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Joseph Stiglitz How Not to Fight Inflation 如何不對抗通貨膨脹

(2023-07-04 00:01:13) 下一個

如何不對抗通貨膨脹

作者:約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨 2023 年 1 月 26 日
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-inflation-fed-interest-rates-high-costs-dubious-benefits-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2023-01

仔細觀察美國的經濟狀況可以證明通脹主要是由供給側中斷和需求模式轉變驅動的。 鑒於此,進一步加息幾乎不會產生任何影響 — — 並且會導致其自身產生深遠的問題。
紐約 — — 盡管指數良好,但現在判斷通脹是否已得到抑製還為時過早。 盡管如此,最近的價格飆升還是得出了兩個明顯的教訓。

首先,經濟學家的標準模型 — — 尤其是假設經濟始終處於均衡狀態的主導模型 — — 實際上毫無用處。 其次,那些自信地聲稱需要五年的痛苦才能將通貨膨脹從體係中擠出來的人已經被駁斥了。 通貨膨脹大幅下降,2022 年 12 月經季節性調整的消費者價格指數僅比 6 月份高 1%。

有大量證據表明,通脹的主要來源是與大流行相關的供應衝擊和需求模式的轉變,而不是總需求過剩,當然也不是大流行支出造成的任何額外需求。 任何對市場經濟有信心的人都知道,供給問題最終會得到解決; 但沒有人知道具體時間是什麽時候。

畢竟,我們從未經曆過大流行導致的經濟關閉然後迅速重新開放的情況。 這就是為什麽基於過去經驗的模型被證明是無關緊要的。 盡管如此,我們仍可以預期,消除供應瓶頸將起到通貨緊縮的作用,即使這不一定會立即或完全抵消早期的通脹過程,因為市場向上調整的趨勢比向下調整的速度更快。

政策製定者繼續平衡做得太少和做得太多的風險。 加息的風險顯而易見:脆弱的全球經濟可能陷入衰退,引發更多債務危機,因為許多負債累累的新興和發展中經濟體麵臨強勢美元、出口收入下降和利率上升的三重打擊。 這將是一場嘲諷。 美國拒絕分享 COVID-19 疫苗的知識產權,已經讓人們不必要地死亡,之後又故意采取了一項可能會讓世界上最脆弱的經濟體陷入困境的政策。 對於一個與中國發動新冷戰的國家來說,這很難說是一個製勝策略。

更糟糕的是,我們甚至不清楚這種方法是否有任何好處。 事實上,加息可能弊大於利,因為企業投資解決當前供應限製的成本會更高。 美聯儲的貨幣政策緊縮已經限製了住房建設,盡管增加供應正是降低通貨膨脹最大來源之一:住房成本所需要的。

此外,房地產市場的許多價格製定者現在可能會將較高的經營成本轉嫁給租房者。 在更廣泛的零售和其他市場中,較高的利率實際上會導致價格上漲,因為較高的利率會促使企業相對於今天較高價格帶來的好處來減記失去客戶的未來價值。

可以肯定的是,深度衰退會抑製通脹。 但我們為什麽要邀請它呢? 美聯儲主席傑羅姆·鮑威爾和他的同事們似乎喜歡為經濟歡呼喝彩。 與此同時,他們在商業銀行業的朋友們卻像土匪一樣大吃大喝,因為美聯儲正在為超過 3 萬億美元的銀行準備金餘額支付 4.4% 的利息 — — 每年帶來超過 1,300 億美元的豐厚回報。

為了證明這一切的合理性,美聯儲指出了常見的問題:失控的通脹、工資價格螺旋式上升以及不受控製的通脹預期。 但這些妖怪在哪裏呢? 通貨膨脹不僅在下降,而且工資的增長速度比價格的增長速度要慢(意味著沒有螺旋式上升),而且預期仍然受到控製。 五年、五年的遠期預期率徘徊在略高於 2% 的水平上 — — 幾乎沒有任何變化。

一些人還擔心我們不會足夠快地回到 2% 的目標通脹率。 但請記住,這個數字是憑空而來的。 它沒有經濟意義,也沒有任何證據表明,如果通貨膨脹在 2% 到 4% 之間變化,會給經濟帶來高昂的代價。 相反,考慮到經濟結構性變革的需要和物價下行剛性,略高的通脹目標是值得推薦的。

一些人還會說,通脹之所以保持溫和,正是因為各國央行已表明了對抗通脹的決心。 每當我的狗伍菲對著飛過我們房子的飛機吠叫時,他可能都會得出同樣的結論。 他可能認為他已經把它們嚇跑了,不吠叫會增加飛機墜落到他身上的風險。

人們希望現代經濟分析能夠比伍菲所做的更深入。 仔細觀察正在發生的事情以及價格下降的地方,就會支持結構主義的觀點,即通貨膨脹主要是由供給側中斷和需求模式的變化驅動的。 隨著這些問題得到解決,通脹可能會繼續下降。

是的,現在準確判斷通貨膨脹何時能夠得到完全抑製還為時過早。 沒有人知道什麽新的衝擊正在等待著我們。 但我仍然把錢放在“Team Temporary”上。 那些認為通貨膨脹將在很大程度上自行解決(並且緩解供應限製的政策可以加速這一過程)的人仍然比那些主張成本明顯高且持續但收益可疑的措施的人更有說服力。

How Not to Fight Inflation

By  Jan 26, 2023 
 
A careful look at US economic conditions supports the view that inflation was driven mainly by supply-side disruptions and shifts in the pattern of demand. Given this, further interest-rate hikes will have little to no effect – and will cause far-reaching problems of their own.

NEW YORK – Despite favorable indices, it is too soon to tell whether inflation has been tamed. Nonetheless, two clear lessons have emerged from the recent price surge.

First, economists’ standard models – especially the dominant one that assumes the economy always to be in equilibrium – were effectively useless. And, second, those who confidently asserted that it would take five years of pain to wring inflation out of the system have already been refuted. Inflation has fallen dramatically, with the December 2022 seasonally adjusted consumer price index coming in just 1% above that for June.

There is overwhelming evidence that the main source of inflation was pandemic-related supply shocks and shifts in the pattern of demand, not excess aggregate demand, and certainly not any additional demand created by pandemic spending. Anyone with any faith in the market economy knew that the supply issues would be resolved eventually; but no one could possibly know when.

After all, we have never endured a pandemic-driven economic shutdown followed by a rapid reopening. That is why models based on past experience proved irrelevant. Still, we could anticipate that clearing supply bottlenecks would be disinflationary, even if this would not necessarily counteract the earlier inflationary process immediately or in full, owing to markets’ tendency to adjust upward more rapidly than they adjust downward.

Policymakers continue to balance the risk of doing too little versus doing too much. The risks of increasing interest rates are clear: a fragile global economy could be pushed into recession, precipitating more debt crises as many heavily indebted emerging and developing economies face the triple whammy of a strong dollar, lower export revenues, and higher interest rates. This would be a travesty. After already letting people die unnecessarily by refusing to share the intellectual property for COVID-19 vaccines, the United States has knowingly adopted a policy that will likely sink the world’s most vulnerable economies. This is hardly a winning strategy for a country that has launched a new cold war with China.

Worse, it is not even clear that there is any upside to this approach. In fact, raising interest rates could do more harm than good, by making it more expensive for firms to invest in solutions to the current supply constraints. The US Federal Reserve’s monetary-policy tightening has already curtailed housing construction, even though more supply is precisely what is needed to bring down one of the biggest sources of inflation: housing costs.

Moreover, many price-setters in the housing market may now pass the higher costs of doing business on to renters. And in retail and other markets more broadly, higher interest rates can actually induce price increases as the higher interest rates induce businesses to write down the future value of lost customers relative to the benefits today of higher prices.

To be sure, a deep recession would tame inflation. But why would we invite that? Fed Chair Jerome Powell and his colleagues seem to relish cheering against the economy. Meanwhile, their friends in commercial banking are making out like bandits now that the Fed is paying 4.4% interest on more than $3 trillion of bank reserve balances – yielding a tidy return of more than $130 billion per year.

To justify all this, the Fed points to the usual bogeymen: runaway inflation, a wage-price spiral, and unanchored inflation expectations. But where are these bogeymen? Not only is inflation falling, but wages are increasing more slowly than prices (meaning no spiral), and expectations remain in check. The five-year, five-year forward expectation rate is hovering just above 2% – hardly unanchored.

Some also fear that we will not return quickly enough to the 2% target inflation rate. But remember, that number was pulled out of thin air. It has no economic significance, nor is there any evidence to suggest that it would be costly to the economy if inflation were to vary between, say, 2% and 4%. On the contrary, given the need for structural changes in the economy and downward rigidities in prices, a slightly higher inflation target has much to recommend it.

Some also will say that inflation has remained tame precisely because central banks have signaled such resolve in fighting it. My dog Woofie might have drawn the same conclusion whenever he barked at planes flying over our house. He might have believed that he had scared them off, and that not barking would have increased the risk of the plane falling on him.

One would hope that modern economic analysis would dig deeper than Woofie ever did. A careful look at what is going on, and at where prices have come down, supports the structuralist view that inflation was driven mainly by supply-side disruptions and shifts in the pattern of demand. As these issues are resolved, inflation is likely to continue to come down.

Yes, it is too soon to tell precisely when inflation will be fully tamed. And no one knows what new shocks await us. But I am still putting my money on “Team Temporary.” Those arguing that inflation will be largely cured on its own (and that the process could be hastened by policies to alleviate supply constraints) still have a much stronger case than those advocating measures with obviously high and persistent costs but only dubious benefits.

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