空色一體
千江有水千江月，萬裏無雲萬裏天。
正文
【原創翻譯】1982年黎巴嫩戰爭中的敘利亞坦克獵手
軒轅春秋： MP586
譯者按：這篇文章是一篇比較老的反映1982年黎巴嫩戰爭的文章，來自ACIG.org archives網站，早先曾經被國內多家知名軍事期刊發掘並翻譯轉載，在北京出版的《兵器》雜誌2010年12月號還發表該文為基礎，作者署名“遠懿”的《貝卡穀地坦克戰》一文。
由於國內對於1982年黎巴嫩戰爭仍然缺乏相關的外文研究資料，因此這篇文章對國內軍事愛好者們來說目前依然有重要的參考價值，所以筆者嚐試翻譯此文，僅供感興趣的軍事愛好者參考。
另外，特別感謝sc論壇“觀星者”網友提供原文鏈接。
譯文：
Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩戰爭中的敘利亞坦克獵手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一點黎巴嫩戰爭常識的人都知道，1982年6月發生在以色列、巴解組織、敘利亞之間的戰鬥，一場複雜的反坦克戰來自雙方的直升機，當少數一些有關以色列武裝直升機在戰爭中的細節早早被披露，敘利亞的方麵的情況卻鮮為人知，無論如何，它們某些戰術是創新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
敘利亞武裝直升機
在1980年代的早期敘利亞阿拉伯空軍有一個旅下轄4個中隊SA.342L“小羚羊”直升機，（976、977、988，和一個不明單位的989中隊） 還有一個旅有三個配備mi-25s的中隊（第765、766、767中隊），兩個旅的基地分別位於Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh機場，但部分mi-24s長期作為預備隊部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
敘利亞比較新式的武裝直升機，在1977年已獲得第一批18架法國宇航公司製造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升機，以對付以色列購買的貝爾AH-1眼鏡蛇 武裝直升機，這批“小羚羊”配屬給第976攻擊直升機中隊，基地位於al-Jdaydeh機場，原本配備AS-12反坦克導彈，稍後，額外的 SA.342S到貨，可動用敘利亞空軍一個包括三個中隊的滿編旅，以及一個和警方共同聯絡合作的部隊，同時提供法製“霍特”反坦克導彈，“霍特”是由法國 和德國聯合研製的，與美製“陶”式反坦克導彈相當，這其實是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亞音速光學製導發射筒”，采取半自動目視導線製導方式(SACLOS)引導，指令通過導線傳送給機載導彈，作為交付給敘利亞人的“霍 特”，被認為是當時世界上最先進的反坦克導彈之一，據稱能以0°法線角擊穿700mm的鋼裝甲，或者以65°法線角擊穿288 mm的鋼裝甲。導彈存儲在發射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能夠攜帶4枚，安裝在駕駛艙後根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.
鑒於敘利亞阿拉伯空軍在1950年代後期以來沒有購買過西方製造的固定翼飛機或直升機，因此購買“小羚羊”在西方觀察家看來十分意外，但實際上，作為這項 交易的努力的後果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促進了阿拉伯國家的團結，同時由於蘇聯無力提供敘利亞所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升機，他們需要優先保證他 們在東德的基地，不過，一旦法國開始向敘利亞提供“小羚羊”，蘇聯會緊隨其後，在1981年的春季，第一個4架編製的mi-25s中隊，（後來增至12 架）被部署在al-Mezzeh機場，在首都大馬士革附近還部署有另一個單位，當時基地設在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被認為是mi-24 的“猴”版（或稱簡化版），一類低檔版被提供給“不可靠”的用戶，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，來自Falanga家族的反坦克導 彈，（北約綽號AT-2”蠅拍”），這是一種相對落後但卻簡單的反坦克導彈，采取無線電指令製導，每架mi-25能夠攜帶4枚”蠅拍”，在發射導軌上接受 指令提示，AT-2包括幾種改進型，其中“B”型被出售給敘利亞，這種型號有效射程為3500m,有說法稱其能以0°法線角擊穿超過500mm的鋼裝甲， 但一般駕駛mi-25的阿拉伯飛行員不相信這種說法，首先是因為它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配備了yak-B12.7mm機槍，安裝在座艙下方的炮塔 內，其他武備包括多聯裝32mm或57mm無製導火箭發射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切關注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用經驗之後，敘利亞人很早就放棄了使用AT-2，並為他們的mi-25s安裝了機槍和火箭發射器，還有炸彈，這些情況 對敘利亞空軍沒有多少影響，引進“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任務在1982年春天沒能夠完全完成，實際上，最終敘利亞沒能看到它們在與以色列戰爭中的每一 次戰鬥中都出場，因此，雖然存在某些相反的報告---尤其是來自俄羅斯和烏克蘭的，但在西方的專門出版物中，在1982年敘利亞的mi-25s卻無法戰鬥 執勤甚至沒有一個戰例，敘利亞空軍的反坦克作戰中“小羚羊”幾乎是單獨作戰。
Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
獵殺者的戰術
1982年初，敘利亞期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行動，他們的指揮者估計以色列國防軍將發起一次類似1978年“利塔尼”行動的進攻，當時以軍僅僅因為搜索 巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而開進了黎巴嫩境內縱深大約40km,然而，敘利亞人清楚，他們將不可避免的在利塔尼河一線與以軍發生大規模的衝突，為此，許多敘利亞精 銳部隊沿戈蘭高地至大馬士革一線部署；而自從1976年以來，敘利亞便在黎巴嫩駐紮著相當數量的部隊，這是由於他們介入黎巴嫩內戰的承諾，大馬士革缺少金 錢和空間建設一條強大的前線以涵蓋整個黎巴嫩，實際上，在1982年的6月初，多數敘利亞部隊部署在這個國家的中部，在貝魯特和紮赫勒之間，建立防禦僅圍 繞著具體的問題沿戈蘭—貝魯特—大馬士革一線，特別在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一帶的鄉村地區。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究該地區的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的數十個村莊和以色列能夠采用可能的途徑，敘利亞製定了簡單但有效的策略，這就是敘利亞直升機和受過專門訓練的敘利亞陸 軍的“獵殺小組”協調一致，目的是憑借地麵部隊伏擊和牽製以色列的裝甲部隊，最好在近距離和城市地區，然後憑借當地的丘陵地形用武裝直升機攻擊以軍。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，敘利亞陸軍有合計20個突擊營與總共50個獵殺小組部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西貝魯特及其以南地區，但在城市的西郊與南郊也有部署， 每個敘利亞獵殺小組包括4-6人，擁有當時西方和蘇聯最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭發射 器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克導彈（僅有早期生產的9P-135型號）和來自法國的“米蘭”反坦克導彈，通常在每個小組有兩名射手和兩名裝填手，每個6人 小組配備2名攜帶SA-7便攜式防空導彈的成員，敘利亞反坦克小組都是老兵，有很多經驗的士兵
流露出較強的軍事素養和戰鬥意誌，戰後以色列人描述他們對他們的任務有著專業的態度，他們偏愛在城區出擊，因為黎巴嫩城鎮與鄉村狹窄的街道能夠輕而易舉的變成攻擊以色列坦克的射擊場。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
敘利亞在黎巴嫩的主要作戰部隊是第10和第3裝甲師，第10裝甲師部署在拜耳圖-大馬士革公路以南，在貝魯特，包括76和第91裝甲旅—裝備t-62s坦 克和BMP-1s步兵戰車，以及第85機械化旅，裝備t-55s坦克和BTR-60s裝甲輸送車。第10裝甲師負責指揮第20突擊營，第3 裝甲師包括第58機械化旅和第62旅，以及2個裝備T-62坦克的裝甲旅，這支部隊控製另一個突擊營，負責防守貝魯特-大馬士革公路，還有總計擁有19個 SAM導彈營的3個SAM導彈旅，沿著敘利亞邊境部署在紮赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日戰役：第一天，6月8日
實際上，戰爭在1982年6月1日已經開始，以色列大規模空襲地中海沿岸的巴解基地和彈藥庫，不過，在地麵，以色列軍隊直到6月6日上午11時才開進南黎巴嫩。
For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因為敘利亞軍隊駐紮在黎巴嫩，然而，戰鬥在兩天後才開始，在黎巴嫩中部的傑津附近，作為以色列國防軍vardi特遣隊---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指揮 下的特別部隊，任務是拿下傑津，然後向北沿著可卡魯恩湖的西岸向貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路推進---攻擊敘利亞第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
當vardi特遣隊開始進攻敘利亞第76裝甲旅時，在其後方的貝爾格.梅納赫姆.埃南的162師級戰鬥隊，沿著狹窄的道路向從南向西南方向推進，經過傑津 前往目標Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脈，埃南的162師級戰鬥隊受阻於交通擁堵和燃料短缺，他在組織調動方麵遇到了很大的困難，他的麻煩增加了，稍後在14:00，他 的部隊中在兩條平行道路上前進的前兩列縱隊開火誤擊了另一個自己人的基地，衝突的原因仍然鮮為人知，但它讓埃南花了至少半小時解決混亂。
Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162師級戰鬥隊剛開始再次移動，大約15:30，有幾部車輛受到了重擊，4架敘利亞空軍977中隊的“小羚羊”突然在以軍反應之前，在山和林木之間飛近 埃南的行軍縱隊，然後在現場的人們發現它們之前發射它們攜帶的“霍特”反坦克導彈，一些數目不詳的以軍坦克和裝甲輸送車在此次襲擊中被擊中，但以色列後來 的報道稱隻有輕微的傷亡，（4人受傷，其中1人重傷）僅僅一小時後，vardi特遣隊也遭到敘利亞空軍戰鬥轟炸機的襲擊，敘利亞空軍飛行員報告，有數輛坦 克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
實際上，埃南師級戰鬥隊遭遇襲擊僅僅是敘利亞直升機當天第二次與對手接觸，首次行動是在黎巴嫩當地時間大約14:00，它們沿著馬特-赫蒙/馬特-宰赫謝 山穀的西北側 低空潛入以軍縱隊上空，然後攻擊以軍由貝爾格.貝納佩萊德指揮包括兩個空降旅和配屬的反坦克步兵的特遣隊，該部的任務是沿著敘利亞邊境貝魯特-大馬士革高 速公路向縱深推進，包抄敘利亞部署在貝卡穀地的部隊，當以軍被敘利亞精銳的第91坦克旅從哈塞拜亞到熱撒亞一線的公路上所阻止時，敘利亞直升機發動了進 攻，但戰果仍然不詳。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
這一天“小羚羊”最後的進攻在17:30進行，兩隊出動對以軍機械化縱隊進行了夾擊，從沙巴到熱撒亞和Barouch到安達，所有的行動結果均不詳，但一般以色列否認受到任何損失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162師級戰鬥隊搜索德魯茲村莊Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脈的中央，距離貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路以南僅15公裏，敘利亞第十裝甲師 的兩個裝甲旅卡魯湖以南被包圍，作為擁有m-60s的師級戰鬥隊，開下公路進入村莊之後，突然遭遇幾輛T-62s,並發生了短暫的近距離戰鬥，雙方的一些 坦克，包括3輛T-62s被擊中，以軍回撤過程中再遭敘利亞突擊隊的襲擊，行軍縱隊被一連串RPG攻擊，換句話說，162師級戰鬥隊闖進了敘利亞第3裝甲 師一部—第58機械化旅的中央，這場戰鬥的結果無法確認，因為沒有以色列傷亡的統計數據，敘利亞承認至少失去了3輛T-62s和20名士兵，而以軍折回 barouch,敘利亞激烈抵抗的是因為vardi特遣隊當天早晨在ch-53直升機的幫助下向敘利亞軍隊右翼側背的運動取得了一些進展，隨以軍開進的 M-151吉普，攜帶“陶”式反坦克導彈，被集中於Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它們中掉隊的車輛遭遇了下一波敘利亞“小羚羊” 的攻擊，然而，vardi重組了他的部隊，部署在barouch的西麵和南麵的三道攔阻陣地裏，至少理論上，vardi特遣隊現在僅距貝魯特-大馬士革高 速公路僅僅15km,假如它能控製它，那它不僅能夠切斷在貝魯特敘軍與敘利亞後勤基地的聯係，還能夠打開一條進入敘利亞第一裝甲師後方的通路。
The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但問題是，以軍無法前進，至少不能馬上做到，162師級戰鬥隊繼續在Ayn-Zhalta與敘軍交戰，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻擊，左翼六輛坦克在晚 間被摧毀，這隻是到那時，埃南的部隊才打通達拉泉，一個僅僅距離戰略高速路幾千米的村莊，然而，前進中的以軍首次被敘利亞第51旅的部隊和反坦克小分隊伏 擊，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，這一係列的衝突中，他們擊毀了一些車輛。
Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
與此同時，進一步朝西南方向擴展，兩個敘利亞裝甲旅正在卡魯恩湖的南麵進行處境艱難戰鬥，忙碌的以軍縱隊保持主要編隊，在幸存的敘利亞軍官的回憶中，這一 戰是慘烈的：來自他的營的兩個先頭連的T-62被徹底摧毀，他的連也失去了好幾輛坦克，作為回報，敘利亞摧毀6輛並擊傷3輛m-60s,到了中午，當以色 列的壓力越來越大，當幸存的敘利亞坦克耗盡了他們的彈藥和燃料後，他們的情況惡化了，關注著第76和第91坦克旅情況的敘軍總部命令第1裝甲師的一個裝備 T-72坦克的裝甲旅，沿著大馬士革的公路朝黎巴嫩邊界移動，徑直前行，穿越邊界後打擊沿著貝卡穀地東側前進的以軍的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
敘利亞的反擊是從東朝西，經過Rashayya北麵的附近，被敘利亞退伍軍人描述為“整個戰爭中最激烈的坦克戰”， T-72與幾個連的m-60s展開戰鬥，摧毀了它們中的一些，在這個交換過程中僅遭受了一點損失：實際上，一位敘利亞指揮官因為他的部隊成功突破以軍對 76和91裝甲旅的包圍而做了誇張，敘軍在突破卡魯恩湖的東麵和南麵期間沒有損失一輛坦克，在6月9日的下午，幾位敘利亞軍官注意到，一架著火的以色列 F-16A戰鬥機墜落在以軍戰線的後方，在這一過程中飛行員彈出，僅僅被以色列陸軍所救回，損失的原因被以色列解釋為非戰鬥損失，但沒有一個當地防空部隊 聲稱擊落，這是幾名接受獨立采訪的敘利亞退伍軍人非常生動的回憶。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
盡管敘利亞取得了成功，兩個裝甲旅通過這個開放了幾個小時的走廊事實上逃脫了，但敘軍的第10裝甲師卻付出了沉重的代價，在戰鬥過程中損失了差不多200 輛T-62s,它們中至少有90輛被完整的俘獲，這支部隊被調回並用來自戰略儲備物資的T-55坦克迅速重新武裝，反過來，第1裝甲師被命令返回敘利亞邊 界後方，重組後繼續繼續它前往紮赫勒的行程，在那個重要時刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻擊波共4架敘利亞空軍的米格-23BN戰鬥機轟炸了設置在薩瑪奇 亞的以軍總部，通過檢測被跟蹤的以軍無線電通訊，得知已經受到了敘利亞炮兵的重壓，另外的敘還以的空中打擊支援了敘軍第1裝甲師營救卡魯恩湖南側兩個裝甲 旅的行動。
Syrian-Tank-Hunter in Lebanon,1982
1982年黎巴嫩戰爭中的敘利亞坦克獵手
One of little-known aspects of the Lebanon War, fought between Israel, PLO, and Syria, in June 1982, was a complex anti-tank battle fought by helicopters of both sides. While at least some details about Israeli attack helicopters were published ever since, almost nothing is known about the Syrians, regardless how interesting and innovative some their tactics was.
了解一點黎巴嫩戰爭常識的人都知道，1982年6月發生在以色列、巴解組織、敘利亞之間的戰鬥，一場複雜的反坦克戰來自雙方的直升機，當少數一些有關以色列武裝直升機在戰爭中的細節早早被披露，敘利亞的方麵的情況卻鮮為人知，無論如何，它們某些戰術是創新和有趣的。
Syrian Attack Helicopters
In the early 1980s the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) operated one brigade with four squadrons of SA.342L/M Gazelles (976, 977, 988, and an unknown unit – probably 989 Sqn), and one wing of three squadrons equipped with Mi-25s (765, 766, and 767). Both brigades had units based at Marj al-Sultan and al-Jdaydeh airfields, but part of Mi-24s was permanently deployed to Sueda AB as well.
敘利亞武裝直升機
在1980年代的早期敘利亞阿拉伯空軍有一個旅下轄4個中隊SA.342L“小羚羊”直升機，（976、977、988，和一個不明單位的989中隊） 還有一個旅有三個配備mi-25s的中隊（第765、766、767中隊），兩個旅的基地分別位於Marj al-Sultan 和 al-Jdaydeh機場，但部分mi-24s長期作為預備隊部署在sueda.
Syria was a relatively new operator of combat helicopters, having obtained the first 18 French-built Aérospatiale SA.342 Gazelles only in 1977, in response to Israeli acquisition of Bell AH-1 Cobras. These 18 Gazelles entered service with the 976 Attack Helicopter Squadron, based at al-Jdaydeh AB, and were originally equipped with AS.12 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Later on, additional SA.342s were supplied, enabling the SyAAF to organize a full brigade of three squadrons, and one unit used for liaison and cooperation with police. Also supplied to Syria by France were HOT ATGMs. HOT is essentially a French-German equivalent to the US-made TOW, this designation actually standing for “Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube” – or “high-subsonic optical remote-guided fired from a tube”, with semi-automatic command-to-line of sight (SACLOS) guidance, with guidance inputs being transferred via a thin wire connecting the missile with the helicopter. As delivered to Syrians, the HOT was considered one of the most advanced ATGMs world-wide, claimed as capable of penetrating 700mm of steel armour at 0° and 288mm armour at 65°. The missile was delivered in tubes, of which each Gazelle could carry four, mounted on stubs behind the cockpit.
敘利亞比較新式的武裝直升機，在1977年已獲得第一批18架法國宇航公司製造的SA.342L“小羚羊”直升機，以對付以色列購買的貝爾AH-1眼鏡蛇 武裝直升機，這批“小羚羊”配屬給第976攻擊直升機中隊，基地位於al-Jdaydeh機場，原本配備AS-12反坦克導彈，稍後，額外的 SA.342S到貨，可動用敘利亞空軍一個包括三個中隊的滿編旅，以及一個和警方共同聯絡合作的部隊，同時提供法製“霍特”反坦克導彈，“霍特”是由法國 和德國聯合研製的，與美製“陶”式反坦克導彈相當，這其實是指“Hautsubsonique Optiquement Téleguidé Tiré d’un Tube”-或者“高亞音速光學製導發射筒”，采取半自動目視導線製導方式(SACLOS)引導，指令通過導線傳送給機載導彈，作為交付給敘利亞人的“霍 特”，被認為是當時世界上最先進的反坦克導彈之一，據稱能以0°法線角擊穿700mm的鋼裝甲，或者以65°法線角擊穿288 mm的鋼裝甲。導彈存儲在發射筒交付，每架“小羚羊”能夠攜帶4枚，安裝在駕駛艙後根部。
Given that SyAAF purchased no Western-built aircraft or helicopters already since the late 1950s, the acquisition of Gazelles was quite surprising for many observers in the West. But, the fact was that this deal came as a result of Saudi efforts to orient as many Arab states towards West as possible, as well as Soviet inability to supply the number of Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) helicopters required by Syria. The Soviets needed any Hind they could get at the time for their units based in East Germany. Nevertheless, once the French started delivering Gazelles to Syria, the Soviets followed the suit, and in spring of 1981 the first squadron of four - later to rise to 12 - Mi-25s was organized at al-Mezzeh AB, near Damascus, followed by another unit, then based in al-Ladahiqiyah. The Mi-25 was considered a “monkey” version of the Mi-24, a downgraded variant supplied to “less reliable” customers. Its main anti-tank armament was the 9M17 Skorpion from the Falanga family of ATGMs (ASCC-Code “AT-2 Swatter”). This was a relatively primitive but simple ATGM with MCLOS radio-guidance. Each Mi-25 could mount four Swatters on launch rails mounted bellow wing-tips. The AT-2 was supplied in several variants, of which the B was sold to Syria. This version could reach targets out to a range of 3.500m, and had a claimed capability of armour penetration of over 500mm at 0°. Arabic Mi-25-pilots in generaly considered it useless, foremost because of its poor reliability. In addition, the Mi-25 was equipped with the YakB-12,7 machine-gun, mounted in a barbette underneath the front cockpit, as well as UB-32-57 rocket launchers for unguided rockets.
鑒於敘利亞阿拉伯空軍在1950年代後期以來沒有購買過西方製造的固定翼飛機或直升機，因此購買“小羚羊”在西方觀察家看來十分意外，但實際上，作為這項 交易的努力的後果，沙特阿拉伯最大可能的促進了阿拉伯國家的團結，同時由於蘇聯無力提供敘利亞所要求的具有同等性能Mi-24直升機，他們需要優先保證他 們在東德的基地，不過，一旦法國開始向敘利亞提供“小羚羊”，蘇聯會緊隨其後，在1981年的春季，第一個4架編製的mi-25s中隊，（後來增至12 架）被部署在al-Mezzeh機場，在首都大馬士革附近還部署有另一個單位，當時基地設在al-Ladahiqiyah，mi-25被認為是mi-24 的“猴”版（或稱簡化版），一類低檔版被提供給“不可靠”的用戶，它的主要反坦克武器是9M17“Skorpion”，來自Falanga家族的反坦克導 彈，（北約綽號AT-2”蠅拍”），這是一種相對落後但卻簡單的反坦克導彈，采取無線電指令製導，每架mi-25能夠攜帶4枚”蠅拍”，在發射導軌上接受 指令提示，AT-2包括幾種改進型，其中“B”型被出售給敘利亞，這種型號有效射程為3500m,有說法稱其能以0°法線角擊穿超過500mm的鋼裝甲， 但一般駕駛mi-25的阿拉伯飛行員不相信這種說法，首先是因為它的可靠性差。另外，mi-25配備了yak-B12.7mm機槍，安裝在座艙下方的炮塔 內，其他武備包括多聯裝32mm或57mm無製導火箭發射器。
After closely monitoring the Iraqi experiences with Mi-25s, the Syrians relatively early dropped the use of AT-2 almost completely, and were arming their Mi-25s with machine-guns and unguided rockets, or bombs only. For various reasons that stood in no relation directly to the SyAAF, the introduction of Gazelles and Mi-25s in service with SyAAF was not entirely complete by spring of 1982. In fact, eventually the Syrian Hinds were not to see any kind of combat service during the fighting against Israelis. Consequently, although there is a number of reports of the contrary – especially in the Russian and Ukrainian, but also in specialized Western publications - the SyAAF Mi-25s did not fly even a single combat sortie in 1982: when it comes to the SyAAF anti-tank operations Gazelles fought almost alone.
在密切關注了mi-25在伊拉克的使用經驗之後，敘利亞人很早就放棄了使用AT-2，並為他們的mi-25s安裝了機槍和火箭發射器，還有炸彈，這些情況 對敘利亞空軍沒有多少影響，引進“小羚羊”和mi-25s的任務在1982年春天沒能夠完全完成，實際上，最終敘利亞沒能看到它們在與以色列戰爭中的每一 次戰鬥中都出場，因此，雖然存在某些相反的報告---尤其是來自俄羅斯和烏克蘭的，但在西方的專門出版物中，在1982年敘利亞的mi-25s卻無法戰鬥 執勤甚至沒有一個戰例，敘利亞空軍的反坦克作戰中“小羚羊”幾乎是單獨作戰。
Hunter-Killer Tactics
By early 1982 the Syrians were expecting some kind of a new Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Their commanders calculated that the IDF would most likely launch an attack similar to the Operation “Litani”, from 1978, when the Israelis drove only some 40km deep into Lebanon in a search for Palestinian terrorists. However, the Syrians knew that in the case the Israelis would not stop on the Litani River a major clash with IDF was inevitable. Yet, with most of Syrian Army important units being deployed either along the Golan Heights or in Damascus, and given the burden of sustaining a sizeable force inside Lebanon already since 1976, as well as because of their commitment in the local civil war, Damascus lacked assets and space to build a strong front-line stretching over whole width of Lebanon. In fact, by early June 1982 the majority of Syrian units in Lebanon was deployed in centre of the country, between Beirut and Zahle, with established defences only around specific points of interest - along the highway Beirut-Damascus, and especially in the area of the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta.
獵殺者的戰術
1982年初，敘利亞期待以色列在南黎巴嫩的新行動，他們的指揮者估計以色列國防軍將發起一次類似1978年“利塔尼”行動的進攻，當時以軍僅僅因為搜索 巴勒斯坦恐怖分子而開進了黎巴嫩境內縱深大約40km,然而，敘利亞人清楚，他們將不可避免的在利塔尼河一線與以軍發生大規模的衝突，為此，許多敘利亞精 銳部隊沿戈蘭高地至大馬士革一線部署；而自從1976年以來，敘利亞便在黎巴嫩駐紮著相當數量的部隊，這是由於他們介入黎巴嫩內戰的承諾，大馬士革缺少金 錢和空間建設一條強大的前線以涵蓋整個黎巴嫩，實際上，在1982年的6月初，多數敘利亞部隊部署在這個國家的中部，在貝魯特和紮赫勒之間，建立防禦僅圍 繞著具體的問題沿戈蘭—貝魯特—大馬士革一線，特別在坦塔的as-Sultan Yac'ub一帶的鄉村地區。
Studying the local terrain, roads, dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and possible routes along which the Israelis could approach, the Syrians developed simple but effective tactics. This called for co-ordination between SyAAF helicopters and specially trained “hunter-killer teams” of the Syrian Army. The aim was to ambush and tie down Israeli mechanized formations by ground-forces, preferably at short range and within urban areas, and then hit them by attack helicopters that would approach using local hilly terrain.
研究該地區的地形、道路、南黎巴嫩的數十個村莊和以色列能夠采用可能的途徑，敘利亞製定了簡單但有效的策略，這就是敘利亞直升機和受過專門訓練的敘利亞陸 軍的“獵殺小組”協調一致，目的是憑借地麵部隊伏擊和牽製以色列的裝甲部隊，最好在近距離和城市地區，然後憑借當地的丘陵地形用武裝直升機攻擊以軍。
By early June 1982 the SA had the whole 20 Commando Battalion with a total of 50 hunter-killer teams deployed in Lebanon, mainly in the areas south and west of Beirut, but also in eastern and southern suburbs of the city. Each of Syrian teams consisted of between four and six men, armed with some of the best Western and Soviet anti-tank weapons of the time, including RPG-7s, RPG-18s (disposable 64 mm antitank rocket launcher), AT-4 Spigot ATGMs (only early-production 9P135 units), and MILAN ATGMs from France. Usually there were two shooters and two loaders in each team. Every six-man team had two additional members equipped with SA-7 MANPADS. Syrian anti-tank troops were older, more experienced soldiers of the SA, showing strong military skills and determination, and were later described by the Israelis as having a very professional attitude towards their mission. They operated with predilection in urban areas, where narrow streets of Lebanese towns and villages could easily be turned into shooting galleries for Israeli tanks.
在1982年6月初，敘利亞陸軍有合計20個突擊營與總共50個獵殺小組部署在黎巴嫩，主要分布在西貝魯特及其以南地區，但在城市的西郊與南郊也有部署， 每個敘利亞獵殺小組包括4-6人，擁有當時西方和蘇聯最好的反坦克武器，包括RPG-7s，RPG-18s（一次性使用的64mm反坦克火箭發射 器），AT-4“塞子”反坦克導彈（僅有早期生產的9P-135型號）和來自法國的“米蘭”反坦克導彈，通常在每個小組有兩名射手和兩名裝填手，每個6人 小組配備2名攜帶SA-7便攜式防空導彈的成員，敘利亞反坦克小組都是老兵，有很多經驗的士兵
流露出較強的軍事素養和戰鬥意誌，戰後以色列人描述他們對他們的任務有著專業的態度，他們偏愛在城區出擊，因為黎巴嫩城鎮與鄉村狹窄的街道能夠輕而易舉的變成攻擊以色列坦克的射擊場。
Of conventional fighting forces the major Syrian units in Lebanon were the 10th and the 3rd Armoured Divisions. The 10th Armoured Division was deployed south of the Beirtu-Damascus road, and inside Beirut, and consisted of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades – equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s – and the 85th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with T-55s and BTR-60s. This division was in control of the 20 Commando Battalion as well. The 3rd Armoured Division included the 58th Mechanized Brigade and the 62nd Brigade, as well as two armoured brigades with T-62 tanks. This unit controlled an additional Commando Battalion, and defended the Beirut-Damascus road, as well as three SAM-brigades with a total of 19 SAM-sites, deployed mainly in the area near Zahle, along the Syrian border.
敘利亞在黎巴嫩的主要作戰部隊是第10和第3裝甲師，第10裝甲師部署在拜耳圖-大馬士革公路以南，在貝魯特，包括76和第91裝甲旅—裝備t-62s坦 克和BMP-1s步兵戰車，以及第85機械化旅，裝備t-55s坦克和BTR-60s裝甲輸送車。第10裝甲師負責指揮第20突擊營，第3 裝甲師包括第58機械化旅和第62旅，以及2個裝備T-62坦克的裝甲旅，這支部隊控製另一個突擊營，負責防守貝魯特-大馬士革公路，還有總計擁有19個 SAM導彈營的3個SAM導彈旅，沿著敘利亞邊境部署在紮赫勒附近。
The Three Days Battle: Day One, 8 June
The war actually began already on 1 June 1982, with massive Israeli air strikes against PLO bases and ammunition depots along the Mediterranean coast. On the ground, however, the Israelis drove into southern Lebanon only around 11:00hrs of 6 June.
三日戰役：第一天，6月8日
實際上，戰爭在1982年6月1日已經開始，以色列大規模空襲地中海沿岸的巴解基地和彈藥庫，不過，在地麵，以色列軍隊直到6月6日上午11時才開進南黎巴嫩。
For Syrian troops stationed in the country, however, the fighting began two days later, near Jazzin, in central Lebanon, as the IDF Task Force Vardi – a specially configured task force under command of Brig.Gen. Danni Vardi, the task of which was to take Jazzin and then push north along the eastern side of Lake Qaroun towards the Beirut-Damascus highway – attacked positions of the 76th Syrian Tank Brigade.
因為敘利亞軍隊駐紮在黎巴嫩，然而，戰鬥在兩天後才開始，在黎巴嫩中部的傑津附近，作為以色列國防軍vardi特遣隊---一支在巴拉克.丹尼.瓦迪指揮 下的特別部隊，任務是拿下傑津，然後向北沿著可卡魯恩湖的西岸向貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路推進---攻擊敘利亞第76坦克旅。
While Vardi's force opened the attack on the 76th Brigade, in his rear Brig.Gen. Menachem Einan’s 162 Ugda was moving along narrow roads from south towards south-west, passing Jazzin with objective Beit en-Din, in the Shouf Mountains. Hampered by several massive traffic jams and fuel shortages Einan had experienced massive difficulties in organizing his movement so far and now his problems were to increase by a magnitude: shortly after 14:00hrs, the two lead columns of his unit that travelled on two parallel roads opened fire at each other in a case of mistaken identity. The results of this clash remain unknown, but it took Einan at least an hour to solve the chaos.
當vardi特遣隊開始進攻敘利亞第76裝甲旅時，在其後方的貝爾格.梅納赫姆.埃南的162師級戰鬥隊，沿著狹窄的道路向從南向西南方向推進，經過傑津 前往目標Beit en-Din，在舒夫山脈，埃南的162師級戰鬥隊受阻於交通擁堵和燃料短缺，他在組織調動方麵遇到了很大的困難，他的麻煩增加了，稍後在14:00，他 的部隊中在兩條平行道路上前進的前兩列縱隊開火誤擊了另一個自己人的基地，衝突的原因仍然鮮為人知，但它讓埃南花了至少半小時解決混亂。
Barely that the 162 Ugda began to move again, around 15:30hrs, several of its vehicles suddenly received heavy hits. Four SA.342s of the 977 Sqn SyAAF approached Einan’s columns flying between hills and trees before taking positions and then firing their HOTs before their presence was ever detected. An unknown number of Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers was hit in this attack, but the IDF subsequently reported only slight casualties (four injured, one of which seriously). Barely one hour later, Task Force Vardi was also attacked by SyAAF fighter bombers, the pilots of which reported, "leaving several tanks afire".
162師級戰鬥隊剛開始再次移動，大約15:30，有幾部車輛受到了重擊，4架敘利亞空軍977中隊的“小羚羊”突然在以軍反應之前，在山和林木之間飛近 埃南的行軍縱隊，然後在現場的人們發現它們之前發射它們攜帶的“霍特”反坦克導彈，一些數目不詳的以軍坦克和裝甲輸送車在此次襲擊中被擊中，但以色列後來 的報道稱隻有輕微的傷亡，（4人受傷，其中1人重傷）僅僅一小時後，vardi特遣隊也遭到敘利亞空軍戰鬥轟炸機的襲擊，敘利亞空軍飛行員報告，有數輛坦 克起火。
In fact Einan's Ugda was attacked by only the second section of SyAAF helicopters that had a contact with enemy on that day. The first section was active over Lebanon already around 14:00hrs. It sneaked upon the Israelis by flying at low level along the canyons on north-western side of Mt. Hermon/Mt. Jabel Sheikh, and then attacked a column of the Special Manoeuvre Force, commanded by Brig.Gen. Yossi Peled, which consisted of two brigades of paratroops and infantry configured for anti-tank operations, and had a task of reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway along the Syrian border, thus outflanking Syrian positions in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian helicopters launched their attack when the Israelis were stopped by elements of the 91st Syrian Tank Brigade on the road from Hasabaiya towards Rashayya, but its results remain unknown.
實際上，埃南師級戰鬥隊遭遇襲擊僅僅是敘利亞直升機當天第二次與對手接觸，首次行動是在黎巴嫩當地時間大約14:00，它們沿著馬特-赫蒙/馬特-宰赫謝 山穀的西北側 低空潛入以軍縱隊上空，然後攻擊以軍由貝爾格.貝納佩萊德指揮包括兩個空降旅和配屬的反坦克步兵的特遣隊，該部的任務是沿著敘利亞邊境貝魯特-大馬士革高 速公路向縱深推進，包抄敘利亞部署在貝卡穀地的部隊，當以軍被敘利亞精銳的第91坦克旅從哈塞拜亞到熱撒亞一線的公路上所阻止時，敘利亞直升機發動了進 攻，但戰果仍然不詳。
The final Gazelle strike of the day was delivered around 17:30hrs, by two pairs that executed a pincer attack against mechanized IDF units on the road from Shab’a to Rashayya and from Barouch to Ayn Dara. The results of all these operations remain unknown, but in general the Israelis denied suffering any losses.
這一天“小羚羊”最後的進攻在17:30進行，兩隊出動對以軍機械化縱隊進行了夾擊，從沙巴到熱撒亞和Barouch到安達，所有的行動結果均不詳，但一般以色列否認受到任何損失。
Day Two, 9 June
Around midnight of 9 June, the 162 Ugda reached the Druze village Ayn-Zhalta, in the middle of the Shouf Mountains, and only some 15km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. With this, the two armoured brigades of the Syrian 10th Division south of Lake Karoun were encircled. However, as the leading M-60s of 162 Ugda rolled down the road into the village they suddenly detected several T-62s: within seconds a fierce battle at close quarters developed in which a number of tanks from both sides - including three T-62s - was hit. As the Israelis pulled back to re-group the Syrian commandos attacked, engulfing the column in a barrage of RPGs. Namely, Einan’s Ugda drove directly into the centre of the Syrian 58th Mechanized Brigade, part of the the 3rd Armoured Division. The results of this initial clash are uncertain, then there is no reliable data about the Israeli casualties: the Syrians are said to have lost at least three T-62s and 20 soldiers, while the Israelis pulled back to Barouch. Certain is also that the Syrian resistance was fierce enough to cause the IDF in the morning to move a part of the Task Force Vardi with help of CH-53D helicopters behind the right flank of the Syrian position. As the Israeli paras - driving M-151 jeeps armed with TOW-ATGMs – were concentrating along the Ayn Zhalta–Barouch road, around 09:30hrs they were hit by the next SyAAF Gazelle attack that left several M-151 jeeps destroyed. However, Vardi managed to reorganize his force and deploy it in three blocking positions north and east of Barouch. At least in theory, Vardi’s force was now also only 15km away from the Beirut-Damascus highway. If it could reach it, it would not only cut off the Syrian units in the Beirut area from supply bases in Syria, but also have an open way into the rear of the 1st Syrian Armoured Division.
第二天，6月9日
6月9日全天，162師級戰鬥隊搜索德魯茲村莊Ayn-Zhalta，在舒夫山脈的中央，距離貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路以南僅15公裏，敘利亞第十裝甲師 的兩個裝甲旅卡魯湖以南被包圍，作為擁有m-60s的師級戰鬥隊，開下公路進入村莊之後，突然遭遇幾輛T-62s,並發生了短暫的近距離戰鬥，雙方的一些 坦克，包括3輛T-62s被擊中，以軍回撤過程中再遭敘利亞突擊隊的襲擊，行軍縱隊被一連串RPG攻擊，換句話說，162師級戰鬥隊闖進了敘利亞第3裝甲 師一部—第58機械化旅的中央，這場戰鬥的結果無法確認，因為沒有以色列傷亡的統計數據，敘利亞承認至少失去了3輛T-62s和20名士兵，而以軍折回 barouch,敘利亞激烈抵抗的是因為vardi特遣隊當天早晨在ch-53直升機的幫助下向敘利亞軍隊右翼側背的運動取得了一些進展，隨以軍開進的 M-151吉普，攜帶“陶”式反坦克導彈，被集中於Ayn-Zhalta-barouch沿途，9:30，它們中掉隊的車輛遭遇了下一波敘利亞“小羚羊” 的攻擊，然而，vardi重組了他的部隊，部署在barouch的西麵和南麵的三道攔阻陣地裏，至少理論上，vardi特遣隊現在僅距貝魯特-大馬士革高 速公路僅僅15km,假如它能控製它，那它不僅能夠切斷在貝魯特敘軍與敘利亞後勤基地的聯係，還能夠打開一條進入敘利亞第一裝甲師後方的通路。
The problem was that the Israelis could not advance, at least not immediately: the 162 Ugda continued battling Syrians in Ayn Zhalta – in part because of another Gazelle-attack that left six Israeli tanks destroyed - until evening. It was only then that Einan’s units broke through towards Ayn Dara, a village only few kilometres south of the strategic highway. However, while advancing the Israelis were first ambushed by elements of the Syrian 51st Brigade and several anti-tank teams that went after M-60s and Merkava tanks for the most part: in a series of sharp clashes they hit a number of vehicles.
但問題是，以軍無法前進，至少不能馬上做到，162師級戰鬥隊繼續在Ayn-Zhalta與敘軍交戰，部分原因是另外的“小羚羊”攻擊，左翼六輛坦克在晚 間被摧毀，這隻是到那時，埃南的部隊才打通達拉泉，一個僅僅距離戰略高速路幾千米的村莊，然而，前進中的以軍首次被敘利亞第51旅的部隊和反坦克小分隊伏 擊，通常尾追m-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，這一係列的衝突中，他們擊毀了一些車輛。
Meanwhile, furhter to souther-east, two Syrian armour brigades encircled south of Lake Karoun were fighting for their naked survival, keeping the main group of Israeli forces busy. In the words of Syrian officers that survived this battle, the fighting was savage: the two front T-62-companies from his battalion were completely destroyed, and his company lost several tanks as well. In return, the Syrians destroyed six and captured three M-60s. By the noon, their situation worsened when surviving Syrian tanks began to run out of ammunition and fuel while under increasing Israeli pressure. Concerned with the situaiton of the 76th and 91st Tank Brigades, the Syrian General Headquarters ordered a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72 tanks, and moving along the road from Damascus towards the Lebanese border, to move straight ahead, cross the border and hit the right flank of the Israeli units advancing along the eastern side of Beka'a.
與此同時，進一步朝西南方向擴展，兩個敘利亞裝甲旅正在卡魯恩湖的南麵進行處境艱難戰鬥，忙碌的以軍縱隊保持主要編隊，在幸存的敘利亞軍官的回憶中，這一 戰是慘烈的：來自他的營的兩個先頭連的T-62被徹底摧毀，他的連也失去了好幾輛坦克，作為回報，敘利亞摧毀6輛並擊傷3輛m-60s,到了中午，當以色 列的壓力越來越大，當幸存的敘利亞坦克耗盡了他們的彈藥和燃料後，他們的情況惡化了，關注著第76和第91坦克旅情況的敘軍總部命令第1裝甲師的一個裝備 T-72坦克的裝甲旅，沿著大馬士革的公路朝黎巴嫩邊界移動，徑直前行，穿越邊界後打擊沿著貝卡穀地東側前進的以軍的右翼。
The Syrian counterattack that came from east towards west, passing few kilometres north of Rashayya, is described as the "most savage tank battle of the whole war" by Syrian veterans. The T-72s clashed with several companies of M-60s, destroying some of these in process while suffering only a few losses in exchange: in fact, the officer in command of one of leading Syrian companies was subsequently decorated for his unit successfully penetrated the Israeli ring around the 76th and 91st Brigades, without loosing a single tank in the process. During the Syrian breakthrough south and east of Lake Karoun, on the afternoon of 9 June, several officers noticed an Israeli F-16A falling in flames behind the Israeli lines, the pilot ejecting in the process - only to be recovered by IDF ground troops. The cause of this loss remains unclear until today, but no local air-defence units claimed any kills, while a number of Syrian veterans - interviewed independently - recall this event very vividly.
敘利亞的反擊是從東朝西，經過Rashayya北麵的附近，被敘利亞退伍軍人描述為“整個戰爭中最激烈的坦克戰”， T-72與幾個連的m-60s展開戰鬥，摧毀了它們中的一些，在這個交換過程中僅遭受了一點損失：實際上，一位敘利亞指揮官因為他的部隊成功突破以軍對 76和91裝甲旅的包圍而做了誇張，敘軍在突破卡魯恩湖的東麵和南麵期間沒有損失一輛坦克，在6月9日的下午，幾位敘利亞軍官注意到，一架著火的以色列 F-16A戰鬥機墜落在以軍戰線的後方，在這一過程中飛行員彈出，僅僅被以色列陸軍所救回，損失的原因被以色列解釋為非戰鬥損失，但沒有一個當地防空部隊 聲稱擊落，這是幾名接受獨立采訪的敘利亞退伍軍人非常生動的回憶。
Despite the Syrian success, and the fact that the two armoured brigades managed to escape throught the corridor that remained open for several hours, the 10th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army paid a heavy price, losing almost 200 T-62s in the course of the fighting. At least 90 of these were captured intact. Eventually, this unit has had to be pulled back and swiftly re-armed with T-55 tanks from strategic reserve stocks. In turn, the 1st Armoured Division was ordered back behind the Syrian border, to regroup and continue its trip to Zahle.
In the meantime, around 12:30hrs of 9 June, a strike package of four SyAAF MiG-23BNs bombed the Israeli HQs set up in Samaqiyah, which was detected by tracking Israeli radio communications and already under heavy pressure by Syrian artillery. Additional Syrian strikes were flown in support of the 1st Armoured Division's counterattack to relieve the armoured brigades besieged south of the Karoun Lake.
盡管敘利亞取得了成功，兩個裝甲旅通過這個開放了幾個小時的走廊事實上逃脫了，但敘軍的第10裝甲師卻付出了沉重的代價，在戰鬥過程中損失了差不多200 輛T-62s,它們中至少有90輛被完整的俘獲，這支部隊被調回並用來自戰略儲備物資的T-55坦克迅速重新武裝，反過來，第1裝甲師被命令返回敘利亞邊 界後方，重組後繼續繼續它前往紮赫勒的行程，在那個重要時刻，6月9日的12:30，一攻擊波共4架敘利亞空軍的米格-23BN戰鬥機轟炸了設置在薩瑪奇 亞的以軍總部，通過檢測被跟蹤的以軍無線電通訊，得知已經受到了敘利亞炮兵的重壓，另外的敘還以的空中打擊支援了敘軍第1裝甲師營救卡魯恩湖南側兩個裝甲 旅的行動。
Two hours later, in order to be able to better support their ground troops in fighting Syrians, the IDF/AF launched the Operation Drugstore – a concentrated attack against the Syrian SAM-sites in the area between Zahle and the Syrian border. This operation was highly successful and resulted not only in the neutralization of the Syrian SAMs, but also in downing of 23 SyAAF fighter-bombers scrambled into the Lebanese skies.
兩個小時以後，戰鬥中的敘利亞陸軍得到了更好的支援，以色列陸軍和空軍開始了行動方案，一次密集針對性的攻擊敘利亞位於紮赫勒和敘利亞邊界之間的薩姆導彈 陣地，這次行動獲得了圓滿成功，結果不僅瓦解了敘利亞的薩姆防空導彈網，還擊落了進入黎巴嫩領空的23架敘利亞戰鬥轟炸機。
With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
隨著敘利亞薩姆防空網的瓦解，以軍指揮官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下達命令，以第90和第252師級戰鬥隊的全部，進行一次大規模的三管齊下的攻擊，進攻敘利亞第10裝甲師的殘部，以及在貝卡穀地的敘利亞第3裝甲師的小股部隊。
Day Three, 10 June
By the morning of 10 June Einan’s 162 Ugda – supported by vicious attacks of IDF/AF fighter-bombers and attack helicopters - broke through the positions of the 51st Syrian Brigade at Ayn Dara, destroying a number of T-62 tanks in the process. In return, it was hit by several Gazelle- and attacks by SyAAF fighter-bombers between 07:15 and 08:30hrs, losing additional vehicles in the process. Namely, the SyAAF has sent a large number of Gazelles into “search and destroy” missions over Lebanon, as the Syrian army was unable to confirm location of enemy units due to a very fluid situation. The Gazelle-crews were thus roaming deep over the Beka’a Valley, searching for suitable targets. Several times they were successful, in other cases not: as by the time the IDF started deploying M-163 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with its forward mechanized units, their task became extremely dangerous. One of the Gazelles was indeed badly damaged by 20mm AAA after attacking a column of Israeli tanks and claiming four direct hits. The pilot was badly injured but flew his smoking SA.342 back to al-Mezzeh and laded it safely: he was immediately hospitalized and managed to recover only after emergency surgery.
第3天 ，6月10日
埃南的162師級戰鬥隊，在以色列陸軍和空軍的戰鬥轟炸機和武裝直升機猛烈攻擊的支援下，突破了敘利亞軍第51步兵旅在達拉泉的防禦，在這一過程中摧毀了 一定數量的T-62坦克，但在7:15至8：30分之間，受到了“小羚羊”和敘利亞空軍的戰鬥轟炸機的攻擊，損失了不少車輛，換句話說，敘利亞空軍起飛了 大批的“小羚羊”進入黎巴嫩執行搜索與摧毀的任務，出於敘軍對於無法確定敵軍位置的不明朗局勢，“小羚羊”的乘員們駕駛飛機在貝卡穀地的深處遊弋，搜索合 適的目標。有時他們是成功的，其他情況下：當以軍伴隨前進的機械化縱隊開始部署有M-163“火神”自行高炮後，它們的任務變得極其危險，一架“小羚羊” 被以軍裝甲縱隊隨行的20mm“火神”自行高炮擊中後嚴重受損，據稱還有4架被擊中。受重傷的飛行員駕駛它冒煙的飛機飛回了al-Mezzeh並安全著 陸，他被立即送往醫院，設法恢複後做了急診手術。
The last in this series of attacks, executed around 09:00hrs near the Hill 1943, reportedly left a number of Israeli vehicles afire. Simultaneously, another Gazelle-attack was flown against the Task Force Vardi, in the area between Ayn Zhalta and Azzoniyeh, and two hours later Gazelles of the 977 Squadron attacked also a column of Israeli tanks moving from Barouch towards Ayn Zhalta. Eventually, Einan’s advance was stopped cold only few kilometres short of his objective: it remains unclear if this happened due to fierce Syrian counterattacks or because Einan was ordered to turn and attack towards east. Certainly, the IDF was interested in capturing at least a section of the Beirut-Damascus highway and thus splitting Syrian forces in Lebanon in two, as well as advancing into the rear of the 1st Armoured Division. There must have been a strong reason for them not to attempt doing this.
在這一係列的攻擊之後，在9:00左右在1943高地附近執行任務，據報道，以色列留下了一定數目的著火車輛，其他的“小羚羊”攻擊了vardi特遣隊， 在Ayn Zhalta 和Azzoniyeh之間的地區，兩個小時之後，第977“小羚羊”中隊也攻擊了一隊自Barouch向Ayn Zhalta移動的以色列坦克，埃南的推進停止在距離他的目標僅僅幾千米的地方，仍然不清楚，是發生了敘利亞軍隊的激烈抵抗還是因為埃南決定轉向向西攻 擊，當然，以軍得興趣在奪得貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路的至少一段，將在黎巴嫩的敘利亞軍隊分割為兩部分，以及推進到敘利亞第1裝甲師的後方，一定有重要的 原因使他們不願做這樣的嚐試。
Meanwhile, the 252 Ugda was moving as well, despite very difficult terrain and poor roads, and by the noon its leading elements were in full advance towards north. However, around 15:30hrs it was hit by an attack of SyAAF Gazelles while struck in a traffic jam near the Hill 1794, north of Shab’a. As the helicopters targeted one tank and APC after the other, firing their missiles outside the range of Israeli machine-guns, a chaos broke out. Syrians claimed seven M-113s and M-60s destroyed during this attack. Ignoring his difficult situation Ben Gal was pushing his units forward, reorganizing 252 Ugda for an advance by night.
與此同時，第252師級戰鬥隊繼續運動，盡管複雜的地形和較差的路況，到中午它的前鋒，全麵朝北推進，但在15:30它在1794高地附近的交通堵塞中被 敘利亞空軍的“小羚羊”一次攻擊所打擊，shab’a的北麵，隨著直升機針對一輛坦克和後麵的裝甲運兵車後，在以軍機槍的射程外發射它們的導彈，一陣混亂 之後，敘利亞聲稱7輛M-113s和M-60s在這次攻擊中被摧毀。忽略了他的困難局麵的本加爾督促他的部隊前進，提前一夜重組了252師級戰鬥隊。
To the right of the Ugda 252, after overruning vacated positions of the Syrian 91st Tank Brigade, the Task Force Peled reached Yanta, near the Syrian border, where it was stopped by the Syrian 21st Mechanized Brigade – the second element of the 1st Armoured Division that was still on march from Damascus. The leading elements of the 90 Ugda joined Peled after a fighting march through Beka’a Valley. Despite fierce air battles raging overhead, in the afternoon Yanta and the newly-set-up local Israeli HQs was hit by a tremendous attack by several waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22s, in which the IDF vize-Chief of Staff, Gen. Yekotai Adam, was killed as well (according to Israeli sources, Adam was killed by a Palestinian boy, using an RPG-7).
在第252師級戰鬥隊的左翼，敘利亞軍第91坦克旅的位置騰空之後，佩萊德特遣隊搜索了在敘利亞邊界附近的yanta，在那裏它被敘利亞第21機械化旅所 阻止—這是從大馬士革行軍趕來的第1裝甲師的第2個旅，加入佩萊德特遣隊的第90師級戰鬥隊的先頭在一場行進中的戰鬥之後穿過了貝卡穀地，盡管激烈的空戰 在天空進行，在下午yanta,新建立的以軍指揮部被敘利亞空軍的蘇霍伊蘇-22戰鬥轟炸機的幾波猛烈的攻擊所擊中，當時以軍總參謀長維澤、將軍雅各達. 亞當也被打死（以色列方麵的記錄，亞當被一名巴勒斯坦少年使用RPG-7火箭筒擊斃）
Gazelles followed in the wake of the fighter-bombers, hitting a number of M-60s and M-113s along the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. Given that this communication is running parallel to the Syrian border and only few kilometres away from it, the SyAAF now had it very easy to deploy an increasing number of attack helicopters. 12 Israeli tanks were reportedly hit during this attack alone and a number of other vehicles was destroyed as well.
“小羚羊”在戰鬥轟炸機的轟鳴聲中跟進，在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上擊中了一些m-60s坦克和m-113裝甲車，鑒於以軍這種通訊情況是並行的，並且距離敘利亞邊界僅有幾千米，敘利亞空軍掌 握了它非常容易去部署增加一定數目的武裝直升機，據報12輛以軍坦克被擊中，還有一定數目的車輛被摧毀。
Clearly, until today the Israelis deny any such Syrian strikes, and none of their sources mentions large tank battles in the area south and south-east of Lake Karoun: according to their reports issued to Pentagon their whole force in Lebanon suffered only four injured troops on that day. However, the following comment from an IDF/AF F-16-pilot who scored the only kill against a Syrian Su-22 of that war, on 11 June 1982, is clearly indicating what must have happened at Yanta:
- Of all the four kills I made, downing the Su-22 gave me the greatest satisfaction because I saw the horrendous results of a Sukhoi attack on our ground forces a day earlier.
很明顯，直到今日以色列否認某些敘利亞的打擊，它們的來源無一提到在卡魯恩湖南麵和西南麵的區域的大規模的坦克戰：它們提交給五角大樓的報告記錄中，它們 的整個部隊在當天在黎巴嫩僅僅有四名士兵受傷，但是，來自以色列F-16戰鬥機飛行員的之後評論---整個戰爭期間隻有擊落一架蘇-22的成績，在 1982年6月11日，清楚的說明在yanta肯定發生了：我製造了全部4個損失，墜落的蘇-22給我很強的通訊，因為我看見過駭人聽聞的結果，那天早些 時候，一架蘇-22攻擊了我們的特遣隊。
Another Gazelle-raid then hit the Peled’s Special Manoeuvre Force on the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. These attacks bought sufficient time for the Syrians not only to pull back the survivors from the 10th Armoured Division back behind the border, but also to deploy reinforcements in anti-tank commandos by Mi-8 helicopters into the Ghazzah area: despite the supposed “total” IDF/AF air superiority, not a single of at least a dozen of involved SyAAF helicopter was detected by the Israelis. Nevertheless, the SyAAF did lose a Mi-8 to Israeli anti-aircraft fire during another operation.
另一些“小羚羊”空襲，在在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上襲擊佩萊德特遣隊，這些攻擊帶來了足夠的時間不僅使得敘利亞第10裝甲師的幸存者回到邊界的後方，而且也將由米-8運輸的反 坦克突擊隊進入Ghazzah地區以增強防禦。盡管假定以軍的空中優勢，但參與的敘利亞至少一打的直升機沒有一架被以色列發現，不過，在另一次行動中一架 敘利亞米-8直升機被以色列防空炮火擊落。
The Syrian air strikes and fierce artillery attacks against all known forward Israeli headquarters, as well as a fluid situation in Lebanon now obviously resulted in a critical mistake of the Israeli leadership. The situation on the battlefield was far from clear, then the two opponents were deeply wedged into each other. But, at least the IDF/AF should have been in possession of air superiority, enabling Israeli reconnaissance assets to find the enemy and track the Syrians down. Strangely enough, this was obviously not the case. The Israelis either completely failed to notice or misunderstood that the Syrians were reorganizing their units after the battering experienced by their 10th Armoured Division. This elements of this unit that were originally surrounded south of the Lake Karoun were pulled out of Lebanon, regroupped and - as already mentioned - later re-equipped with T-55 tanks. The rest of this division pulled back towards the north. Simultaneously, two armoured brigades of the 3rd Armoured Division were moved towards south from the Beirut-Damascus road, with intention of closing the gap that came into being through the collapse of 10th Armoured Division's front south of them. The 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72s and still fresh despite the fighting along the border, was then to enter Lebanon along the Beirut-Damascus road and replace the 3rd. The Syrians were therefore not falling back, just replacing their units: however, the IDF considered the movement of the 1st Armoured Division towards north for a general withdrawal. Consequently, the Israelis immediately pushed their units into “pursuit” towards north. The IDF was to pay a high price for this mistake.
敘利亞的空中打擊和猛烈的炮火朝位置已知的以軍指揮部攻擊，而在黎巴嫩一個不確定的情況，以軍指揮部犯了一個關鍵的錯誤，雖然戰場的情況不確定，交戰雙方 犬牙交錯，但是至少以軍擁有空中優勢，可以啟用以軍的偵察資料去發現敵軍和打擊敘利亞人，很奇怪的是，事實並非如此，以軍完全忽略或者誤判了重組的敘利亞 第10裝甲師的戰鬥經驗，這支原本一部被包圍在卡魯恩湖南側的撤出黎巴嫩後，重新組織，前麵已經提到它重新裝備了T-55s坦克，該師的其餘朝北拉回，同 時，敘利亞第3裝甲師的2個裝甲旅沿貝魯特-大馬士革公路朝南運動，它們意圖封閉因為敘利亞第10裝甲師南麵陣地的崩潰而造成的缺口，第1裝甲師裝備T- 72s坦克，剛剛沿邊界進行了戰鬥，爾後它們沿貝魯特-大馬士革公路進入黎巴嫩，接替第3裝甲師，敘軍因此不用後撤，剛剛重組的部隊，以軍研究認為第1裝 甲師朝南的運動隻是一般的後撤，因此，以軍馬上調動它的部隊朝南追趕，以軍因為這個錯誤付出了高昂的代價。
Chaos of "Sultan Yacoub": 11 June
On the evening of 10 June, Ben Gal once again rushed his troops forward. To the north of them was an area known as well-fortified by the Syrians. Nevertheless, the Israelis considered their opposition as weak: only two commando battalions of 250 men each, and few tanks was what – at least in theory – was standing between them and the Beirut-Damascus road in this part of Lebanon. “In theory”, then the Israelis were already informed about deployment of a strong Syrian mechanized force along the strategic highway, from east towards West. Obviously, the IDF HQs concluded that the Syrians were rather preparing for a “last-ditch” counterattack, then bringing serious reinforcements to the frontlines.
“蘇坦 亞庫布”的混亂：6月11日
在6月10日清晨，本.加爾再一次命令他的部隊前進，目標是他們北麵一個被敘利亞加強的區域，不過，以軍認為他們抵抗不強：僅有每營250人的2個突擊 營，和一些坦克---至少在理論上---擋在他們與黎巴嫩境內的貝魯特-大馬士革公路之間，“在理論上”，後來以軍已經得知一支強大的敘利亞裝甲部隊沿戰 略高速公路部署，由東朝西，顯然，以軍指揮部斷定敘軍在為“最後一搏”的反擊而準備，於是認真的向前線增援。
The task of leading this final advance fell on 90 Ugda; a unit that was previously successful in fighting the Syrian 91st Armoured Brigade, and destroying no less but 35 Syrian tanks in exchange for five own losses. Commander of the 90 Ugda, Brig.Gen. Giora Leo, received the corresponding order around 19:00hrs. Several hours later, its 362 Battalion, equipped with M48A-3 Magach-3 tanks, drove through the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta – only to receive strong fire of all calibres and have its leading element cut off deep inside the Syrian positions.
主導這一關鍵推進的任務落在第90師級戰鬥群的身上：一支早先成功戰勝敘軍第91裝甲旅的部隊，在戰鬥交換中摧毀不少於35輛敘利亞坦克，自身損失5 輛，90師級戰鬥群的指揮官是本.加爾.格拉.雷恩，在19:00收到相應的指令。晚了幾個小時，它的第362戰鬥群，裝備M-48A3馬加奇3坦克，在 坦他行進穿過as-Sultan Yac'ub村，僅遇到各種口徑的重火器射擊，其先頭部隊深深切入敘軍陣地內部。
By 01:30hrs in the morning of 11 June the trapped Israeli battalion was in a state of chaos, blocked in a narrow valley on the end of which was another village, drawing heavy direct- and artillery-fire from several sides. It was not until 04:00hrs that the situation slowly improved, although during the permanent contact with Syrians around it the unit lost several tanks and a number of crewmembers. Several Syrian Army anti-tank teams participated in this battle, attacking from very short ranges with RPGs, as well as Milan ATGMs. Early in the morning the Israelis were also strafed by two MiG-21s, but these dropped no bombs due to close proximity of their own troops. Eventually, the IDF was unable to mount a large-scale operation in time to recover the embattled battalion; the 90 and the nearby 880 Ugdas - deployed to Lebanon only a day earlier - were busy attempting to prevent the 3rd Syrian Armoured Division's attempt to advance towards the south, and preven the 1st Armoured Division from deploying along the Beirut-Damascus road towards west.
6月11日清晨1:30分，被困的以色列營處於混亂狀態中，在最後被封鎖在一條狹窄山穀的末端的另一個村莊麵前，引出來自側麵的重要指向和炮火，直到 4：00情況慢慢好轉，雖然期間保持通暢的聯係，因為敘利亞的包圍而損失了幾輛坦克和一些成員，幾個敘軍反坦克小分隊在戰鬥中參戰，襲擊來自近距離的 RPGs，同時還有“米蘭”反坦克導彈。在早晨以軍也受到了2架米格-21來自低空的掃射，但這些投下的炸彈沒有靠近他的部隊，最後，以軍不能按時設置一 個大幅度運轉換取營隊的戰鬥序列，第90和附近的第880師級戰鬥隊，在黎巴嫩僅僅在當天早晨才部署，試圖預防敘利亞第3裝甲師朝南前進的企圖，以及預防 敘利亞第1裝甲師沿貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路西麵的布防。
Eventually, what was left of the 362 Battalion had to dash for Israeli lines in the course of the morning, with massive artillery support, but leaving some eight destroyed or abandoned M-48s behind.
最後，第362戰鬥營的左翼因為早晨以色列的直線路線被猛烈衝擊，伴隨強有力的炮火支援，但是，丟下8輛被摧毀或在後麵掉隊的m-48s。
There was a sense of urgency in extracting the remnants of the 362 Battalion from behind the Syrian lines, then meanwhile the final Israeli push towards north was in full swing, while the Syrian 1st Armoured was deploying along the highway from the border towards Beirut. Besides, the Israeli and Syrian governments agreed to a ceasefire, to start at noon of 11 June, and now both sides were in a rush to grab as much as they could.
這樣一個緊急的判斷在拉出敘利亞防線間的第362戰鬥營的殘餘，然後最終決定性的以軍在完全的回轉中推進朝北，當敘利亞第1裝甲師沿著從邊界朝貝魯特的高速路部署時，以色列和敘利亞政府同意一次停火，自6月11日中午生效，現在兩方在一次倉促中去搶奪他們盡可能多的東西。
兩個小時以後，戰鬥中的敘利亞陸軍得到了更好的支援，以色列陸軍和空軍開始了行動方案，一次密集針對性的攻擊敘利亞位於紮赫勒和敘利亞邊界之間的薩姆導彈 陣地，這次行動獲得了圓滿成功，結果不僅瓦解了敘利亞的薩姆防空導彈網，還擊落了進入黎巴嫩領空的23架敘利亞戰鬥轟炸機。
With Syrian SAMs neutralized, an IDF corps under command of Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal, consisting of Ugdas 90 and 252, opened a major, three-pronged offensive against the remnants of the 10th Syrian Armoured Division, as well as forward elements of the 3rd Armoured Division in the Beka’a Valley.
隨著敘利亞薩姆防空網的瓦解，以軍指揮官Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ben Gal下達命令，以第90和第252師級戰鬥隊的全部，進行一次大規模的三管齊下的攻擊，進攻敘利亞第10裝甲師的殘部，以及在貝卡穀地的敘利亞第3裝甲師的小股部隊。
Day Three, 10 June
By the morning of 10 June Einan’s 162 Ugda – supported by vicious attacks of IDF/AF fighter-bombers and attack helicopters - broke through the positions of the 51st Syrian Brigade at Ayn Dara, destroying a number of T-62 tanks in the process. In return, it was hit by several Gazelle- and attacks by SyAAF fighter-bombers between 07:15 and 08:30hrs, losing additional vehicles in the process. Namely, the SyAAF has sent a large number of Gazelles into “search and destroy” missions over Lebanon, as the Syrian army was unable to confirm location of enemy units due to a very fluid situation. The Gazelle-crews were thus roaming deep over the Beka’a Valley, searching for suitable targets. Several times they were successful, in other cases not: as by the time the IDF started deploying M-163 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with its forward mechanized units, their task became extremely dangerous. One of the Gazelles was indeed badly damaged by 20mm AAA after attacking a column of Israeli tanks and claiming four direct hits. The pilot was badly injured but flew his smoking SA.342 back to al-Mezzeh and laded it safely: he was immediately hospitalized and managed to recover only after emergency surgery.
第3天 ，6月10日
埃南的162師級戰鬥隊，在以色列陸軍和空軍的戰鬥轟炸機和武裝直升機猛烈攻擊的支援下，突破了敘利亞軍第51步兵旅在達拉泉的防禦，在這一過程中摧毀了 一定數量的T-62坦克，但在7:15至8：30分之間，受到了“小羚羊”和敘利亞空軍的戰鬥轟炸機的攻擊，損失了不少車輛，換句話說，敘利亞空軍起飛了 大批的“小羚羊”進入黎巴嫩執行搜索與摧毀的任務，出於敘軍對於無法確定敵軍位置的不明朗局勢，“小羚羊”的乘員們駕駛飛機在貝卡穀地的深處遊弋，搜索合 適的目標。有時他們是成功的，其他情況下：當以軍伴隨前進的機械化縱隊開始部署有M-163“火神”自行高炮後，它們的任務變得極其危險，一架“小羚羊” 被以軍裝甲縱隊隨行的20mm“火神”自行高炮擊中後嚴重受損，據稱還有4架被擊中。受重傷的飛行員駕駛它冒煙的飛機飛回了al-Mezzeh並安全著 陸，他被立即送往醫院，設法恢複後做了急診手術。
The last in this series of attacks, executed around 09:00hrs near the Hill 1943, reportedly left a number of Israeli vehicles afire. Simultaneously, another Gazelle-attack was flown against the Task Force Vardi, in the area between Ayn Zhalta and Azzoniyeh, and two hours later Gazelles of the 977 Squadron attacked also a column of Israeli tanks moving from Barouch towards Ayn Zhalta. Eventually, Einan’s advance was stopped cold only few kilometres short of his objective: it remains unclear if this happened due to fierce Syrian counterattacks or because Einan was ordered to turn and attack towards east. Certainly, the IDF was interested in capturing at least a section of the Beirut-Damascus highway and thus splitting Syrian forces in Lebanon in two, as well as advancing into the rear of the 1st Armoured Division. There must have been a strong reason for them not to attempt doing this.
在這一係列的攻擊之後，在9:00左右在1943高地附近執行任務，據報道，以色列留下了一定數目的著火車輛，其他的“小羚羊”攻擊了vardi特遣隊， 在Ayn Zhalta 和Azzoniyeh之間的地區，兩個小時之後，第977“小羚羊”中隊也攻擊了一隊自Barouch向Ayn Zhalta移動的以色列坦克，埃南的推進停止在距離他的目標僅僅幾千米的地方，仍然不清楚，是發生了敘利亞軍隊的激烈抵抗還是因為埃南決定轉向向西攻 擊，當然，以軍得興趣在奪得貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路的至少一段，將在黎巴嫩的敘利亞軍隊分割為兩部分，以及推進到敘利亞第1裝甲師的後方，一定有重要的 原因使他們不願做這樣的嚐試。
Meanwhile, the 252 Ugda was moving as well, despite very difficult terrain and poor roads, and by the noon its leading elements were in full advance towards north. However, around 15:30hrs it was hit by an attack of SyAAF Gazelles while struck in a traffic jam near the Hill 1794, north of Shab’a. As the helicopters targeted one tank and APC after the other, firing their missiles outside the range of Israeli machine-guns, a chaos broke out. Syrians claimed seven M-113s and M-60s destroyed during this attack. Ignoring his difficult situation Ben Gal was pushing his units forward, reorganizing 252 Ugda for an advance by night.
與此同時，第252師級戰鬥隊繼續運動，盡管複雜的地形和較差的路況，到中午它的前鋒，全麵朝北推進，但在15:30它在1794高地附近的交通堵塞中被 敘利亞空軍的“小羚羊”一次攻擊所打擊，shab’a的北麵，隨著直升機針對一輛坦克和後麵的裝甲運兵車後，在以軍機槍的射程外發射它們的導彈，一陣混亂 之後，敘利亞聲稱7輛M-113s和M-60s在這次攻擊中被摧毀。忽略了他的困難局麵的本加爾督促他的部隊前進，提前一夜重組了252師級戰鬥隊。
To the right of the Ugda 252, after overruning vacated positions of the Syrian 91st Tank Brigade, the Task Force Peled reached Yanta, near the Syrian border, where it was stopped by the Syrian 21st Mechanized Brigade – the second element of the 1st Armoured Division that was still on march from Damascus. The leading elements of the 90 Ugda joined Peled after a fighting march through Beka’a Valley. Despite fierce air battles raging overhead, in the afternoon Yanta and the newly-set-up local Israeli HQs was hit by a tremendous attack by several waves of Syrian Sukhoi Su-22s, in which the IDF vize-Chief of Staff, Gen. Yekotai Adam, was killed as well (according to Israeli sources, Adam was killed by a Palestinian boy, using an RPG-7).
在第252師級戰鬥隊的左翼，敘利亞軍第91坦克旅的位置騰空之後，佩萊德特遣隊搜索了在敘利亞邊界附近的yanta，在那裏它被敘利亞第21機械化旅所 阻止—這是從大馬士革行軍趕來的第1裝甲師的第2個旅，加入佩萊德特遣隊的第90師級戰鬥隊的先頭在一場行進中的戰鬥之後穿過了貝卡穀地，盡管激烈的空戰 在天空進行，在下午yanta,新建立的以軍指揮部被敘利亞空軍的蘇霍伊蘇-22戰鬥轟炸機的幾波猛烈的攻擊所擊中，當時以軍總參謀長維澤、將軍雅各達. 亞當也被打死（以色列方麵的記錄，亞當被一名巴勒斯坦少年使用RPG-7火箭筒擊斃）
Gazelles followed in the wake of the fighter-bombers, hitting a number of M-60s and M-113s along the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. Given that this communication is running parallel to the Syrian border and only few kilometres away from it, the SyAAF now had it very easy to deploy an increasing number of attack helicopters. 12 Israeli tanks were reportedly hit during this attack alone and a number of other vehicles was destroyed as well.
“小羚羊”在戰鬥轟炸機的轟鳴聲中跟進，在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上擊中了一些m-60s坦克和m-113裝甲車，鑒於以軍這種通訊情況是並行的，並且距離敘利亞邊界僅有幾千米，敘利亞空軍掌 握了它非常容易去部署增加一定數目的武裝直升機，據報12輛以軍坦克被擊中，還有一定數目的車輛被摧毀。
Clearly, until today the Israelis deny any such Syrian strikes, and none of their sources mentions large tank battles in the area south and south-east of Lake Karoun: according to their reports issued to Pentagon their whole force in Lebanon suffered only four injured troops on that day. However, the following comment from an IDF/AF F-16-pilot who scored the only kill against a Syrian Su-22 of that war, on 11 June 1982, is clearly indicating what must have happened at Yanta:
- Of all the four kills I made, downing the Su-22 gave me the greatest satisfaction because I saw the horrendous results of a Sukhoi attack on our ground forces a day earlier.
很明顯，直到今日以色列否認某些敘利亞的打擊，它們的來源無一提到在卡魯恩湖南麵和西南麵的區域的大規模的坦克戰：它們提交給五角大樓的報告記錄中，它們 的整個部隊在當天在黎巴嫩僅僅有四名士兵受傷，但是，來自以色列F-16戰鬥機飛行員的之後評論---整個戰爭期間隻有擊落一架蘇-22的成績，在 1982年6月11日，清楚的說明在yanta肯定發生了：我製造了全部4個損失，墜落的蘇-22給我很強的通訊，因為我看見過駭人聽聞的結果，那天早些 時候，一架蘇-22攻擊了我們的特遣隊。
Another Gazelle-raid then hit the Peled’s Special Manoeuvre Force on the road from Ayn Ata to Rashayya. These attacks bought sufficient time for the Syrians not only to pull back the survivors from the 10th Armoured Division back behind the border, but also to deploy reinforcements in anti-tank commandos by Mi-8 helicopters into the Ghazzah area: despite the supposed “total” IDF/AF air superiority, not a single of at least a dozen of involved SyAAF helicopter was detected by the Israelis. Nevertheless, the SyAAF did lose a Mi-8 to Israeli anti-aircraft fire during another operation.
另一些“小羚羊”空襲，在在Ayn Ata 至 Rashayya的沿途道路上襲擊佩萊德特遣隊，這些攻擊帶來了足夠的時間不僅使得敘利亞第10裝甲師的幸存者回到邊界的後方，而且也將由米-8運輸的反 坦克突擊隊進入Ghazzah地區以增強防禦。盡管假定以軍的空中優勢，但參與的敘利亞至少一打的直升機沒有一架被以色列發現，不過，在另一次行動中一架 敘利亞米-8直升機被以色列防空炮火擊落。
The Syrian air strikes and fierce artillery attacks against all known forward Israeli headquarters, as well as a fluid situation in Lebanon now obviously resulted in a critical mistake of the Israeli leadership. The situation on the battlefield was far from clear, then the two opponents were deeply wedged into each other. But, at least the IDF/AF should have been in possession of air superiority, enabling Israeli reconnaissance assets to find the enemy and track the Syrians down. Strangely enough, this was obviously not the case. The Israelis either completely failed to notice or misunderstood that the Syrians were reorganizing their units after the battering experienced by their 10th Armoured Division. This elements of this unit that were originally surrounded south of the Lake Karoun were pulled out of Lebanon, regroupped and - as already mentioned - later re-equipped with T-55 tanks. The rest of this division pulled back towards the north. Simultaneously, two armoured brigades of the 3rd Armoured Division were moved towards south from the Beirut-Damascus road, with intention of closing the gap that came into being through the collapse of 10th Armoured Division's front south of them. The 1st Armoured Division, equipped with T-72s and still fresh despite the fighting along the border, was then to enter Lebanon along the Beirut-Damascus road and replace the 3rd. The Syrians were therefore not falling back, just replacing their units: however, the IDF considered the movement of the 1st Armoured Division towards north for a general withdrawal. Consequently, the Israelis immediately pushed their units into “pursuit” towards north. The IDF was to pay a high price for this mistake.
敘利亞的空中打擊和猛烈的炮火朝位置已知的以軍指揮部攻擊，而在黎巴嫩一個不確定的情況，以軍指揮部犯了一個關鍵的錯誤，雖然戰場的情況不確定，交戰雙方 犬牙交錯，但是至少以軍擁有空中優勢，可以啟用以軍的偵察資料去發現敵軍和打擊敘利亞人，很奇怪的是，事實並非如此，以軍完全忽略或者誤判了重組的敘利亞 第10裝甲師的戰鬥經驗，這支原本一部被包圍在卡魯恩湖南側的撤出黎巴嫩後，重新組織，前麵已經提到它重新裝備了T-55s坦克，該師的其餘朝北拉回，同 時，敘利亞第3裝甲師的2個裝甲旅沿貝魯特-大馬士革公路朝南運動，它們意圖封閉因為敘利亞第10裝甲師南麵陣地的崩潰而造成的缺口，第1裝甲師裝備T- 72s坦克，剛剛沿邊界進行了戰鬥，爾後它們沿貝魯特-大馬士革公路進入黎巴嫩，接替第3裝甲師，敘軍因此不用後撤，剛剛重組的部隊，以軍研究認為第1裝 甲師朝南的運動隻是一般的後撤，因此，以軍馬上調動它的部隊朝南追趕，以軍因為這個錯誤付出了高昂的代價。
Chaos of "Sultan Yacoub": 11 June
On the evening of 10 June, Ben Gal once again rushed his troops forward. To the north of them was an area known as well-fortified by the Syrians. Nevertheless, the Israelis considered their opposition as weak: only two commando battalions of 250 men each, and few tanks was what – at least in theory – was standing between them and the Beirut-Damascus road in this part of Lebanon. “In theory”, then the Israelis were already informed about deployment of a strong Syrian mechanized force along the strategic highway, from east towards West. Obviously, the IDF HQs concluded that the Syrians were rather preparing for a “last-ditch” counterattack, then bringing serious reinforcements to the frontlines.
“蘇坦 亞庫布”的混亂：6月11日
在6月10日清晨，本.加爾再一次命令他的部隊前進，目標是他們北麵一個被敘利亞加強的區域，不過，以軍認為他們抵抗不強：僅有每營250人的2個突擊 營，和一些坦克---至少在理論上---擋在他們與黎巴嫩境內的貝魯特-大馬士革公路之間，“在理論上”，後來以軍已經得知一支強大的敘利亞裝甲部隊沿戰 略高速公路部署，由東朝西，顯然，以軍指揮部斷定敘軍在為“最後一搏”的反擊而準備，於是認真的向前線增援。
The task of leading this final advance fell on 90 Ugda; a unit that was previously successful in fighting the Syrian 91st Armoured Brigade, and destroying no less but 35 Syrian tanks in exchange for five own losses. Commander of the 90 Ugda, Brig.Gen. Giora Leo, received the corresponding order around 19:00hrs. Several hours later, its 362 Battalion, equipped with M48A-3 Magach-3 tanks, drove through the village of as-Sultan Yac'ub at Tanta – only to receive strong fire of all calibres and have its leading element cut off deep inside the Syrian positions.
主導這一關鍵推進的任務落在第90師級戰鬥群的身上：一支早先成功戰勝敘軍第91裝甲旅的部隊，在戰鬥交換中摧毀不少於35輛敘利亞坦克，自身損失5 輛，90師級戰鬥群的指揮官是本.加爾.格拉.雷恩，在19:00收到相應的指令。晚了幾個小時，它的第362戰鬥群，裝備M-48A3馬加奇3坦克，在 坦他行進穿過as-Sultan Yac'ub村，僅遇到各種口徑的重火器射擊，其先頭部隊深深切入敘軍陣地內部。
By 01:30hrs in the morning of 11 June the trapped Israeli battalion was in a state of chaos, blocked in a narrow valley on the end of which was another village, drawing heavy direct- and artillery-fire from several sides. It was not until 04:00hrs that the situation slowly improved, although during the permanent contact with Syrians around it the unit lost several tanks and a number of crewmembers. Several Syrian Army anti-tank teams participated in this battle, attacking from very short ranges with RPGs, as well as Milan ATGMs. Early in the morning the Israelis were also strafed by two MiG-21s, but these dropped no bombs due to close proximity of their own troops. Eventually, the IDF was unable to mount a large-scale operation in time to recover the embattled battalion; the 90 and the nearby 880 Ugdas - deployed to Lebanon only a day earlier - were busy attempting to prevent the 3rd Syrian Armoured Division's attempt to advance towards the south, and preven the 1st Armoured Division from deploying along the Beirut-Damascus road towards west.
6月11日清晨1:30分，被困的以色列營處於混亂狀態中，在最後被封鎖在一條狹窄山穀的末端的另一個村莊麵前，引出來自側麵的重要指向和炮火，直到 4：00情況慢慢好轉，雖然期間保持通暢的聯係，因為敘利亞的包圍而損失了幾輛坦克和一些成員，幾個敘軍反坦克小分隊在戰鬥中參戰，襲擊來自近距離的 RPGs，同時還有“米蘭”反坦克導彈。在早晨以軍也受到了2架米格-21來自低空的掃射，但這些投下的炸彈沒有靠近他的部隊，最後，以軍不能按時設置一 個大幅度運轉換取營隊的戰鬥序列，第90和附近的第880師級戰鬥隊，在黎巴嫩僅僅在當天早晨才部署，試圖預防敘利亞第3裝甲師朝南前進的企圖，以及預防 敘利亞第1裝甲師沿貝魯特-大馬士革高速公路西麵的布防。
Eventually, what was left of the 362 Battalion had to dash for Israeli lines in the course of the morning, with massive artillery support, but leaving some eight destroyed or abandoned M-48s behind.
最後，第362戰鬥營的左翼因為早晨以色列的直線路線被猛烈衝擊，伴隨強有力的炮火支援，但是，丟下8輛被摧毀或在後麵掉隊的m-48s。
There was a sense of urgency in extracting the remnants of the 362 Battalion from behind the Syrian lines, then meanwhile the final Israeli push towards north was in full swing, while the Syrian 1st Armoured was deploying along the highway from the border towards Beirut. Besides, the Israeli and Syrian governments agreed to a ceasefire, to start at noon of 11 June, and now both sides were in a rush to grab as much as they could.
這樣一個緊急的判斷在拉出敘利亞防線間的第362戰鬥營的殘餘，然後最終決定性的以軍在完全的回轉中推進朝北，當敘利亞第1裝甲師沿著從邊界朝貝魯特的高速路部署時，以色列和敘利亞政府同意一次停火，自6月11日中午生效，現在兩方在一次倉促中去搶奪他們盡可能多的東西。
Final clashes occurred in two sectors. Early in the morning, the 81st Syrian Armoured Brigade, equipped with T-72 tanks, reached Shtawrah - where a forward repair shop was set - and then turned south along two parallel roads – driving directly into positions of the 409 Israeli Anti-Tank battalion (originally part of the Task Force Peled), and M-60s of the 767 Armoured Brigade. The Syrian tankers, emboldened by their first success from 9th of June, advanced without careful reconnaissance of the area in front of them. In a short but sharp clash that occurred in the late morning, the Israelis hit 12 T-72s with TOWs, forcing the Syrian brigade to pull back to Beirut-Damascus highway. This vital communication, however, remained in Syrian hands: in fact, the Syrians also claimed up to ten M-60s destroyed during this battle while collecting their destroyed and badly damaged T-72s back in Shtawrah.
最後的衝突發生在兩部分，在黎明時分，敘利亞第81裝甲旅，裝備T-72坦克，搜索shtawrah—一個在建的修理店—然後轉南麵沿著兩條平行路線行駛 馬上進入以色列第409反坦克營（來自佩萊德特遣隊組成）和裝備M-60s的767裝甲旅的位置，敘利亞的坦克，受到他們6月9日一次成功攻擊的鼓勵，前 進中沒有仔細偵察它們正前方的區域，在深夜一次短暫而又激烈的衝突中，以色列以“陶”式反坦克導彈擊中了12輛T-72，迫使敘軍拉回貝魯特-大馬士革高 速路，這是重大的訊息，然而，仍然沒有在敘利亞傳遞：實際上，敘利亞也聲稱10輛M-60s在這次戰鬥中被摧毀，當時他們損毀和受傷的T-72s回到 shatawrah.
Meanwhile, in the Beka’a Valley 7th Armoured Brigade of Eitan’s 162 Ugda engaged T-62s of the 58th Syrian Brigade due south of Jub Jnin: in exchange for two destroyed Merkavas, the Israelis knocked out at least a dozen of T-62s. The Syrians claimed destruction of 21 to 30 Israeli armoured vehicles during this battle - which culminated shortly before noon, with attacks of attack helicopters from both sides. Israeli AH-1s and MD.500 Defenders claimed destruction of 15 T-62s and few T-72s near Zahla. However, they encountered fierce anti-aircraft fire and were not able to execute their attacks as expected. One of Defenders was badly damaged by explosion of a shell nearby, so that it crashed on the ground in front of Syrian positions: the navigator was heavily injured but the pilot pulled him out of wreckage and both were recoered by an AB.212. Another Defender was apparently lost to anti-aircraft fire from Israeli armoured units after being misidentified as a Syrian Gazelle: obviously, after previous experiences with SA.432s the Israeli gunners were exceptionally nervous by the time. In return, the Merkavas of the 7th Israeli Brigade shot down at least one Gazelle using their 105mm cannons, and another Syrian SA.342 should have been shot down by a long-range TOW-shot from an Israeli Cobra helicopter.
當然最主要的，在貝卡穀地的埃南的162師級戰鬥隊的第7裝甲旅遇上了在jub jnin以南的敘利亞第58旅，在被摧毀了2輛“梅卡瓦”之後，以軍擊毀了至少一打的T-62s,敘利亞聲稱在這場戰鬥在中午之前的短暫激戰中摧毀了 21-30輛以色列裝甲車輛，同時雙方的武裝直升機也參與了進攻，以色列的AH-1s和md.500“衛士”聲稱摧毀了紮赫勒附近的15輛T-62s和幾 輛T-72s，可是，他們遇到了猛烈的防空炮火，不能執行他們預期的攻擊任務，一架“衛士”被附近一陣防空炮火的轟擊嚴重損壞，使得他墜毀在敘利亞陣地前 方的地麵上：領航員嚴重受傷，但飛行員將其拉出飛機殘骸，兩人都被AB-212營救，另一架“衛士”的損失顯然被以色列裝甲部隊的防空炮火誤當做一架敘利 亞的“小羚羊”：顯然，有了以往與“小羚羊”的經驗後，以色列炮手到時候異常緊張，作為回報，以色列第7裝甲旅的“梅卡瓦”用105mm主炮擊落了至少一 架“小羚羊”，另一架“小羚羊”應該是被以軍“眼鏡蛇”武裝直升機用一枚遠程發射的“陶”式導彈擊落。
How fierce and bitter the fighting on the group was shows the fact that - according to contemporary reports in Israeli press - in the fierce fighting of this day a single Israeli Brigade suffered a loss of 18 KIA - including its commander, Col. Avigdor Shriper - 87 injured, and 22 tanks destroyed.
顯露怎樣在團隊中進行激烈和嚴酷的戰鬥的事實，根據以色列現代的新聞報告，在這一天的激烈戰鬥中，一個以色列旅遭受了18人陣亡的損失—包括它的指揮官vigdor Shriper上校，87人受傷，22輛坦克損毀。
Mixed Results
Despite the ceasefire, the fighting was to resume several days later: in fact, by the end of 1982 there were to be no less but eleven additional ceasefires agreed between the Israelis and Syrians.
綜合結果
盡管停火了，戰鬥卻又在幾天後恢複：事實上，直到1982年末，以色列和敘利亞之間達成了不少於十一次停火協定.
Bean-counting began already on the afternoon of 11 June, of course. On a press conference in early July 1982, the representants of the Syrian Ministry of Defence stated that SA hunter-killer AT-teams destroyed 23 Israeli tanks during the first three days of fighting (between 8 and 11 June) for only minor losses to themselves (overall, the Syrians claimed destruction of “more than 120 Israeli tanks, APCs and mine-clearing vehicles by their ATGMs by the time). Subsequent studies proved that Syrian "hunter-killer" teams in fact hit a total of some 60 Israeli M-60s and Merkavas. However, no less but half of these remained operational, while only few of the others were completely destroyed (some sources state that SA anti-tank teams destroyed only two IDF tanks). As well-known, the Merkavas were heavily armoured and had very good anti-detonation as well as fire-protection equipment, while M-60s, M-48s and Centurions were heavily protected by explosive-reactive-armour (ERA). Although the IDF subsequently concluded that the ERA on their tanks needed improvement, and that at least two Merkavas were indeed destroyed by Syrian anti-tank teams (the IDF lost a total of seven Merkava Mk.1s written-off during this war), it is obvious that these tanks were extremely problematic opponents. The situation with M-113s was less satisfactory: these APCs apparently suffered such losses in the first few days of the war, that by the time the IDF reached Beirut the Israelis were doing their best to avoid deploying them in combat first of all. The Israeli infantry therefore marched beside its APCs for the best part of their way into Lebanon.
統計開始已經在6月11日下午，當然，在1982年6月初的一次記者招待會上，敘利亞外交部和國防部的聲明的描述中，敘利亞空軍獵殺者和地麵反坦克部隊在 頭三天的戰鬥中（6月8日至11日）共摧毀以軍坦克23輛，自身隻有輕微的損失（總體上，敘利亞聲明摧毀“超過120輛坦克、裝甲運兵車和掃雷車在這段時 間被敘軍的反坦克導彈摧毀）隨後研究證明敘利亞“獵殺者”分隊實際擊中以軍60輛M-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，可是，他們中不少於大約一半仍能使用，而其 他的僅有幾輛被完全摧毀。（有消息稱敘利亞反坦克部隊僅摧毀2輛以軍坦克），眾所周知，“梅卡瓦”是重裝，有非常好的抑爆以及防火裝備。而“百夫長”、 m-60s和m-48s被爆炸式反應裝甲（era）嚴密保護，雖然以軍後來斷定他們的era需要改善，至少2輛“梅卡瓦”被敘利亞反坦克部隊摧毀，（以軍 在戰爭期間總共損失7輛“梅卡瓦”1）很明顯，這些坦克是很厲害的對手，M-113裝甲車的情況則不令人滿意，這些裝甲運兵車在戰爭的頭幾天很容易遭受損 失。在那段時間，以軍到達貝魯特後，最大程度的避免在戰鬥第一線部署它們。因此以色列步兵在進軍黎巴嫩的道路上最大限度的在裝甲運兵車旁邊做遊行式的行 軍。
Nevertheless, the fact was also that the Israelis were swift to adapt tactics of their mechanised formations against Syrian AT-teams. They would use 20mm M-163 Vulcan guns to spray their possible positions and TOW-missiles to hit them precisely – usually with deadly results. To counter such weapons the Syrians preferred fighting at shorter range and using lighter anti-tank weapons. This forced the Israelis to deploy their commandos in order to tackle the Syrian anti-tank snipers: much more often than expected the Syrians had the unpleasant experience of being hunted instead of hunting. The resulting clashes were extremely bitter and brutal. This is at best illustrated by the fact that only between 10 and 15% of Syrian anti-tank hunters survived this war. Very few were captured alive, including only one officer: 1st Lt. Mehdi fell into Israeli hands in a badly injured condition, but defied all the IDF efforts to break his spirit before being returned to Syria. As Captain he was later to fight against the Iraqis, in 1991, together with US forces.
不過，事實上以軍迅速適應它們的機械化編隊反擊敘利亞反坦克部隊的戰術，它們會使用20mm“火神”高炮掃射可疑目標，用“陶”式導彈準確打擊它們--- 通常是致命的結果。對付這種武器敘利亞首選是在近距離使用輕型反坦克武器的白刃戰，這迫使以軍部署它們的突擊隊去對付敘利亞反坦克狙擊手：敘利亞人有比預 期更多的被獵殺而非狩獵的不愉快經曆。戰鬥的結果非常痛苦和殘酷，最好的證明是這場戰爭中僅有10%-15%的敘利亞反坦克小組在戰爭中幸存，很少被俘 獲：其中隻有一名成員：一位名叫邁赫迪的中尉在身負重傷的情況下落入以軍手中，但他在回到敘利亞之前卻挫敗了以色列所有摧垮他的精神的努力。作為隊長，他 在1991年他與美軍一起參加了反對伊拉克的戰爭。
Despite immense problems, quite a few surprises, and losses, the Israelis were eventually satisfied with results of the conventional part of the war in Lebanon: in four days of battles they claimed destruction of 81 Syrian tanks, and capturing 41 (mainly T-62s), losing only eight M-48s and two Merkavas in return. Supposedly, one of destroyed Merkavas was subsequently salvaged and repaired. Pictorial evidence exists for a number of additional M-60s being destroyed as well, while the losses of M-113s were obviously so heavy that they were not deployed in forward lines until much later, when most were equipped with additional protection against anti-tank missiles.
盡管有很大的問題，不少的驚喜和損失，以色列最終對黎巴嫩常規戰部分中成果感到滿意，在4天的戰鬥中，他們聲稱摧毀了81輛敘利亞坦克，俘獲41輛（主要 是T-62s）,回報是僅僅損失了8輛m-48s和2輛“梅卡瓦”，據說，一輛被摧毀的“梅卡瓦”隨後被回收和修理，以及在畫報上的一個額外數目的被摧毀 的m-60s的證據，而m-113s的損失明顯很重，直到很久以後都不能部署到前線，且大部分增強防護抵禦反坦克導彈。
The Syrians were not entirely satsified, even if their local commanders showed great initiative and tactical skill on the battlefied, proving that the additional training and decentralization of the command system of the SA were proper decisions. The main problem of the SA was that some of its larger units failed to fully exploit the poor situation of several Israeli units: there was a number of situations in which Syrian brigades and battalions stopped and started digging-in instead of advancing towards south where they could establish better defensive positions. Consequently, they did not manage to deploy the 3rd Armoured into the old positions of the 10th Armoured Division. Nevertheless, they fought with vigour and ferocity surpassing anything seen before from a Syrian soldier, and eventually stopped the Israeli advance. In fact, the IDF failed to reach its objectives in the Beka'a Valley as by the ceasefire on 11 June the Syrians still held the Beirut-Damascus highway after fighting an opponent that was superior in numbers and quality: the IDF deployed an equivalent of five divisions with something like 1.000 tanks against only something like two Syrian.
敘利亞人不完全滿意，即使他們現場的指揮員顯露出了不起的主動性，和在戰火中的戰術技巧，以證明敘利亞空軍正確的安排了加強訓練和權力下放的指揮係統，敘 利亞空軍的主要問題是它的大機群未能充分利用幾支以軍的困境：在敘利亞旅和突擊隊停止前進並開始深挖的情況下，反而朝南前進，那裏他們能夠建立更好的防禦 陣地。因此，他們不能調動部署第3裝甲師進入第10裝甲師的舊有陣地，不過，它們凶猛靈活的戰鬥超越了一名敘利亞士兵以往所見。最終阻止了以軍的前進，事 實上，以色列抵達它在貝卡穀地目標的努力失敗了，在6月11日停火的時候，敘利亞在與一個數量和質量都占優勢對手激戰之後仍然保有貝魯特-大馬士革高速公 路，以軍調動相當於5個師的兵力，以及相當於敘利亞2倍的大約1000輛坦克。
The SyAAF, of course, came away in a very bad shape, losing between 85 and 87 fighters and 24 or 27 pilots (Syrian sources differ on this issue) in air battles and to Israeli ground defences between 6 June and 8 July 1982. Yet, the Syrians were proud with performance of their attack helicopter- and fighter-bomber-crews. Although flying well over 150 attack sorties, only two Gazelles were shot down by the Israelis (both crews were killed). Two other examples were badly damaged during the fighting and subsequently captured by the Israelis: one of these was rebuilt and test-flown in Israel (for comparison, the IDF/AF lost only one Defender). At least an additional SA.342 was badly damaged but flown back to Syria. In exchange the SyAAF claimed destruction of 95 ground targets by Gazelles, including 71 tanks, five APCs, three trucks, two artillery pieces, nine M-151 jeeps, and five tanker trucks. While these figures are usually considered as exaggerated, a closer examination of all known reports about IDF losses as published in the Israeli media, shows that the Israelis very likely did lose as many tanks, and certainly many more APCs and other vehicles. Besides, one should not forget that attack helicopters are considered extremely effective by most armies of the world, and that this fact was proved not only in a number of exercises, but also in several wars.
當然，敘利亞空軍在一個情形很糟時刻離開，損失了85-87架戰鬥機和24-27名飛行員，（敘利亞的損失由不同的說法）但在空戰和對以軍地麵攻擊的 1982年6月6日至8日，敘利亞武裝直升機和戰鬥轟炸機乘員的表現令人驕傲，出動超過150架次，僅有2架“小羚羊”被擊落（機組人員全部喪生），2架 “小羚羊”因嚴重受損被以色列俘獲，其中一架被以色列修複並測試，（作為對照，以色列僅損失了一架“衛士”）至少還有其他一些“小羚羊”嚴重受損但飛回敘 利亞降落，作為交換，敘利亞空軍聲稱“小羚羊”摧毀95個地麵目標，包括71輛坦克，5輛裝甲運兵車，3輛卡車，2門大炮，9輛m-151吉普，5輛油罐 車，當然，這些數字通常視為誇大，仔細觀察以色列媒體所有出版的有關以軍損失的報告，透露出以色列很可能失去了很多坦克，和肯定更多的裝甲運兵車和其他車 輛，另外，一個不應忘記的事實是，武裝直升機被世界大多數軍隊認為非常有效的，這個事實不僅被很多演習，而且也被幾場戰爭所證明。
Overall it is sure that the Syrian Gazelles proved their worth during this war beyond any doubt. When they were pulled from the battlefield, in the wake of the cease-fire from 11 June, the SA.342s were badly missed by remaining Syrian troops in Lebanon. For the rest of that war the Syrian Army's anti-tank teams had to fight alone.
總而言之，敘利亞的“小羚羊”在戰爭中毫無疑問的證明了它們的價值，當它們在戰地起降時，在6月11日的停戰中停止行動，“小羚羊”與敘利亞其他在黎巴嫩的軍隊失之交臂，因為停戰，敘利亞的反坦克部隊不得不孤軍奮戰。
最後的衝突發生在兩部分，在黎明時分，敘利亞第81裝甲旅，裝備T-72坦克，搜索shtawrah—一個在建的修理店—然後轉南麵沿著兩條平行路線行駛 馬上進入以色列第409反坦克營（來自佩萊德特遣隊組成）和裝備M-60s的767裝甲旅的位置，敘利亞的坦克，受到他們6月9日一次成功攻擊的鼓勵，前 進中沒有仔細偵察它們正前方的區域，在深夜一次短暫而又激烈的衝突中，以色列以“陶”式反坦克導彈擊中了12輛T-72，迫使敘軍拉回貝魯特-大馬士革高 速路，這是重大的訊息，然而，仍然沒有在敘利亞傳遞：實際上，敘利亞也聲稱10輛M-60s在這次戰鬥中被摧毀，當時他們損毀和受傷的T-72s回到 shatawrah.
Meanwhile, in the Beka’a Valley 7th Armoured Brigade of Eitan’s 162 Ugda engaged T-62s of the 58th Syrian Brigade due south of Jub Jnin: in exchange for two destroyed Merkavas, the Israelis knocked out at least a dozen of T-62s. The Syrians claimed destruction of 21 to 30 Israeli armoured vehicles during this battle - which culminated shortly before noon, with attacks of attack helicopters from both sides. Israeli AH-1s and MD.500 Defenders claimed destruction of 15 T-62s and few T-72s near Zahla. However, they encountered fierce anti-aircraft fire and were not able to execute their attacks as expected. One of Defenders was badly damaged by explosion of a shell nearby, so that it crashed on the ground in front of Syrian positions: the navigator was heavily injured but the pilot pulled him out of wreckage and both were recoered by an AB.212. Another Defender was apparently lost to anti-aircraft fire from Israeli armoured units after being misidentified as a Syrian Gazelle: obviously, after previous experiences with SA.432s the Israeli gunners were exceptionally nervous by the time. In return, the Merkavas of the 7th Israeli Brigade shot down at least one Gazelle using their 105mm cannons, and another Syrian SA.342 should have been shot down by a long-range TOW-shot from an Israeli Cobra helicopter.
當然最主要的，在貝卡穀地的埃南的162師級戰鬥隊的第7裝甲旅遇上了在jub jnin以南的敘利亞第58旅，在被摧毀了2輛“梅卡瓦”之後，以軍擊毀了至少一打的T-62s,敘利亞聲稱在這場戰鬥在中午之前的短暫激戰中摧毀了 21-30輛以色列裝甲車輛，同時雙方的武裝直升機也參與了進攻，以色列的AH-1s和md.500“衛士”聲稱摧毀了紮赫勒附近的15輛T-62s和幾 輛T-72s，可是，他們遇到了猛烈的防空炮火，不能執行他們預期的攻擊任務，一架“衛士”被附近一陣防空炮火的轟擊嚴重損壞，使得他墜毀在敘利亞陣地前 方的地麵上：領航員嚴重受傷，但飛行員將其拉出飛機殘骸，兩人都被AB-212營救，另一架“衛士”的損失顯然被以色列裝甲部隊的防空炮火誤當做一架敘利 亞的“小羚羊”：顯然，有了以往與“小羚羊”的經驗後，以色列炮手到時候異常緊張，作為回報，以色列第7裝甲旅的“梅卡瓦”用105mm主炮擊落了至少一 架“小羚羊”，另一架“小羚羊”應該是被以軍“眼鏡蛇”武裝直升機用一枚遠程發射的“陶”式導彈擊落。
How fierce and bitter the fighting on the group was shows the fact that - according to contemporary reports in Israeli press - in the fierce fighting of this day a single Israeli Brigade suffered a loss of 18 KIA - including its commander, Col. Avigdor Shriper - 87 injured, and 22 tanks destroyed.
顯露怎樣在團隊中進行激烈和嚴酷的戰鬥的事實，根據以色列現代的新聞報告，在這一天的激烈戰鬥中，一個以色列旅遭受了18人陣亡的損失—包括它的指揮官vigdor Shriper上校，87人受傷，22輛坦克損毀。
Mixed Results
Despite the ceasefire, the fighting was to resume several days later: in fact, by the end of 1982 there were to be no less but eleven additional ceasefires agreed between the Israelis and Syrians.
綜合結果
盡管停火了，戰鬥卻又在幾天後恢複：事實上，直到1982年末，以色列和敘利亞之間達成了不少於十一次停火協定.
Bean-counting began already on the afternoon of 11 June, of course. On a press conference in early July 1982, the representants of the Syrian Ministry of Defence stated that SA hunter-killer AT-teams destroyed 23 Israeli tanks during the first three days of fighting (between 8 and 11 June) for only minor losses to themselves (overall, the Syrians claimed destruction of “more than 120 Israeli tanks, APCs and mine-clearing vehicles by their ATGMs by the time). Subsequent studies proved that Syrian "hunter-killer" teams in fact hit a total of some 60 Israeli M-60s and Merkavas. However, no less but half of these remained operational, while only few of the others were completely destroyed (some sources state that SA anti-tank teams destroyed only two IDF tanks). As well-known, the Merkavas were heavily armoured and had very good anti-detonation as well as fire-protection equipment, while M-60s, M-48s and Centurions were heavily protected by explosive-reactive-armour (ERA). Although the IDF subsequently concluded that the ERA on their tanks needed improvement, and that at least two Merkavas were indeed destroyed by Syrian anti-tank teams (the IDF lost a total of seven Merkava Mk.1s written-off during this war), it is obvious that these tanks were extremely problematic opponents. The situation with M-113s was less satisfactory: these APCs apparently suffered such losses in the first few days of the war, that by the time the IDF reached Beirut the Israelis were doing their best to avoid deploying them in combat first of all. The Israeli infantry therefore marched beside its APCs for the best part of their way into Lebanon.
統計開始已經在6月11日下午，當然，在1982年6月初的一次記者招待會上，敘利亞外交部和國防部的聲明的描述中，敘利亞空軍獵殺者和地麵反坦克部隊在 頭三天的戰鬥中（6月8日至11日）共摧毀以軍坦克23輛，自身隻有輕微的損失（總體上，敘利亞聲明摧毀“超過120輛坦克、裝甲運兵車和掃雷車在這段時 間被敘軍的反坦克導彈摧毀）隨後研究證明敘利亞“獵殺者”分隊實際擊中以軍60輛M-60s和“梅卡瓦”坦克，可是，他們中不少於大約一半仍能使用，而其 他的僅有幾輛被完全摧毀。（有消息稱敘利亞反坦克部隊僅摧毀2輛以軍坦克），眾所周知，“梅卡瓦”是重裝，有非常好的抑爆以及防火裝備。而“百夫長”、 m-60s和m-48s被爆炸式反應裝甲（era）嚴密保護，雖然以軍後來斷定他們的era需要改善，至少2輛“梅卡瓦”被敘利亞反坦克部隊摧毀，（以軍 在戰爭期間總共損失7輛“梅卡瓦”1）很明顯，這些坦克是很厲害的對手，M-113裝甲車的情況則不令人滿意，這些裝甲運兵車在戰爭的頭幾天很容易遭受損 失。在那段時間，以軍到達貝魯特後，最大程度的避免在戰鬥第一線部署它們。因此以色列步兵在進軍黎巴嫩的道路上最大限度的在裝甲運兵車旁邊做遊行式的行 軍。
Nevertheless, the fact was also that the Israelis were swift to adapt tactics of their mechanised formations against Syrian AT-teams. They would use 20mm M-163 Vulcan guns to spray their possible positions and TOW-missiles to hit them precisely – usually with deadly results. To counter such weapons the Syrians preferred fighting at shorter range and using lighter anti-tank weapons. This forced the Israelis to deploy their commandos in order to tackle the Syrian anti-tank snipers: much more often than expected the Syrians had the unpleasant experience of being hunted instead of hunting. The resulting clashes were extremely bitter and brutal. This is at best illustrated by the fact that only between 10 and 15% of Syrian anti-tank hunters survived this war. Very few were captured alive, including only one officer: 1st Lt. Mehdi fell into Israeli hands in a badly injured condition, but defied all the IDF efforts to break his spirit before being returned to Syria. As Captain he was later to fight against the Iraqis, in 1991, together with US forces.
不過，事實上以軍迅速適應它們的機械化編隊反擊敘利亞反坦克部隊的戰術，它們會使用20mm“火神”高炮掃射可疑目標，用“陶”式導彈準確打擊它們--- 通常是致命的結果。對付這種武器敘利亞首選是在近距離使用輕型反坦克武器的白刃戰，這迫使以軍部署它們的突擊隊去對付敘利亞反坦克狙擊手：敘利亞人有比預 期更多的被獵殺而非狩獵的不愉快經曆。戰鬥的結果非常痛苦和殘酷，最好的證明是這場戰爭中僅有10%-15%的敘利亞反坦克小組在戰爭中幸存，很少被俘 獲：其中隻有一名成員：一位名叫邁赫迪的中尉在身負重傷的情況下落入以軍手中，但他在回到敘利亞之前卻挫敗了以色列所有摧垮他的精神的努力。作為隊長，他 在1991年他與美軍一起參加了反對伊拉克的戰爭。
Despite immense problems, quite a few surprises, and losses, the Israelis were eventually satisfied with results of the conventional part of the war in Lebanon: in four days of battles they claimed destruction of 81 Syrian tanks, and capturing 41 (mainly T-62s), losing only eight M-48s and two Merkavas in return. Supposedly, one of destroyed Merkavas was subsequently salvaged and repaired. Pictorial evidence exists for a number of additional M-60s being destroyed as well, while the losses of M-113s were obviously so heavy that they were not deployed in forward lines until much later, when most were equipped with additional protection against anti-tank missiles.
盡管有很大的問題，不少的驚喜和損失，以色列最終對黎巴嫩常規戰部分中成果感到滿意，在4天的戰鬥中，他們聲稱摧毀了81輛敘利亞坦克，俘獲41輛（主要 是T-62s）,回報是僅僅損失了8輛m-48s和2輛“梅卡瓦”，據說，一輛被摧毀的“梅卡瓦”隨後被回收和修理，以及在畫報上的一個額外數目的被摧毀 的m-60s的證據，而m-113s的損失明顯很重，直到很久以後都不能部署到前線，且大部分增強防護抵禦反坦克導彈。
The Syrians were not entirely satsified, even if their local commanders showed great initiative and tactical skill on the battlefied, proving that the additional training and decentralization of the command system of the SA were proper decisions. The main problem of the SA was that some of its larger units failed to fully exploit the poor situation of several Israeli units: there was a number of situations in which Syrian brigades and battalions stopped and started digging-in instead of advancing towards south where they could establish better defensive positions. Consequently, they did not manage to deploy the 3rd Armoured into the old positions of the 10th Armoured Division. Nevertheless, they fought with vigour and ferocity surpassing anything seen before from a Syrian soldier, and eventually stopped the Israeli advance. In fact, the IDF failed to reach its objectives in the Beka'a Valley as by the ceasefire on 11 June the Syrians still held the Beirut-Damascus highway after fighting an opponent that was superior in numbers and quality: the IDF deployed an equivalent of five divisions with something like 1.000 tanks against only something like two Syrian.
敘利亞人不完全滿意，即使他們現場的指揮員顯露出了不起的主動性，和在戰火中的戰術技巧，以證明敘利亞空軍正確的安排了加強訓練和權力下放的指揮係統，敘 利亞空軍的主要問題是它的大機群未能充分利用幾支以軍的困境：在敘利亞旅和突擊隊停止前進並開始深挖的情況下，反而朝南前進，那裏他們能夠建立更好的防禦 陣地。因此，他們不能調動部署第3裝甲師進入第10裝甲師的舊有陣地，不過，它們凶猛靈活的戰鬥超越了一名敘利亞士兵以往所見。最終阻止了以軍的前進，事 實上，以色列抵達它在貝卡穀地目標的努力失敗了，在6月11日停火的時候，敘利亞在與一個數量和質量都占優勢對手激戰之後仍然保有貝魯特-大馬士革高速公 路，以軍調動相當於5個師的兵力，以及相當於敘利亞2倍的大約1000輛坦克。
The SyAAF, of course, came away in a very bad shape, losing between 85 and 87 fighters and 24 or 27 pilots (Syrian sources differ on this issue) in air battles and to Israeli ground defences between 6 June and 8 July 1982. Yet, the Syrians were proud with performance of their attack helicopter- and fighter-bomber-crews. Although flying well over 150 attack sorties, only two Gazelles were shot down by the Israelis (both crews were killed). Two other examples were badly damaged during the fighting and subsequently captured by the Israelis: one of these was rebuilt and test-flown in Israel (for comparison, the IDF/AF lost only one Defender). At least an additional SA.342 was badly damaged but flown back to Syria. In exchange the SyAAF claimed destruction of 95 ground targets by Gazelles, including 71 tanks, five APCs, three trucks, two artillery pieces, nine M-151 jeeps, and five tanker trucks. While these figures are usually considered as exaggerated, a closer examination of all known reports about IDF losses as published in the Israeli media, shows that the Israelis very likely did lose as many tanks, and certainly many more APCs and other vehicles. Besides, one should not forget that attack helicopters are considered extremely effective by most armies of the world, and that this fact was proved not only in a number of exercises, but also in several wars.
當然，敘利亞空軍在一個情形很糟時刻離開，損失了85-87架戰鬥機和24-27名飛行員，（敘利亞的損失由不同的說法）但在空戰和對以軍地麵攻擊的 1982年6月6日至8日，敘利亞武裝直升機和戰鬥轟炸機乘員的表現令人驕傲，出動超過150架次，僅有2架“小羚羊”被擊落（機組人員全部喪生），2架 “小羚羊”因嚴重受損被以色列俘獲，其中一架被以色列修複並測試，（作為對照，以色列僅損失了一架“衛士”）至少還有其他一些“小羚羊”嚴重受損但飛回敘 利亞降落，作為交換，敘利亞空軍聲稱“小羚羊”摧毀95個地麵目標，包括71輛坦克，5輛裝甲運兵車，3輛卡車，2門大炮，9輛m-151吉普，5輛油罐 車，當然，這些數字通常視為誇大，仔細觀察以色列媒體所有出版的有關以軍損失的報告，透露出以色列很可能失去了很多坦克，和肯定更多的裝甲運兵車和其他車 輛，另外，一個不應忘記的事實是，武裝直升機被世界大多數軍隊認為非常有效的，這個事實不僅被很多演習，而且也被幾場戰爭所證明。
Overall it is sure that the Syrian Gazelles proved their worth during this war beyond any doubt. When they were pulled from the battlefield, in the wake of the cease-fire from 11 June, the SA.342s were badly missed by remaining Syrian troops in Lebanon. For the rest of that war the Syrian Army's anti-tank teams had to fight alone.
總而言之，敘利亞的“小羚羊”在戰爭中毫無疑問的證明了它們的價值，當它們在戰地起降時，在6月11日的停戰中停止行動，“小羚羊”與敘利亞其他在黎巴嫩的軍隊失之交臂，因為停戰，敘利亞的反坦克部隊不得不孤軍奮戰。
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