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為什麽中國不會和平崛起
https://opencanada.org/why-china-will-not-rise-peaceously/
約翰·米爾斯海默 (John Mearsheimer) 接受采訪，了解中國的崛起以及太平洋兩岸國家為何應感到擔憂。
作者：JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC LÉGARÉ-TREMBLAY / 自由記者，2014 年 2 月 12 日
過去四十年來，中國經濟每年增長百分之七到百分之十。 芝加哥大學政治學傑出教授約翰·米爾斯海默擔心，人口問題、社會動蕩或經濟危機最終可能會抑製這種增長，但如果中國確實繼續崛起，它也不會平靜地崛起。
米爾斯海默教授受蒙特利爾大學國際研究中心（CÉRIUM）邀請發表演講。 OpenCanada 撰稿人 Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay 和他坐在一起。
萊加雷-特朗布萊：為什麽中國不能和平崛起？
米爾斯海默：真正強大的國家喜歡主宰自己的地區，這樣自己的後院就不會受到任何威脅。 因此，如果中國確實變得更加強大，我相信它將試圖像美國統治西半球那樣統治亞洲。 它將試圖將美國盡可能遠離亞太地區。 它還將試圖主宰其鄰國。 這並不意味著中國會試圖征服所有這些國家，但它將處於“稱雄”的位置。
與此同時，美國和中國的鄰國不希望中國成為地區霸主，因此將竭盡全力遏製其增長。 這些利益衝突將導致激烈的安全競爭，甚至有可能爆發戰爭。
還有兩個悲觀的理由。 一是中國顯然是一個修正主義國家：它想要回歸台灣； 它要收回釣魚島； 它想主宰南海； 它與印度和布坦存在邊界爭端……這個國家有非常強大的動機利用其軍事力量以它認為合適的方式改變現狀。
第二個原因是中國的民族主義。 中國人對於過去受過列強的迫害有著非常深刻的感受。 日本在這方麵尤其重要，美國也是如此。 這種民族主義在很大程度上是針對他們的。 因此，如果我們將來某個地方發生危機，民族主義可能會助長危機並導致衝突。
與此同時，中國對台灣、釣魚島、南海、印度和不丹等鄰國的領土爭端持什麽態度？
如果你看看過去十年中幾乎所有涉及中國的危機，就會發現幾乎每一場危機都是由中國的一個鄰國挑起的。 我認為中國幾乎在所有情況下都對挑釁反應過度，但最初的挑釁來自中國的鄰國。 我認為這是因為這些鄰國有動機製造麻煩並嚐試立即解決特定問題，而不是等待20或30年，屆時中國肯定會更加強大，並且能夠更好地決定最終協議的條款 。
從中國的角度來看，明智的策略是等待。 這就是為什麽我認為中國人對過去十年左右出現的各種危機反應過度是愚蠢的。 他們最好緩和自己的言辭，顯得不那麽好戰，等到他們變得足夠強大來決定任何協議的條款。
您在《大國政治的悲劇》一書中寫道，與中國發生戰爭的風險將比冷戰時期與蘇聯的戰爭風險更大。 為什麽？
冷戰時期，美國和蘇聯之間爆發戰爭是極其困難的，因為衝突的中心點在歐洲的中心。 這就是我們所說的中央陣線。 蘇聯及其盟國擁有大量的裝甲師、機械化師和核武器，美國及其盟國也擁有類似的武庫。 這意味著作為競爭焦點的歐洲衝突將成為核武器的第三次世界大戰。 而且，沒有一個頭腦清醒的人願意這樣。 這將是災難性的。 戰爭越可怕，發生這場戰爭的可能性就越小。
亞洲的情況非常不同，因為地理位置非常不同。 亞洲沒有中央陣線。 當我們談論潛在的衝突局勢時，我們談論的是圍繞台灣、南海或東海小島嶼可能發生的戰爭。 這些將是小規模戰爭，而不是核武器的第三次世界大戰。 這就是為什麽它們更有可能發生。
崛起的中國將采取哪些步驟？
大國所做的事情，首先是試圖在其地區建立霸權。 一旦它實現了這一目標，它就開始走向世界舞台並表現得像一個超級大國。 超級大國是一個有能力向世界其他地區投射軍事力量的大國，就像今天的美國一樣。
今天的中國是一個大國，但它在亞洲以外的地區投射力量的能力非常有限。 因此，中國首先要做的就是在亞洲建立地區霸權，這意味著它比所有鄰國都強大得多，並有效地將美國趕出亞洲。 一旦做到這一點，它將開始認真考慮在全球範圍內投射力量。
您在書中提到，波斯灣和西半球將成為對北京具有特殊戰略價值的兩個地區。 為什麽？
就西半球而言，確保美國必須關注自己的後院符合中國的既得利益。 大多數美國人從來沒有想過為什麽美國可以自由地在世界各地漫遊，插手每個人的事情。 這是因為美國在西半球幾乎不麵臨任何安全威脅。 加拿大、墨西哥、危地馬拉、巴西——這些並不是對美國的威脅。 因此，美國可以自由地漫遊到世界其他地區。 如果中國人想要停止這種情況，他們就在西半球製造麻煩，這符合他們的既得利益，讓美國不得不關注自己的背景，而不太能夠關注亞洲。
這也是我們既得利益的原因，即確保亞洲有其他強國能夠吸引中國人的注意力，並迫使中國人關注他們，這樣北京就不會隨意闖入西方國家。 半球。
至於波斯灣，這在很大程度上是因為中國已經從該地區獲得了大量石油，並且隨著時間的推移，中國將從該地區進口更多石油。 中國人將越來越將該地區視為具有重要戰略意義的地區。 他們還希望有能力將石油從海灣運回中國。
當然，美國是一個嫉妒的上帝，它不喜歡中國在波斯灣的影響力，就像它不喜歡蘇聯在那裏的影響力一樣。 這就是為什麽我認為美國和中國之間將會發生涉及波斯灣的嚴重安全競爭。
盡管美國製裁，中國仍從伊朗獲得大量石油，這種情況不是已經發生了嗎？
是的。 我認為我們已經看到了這種競爭的開始。 我還認為，直到最近，美國對伊朗的政策一直是非常愚蠢的，因為我們所做的實際上是將伊朗人推入中國人的懷抱。 如果美國繼續對伊朗采取強硬態度，他們就會對尋找盟友有著根深蒂固的興趣，比如中國，他們已經在波斯灣尋找盟友。 德黑蘭和北京之間將會出現利益聯姻，但這不符合美國的利益。 這就是為什麽美國應該竭盡全力改善與伊朗的關係。
2012年，美國戰略重心部分東移，提出“重返亞洲”戰略。 您認為這是一個好的戰略方法嗎？
首先，我認為華盛頓宣布轉向亞洲的主要原因不是因為中國。 這是因為我們的亞洲盟友開始認為美國是一個不可靠的夥伴。 對於日本和韓國來說尤其如此。 他們兩人都非常擔心中國的崛起和朝鮮。 平壤和北京擁有核武器，但韓國和日本沒有。 他們依賴美國的核保護傘。 首爾和東京的人們非常密切地關注美國在世界舞台上的表現以及美國決策者認為亞洲有多重要。
如果你是韓國人或日本人，看看美國自9月11日以來的表現，你就會對美國人不太有信心。 他們一直癡迷於中東，而且他們的行為方式非常愚蠢。 所以在日本、韓國，還有新加坡等地，人們都擔心美國。 我認為，通過轉向亞洲，我們向我們的盟友發出了一個明確的信號：盡管中東發生了一切，我們仍將支持他們。
與此同時，中國應該被視為夥伴還是競爭對手？
美國應該開始製定遏製戰略，這就是他們正在做的事情。 順便說一句，獨立於美國之外，我們可以看到中國的鄰國開始以前所未有的方式走到一起並相互合作。 例如，你會驚訝地看到過去五年印度和日本之間的軍事合作有多大。 我們已經可以看到平衡聯盟的各個部分正在就位。 我認為美國現在必須開始保持平衡，同時非常小心，以免引發戰爭。
到目前為止，奧巴馬政府做得非常好。 它沒有反應過度，也沒有反應不足。 中國距離擁有在亞洲造成重大麻煩的軍事實力還有很長的路要走。 因此美國此時不必在軍事上做太多的事情。 但慢慢地、穩定地，這些資產將不得不轉移到亞洲，而美國將不得不努力組建一個聯盟來遏製中國。
本次采訪是在蒙特利爾大學國際研究中心 (CÉRIUM) 的讚助下進行的，采訪者是該中心的研究員。
Why China Will Not Rise Peacefully
https://opencanada.org/why-china-will-not-rise-peacefully/
An interview with John Mearsheimer about China’s rise and why countries on both sides of the Pacific should be worried.
Professor Mearsheimer was invited to speak by the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CÉRIUM) at the Université de Montréal. OpenCanada contributor Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay sat down with him there.
Légaré-Tremblay: Why can’t China rise peacefully?
Mearsheimer: Really powerful states like to dominate their region so that there are no threats whatsoever in their own backyard. So, if China does indeed grow more powerful, I believe it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will try to push the United States as far away as possible from the Asia Pacific region. And it will try to dominate its neighbours. This doesn’t mean that China will try to conquer all of them, but it will be in a position where it “rules the roost.”
At the same time, the United States and China’s neighbours, who don’t want China to become a regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to contain its growth. These conflicting interests will lead to an intense security competition, with a real possibility of war.
There are two other reasons to be pessimistic. One is that China is clearly a revisionist power: it wants Taiwan back; it wants the Diaoyu Islands back; it wants to dominate the South China Sea; it has border disputes with India and Butan… This is a country that has very powerful incentives to use its military might to change the status quo in ways that it sees fit.
The second reason is Chinese nationalism. The Chinese have a very profound sense of having been victimized by great powers in the past. Japan is especially important in this regard—and the United States, too. This nationalism is directed in important ways at them. So if we are to have a crisis somewhere down the road, that nationalism could fuel the crisis and lead to conflict.
In the meantime, what is China’s approach regarding those territorial disputes with its neighbors: Taiwan, the Diaoyu islands, the South China Sea, India, and Bhutan?
If you look at almost all of the crises over the past decade that have involved China, almost every one of them has been started by one of China’s neighbours. I think China has overreacted in almost every case to the provocation, but the initial provocation has come from China’s neighbours. I think this is because those neighbours have an incentive to cause trouble and try and resolve particular problems now rather than wait 20 or 30 years, when China will certainly be much more powerful and in a much better position to dictate the terms of a final agreement.
From China’s point of view, the smart strategy is to wait. This is why I think that the Chinese have been foolish to overreact to these various crises that have popped up over the past decade or so. They would be much better off toning down their rhetoric, appearing to be less bellicose, and wait until they get powerful enough to dictate the terms of any agreement.
In your book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, you write that the risk of war with China will be greater than with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Why?
It was extremely difficult to come to a war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War because the central point of conflict was in the heart of Europe. It’s what we call the Central Front. The Soviets and their allies had huge numbers of armoured divisions, mechanized divisions, and nuclear weapons on their side and the United States and its allies had a similar arsenal on their side. It meant that a conflict in Europe, which was the key focus of the competition, would have been World War 3 with nuclear weapons. And, nobody in his right mind wanted that. It would have been catastrophic. The more horrible the war is going to be, the less likely it is that you will have that war.
The situation in Asia is very different, because the geography is very different. There is no Central Front in Asia. And when we talk about potential conflict situations, we’re talking about a possible war over Taiwan, over the South China Sea, or over small islands in the East China Sea. These would be small wars, not World War 3 with nuclear weapons. This is why it is more likely that they will happen.
What steps would a rising China follow?
What a great power does, first of all, is try to establish hegemony in its region. Once it accomplishes that goal, it begins to move out on the world stage and act like a superpower. The superpower is a great power that has the ability to project military might into other regions of the world, like the United States today.
China today is a great power, but it has very little power projection capability outside of Asia. So what China will try to do first is to establish regional hegemony in Asia, which means getting to the point where it is much more powerful than all of its neighbours and where it has effectively pushed the United States out of Asia. Once it has done that, it will begin to think about projecting power in a serious way all around the globe.
In your book, you mention that the Persian Gulf and the Western Hemisphere will be two regions of a peculiar strategic value to Beijing. Why?
Regarding the Western hemisphere, China has a vested interest in making sure that the United States has to focus on its own backyard. Most Americans never think about the reason why the United States is free to roam all over the world, sticking its nose in everybody’s business. This is because the United States faces virtually no security threats in the Western Hemisphere. Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil – These are not threats to the United States. The United States is thus free to roam into other regions of the world. If the Chinese want this to stop, they have a vested interest in causing trouble in the Western Hemisphere, so that the United States has to focus on its background and is less able to pay attention to Asia.
This is the same reason we have a vested interest in making sure that there are other powers in Asia that can attract the attention of the Chinese, and force the Chinese to pay attention to them, so that Beijing is not free to roam into the Western Hemisphere.
As for the Persian Gulf, this is in large part because China already gets a large amount of oil from that region and will import even more oil from there over time. The Chinese will view that region more and more as a strategically important area. They will also want to have the capability to move that oil from the Gulf back to China.
The United States, of course, is a jealous god, and it does not like the idea of Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf any more than it liked the idea of Soviet influence there. This is why I think there will be a serious security competition between the United States and China involving the Persian Gulf.
Isn’t that already happening with Iran, from which China gets a lot of oil despite U.S. sanctions?
Yes. I think we have seen the beginnings of that rivalry. I also think that up until recently, American policy towards Iran has been remarkably foolish, because what we are doing in effect is driving the Iranians into the arms of the Chinese. If the United States continues to play hardball with the Iranians, they will have a deep-seated interest in trying to find allies, such as the Chinese, who are already looking for allies in the Persian Gulf. There would then be a marriage of interest between Tehran and Beijing and that would not be in America’s interest. This is why the United States should go to great lengths to improve its relations with Iran.
The United States has partly shifted its strategic focus eastward in 2012 by adopting the “Pivot to Asia.” In your opinion, is that a good strategic approach?
First, I think that the principal reason Washington enunciated the pivot to Asia is not because of China. It is because our allies in Asia have come to think that the United States is an unreliable partner. This is especially true with regard to Japan and South Korea. Both of them are very worried about the rise of China and about North Korea. Pyongyang and Beijing have nuclear weapons, but South Korea and Japan do not. They depend on the American nuclear umbrella. People in Seoul and Tokyo pay very careful attention to how America behaves on the world stage and how important American policy-makers seem to think Asia is.
If you are South Korean or Japanese and you look at how the United States has behaved since September 11th, you cannot be very confident in the Americans. They have been obsessed with the Middle East and they have behaved in remarkably foolish ways. So in Japan, in South Korea, and in places like Singapore as well, people are worried about the United States. I think that with the pivot to Asia, we were sending a clear signal to our allies that despite all that’s happened in the Middle East, we will be there for them.
In the meantime, should China be treated as a partner or a rival?
The United States should start to build up a containment strategy and this is what they are doing. By the way, independent of the United States, we can see that China’s neighbours are beginning to come together and co-operate with each other in ways they have not in the past. You would be surprised to see how much military cooperation has developed between India and Japan for instance over the past five years. We can already see the pieces of the balancing coalition moving into place. And I think it is imperative that the United States starts to balance now while being very careful that it does not precipitate a war.
So far, the Obama administration has done very well. It has not overreacted and it has not under reacted. China is still a long way off from having the military might to cause significant trouble in Asia. Therefore the United States does not have to do too much militarily at this point in time. But slowly, steadily, the assets are going to have to be shifted to Asia and the United States is going to have to work to put together an alliance to contain China.
This interview was conducted under the auspices of the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM), of which the interviewer is a fellow.
