傅立民 美國對華競爭是惡意對抗，一切隻為削弱中國

傅立民：美國對華競爭是“惡意對抗”，一切隻為削弱中國

 傅立民美國前駐華公使，尼克鬆訪華時美方首席翻譯 2023-05-17 觀察者網

傅立民（Charles W. Freeman Jr.）1965年進入美國國務院工作，在此後近50年時間裏曾擔任美國駐沙特阿拉伯大使、克林頓政府的助理國防部長，有豐富的外交工作經驗。他最為中國人熟知的印象，是在1972年尼克鬆總統曆史性的訪華之旅中擔任美方首席翻譯。

2023年3月，傅立民接受美國讚巴卡裏谘詢公司CEO克裏斯托弗·讚巴卡裏博士的視頻采訪，兩人討論了從烏克蘭危機、中美關係到美國外交現狀等問題。部分采訪內容發布在英國杜倫大學全球政策研究所網站。觀察者網基於原文翻譯，未經作者審閱，僅供參考。

【翻譯/觀察者網 郭涵】

問：美國能在多大的程度上左右當前烏克蘭衝突的結果？

傅立民：許多證據表明，烏克蘭總統澤連斯基先生必須聽從來自外國的建議、意見乃至指令。最明顯的證據是2022年4月，時任英國首相鮑裏斯·約翰遜造訪基輔。當時俄羅斯與烏克蘭似已非常接近達成停火協議，約翰遜的從中作梗顯然破壞了這一努力。

我們已見識到，外部力量有能力幹預並要求澤連斯基先生拋棄和平的機會；這些力量是否會引導他追求實現和平，則是另外一回事。然而，不應忘記，盡管這個人作為演員非常出色，但他終究隻是一名演員。有相當多的理由去懷疑他所說的話是否發自內心。澤連斯基先生的表態顯然服務於我們美國正在討論的地緣政治目標。所以，回答你的問題：是的，如果我們願意，當然有可能實現和平。但老實說，沒有證據證明美國現在想要實現和平。

前美國駐沙特大使、資深外交官傅立民

問：您認為由歐洲主持推動烏克蘭危機解決方案的意義在哪裏？

傅立民：在國際衝突解決的研究中有一項基本原則，那些有能力破壞和平方案的勢力，必須參與方案的製定。有些勢力的利益與這場衝突息息相關，因此必須爭取這些勢力的支持，說服他們同意（和談）。

我對和平的定義非常直白，意味著那些有能力擾亂和平的力量能夠充分接受和談安排，打消再動幹戈的念頭。相比通常的描述，這種和平可能聽起來沒那麽高尚，但我認為這是現實的。因此，俄烏衝突最終會迎來什麽樣的和平，在烏克蘭境內實現和平是否意味著俄羅斯與其它歐洲國家間的和解，這才是核心問題。

問：您如何看待快速變化的美中關係？

傅立民：我傾向於使用一種區分中美不同競爭形式的分析框架，並確定了三種形式。第一種是“相互較勁”式的競爭，如果中美雙方（有時可能涉及多方）通過不斷提升本國在各領域的表現，相互超越，最終將形成良性競爭而非零和博弈，並帶來積極的結果。在過去相當長一段時期內，這就是美中關係的情況。

接下來是“惡意對抗”般的競爭，好比一場田徑比賽中的某位選手認為，他/她隻能靠絆倒或妨礙其他選手，而不是努力提升個人表現的方式贏得比賽。采取這種競爭形式的唯一目標就是削弱對手，也是目前美國在處理對華關係時的做法。

最後則是“不共戴天”式的競爭，意味著彼此都渴望徹底消滅對方。也許這個詞適用於美國曾經參與的全麵戰爭——美國內戰，第一次與第二次世界大戰，冷戰——美國當時的目標是徹底擊垮對手，並按照一種更符合美國價值觀的方式重構對手的體製。

現在美國與中國已經脫離了“相互較勁”式的良性競爭，陷入非常不健康的第二種競爭形式。對美國來說，競爭的基本原則不是為了提升自己，而是為了削弱中國。

問：您能否談一談美國外交的現狀？

傅立民：現在美國沒有人在認真地開展外交。如果你不信，隻用看拜登政府執政之初，布林肯、蘇利文與楊潔篪、王毅2021年3月在阿拉斯加州安克雷奇舉行的會談。那場會談基本上是什麽性質？美方官員走進會場撂下話：“我們不喜歡你們（中國），我們在道德上鄙視你們，如果有辦法拖你們的後腿，我們一定會付諸實踐。我們肯定會遏製你們的發展。但是，現在有幾件事需要拜托中國，你們願意幫幫忙嗎？”

2021年3月，楊潔篪在安克雷奇中美高層戰略對話開場白中闡明中方有關立場 圖自：新華網

這就是今天美國開展外交的方式，水平之低劣，令人“歎為觀止”。那次會談的結果也完全在意料之中——雙方陷入相互指責，完全沒有取得任何建設性的成果。

問：如何培養下一代美國外交官？

傅立民：根本無從談起。一個標誌性的案例是，美國國會眾議院正在認真考慮發起提案，將中國“踢出”二十國集團（G20）。難不成二十國集團是美國開的？我不這麽認為。也許這些美國政客對嘩眾取寵產生了偏執妄想，但更重要的是，這件事背後體現出一種完全與現實脫節的世界觀。

今天的世界不再是美國一手主導、唯我獨尊的格局，也許隻有在冷戰剛結束時有過這樣一段短暫的時期。今天的世界包含多個相互競爭的區域力量中心——這種格局在很大程度上是美國造成的——在美國人的腦海中，國際法與相關規章被所謂“基於規則的秩序”所取代，也就是我們製定規則，我們決定規則適用於哪些國家，不適用於哪些國家。這根本沒有說服力。

我們必須重新認識到外交的價值，它首先源於一種同理心。與你對話的這位代表來自哪裏？美國外交官現在不可能有效地說服任何人，也許隻能恐嚇他們的談判對象。但如果你不願意傾聽對方的關切、了解他們對世界的看法，就不可能實現說服。

問：關於“全球南方”國家未來可能扮演的角色。

傅立民：我認為所謂的“全球南方”——有些國家地理上未必在南方——希望能夠實現獨立自主，建立符合他們自身願景的社會，而不是遵從外部的指令或者幹涉。

以非洲為例，到本世紀末，非洲總人口有可能達到20億，將孕育全球最龐大、最年輕的勞動力群體，目前的經濟發展動能非常活躍。那些正在取得成功的非洲國家，未來可能在國際舞台上扮演更重要的角色。

然而，這些國家的發展，勢必會進一步擴大對國際合作的需求。我有點懷疑，比如說印度、日本、更多的非洲國家、歐盟而非英國、法國等等，未來能否找到一種途徑，給予他們目前不具備的、在全球治理當中能發揮更大作用的角色。這是通往未來的必由之路。顯然當人們需要認真研究這個問題，我早已作古多時，所以我也沒啥可抱怨的。

'We don't do diplomacy anymore': An interview with U.S. Ambassador Chas W. Freeman Jr.

https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/10/05/2023/we-dont-do-diplomacy-anymore-interview-us-ambassador-chas-w-freeman-jr

By Christopher Zambakari - 10 May 2023   CONFLICT AND SECURITY

Recently, The Zambakari Advisory sat down with Ambassador Freeman in a wide-ranging Zoom call, posing questions on a series of subjects relating to the war in Ukraine, U.S. relations with China, the state of U.S. diplomacy, and the role of Africa and its emerging countries in a world shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity.

Considered one of the “whiz kids” of the U.S. State Department when he entered the foreign service in 1965, Chas Freeman Jr. was for nearly 50 years involved in diplomatic service to his country including serving as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia under President George W. Bush, assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, and interpreter for President Richard Nixon during the path-breaking 1972 China visit.

Below are other excerpts from the March interview with Ambassador Freeman.

On the ability of the U.S. to dictate to Ukraine the outcome of the current conflict:

“Well, there’s a lot of evidence that Mr. Zelensky responds to foreign advice and counsel and direction. The clearest evidence of that was [British Prime Minister] Boris Johnson’s visit to Kyiv [in April 2022], and his apparent sabotage of what appeared to be something very close to an agreement between Russia and Ukraine to end this fight.

“We’ve seen that foreigners can direct Mr. Zelensky away from peace. Whether they could direct him toward peace is another question. Let’s remember, however, that this man, although he is a brilliant actor, is an actor. And there is a considerable reason to doubt that the lines he is delivering are original to him. They certainly serve geopolitical purposes of the sort we were discussing. So, I think the answer is yes, if we wanted to have peace, we could, but frankly, there’s no evidence we want peace.”

On the importance of a European-driven resolution in Ukraine:

“There is a basic principle of conflict resolution, which is that those with the capacity to overthrow the solution have to be part of the solution. You have to have buy-in from those who have a stake in what happens, and you have to convince them.

“My definition of peace is a very bland one. It is a situation that is sufficiently acceptable to those with the capacity to disturb it so that they don’t disturb it. That may make peace sound less noble than it is often portrayed, but I think it’s realistic. So the question of what kind of peace is established eventually, if one is established in Ukraine and therefore between Russia and the rest of Europe, is the core question.” 

On the changing U.S.-China relationship:

“I like an analytical framework that distinguishes forms of competition, and I identify three. One form is rivalry. That can be very healthy because it consists of each side — sometimes more than two sides — but each side striving to improve its own performance, and thereby out-compete, outdo the others. That is a competition which is not a zero-sum game. It is positive in its outcomes. And that is what we had for a considerable period of time in the U.S.-China relationship.”

“[There is] ‘adversarial animosity.’ Adversarial animosity is what happens when a runner in a race decides that he or she can win only by tripping up or hamstringing the competitor. Rather than trying to improve his or her own performance, someone who practices this form of competition strives to cripple the opposition. That is where we are with China at the moment.

“[Then, there] is enmity, which implies a desire to annihilate the other side. Perhaps this is the word to describe the total wars that the United States has fought — the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War — in which the objective was to destroy the enemy and reconstitute the enemy in a form more congenial to the values of the United States.”

“So, with China, we have moved from rivalry — healthy competition — to a very unhealthy competition in which our basic effort to compete is not to improve ourselves very much but to cripple the Chinese.”

On the state of U.S. diplomacy:

“We don’t do diplomacy anymore. If you doubt that, look at the [March 2021] Anchorage [Alaska] meeting between Anthony Blinken, [Chinese officials] Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi, and [U.S. National Security Advisor] Jake Sullivan back at the start of the Biden administration. What was the nature of that meeting? We went in there and we said, ‘We don’t like you. We think you are a moral reprobate; if we can pull you down, we will. We’re certainly going to try to block your progress, but there are a few things we need you to do for us, and could you help us?’ That was the approach. That was remarkably inept, and the result was entirely predictable — an exchange of diatribe rather than anything constructive.”

On the training of tomorrow’s diplomats:

“We’re not. The symbol of this is that the House of Representatives is seriously considering a bill to remove China from the G20. Does the United States control the G20? I don’t think so. So, delusions of grandeur, perhaps, but more importantly, a worldview that is totally out of date.

“The world is now composed not of a dominant, single, unified domain dominated by the United States, as it may have been briefly after the Cold War. The world is composed of multiple competing regional centers — and we’ve done a good deal to bring that about … [International law and regulation] has been replaced in our minds by something called the ‘rules-based order,’ in which we make the rules and decide who they apply to and who is exempt from them. That’s not very persuasive.”

“We need to rediscover the merits of diplomacy, which begins with empathy. Where is the other guy coming from? You can’t persuade anybody effectively, you can intimidate them, but you can’t persuade them, if you don’t address their concerns and their worldview.”

On the role of the “Global South” moving forward:

“I think what the so-called ‘Global South’ — some of which isn’t very far south — wants is their own self-determination, building their own societies to match their own aspirations, not being subjected to outside dictation or interference.

“Let’s take Africa for example … You see Africa at the end of a century with perhaps two billion people, the largest labor force, the youngest labor force on the planet, and currently very robust economic development. These are countries that are succeeding, and that are going to be far more important internationally.

“But, as these countries grow there’s still going to be a need for international global cooperation. And I suspect we will find a way to, for example, give countries like India or perhaps one or more African countries, certainly Japan, perhaps the EU instead of Britain and France, a role in global governance that they don’t have now. That’s a requirement. But that’s for somebody to work out long after I’m dead. So I’ll not croak on about it.”

 

 

Dr. Christopher Zambakari, Founder & CEO, The Zambakari Advisory.

Hartley B. and Ruth B. Barker Endowed Rotary Peace Fellow, Assistant Editor, Bulletin of The Sudan Studies Association.

The Zambakari Advisory is a Phoenix-headquartered international consultancy in the areas of strategic intelligence, program design and transitional processes. Twice annually, The Advisory publishes an online Special Issue surrounding issues of global impact as seen through the eyes of recognized leaders in the subject areas. The interview was conducted by Christopher Zambakari, LP.D., founder and CEO of The Zambakari Advisory; Estève Giraud, Ph.D., assistant research professor at Arizona State University’s Swette Center for Sustainable Food Systems; Dr. Benjamin Abelow, author of How the West Brought War to Ukraine; and Stephen Des Georges, content development and communications consultant and TZA editor-at-large.