New York Times: Ten Questions for China's Heir Presumptive

【中文標題】中國假定繼承人的十個問題
【原文標題】Ten Questions for China's Heir Presumptive
【登載媒體】紐約時報
【原文作者】DAVID SHAMBAUGH
【原文鏈接】http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/opinion/ten-questions-for-chinas-heir-presumptive.html?_r=1&ref=china


中國副主席習近平下周的華盛頓之行，是一個絕佳的機會來近距離觀察這個將在未來十年領導中國的人。

自從2007年被欽點為胡錦濤的繼承人之後，習造訪了多個國家，但在粉墨登場之機從未來到過美國（他上一次來訪的身份是省級官員）。

這是習了解美國，也是美國認識他的好機會。他在中國之外少有人知，即使在國內也具有一些神秘色彩，觀察人士將會努力尋找習的本土和國際政治導向。

以下是中國觀察人士希望了解有關習近平的10個問題：

1，習會成為中國共產黨的政治改革人士嗎？

自從2009年以來，黨的行為收斂了許多，很多改革舉措被習的前任曾慶紅叫停。習能夠敢於直麵阻礙改革的強大、保守的機構嗎——國家安全部、軍隊、黨的宣傳體製和大型國有企業？還是說他會像胡錦濤一樣對這些機構俯首稱臣？在10月份舉行的第18屆黨代表大會中，一些改革人士，如李源潮、汪洋、薄熙來、王滬寧和劉延東會被選入政治局常委嗎？

2，習和下一任總理（競爭者包括副總理李克強和王岐山）會把口頭上的“經濟再平衡”落實在行動中嗎？

過去兩年裏，很多官方發言都在呼籲，把國家的經濟重點從沿海出口型轉變為本地消費型，以形成中國可持續發展的經濟基礎。到目前為止，實際中的投資並未與此相吻合。

3，習有能力製定出針對西藏和新疆更加人性化的政策嗎？那裏的民族躁動情緒從2008年以來就不斷上升，在本周達到頂峰。

政府安全部門的鐵腕政策導致生命的逝去和更進一步的不安定局麵，社會需要一種新的、柔和的手段。習具備足夠強大的政治影響力來與當前殘暴的體製抗衡嗎？他能在焦躁不安的民族社團與中國政府間營造出一個和諧共存的局麵嗎？

4，習和黨內機構能夠有效控製激進的民族主義情緒嗎？這種情緒現在已經讓政府在與周邊國家的領土爭端中擺出比較極端的姿態，並且敢於“對抗”美國，在國際問題上咄咄逼人。

5，習有信心放鬆對主流媒體、社會媒體、互聯網和教育的嚴格管製嗎？

6，習有能力掌控軍隊嗎？中國軍方在近幾年所展示出的令人擔憂的動向激怒了臨近的國家，而且，它的行動似乎獨立於黨的控製。

7，習會把口頭上的外交政策落實在行動中嗎？

在一個危險的世界裏，北京需要有實際的行動，它那些老生常談的口號已經越來越難令人相信了。一個值得欣慰的跡象是習在2009底在中央黨校的講話，他明確批判了國內和國際政策中濫用口號的現象，說要用實際行動來代替口號。

8，習將如何應對非洲、中東和拉丁美洲對中國瘋狂掠奪資源的援助和貿易政策所表現出的強烈不滿。

習和中國政府在國際政策上是否會扮演更積極、更支持的角色，而不是消極、阻礙的角色？中國還會繼續與俄羅斯站在一起，在聯合國安理會上違背大多數國家的意願嗎？就像敘利亞和伊朗問題，它更願意成為大家眼中的問題還是解決方案？

10，習有足夠的遠見來事先培養與美國之間的關係嗎？

當今世界上，再沒有其它國家比得上這兩個國家之間關係的重要性了，但目前的關係存在著諸多不信任現象。培養這樣的關係，需要中國下一屆領導人和美國總統首先在兩個國家間建立起起碼的信任。

習在訪問美國期間不大可能直接回答這些問題。假以時日，我們就可以發現他是一個積極改變的“革新型”領導人，還是又一個安於現狀的碌碌官員。





原文：

WASHINGTON — The visit by China’s vice president, Xi Jinping, to Washington this coming week offers a unique opportunity to take the measure of the man who will lead China for the next decade. 

While Xi has traveled the world since being anointed Hu Jintao’s designated successor in 2007, he has not been to the United States during this grooming period (he did visit earlier as a provincial official). 

This will be a good opportunity for Xi to familiarize himself with America and vice versa. As he is not well known outside of China and enigmatic even inside the country, observers will be looking for clues to Xi’s domestic and international orientation.  

Here are 10 questions China watchers would like to know about Xi Jinping: 

•1. Will Xi return to a politically reformist path for the Chinese Communist Party? 

Since late 2009, the party has retrenched significantly — halting and rolling back reforms by Xi’s predecessor, Zeng Qinghong. Can Xi stand up to the powerful conservative institutions that have blocked reforms — the state security apparatus, the military, the party propaganda system and large state-owned enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as Hu Jintao has been? Will reformers such as Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Wang Huning and Liu Yandong be promoted to top Politburo positions along with Xi at the 18th Party Congress in October? 

• 2. Can Xi and the next prime minister (the contenders are reportedly Vice Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) turn the rhetoric of economic “rebalancing” into reality? 

Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the economy away from the export sector and the coastal regions to domestic consumption and the interior as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for China. To date the reality of investment has not matched the rhetoric. 

•3. Will Xi be able to devise a more humane policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic unrest has steadily risen since 2008 and has spiked in recent weeks? 

Government security forces have responded with a heavy hand, resulting in loss of life and heightened instability. A new, softer approach is needed. But will Xi have the political strength to stand up to the repressive apparatus and put in place conditions for a more stable coexistence between restive ethnic groups and the Chinese state? 

•4. Can Xi and the party apparatus reign in the nationalism that is pushing the government to take extreme positions on territorial disputes with China’s neighbors, to “stand up” to the United States and behave aggressively internationally? 

• 5. Will Xi be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on mainstream media, social media, the Internet and educational institutions? 

•6. Can Xi reign in the military, which has demonstrated a worrisome tendency in recent years to undertake actions that provoke China’s neighbors and, seemingly, act independently of civilian party control? 

•7. Will Xi authorize a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric? 

China’s diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Beijing. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech Xi gave at the Central Party School in late 2009, in which he explicitly criticized the pervasive tendency toward sloganeering in domestic and foreign policy, arguing that slogans needed to be replaced by substance and hard work. 

•8. How will Xi handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over China’s rapacious and mercantilist energy, aid and trade policies? 

•9. Will Xi and the Chinese government begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance? Will China continue to stand with Russia in the United Nations Security Council against the will of the majority of other nations on issues like Syria and Iran — and become part of the solution instead of part of the problem? 

•10. Will Xi have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with the United States? 

There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China’s next leader — and the American president — to build strategic trust between the two great nations. 

As Xi’s visit is not likely to provide answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if he is a “transformational” leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for China at home and abroad, or whether he is another risk-averse apparatchik.