Munich Security 2023- 4 Development Cooperation: Strings Attache

Munich Security Report 2023 Chapter 4 – Development Cooperation: Strings Attached

https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2023/development-cooperation/?

Strings Attached

Development Cooperation

Author Isabell Kump Author Amadée Mudie-Mantz

 

How do increasing systemic competition and efforts to rewrite the international rules-based order affect development cooperation? To what extent does China offer an alternative model for development, and how does this play out for the provision of vaccines, food security, and climate finance? What are the consequences for the US and Europe? Can countries in the “Global South” capitalize on the increased engagement of external powers?

Development cooperation has not been spared from growing systemic competition and efforts to rewrite the international rules-based order. Health and food security as well as climate finance have become key policy fields where geopolitical dynamics and competing narratives are playing out. China, in particular, is challenging US and European approaches to development cooperation with low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). And as the current order has hardly worked in favor of those countries, China’s growing engagement falls on fertile ground. Based on its own development trajectory, China aims to promote cooperation between countries in the “Global South,” which, it claims, is guided by solidarity and produces mutual benefits.[1] However, China’s engagement comes with strings attached, which deepen the political and economic dependencies of their partner countries. Furthermore, the US and Europe are wary of Russia expanding its influence in other regions of the world, especially on the African continent, often sparking instability in already fragile contexts. As the competing powers are trying to strengthen their commercial and strategic ties with countries in the “Global South,” there is a risk of those countries once again being drawn into great- power competition. But it also opens up opportunities for countries in the “Global South” to push for a more equitable global system.

Development Cooperation: A Means to a Strategic End?

Development cooperation and foreign aid have always been used as tools to achieve states’ foreign policy objectives. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union deployed foreign aid as a means to secure the allegiance of other countries, including many newly independent African countries.[2] Moreover, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US used foreign aid as a means to support “friends and allies” and prevent the spread of radicalism and terrorism through the promotion of democracy and human rights.[3] However, growing systemic competition as well as China’s and Russia’s desire to rewrite the international rules-based order have now elevated the strategic use of development cooperation to another level. It is used to secure economic opportunities, forge political alliances, and shape the rules of development.[4]

 

"South-East Asia is a key region and we want to further develop sustainable and trusted connections with ASEAN countries."

Jutta Urpilainen•EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit, December 14, 2022

The US, Europe, China, and Russia are rallying political support and seeking economic opportunities in countries in the “Global South.”[5] The scramble for winning the battle of narratives over who is to blame for Russia’s war of aggression shows that major powers increasingly recognize that countries in the “Global South” can become crucial “swing states.” They can tip the balance between the systemic competitors and therefore shape the fate of the international rules-based order.

In the near future, countries in Southeast Asia and Africa will play a much bigger role in international trade, given their abundant natural resources, fast demographic growth, and economic dynamism.[6] Latin America also offers vast deposits of critical raw materials, such as the world’s largest lithium reserves, which are considered essential for the energy and electric mobility transition (Chapter 5).[7] Finally, the African continent represents one of the largest UN voting blocks, holding three non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, 13 seats on the Human Rights Council, and 54 seats in the UN General Assembly. Winning the support of African countries is becoming increasingly decisive for breaking deadlocks, fostering collaboration, and achieving particular outcomes in multilateral institutions.[8]

Winning Hearts and Minds

The US and Europe have become increasingly alarmed by China’s and Russia’s engagement with countries in the “Global South” in recent years.[9] Competition is especially strong in African countries, where particularly China’s growing engagement falls on fertile ground, because the current order has not yielded sufficient benefits for them.[10] 23 of the world’s
28 poorest countries are on the African continent.[11] Moreover, many African countries suffer from protracted conflicts, political upheavals, and inadequate access to global public goods, including vaccines, food security, and climate finance.

 

"There is the will to perpetuate systems that have not helped Africa."

Moussa Faki Mahamat •Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Munich Security Conference, February 19, 2022

Both China and Russia frame their approaches as distinct alternatives to what they purport to be a continuation of Western neocolonialism.[12] Based on their revisionist ambitions, both countries challenge the approaches to development by the US and Europe, which aim to advance areas including poverty reduction, health, and education and emphasize democracy, good governance, free markets, accountability, and transparency.

 

"[…] Africa has come of age and Africa has to choose its partners and decide what kinds of partnership it wants. […] Let’s just move into another era."

Louise Mushikiwabo•Secretary General of the Organization de la Francophonie, Munich Security Conference, February 19, 2022

However, China and Russia challenge the approaches of the US and Europe in different ways. Russia, on the one hand, purposefully undermines US and European efforts in many countries in the “Global South.” A case in point is the African continent, where Moscow follows rather limited objectives, mainly concentrating on arms sales, extractive industries, the expansion of export opportunities, and security assistance.[13] Its foreign aid, and its soft power in general, lag significantly behind that of the US, Europe, and China.[14] For the most part, Russia plays a destabilizing role in African countries, aggravating instability and propping up authoritarian regimes through election interference, disinformation campaigns, and the deployment of Kremlin-linked mercenaries.[15]

China, on the other hand, is pursuing a long-term approach to development.[16] It presents itself as a global power willing to step in where the US and Europe have failed to support countries in their sustainable development.[17] However, in practice, China uses development cooperation to challenge the rules-based order and foster its commercial and geopolitical interests.[18]

Chinese Engagement: Under the Pretext of Solidarity

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, China’s development policy has become more assertive. Beijing offers a development model which, it proclaims, is markedly different from the model advocated by the US and Europe. Launched in 2021, the Global Development Initiative is the intellectual umbrella that is supposed to create coherence across Chinese development activities (Figure 4.1). Insisting on its status as “the world’s largest developing country,” China has created a narrative to promote solidarity, shared values, and “win-win” cooperation between countries in the “Global South,”[19] in contrast to the Western donor–recipient approach.[20]

China habitually criticizes the US and Europe for linking their foreign aid to demands for economic and political reforms, while portraying its own engagement as free from conditionalities. However, Chinese development cooperation comes with very different strings attached. On the one hand, Chinese investment imposes political strings. Recipients must respect Beijing’s red lines, including the denial of Taiwan’s independence and its policy toward Tibetans and Uyghurs, and vote accordingly in international bodies. On the other hand, Chinese development cooperation creates economic dependencies.[21] Hence, Beijing presents itself as an altruistic partner, but economic and geopolitical pursuits remain at the heart of Chinese development policy, often at the expense of partner countries.

 

 

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a case in point of China responding to the infrastructure investment needs of LMICs while promoting its own economic goals. While the US and Europe have mainly focused on advancing areas such as poverty reduction, they have largely neglected investment in infrastructure.[22] In fact, the investment needs of African

countries have grown sharply since 2015.[23] By 2030, investment needs for infrastructure will total 253 billion US dollars, while forecasts suggest that only 183 billion US dollars will be made available.[24] Nevertheless, infrastructure assistance by the G7 countries has been declining for years,[25] leaving a void that China has sought to fill. By now, 147 countries have joined the BRI, including 48 from Africa, 20 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and six from Southeast Asia.[26] But the BRI lacks transparency,[27] aggravates the indebtedness of partner countries, and cements their financial dependence on China,[28] while increasing China’s political clout (Chapter 3).

 

"China will always be Africa’s partner of mutual respect, equality, and sincere cooperation. We will firmly support African countries in pursuing [their] own development paths and seeking strength through unity."

Wang Yi•then–Chinese Foreign Minister, Coordinators’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Follow-Up Actions of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, August 18, 2022

 

Although China has become a prominent development partner for African countries, Afrobarometer polling results strikingly show that the Chinese development model has not yet won the hearts and minds of African citizens. Citizens from 34 African countries polled from 2019 to 2021 still view the US model for development more positively than the Chinese one (Figure 4.2). However, they view the European model much less favorably, despite its similarities to the US, one which reflects the common perception that European countries have still not sufficiently confronted their colonial past.[29] Europe’s development efforts also largely go unnoticed compared to much more visible Chinese initiatives, even though European countries and EU institutions invest heavily in development.[30] The US remains the largest donor country, having spent 35 billion US dollars in 2020, but it is closely followed by Germany (29 billion US dollars), EU institutions (21 billion US dollars), and the United Kingdom (19 billion US dollars).[31] The share of China’s foreign aid, which is comparable to the official development assistance pursued by the US and Europe, only amounted to around 5.4 billion in the same year.[32]

Covid-19 Vaccines: Overpromised and Underdelivered

Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, China and Russia have both used the delivery of medical and health assistance, including Covid-19 vaccines, to portray themselves as responsible global powers. At the same time, they were quick to highlight the failure of the US and its partners to ensure access to Western-produced Covid-19 vaccines for LMICs, while also claiming that these vaccines were unsafe.[33] China, in particular, used the dispatch of medical teams, donations of medical supplies, and delivery of Covid-19 vaccines to present itself as the most reliable partner for LMICs.[34]

 

"The deep inequity that left Africa at the back of the queue for vaccines must not be repeated with […] life-saving treatments. Universal access to diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics  will pave the shortest path to the end of this pandemic."

Matshidiso Moeti •WHO Africa Regional Director, Covid-19 press conference, January 20, 2022

In reality, China and Russia have fallen way short of their promises to deliver substantial amounts of vaccines to LMICs.[35] China, for instance, had only delivered 10 percent of the 850 million doses it had committed to African and Asian countries by December 2021.[36] Russia had only produced 33 million of the targeted 800 million doses of its Sputnik V vaccine by May 2021.[37] In addition, there have been growing concerns about the efficacy of Sputnik V and China’s Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, contributing to decreased trust and demand in the recipient countries.[38] Nevertheless, on the African continent, China initially won the battle of narratives by successfully presenting itself as the key supporter in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic, even though, as of May 31, 2022, the US and Europe had delivered significantly more vaccines to African countries (Figure 4.3).[39] The initial vaccine nationalism of the US and Europe, as well as their failure to provide the pledged amount of vaccine doses, have not helped to counter this narrative.

 

China’s and Russia’s delivery of Covid-19 vaccines also largely served their economic and geostrategic interests. Even though both China and Russia officially advocated for vaccines to be recognized as global public goods, they mainly delivered them on the basis of bilateral deals.[40] China, for instance, supplied most of its vaccines via bilateral deals and used COVAX, an initiative by the World Health Organization (WHO) to supply vaccines to poorer countries and emerging economies, mainly as a platform to sell its vaccines instead of donating them (Figure 4.3). These Chinese vaccines also came with political strings, as China demanded that recipient countries cut ties with Taiwan.[41] Contrary to its self-proclaimed role as a solidary anti-­colonial power, China thus used (far fewer than promised) vaccine deliveries to advance its geopolitical interests, deepen dependencies, and attack the credibility of the US and Europe in Africa.

Food Insecurity: Hunger Games

Food security is another policy field in which different development models compete. Staggering global inequality persists, with the number of people facing acute food insecurity rising from 135 million in 2019 to 345 million in 2022.[42] Sub-Saharan Africa is the most food-insecure region in the world by far, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and Asia–Pacific.[43] US and European multilateral development efforts in the field of food security have been insufficient, and Russia often acts as a spoiler, whereas China offers an alternative – which again comes with strings of dependency attached.

 

The traditional approach by Europe and the US to combatting food insecurity focuses on providing aid through multilateral bodies, such as the UN. For example, the US, Germany, and the European Commission are the largest donors to the UN World Food Programme (WFP).[44] European and US national food programs abroad are closely aligned with their multilateral efforts. They largely focus on providing emergency relief and strengthening the resilience of recipient countries to climate change.[45] However, US and European agricultural subsidies have often undermined their own development goals, as they depress prices on the world market, put farmers in LMICs out of business, and render these countries dependent on volatile imports.

Unlike China, Russia does not isolate itself from multilateral food security efforts; indeed, it ranks 22nd as a donor to the WFP, often contributing with in-kind donations.[46] It was only through Russia’s donations, for example, that the WFP was able to sustain its operation in Kyrgyzstan during the Covid-19 pandemic.[47] However, Russia’s war against Ukraine has exacerbated food insecurity by inducing a spike in food prices that were already high due to climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic,[48] and also by creating supply chain bottlenecks for grain and fertilizer exports.[49] Russia has strategically instrumentalized grain exports by blockading the main Black Sea trading routes to increase pressure on the international coalition supporting the Ukrainian government.[50] The consequences of this weaponization of food have been most felt by LMICs.

 

"No one has the right to weaponize food or play starvation games."

Ferit Hoxha•Albanian Ambassador to the UN, UN Security Council, October 31, 2022

China hardly contributes to multilateral food aid at all; it donates around the same amount to the WFP as Haiti does.[51] At the same time, as part of its South-South cooperation, China has long been making considerable agricultural investments, especially in many African countries, which have helped increase agricultural production and productivity.[52] However, Chinese agricultural projects often lack longevity; they regularly collapse after flourishing initially, as they are set up for Chinese partners to eventually withdraw – leaving locals, who do not have sufficient means and training, to finance and run the projects without support.[53] While there is concern among African countries, for example Ghana and Tanzania, about the risk of debt linked to Chinese agricultural investments, many countries lack alternatives.[54] China portrays itself as a partner in solidarity, while in fact strategically creating dependencies by purchasing large areas of land and controlling much of the necessary infrastructure on the continent. When push comes to shove, China grabs land and resources, including by buying up grain reserves of food-insecure countries to fill Chinese stocks, rather than truly supporting those in need.[55]

Climate Finance: Blame Game

There is broad consensus that climate change is threatening developmental progress in low-income countries (LICs), which have contributed the least to global emissions, but suffer the most from the consequences. However, climate finance risks becoming collateral damage of geopolitical rivalries. Together with other rich states and regions, the US and EU pledged in 2009 to provide low-income countries with 100 billion US dollars in climate finance annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation measures. However, they are lagging behind, with payments reaching just over 83 billion US dollars in 2020,[56] which goes against their promise to assume “common but differentiated responsibilities” based on their historical emissions. This is in part due to growing opposition, particularly in the US, to increasing climate finance unless China also contributes.

 

"We need a coalition of the willing to unlock climate finance for governments, countries, and entire regions to manage predictability of the future, build resilience capacity, and mitigation for a future that survives the coming climate tsunami."

Sherry Rehman•Pakistani Minister of Climate Change, COP27, November 2022

Both Russia and China controversially claim their status as developing countries based on the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, while actually ranking among the top four carbon emitting countries.[57] Moscow officially acknowledges the importance of the Paris Climate Agreement,[58] but in practice often slows down climate change mitigation efforts globally, as the reliance on fossil fuels serves Russia both (geo)politically and economically.[59] The country is “at best a passive player and at worst an active saboteur of worldwide ambition.”[60]

China is more vocal regarding international climate financing and claims to support the demands of those most affected. China emphasizes that while it is not obliged to help, it has named sustainability as one of the priority areas of its GDI,[61] and prides itself in having provided around 276 million US dollars in climate finance through South-South cooperation.[62] This amount is dwarfed by the billions provided in multilateral efforts, which China does not join because it sees industrial countries as bearing the sole responsibility to compensate for their historical emissions.

The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in November 2022 could potentially be a turning point in multilateral climate finance. It is an assistance mechanism for infrastructure damage caused by climate events in LICs, paid for by the big emitters.[63] The EU proposed the fund,[64] and called on the world’s leading economies, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, to contribute.[65] The US is particularly insistent on Chinese contributions.[66] Nonetheless, China has so far rejected giving up its developing country status despite now producing one-quarter of the world’s carbon emissions.[67] Climate finance is thus another issue area in which geostrategic competition, especially between China and the US, is carried out on the backs of the most vulnerable.

 

"The West has a credibility problem. Compromising its values hampers the West’s ability to foster stabilization, development, and democracy elsewhere in the world."

David Miliband•President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee, Munich Security Conference 2022, February 19, 2022

Fostering Cooperation on Equal Terms

The US and Europe will have to rethink their approaches to development cooperation with countries in the “Global South.” They need to make their development models more attractive, as China offers an alternative model based on a narrative of solidarity and mutual benefits. The US and European countries will have to explore the limitations and deficiencies of their development approaches, ensure that these are tailored to the actual needs of their partner countries, and establish real partnerships.[68] However, with regard to the African continent, the latest Afrobarometer data suggests that particularly the US development model still enjoys high approval, which the US can build on. The Chinese development model is not predestined to prevail. For European countries, however, it is essential that they address the frequent criticism of not having sufficiently confronted their colonial pasts to recalibrate their relationships with African countries.

To put partnerships with countries in the “Global South” on a new footing, Europe and the US need to live up to their promises about providing global public goods. Moving away from the donor–recipient relationship is key to enabling cooperation on equal terms. To compete with China, a new approach must simultaneously focus on short-term emergency relief as well as long-term financing that enables sustainable and resilient systems in the partner countries. The EU Global Gateway as well as recent G7 initiatives, including the Global Alliance for Food Security, the Pact for Pandemic Preparedness, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, are a promising start.

 

"China is thinking about how to fuel its economy over the next 25 years. The Belt and Road is an important part of this larger strategy. I don’t think we, in the West, think about the next 25 years in the same way because if we did, we would have a deeper, more strategic relationship with Africa."

Gayle Smith •President and CEO of ONE Campaign, October 24, 2022

For countries in the “Global South,” the renewed attention carries the risk of them becoming a playing field for great-power competition once again. In the medium term, the support of external actors in the provision of public goods, such as healthcare, food, and climate security, will likely continue to play an important role for many. This means dealing with the strings that come attached. At the same time, countries in the “Global South” can use the competition between different actors for their own benefit and select partners whose priorities align with their own.[69] This presents an opportunity to shape the international order to better reflect their interests.[70]

 

Re:vision – Munich Security Report 2023

Bibliographical Information: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte, Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly, “Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.

 Download PDF 12 MB

Bibliographical information for this chapter:
Isabell Kump and Amadée Mudie-Mantz, “Development Cooperation: Strings Attached,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Natalie Knapp/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, 89−101, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.

More about Isabell Kump and Amadée Mudie-Mantz

• [1] Jingdong Yuan, Fei Su, and Xuwan Ouyang, “China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid,” Solna: SIPRI, SIPRI Policy Paper 62, May 2022, doi.org/10.55163/WTNJ4163, 23.

• [2] “The New Scramble for Africa,” The Economist, March 7, 2019, perma.cc/WZ9S-23P6; Stephan Klingebiel, “Engaging With Partners in the Global South in Uncertain Times,” Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability, IDOS Policy Brief 5/2022, September 2022, doi.org/10.23661/IPB5.2022, 4.

• [3] Conor M. Savoy and Janina Staguhn, “Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Washington, DC: CSIS, CSIS Briefs, March 2022, perma.cc/98M6-2JFM, 2–3.

• [4] Mathias Kamp, “Das Engagement autoritärer Geberstaaten in Afrika: Großmachtstreben und Systemexport im geopolitischen Wettstreit?,” Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Auslandsinformationen 2, July 2021, perma.cc/L3VQ-AK4H, 58.

• [5] Gustavo de Carvalho and Daniel Forti, “How Can African States Become More Influential in the UN Security Council?,” New York: International Peace Institute, Global Observatory, March 12, 2020, perma.cc/7277-6DZN.

• [6] “EU-Asean-Gipfel endet ohne gemeinsame Verurteilung Russlands,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 14, 2022, perma.cc/N383-GWAF.

• [7] Astrid Becker, “Schon wieder ausgebeutet,” Journal für Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, November 9, 2021, perma.cc/9FFA-7WNN.

• [8] Priyal Singh, “Africa Has a Rare Chance to Shape the International Order: As Global Powers Seek Support for Their Competing Worldviews, Will Africa Capitalise on Its Rising Strategic Value?,” Pretoria: ISS, ISS Today, August 30, 2022, perma.cc/5BHE-QQKY.

• [9] Kamp, “Das Engagement autoritärer Geberstaaten in Afrika,” 58.

• [10] Singh, “Africa Has a Rare Chance to Shape the International Order.”

• [11] Will Martin, “Ranked: The 28 Poorest Countries in the World – Where People Live on Less Than ,000 per Year,” Insider, June 1, 2018, perma.cc/YL9Y-JEH3; IMF, “GDP Per Capita, Current Prices: Purchasing Power Parity; International Dollars Per Capita,” Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2022, www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPPC@WEO /OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.

• [12] Samuel Ramani, “Russia and China in Africa: Prospective Partners or Asymmetric Rivals?,” Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, Policy Insights 120, December 2021, perma.cc/3WS5-RZ25, 3, 10.

• [13] Matthew T. Page and Paul Stronski, “How Russia’s Hollow Humanitarianism Hurt Its Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2022, perma.cc/6X4G -8BKL.

• [14] Page and Stronski, “How Russia’s Hollow Humanitarianism Hurt Its Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa.”

• [15] Emman El-Badawy et al., “Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa,” London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, March 23, 2022, perma.cc/3QTQ-DNCS.

• [16] Kristen Cordell, “The Sustainable Development Goals: A Playbook for Reengagement,” Washington, DC: CSIS, CSIS Briefs, September 2021, perma.cc/732V-JEX7, 1; Salvador Santino Fulo Regilme, Jr and Obert Hodzi, “Comparing US and Chinese Foreign Aid in the Era of Rising Powers,” The International Spectator 56:2 (2021), 114–131, https://https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020 .1855904, 119.

• [17] Regilme and Hodzi, “Comparing US and Chinese Foreign Aid in the Era of Rising Powers,” 123.

• [18] The White House, “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub- Saharan Africa,” Washington, DC: The White House, August 2022, perma.cc/P2SF-3F6Y, 5.

• [19] Zoe Johnson and Raimund Zühr, “A New Era? Trends in China’s Financing for International Development Cooperation,” Donor Tracker Insights, May 10, 2021, perma.cc/39WK-RSSS; Chukwuka Onyekwena and Mma Amara Ekeruche, “The Global South and Development Assistance,” Washington, DC: Brookings, September 16, 2019, perma.cc/H3YA-Z6LS.

• [20] OECD, “Official Development Assistance – Definition and overage,” Paris: OECD, 2022, perma.cc/S9WL-96KF.

• [21] Savoy and Staguhn, “Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition,” 5.

• [22] Tobita Chow and Jake Werner, “Don’t Assume Russia and China Are on the Same Page. The US Can Work With China,” The Guardian, April 4, 2022, perma.cc M2XM-MB2Q.

• [23] Global Infrastructure Hub, “Infrastructure Outlook: You Are Viewing Investment Forecasts for Africa,” Sydney: Global Infrastructure Hub, 2021, perma.cc/K2EZ -M8PF.

• [24] Global Infrastructure Hub, “Infrastructure Outlook.”

• [25] Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, “The G7’s New Global Infrastructure Initiative,” Washington, DC: CSIS, June 15, 2021, perma.cc N5M9-8Z6W.

• [26] Christoph Nedopil, “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Shanghai: Green Finance & Development Center, Fudan University, 2022, perma.cc/7VHT-PYR4.

• [27] Johnson and Zühr, “A New Era? Trends in China’s Financing for International Development Cooperation”; Yuan, Su, and Ouyang, “China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid,” 1.

• [28] Chloé Farand, “As EU Seeks to Rival China’s Infrastructure Offer, Africans Are Sceptical,” EURACTIV, December 20, 2021, perma.cc/8NAD -V9UK; Yuan, Su, and Ouyang, “China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid,” 13.

• [29] Rosa Balfour and Marta Martinelli, “Introduction,” in: Rosa Balfour/Lizza Bomassi/Marta Martinelli (eds.), The Southern Mirror: Reflections on Europe From the Global South, Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022, 1–3, perma.cc/T4JV -2SVX, 2.

• [30] Rosa Balfour, Lizza Bomassi, and Marta Martinelli (eds.), The Southern Mirror: Reflections on Europe From the Global South, Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022.

• [31] OECD, “Total Flows by Donor,” Paris: OECD, 2021, perma.cc/2HPQ-3GUF.

• [32] Johnson and Zühr, “A New Era? Trends in China’s Financing for International Development Cooperation.”

• [33] Adam Taylor, “Beijing and Moscow Are Losing the Vaccine Diplomacy Battle,” The Washington Post, January 11, 2022, perma.cc/LX37-HT8T.

• [34] Moritz Rudolf, “How China Uses Health Diplomacy as a Soft Power Tool,” International Politics and Society Journal, October 27, 2022, perma.cc/SPU3-FBBS.

• [35] Grace Kier and Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is Mostly Smoke and Mirrors,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2021, perma.cc/UX82-3RDJ, 4–5; Ben Doherty, Daniel Hurst, and Kate Lyons, “Coercion or Altruism: Is China Using Its Covid Vaccines to Wield Global Power?,” The Guardian, March 27, 2021, perma.cc/8BJ2-W7H6.

• [36] Samantha Kiernan, Serena Tohme, and Gayeong Song, “Billions Committed, Millions Delivered: The Mixed Record of Vaccine Donations and Diplomacy,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Think Global Health, December 2, 2021, perma.cc/L8CM-PQ2P.

• [37] Kier and Stronski, “Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is Mostly Smoke and Mirrors,” 3.

• [38] Taylor, “Beijing and Moscow Are Losing the Vaccine Diplomacy Battle.”

• [39] Denis Tull, Benedikt Erforth, and Dominik Schottner, “Megatrends Afrika: Afrika als geopolitisches Spielfeld der Weltmächte,” SWP-Podcast, November 10, 2022, perma.cc/QS6Z-ULSZ.

• [40] Kier and Stronski, “Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is Mostly Smoke and Mirrors,” 3.

• [41] Gisela Grieger, “Towards a Joint Western Alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?,” Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service PE 698.824, December 2021, perma.cc/36E4-CWM3, 2; Doherty, Hurst, and Lyons, “Coercion or Altruism: Is China Using Its Covid Vaccines to Wield Global Power?”

• [42] WFP, “A Global Food Crisis,” Rome: WFP, 2022, perma.cc/U2PY-UX5Y.

• [43] Economist Impact, “Global Food Security Index 2022: Exploring Challenges and Developing Solutions for Food Security Across 113 Countries,” London: Economist Impact, 2022, perma.cc/X4XN-GBFY.

• [44] WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021,” Rome: WFP, 2022, perma.cc/8SFR-PGVK.

• [45] Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Eradicating Hunger – Ensuring Food Security,” Bonn: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2022, perma.cc/42LZ-5J9H.

• [46] WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021.”

• [47] WFP, “Russian Federation Helps World Food Programme to Support Poor Families in Kyrgyzstan,” Press Release, July 1, 2021, perma.cc/3FFK-NERS.

• [48] FAO, “World Food Situation,” Rome: FAO, 2022, perma.cc/XR3P-L543.

• [49] Christopher B. Barrett, “The Global Food Crisis Shouldn’t Have Come as a Surprise: How to Finally Fix the Broken System for Alleviating Hunger,” Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2022, perma.cc/X9E4-3F4S.

• [50] Eddy Wax, “Brussels Playbook: Russia Inflicts Grain Pain - Denmark Gets Mette - Coffee Tips,” Politico, November 2, 2022, perma.cc/55NQ-XC9U.

• [51] WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021.”

• [52] Eric Olander, “Rethinking China’s Participation in African Agricultural Development in the Post-COVID-19 Era,” China Global South Project, September 11, 2020, perma.cc/G9DX-RRNF.

• [53] Ndoricimpa Siméon, Xiaoyang Li, and Sangmeng Xiao, “China’s Agricultural Assistance Efficiency to Africa: Two Decades of Forum for China-Africa Cooperation Creation,” Journal of Agriculture and Food Research 9:100329 (2022), 1–10, doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2022.100329, 8.

• [54] Julian May, “Strengthening African Food Systems: What Role Can China Play?,” Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, July 29, 2021, https:// perma.cc/Y888-RZ8G.

• [55] “China Seeks a World Order That Defers to States and Their Rulers,” The Economist, October 10, 2022, https:// perma.cc/3CBM-U7MZ.

• [56] OECD, “Aggregate Trends of Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2020,” Paris: OECD, 2022, doi.org/10.1787/d28f963c-en.

• [57] World Population Review, “Carbon Footprint by Country 2022,” Walnut: World Population Review, 2022, perma.cc/7QGT-TQZF.

• [58] Katja Doose, Alexander Vorbrugg, and Angelina Davydova, “Russian Climate Action and Research is Collateral Damage in Putin’s War on Ukraine,” Climate Home News, May 26, 2022, perma.cc/77XT-YFUL.

• [59] Ian Hill, “Is Russia Finally Getting Serious on Climate Change?,” The Interpreter, November 1, 2021, perma.cc/NFB5-PQE2.

• [60] Doose, Vorbrugg, and Davydova, “Russian Climate Action and Research is Collateral Damage in Putin’s War on Ukraine.”

• [61] Jie Yu, “Climate Justice with Chinese Characteristics?,” Project Syndicate, September 12, 2022, perma.cc/YMK4-8DWC.

• [62] The State Council Information Office of The People’s Republic of China, “Envoy: China Supports Developing Countries’ Demand on Climate Finance,” Beijing: The State Council Information Office of The People’s Republic of China, November 11, 2022, perma.cc/94B6-7NY8.

• [63] UNFCCC, “COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement on New ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund for Vulnerable Countries,” Press Release, November 22, 2022, https:// perma.cc/XZ47-E4AN.

• [64] Sara Schonhardt and Karl Mathiesen, “EU Climate Finance Proposal Upends COP27 Talks,” Politico, November 18, 2022, perma.cc/3X23-PGUQ.

• [65] Fiona Harvey, “EU Reversal of Stance on Loss and Damage Turns Tables on China at COP27,” The Guardian, November 18, 2022, perma.cc/LPV5-3LAR.

• [66] Zack Colman and Karl Mathiesen, “New U.S. Message on Climate Change: Make China Pay,” Politico, November 5, 2022, perma.cc/ZL63-YA8W.

• [67] Kate Bartlett, “COP27: How China and Africa Fit in Debate Over ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund,” Voice of America, November 18, 2022, perma.cc/3WR8-TKVQ.

• [68] Leslie Vinjamuri et al., “Building Global Prosperity: Proposals for Sustainable Growth,” London: Chatham House, December 9, 2022, perma.cc/7FLU-VSKH, 31.

• [69] Kamp, “Das Engagement autoritärer Geberstaaten in Afrika,” 60.

• [70] Tull, Erforth, and Schottner, SWP Podcast, November 10, 2022.