美國無能外交挑起的。 他們回顧了以色列對黎巴嫩和敘利亞的侵略、美國對伊拉克的入侵、北約對利比亞的幹預以及美國在敘利亞的秘密行動，並淡化了美國對俄羅斯類似不當行為的憤怒。
美國官方指定的大國對手正在主動提出改善與沙特的關係。 發出有助於實現這一目標的威脅在戰術上是愚蠢的，在戰略上也是毫無意義的。 如果拜登總統兌現了他的威脅，要懲罰穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼拒絕通過降低石油價格來懲罰沙特發展預算，那麽沙特有很多報複的選擇。
這讓我想到了中國及其在中東的作用。 長期以來，中國不太關心與該地區國家的關係。 同樣，對於阿拉伯海灣國家和伊朗來說，與中國的關係也不是那麽重要。 但近幾十年來，情況發生了變化。 中國三分之一的能源進口來自海灣合作委員會，其中最大部分來自沙特阿拉伯。 中國公司購買了海灣合作委員會石油出口的六分之一、伊朗的五分之一和伊拉克的一半。 中國已成為該地區最大的貿易夥伴和外國投資者。
該地區國家希望中國更多而不是更少參與。 隨著中國在全球技術創新方麵處於領先地位，它已成為以色列高科技公司的重要合作者和客戶，以及沙特阿拉伯發展國內軍備工業的合作夥伴。 17個阿拉伯國家已加入中國“一帶一路”倡議。 伊朗的偏好可能並非如此，但美國的製裁迫使其放棄歐洲，首先轉向中國，最近又轉向其傳統的地緣政治對手俄羅斯。
與一個世紀前的美國一樣，中國在中東沒有明顯的帝國主義或意識形態議程。 與今天的美國不同，中國不會要求該地區國家改變其政治製度和價值觀，不會懲罰不這樣做的國家，也不會要求與他們建立排他性關係。 這並沒有使他們對第三國 — — 比如俄羅斯對烏克蘭 — — 的行為的立場成為與他們建立良好關係的試金石。 而且它不會侮辱他們或他們的領導人。
到目前為止，中國一直非常謹慎地將其在西亞的政策重點放在貿易和投資上，並與該地區的政治爭端保持距離。 因此，它能夠與伊朗、伊拉克、以色列等“中東”國家以及海合會成員國、埃及、約旦、巴勒斯坦、敘利亞等保持友好關係。
盡管美國在該地區政策的重點現在是排除中國的影響力，但中國尚未公開表示反對美國繼續參與。 相反，北京建議就安全問題建立多邊對話，並在時機成熟時建立區域管理的“海灣集體安全機製”。 簡而言之，中國並未強加自己的偏好或選邊站隊，而是提議幫助彌合伊朗和海灣阿拉伯國家的觀點。 與此同時，中國的海灣合作夥伴發現北京的國家資本主義、雄厚的財力和快速現代化的發展具有吸引力。 他們將中國及其“一帶一路”視為“2030 年願景”和其他經濟發展計劃的潛在貢獻者。但美國剛剛將挫敗中國重新獲得財富和權力的願望作為其全球國家安全戰略的主要目標。 中美關係處於“準戰爭”狀態。 而且由於許多不相關的因素，沙特與美國的關係比以往任何時候都更加不穩定。 現在的問題是，美國和中國之間日益加劇的敵意是否會導致北京擴大其目標，包括減少華盛頓對該地區政府的影響力。
北京在利雅得設有大使。 正如當今主要首都經常發生的情況一樣，華盛頓卻沒有這樣做。 中國沒有威脅沙特阿拉伯，而美國卻在威脅。 日期尚未公布，但廣泛報道習近平即將訪問利雅得。 在那裏，他將會見穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼以及其他阿拉伯領導人。 兩位有權勢的人對美國政客的妖魔化以及他們的國家麵臨來自華盛頓的威脅感到憤憤不平，他們即將討論如何加強合作。 這些領導人和其他將與他們會麵的人可以共同產生具有重大全球影響的地緣政治調整。
近期，中國和沙特就很多問題進行了討論。 其中一些可能會在即將舉行的峰會上實現。 他們包括：
貨幣互換以及使用人民幣和其他非美元貨幣來結算能源和其他大宗商品的國際貿易。
中國對沙特本土軍火工業的銷售和援助。
中國在沙特阿拉伯和該地區的基礎設施項目和其他投資。
沙特是金磚國家和上海合作組織的成員，這兩個國家都致力於創建新的貨幣體係和貨幣，旨在遏製美國濫用美元主權實施單邊非法製裁。
沙特決定將中國語言和文化的學習納入沙特基礎學校課程的一部分，這是教育交流的基礎。
後疫情時代的旅遊和朝聖。
如果中國和沙特阿拉伯達成戰略合作協議，其投資目標與北京在 2021 年與德黑蘭達成的投資目標類似，也就不足為奇了。
很明顯，正如美國在20世紀勉強取代英國成為中東的主導力量一樣，中國最終也將在21世紀超越美國。 中國的利益與最初吸引美國參與中東事務的利益相呼應：
北京對確保可靠地獲得波斯灣獨特豐富的能源資源有著濃厚的興趣。
中國將該地區視為亞洲、歐洲和東非之間貿易和旅行的重要轉口地和十字路口，使其穩定具有重大戰略利益。
對中國企業的工程服務、建築能力、汽車和電信設備、軍備和消費品的需求迅速增長。
到目前為止，北京似乎無意取代美國成為地區穩定與安全的保障者。 但其與海灣阿拉伯國家日益增長的軍事關係是美國決定停止出售F-35多用途飛機的一個因素，阿聯酋曾承諾說服阿聯酋與以色列實現關係正常化。 華盛頓加班加點地限製以色列與中國的技術合作，並阻止中國在那裏和該地區其他地方的基礎設施項目。
中東沒有一個國家認為美國對中國發起的準戰爭符合其利益。 在他們看來，這是進步的障礙，而且美國對他們與中國的合作感到惱火，這種合作沒有任何替代品或替代方案。 美國目前的做法並不是維護美國在中東影響力的可行手段。 除其他外，它表現出一種不合時宜的焦慮，侵蝕了人們對美國智慧和自信的信心。
可悲的是，中美彼此以及地區國家有著許多共同利益。 起草一份互惠互利的合作提案清單是很容易的。 但美國與中國的準戰爭不允許追求互利的舉措。
到目前為止，盡管美國極力阻止，中國還是選擇繼續做自己的事。 但這種被動抵抗可能即將結束。 美國無能的治國之道為中國創造了加速美國在中東主導地位垮台的機會。 現在會這樣做嗎？ 我們很快就會知道。
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East
Chas Freeman 2022-11-09
https://chasfreeman.net/the-united-states-china-and-great-power-competition-in-the-middle-east/
Written by Chas Freeman , chairs Projects International, Inc. He is a retired U.S. defense official, diplomat, and interpreter, the recipient of numerous high honors and awards, a popular public speaker, and the author of five books.
The United States, China, and Great Power Competition in the Middle East Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.) It’s official. The Biden administration agrees with the Trump administration that almost everything that happens in world affairs can be explained by two interlocking zero-sum contests. One is geopolitical, as in ‘great power rivalry.’ The other is ideological, as in ‘democracy vs. authoritarianism.’ The so-called ‘Middle East’ is a subregion[1] of West Asia that occupies the strategic space where Africa, Asia, and Europe collide. It has seen geopolitical contests for dominance between Hittites and Egyptians; Greeks and Persians; Romans, Greco-Romans, and Parthians; Arabs and Persians; Arabs, Turks, and Greco-Romans; Europeans, Turks, and Arabs; Britons and Frenchmen; Americans and Soviets. It is also the birthplace of three of the world’s most disputatious religions, with much history of ideological warfare between them. It was where the decisive battles took place between Indo-European polytheism and Judaism’s Christian offshoot, and where Christendom sent crusaders to fight Judaism’s fiercely monotheistic offspring, Islam. More recently, Euro-Atlantic ideals of governance, including Marxism-Leninism, have struggled with each other there and sought with limited success to supplant indigenous Islamic and tribal traditions. But to a remarkable degree, the situation in the contemporary Middle East refutes Washington’s current foreign policy dogma. Very little that now occurs in the region can be explained by either great power rivalry or ideological contests between democracy and. authoritarianism. The great powers, notably including the United States, have lost their grip on the place. And no one is trying to impose new systems of governance on it anymore. It is striking that Washington has become, to one extent or another, estranged from all the key actors in the Middle East. With few exceptions, countries in the region now make their own decisions, without trying to sugarcoat them for American audiences. The United States has lost most of its influence in Turkey, it is at odds with Iran, and it now has strained relations with Saudi Arabia. Washington no longer has productive links to the Palestinian establishment. Its relations with Israel are increasingly complicated by diverging values, differing calculations of national interest with respect to dealings with Russia and China, and domestic American political polarization. Egypt is less deferential to U.S. views than it has been for four decades. The United Arab Emirates has emerged as a world-class practitioner of self-interested Realpolitik, ensuring that U.S. relations with it are nakedly transactional. And so it goes. It isn’t just America that has lost its clout in the region. Britain and France – former European imperialist powers –– once called the shots in the ‘Middle East.’ Now they feel obliged to defer to their former satrapies so they can sell enough weapons and ammunition to keep their armaments industries’ production lines open. Attempts by them and other foreign vendors to use arms sales to pressure the countries of the region have simply pushed them to diversity their purchases and begin to develop their own military industries. Having been rebuffed by the European Union (EU), Turkey has abandoned its two-century-long drive to redefine its identity as European. Ankara is pursuing an independent, if erratic, course in the former Ottoman space, with Russia and China, and in pursuit of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. The deterioration in Turkish relations with the EU, NATO, and U.S. represents a very significant weakening of Western influence in many arenas, not just the Middle East. The West can no longer count on Turkey to support or acquiesce in its policies toward the Israel-Palestine issue, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Afghanistan, the members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, NATO, or the Maghreb. This has huge implications globally as well as regionally. Turkey is no longer aligned with the rest of NATO, Washington, London, Paris, or Berlin on longstanding Western diplomatic objectives in the region. Turkish policies complicate the tasks of safeguarding Israel; excluding Russian influence in both the Middle East and Black Sea regions; and opposing Iran. Far from joining in the US / NATO proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, Turkey has self-interestedly played a mediating role and exploited Russian distress to boost its economy. Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Iran remain profoundly antagonistic. Washington echoes policy preferences from Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi rather than extrapolating policies from its own national interests. Israel and the Gulf Arabs encouraged and enabled U.S. strategic blunders in post-Cold War Iraq and Syria. These blunders facilitated Iran’s establishment of a sphere of influence and proxy forces in the Fertile Crescent that have left both Israel and the Gulf Arabs feeling encircled. The short-lived ‘JCPOA’ addressed Israel’s near hysteria about Iran’s nuclear programs but not the more immediate concerns of the Gulf Arabs about its aspirations for regional hegemony. Israel’s fears of Iranian nuclear breakout and Gulf Arab anxieties about encirclement led both to press U.S. politicians to scrap the agreement, which they did. Iran has now predictably resumed its previously interrupted emulation of Israel’s semi-clandestine nuclear program. Israel has ironically helped put its nuclear monopoly in its environs in doubt. The mixture of mindless malevolence, sanctimonious sanctioneering, and intermittent military confrontations and attacks that characterizes current U.S. Iran policy does nothing to curtail Iranian regional influence. The latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review judges that Iran is not pursing a nuclear weapon, but Israel and the Biden administration continue to threaten military action to prevent it from acquiring one. This just puts pressure on Tehran to go nuclear. The outcome of similar U.S. policies applied to North Korea suggests that an approach based on “maximum pressure” is more likely to motivate Iran to build nuclear-armed ICBMs to hold the U.S. at bay than to deter it. For now, America's lack of a working relationship with Tehran leaves it unable to craft a regional balance of power or bring influence to bear on a major actor in the region by measures short of war. The United States has fallen into the bad habit of framing its interactions with other countries in terms of obsessions with'great power rivalry' and 'democracy vs. autocracy,' rather than engaging with them about their expressed interests and concerns. Meanwhile, American reactions to Iranian challenges in the Strait of Hormuz have consistently fallen short of Gulf Arab expectations. So, it is not surprising that, after fruitlessly pressuring Qatar to ignore geography by curtailing cooperation with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recognized their own need to deal with Iran, instituted a diplomatic dialogue with it, and begun a measured rapprochement with it. In recent years, US-Saudi relations have suffered from mutual disillusionment and a sense by each country that the other has betrayed it. 9/11 entrenched Islamophobia in the United States and resentment in Saudi Arabia of American stereotyping of the Kingdom as a den of terrorists. Critics of the Saudi version of Islam piled on, drawing often fanciful connections between Saudi proselytizing and homegrown religious extremists. Saudi Arabia’s ????????? [bedoukratiya] – a political system based on tribal norms of governance by a sheikh or amir committed to rule through consultation, consensus, and charity – was always offensively incomprehensible to democratic ideologues. Now it has been eclipsed by the even more clearly objectionable but reformist autocracy of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MbS. Saudis have clung to scriptural norms even as MbS has implemented reforms long called for by the West, yielding astonishingly rapid social liberalization in the Kingdom. Meanwhile, however, American values have evolved to emphasize unbridled feminism, approval of gender complexity, and acceptance of sexual freedom as central concepts of ‘human rights.’ The U.S. insists that foreigners conform to these newly established U.S. norms. Like many other non-Western peoples, most Saudis regard recent American “woke” practices as immoral and the U.S. demand that they be respected as arrogantly presumptuous. Even as the Kingdom has become more ‘westernized,’ the differences between Saudi values and those in the United States persist. The Biden administration’s American First policy version 2.0 has generated reciprocal selfishness abroad, including in Saudi Arabia. Political posturing and churlishly condescending public diplomacy by the United States have nailed the estrangement between Washington and Riyadh in place. It is bizarre to expect political favors from a foreign leader you have condemned as a moral reprobate and sought to ostracize. In the past, the Kingdom would often agree to do things against its own short-term interests out of friendship with the United States. But in the absence of such friendship, it not surprisingly insists on placing its own interests first. The recent demand by President Biden that Saudi Arabia adjust its oil production levels to lower the price of gas at the pump and help Democratic Party candidates in the mid-term elections was both inept and delusional.[2] The argument that the Kingdom should line up behind the United States in its rivalry with China and Russia has no appeal. Neither threatens any country in the Gulf. The Saudis, like most of the world beyond Europe and Japan, see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as illegitimate but provoked by NATO enlargement and inept U.S. diplomacy. They recall Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Syria and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, NATO’s intervention in Libya, and U.S. covert operations in Syria and discount American outrage at analogous Russian misbehavior. The officially designated great power adversaries of the United States are offering to improve relations with the Kingdom. Issuing threats that facilitate this is tactically idiotic and strategically senseless. If President Biden makes good on his threats to punish MbS for declining to penalize the Saudi development budget by lowering the price of oil, the Kingdom has plenty of options for retaliation. This brings me to China and its role in the Middle East. Ties with the countries of the region were long of minor concern to China. Similarly, relations with China were a low priority for the Arab Gulf countries and Iran. But over recent decades, that has changed. One-third of China’s energy imports are from the GCC, with the largest portion from Saudi Arabia. Chinese companies buy one-sixth of GCC oil exports, one-fifth of Iran’s, and half of Iraq’s. China has become the region’s largest trading partner and foreign investor. The states of the region want more, not less Chinese engagement. As China takes a lead in global technological innovation, it has become a significant collaborator and customer for Israel’s high-tech companies and a partner in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to develop a domestic armaments industry. Seventeen Arab states have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran’s preferences might have been otherwise, but U.S. sanctions have forced it to turn away from Europe, first to China, and more recently to its traditional geopolitical adversary, Russia. Most countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, have been trying to dilute what they now believe has been excessive reliance on the United States. To this end, they have reached out to countries like China, India, and Russia. They are not seeking to abandon their ties with the United States or to replace them with ties to others. They are acting in their own interests, not taking sides to rebalance their international relations. They have not wanted to be forced to choose between China and the United States, and they do not react well to American insistence that they curb their relations with China, especially as the United States offers them no compensation or incentives to do so. Like America a century ago, China has had no apparent imperial or ideological agenda in the Middle East. Unlike today’s United States, China does not ask countries in the region to change their political systems and values, punish them for failing to do so, or demand exclusive relationships with them. It does not make their stance on the behavior of third countries – like Russia in Ukraine – a litmus test for good relations with them. And it does not insult them or their leaders. To this point, China has been very careful to focus its policies in West Asia on trade and investment and to keep its distance from the region’s political disputes. As a result, it has been able to maintain cordial ties with every ‘Middle Eastern’ country, including Iran, Iraq, and Israel as well the member states of the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, and Syria. While the focus of American policy in the region is now the exclusion of Chinese influence, China has yet to profess opposition to continuing American involvement. Instead, Beijing has suggested the formation of a multilateral dialogue on security issues and, when the time is ripe, a regionally managed “collective security mechanism for the Gulf.” In short, rather than impose its own preferences or take sides, China has proposed to help bridge Iranian and Gulf Arab views. Meanwhile, China’s Gulf partners have found Beijing’s state capitalism, deep pockets, and rapid rise to modernity appealing. They see China and its BRI as a potential contributor to Vision 2030 and other economic development plans. But the United States has just made the defeat of China’s aspirations for renewed wealth and power the main goal of its global national security strategy. Sino-American relations are in a state of “quasi-war.” And because of many unrelated factors, Saudi relations with the United States are more precarious than they have ever been. The question now is whether the sharpening hostility between the United States and China will lead Beijing to expand its objectives to include the reduction of Washington’s influence on the region’s governments. Beijing has an ambassador in Riyadh. As is all too often the case in major capitals these days, Washington does not. China is not threatening Saudi Arabia, while the United States is. No dates have been announced, but it is widely reported that Xi Jinping is soon to visit Riyadh. There he will meet Mohammed bin Salman as well as other Arab leaders. Two powerful men, aggrieved by their demonization by American politicians and the threats their countries face from Washington, are about to discuss how they can bolster their cooperation. Together, these leaders and others who will meet with them can produce geopolitical realignments with major global impact. China and Saudi Arabia have recently been discussing many issues. Some of these may come to fruition at the forthcoming summit. They include: Currency swaps and the use of the Chinese yuan and other non-dollar currencies to settle international trade in energy and other commodities. Saudi investment in Chinese refineries and oil storage facilities. Chinese arms sales and assistance in the development of an indigenous armaments industry in the Kingdom. Chinese infrastructure projects and other investment in Saudi Arabia and the region. Saudi membership in the BRICS and the SCO, both of which are engaged in creating new monetary systems and currencies designed to outflank U.S. abuse of dollar sovereignty to impose unilateral and therefore illegal sanctions. Educational exchanges that build on the Saudi decision to make the study of Chinese language and culture part of the basic school curriculum in the Kingdom. Tourism and pilgrimages to follow the post-pandemic era. It would not be surprising to see China and Saudi Arabia conclude a strategic cooperation agreement with investment targets like those that Beijing agreed with Tehran in 2021. There is a distinct possibility that, just as the United States reluctantly succeeded Britain as the dominant power in the Middle East in the 20th century, China will eventually end up eclipsing America there in the 21st. China’s interests echo those that first drew America into engagement with the Middle East: Beijing has a compelling interest in securing reliable access to the uniquely rich energy resources of the Persian Gulf. China sees the region as a crucial entrepôt and crossroads for trade and travel between Asia, Europe, and East Africa, making its stability a matter of great strategic interest. There is rapidly growing demand for Chinese companies’ engineering services, construction capabilities, automotive and telecommunications equipment, armaments, and consumer products. China’s citizens and entrepreneurs are establishing an ever-larger presence in the region. (There are now many hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the Gulf Arab countries and Iran.) To this point, Beijing appears to have had no interest in supplanting the United States as the guarantor of regional stability and security. But its growing military relationship with the Gulf Arab states was a factor in the U.S. decision to kill the sale of F-35 multirole aircraft that the UAE had been promised to persuade it to normalize relations with Israel. And Washington has worked overtime to curtail Israeli technological cooperation with China, as well as to block Chinese infrastructure projects there and elsewhere in the region. There is not a single country in the Middle East that sees the quasi-war the United States has initiated with China as in its interest. From their point of view, it is an obstacle to progress accompanied by annoying American peevishness about their cooperation with China that offers no substitute or alternative to such cooperation. The current U.S. approach is not a viable means of preserving U.S. influence in the Middle East. Among other things, it shows an unseemly anxiety that erodes faith in American wisdom and self-confidence. The sad thing is that China and the United States share many common interests with each other and the countries of the region. It would be easy to draw up a list of proposals for cooperation to mutual advantage. But the U.S. Quasi-War with China will not allow the pursuit of mutually advantageous initiatives. Until now, China has chosen to get on with its business despite American efforts to stop it. But this passive resistance may be about to end. Inept U.S. statecraft has created an opportunity for China to accelerate the demise of U.S. dominance in the Middle East. Will it now do so? We will soon know. [1] The ‘Middle East’ is usually defined as the area between the natural barriers of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus mountains, the Iranian and Libyan deserts, and the Black, Caspian, Red, and Arabian Seas.
