ZT: 蓋特納的豪賭

西蒙•約翰遜：蓋特納的豪賭

本文來源於《財經網》　 2011年02月23日

---蓋氏依然是全世界政府高官中被大銀行的自私觀念毒害最深的一個

西蒙•約翰遜曾任IMF首席經濟學家，MIT斯隆管理學院教授，彼得森研究所國際經濟學高級研究員

 

洛杉磯——

在最近的一次采訪中，美國財政部長蒂姆•蓋特納闡述了自己關於世界經濟增長性質和美國金融部門角色的觀點。蓋氏的觀點是危險的，相當於在用美國經濟的未來進行一場盲注豪賭。從中也可以看出，蓋氏依然是全世界政府高官中被大銀行的自私觀念毒害最深的一個。

蓋氏指出，世界將不會經曆大型“金融深化”，因為新興市場對金融產品和服務的需求正在不斷增加。當然了，他所考慮的是印度、中國、巴西這樣的 “中等收入”國家。他強調，上訴三國均有了極大發展，中產階級正在嶄露頭角，這批人希望增加儲蓄、獲得更便利的融資（以進行生產性投資、購房、教育等）， 而且一般而言都希望消費水平不要出現波動，這無疑是正確的。

但接著蓋氏就開始大躍進了。他希望美國銀行能夠領導這些國家的金融發展。我們有必要看看他原話是怎麽說的：

我無意……試圖弱化金融體係作為改革試驗在我們經濟中的相對重要性，因為我們必須考慮到這樣一個事實：我們是在更廣闊的世界舞台上運作……就像微軟等公司一樣。我們希望美國企業能夠從中獲益……如今，風險已經改變了金融企業的麵貌，但你可以通過監管克服這一點。

蓋氏的觀點有三個大問題。首先，全世界範圍內已知的所有金融發展模式全部被他忽視了。事實上，幾個世紀以來的經驗清晰地表明，隨著經濟增長和儲 蓄積累，一國將越來越難以擺脫金融崩潰的宿命。近幾十年來的曆史再次證明了這一點。蓋氏在美國財政部、IMF和紐約聯邦儲備銀行供職多年，有著豐富的國際 危機處理經驗，如今竟然會持有如此幼稚的觀點，著實令人吃驚。

其次，蓋氏認為美國最大企業的風險能夠通過監管克服，這與所有人的知識截然相反。就算是多德-弗蘭克（Dodd-Frank）改革法案最堅定的 支持者也強調，這一法案隻能說是有利於削弱主要金融機構去承擔太多風險的激勵。除了多德-弗蘭克法案外，巴塞爾III協議隻是略微提高了資本要求，而以蓋氏為首的金融穩定監督委員會更是放出了將采取不插手政策的信號。這三點的聯合作用就是，沒有任何東西能得到真正的改善。

事實上，如今的美國大銀行顯然是“太大而不能倒”的，因此它們有更多的激勵去提高負債-股本比水平。提高杠杆可以提高好的情形下的回報——高管和交易員的薪資可都是基於“股東回報率”的。而在壞情形下，比如發生了金融危機，損失則會被轉嫁給債權人。如果債權人損失太大，牽涉太廣，以至於危害到了整個金融體係，政府就會有施手救援的壓力。銀行家攫取了好處，而壞處全部甩給了納稅人（以及信貸不振時被解雇的那些人）。

20世紀70年代，美國金融部門趨之若鶩地向新興市場發放高風險貸款，說這是業務新前線。結果這些貸款組合在1982年的債務危機中灰飛煙滅 了。如今，相同的輕率跨境借貸潮卷土重來，金融部門大佬們（比如JP摩根大通的傑米•戴蒙）不但對此大唱讚歌，還說服蓋氏來為他們抬轎。

第三，蓋氏完全忽視了歐洲的覆轍。他應該花更多的時間與冰島、愛爾蘭和瑞士當局交流交流。在這些國家中，“金融全球化”導致銀行業與經濟的比例出現了失調。

在冰島，最大的三家銀行的全球資產負債表規模達到了經濟規模11~13倍。然後，它們倒閉了。

在愛爾蘭，最大的三家銀行如失心瘋般跳入了商業地產市場——資金是通過大額借款從其他歐元區國家（包括德國）那裏融來的。這些銀行資產負債表的 價值相當於愛爾蘭GDP的兩倍，但政客卻對此視而不見——一些官員還說可以按時償付。然後，它們倒閉了，還差點把愛爾蘭政府也拖向倒閉。

在瑞士，最大的兩家銀行瑞銀和瑞信，2008年秋的資產負債表規模高達GDP的8 倍，且主要業務都是全球業務。UBS駐倫敦抵押貸款交易部門——其中並沒有多少瑞士人——承擔了巨量風險，險些把UBS拖垮。瑞士政府竭盡全力才把UBS救活。現在，瑞士央行采取了與蓋氏相反的動作——讓大銀行變小，並更多地使用股權而非債務融資來為經營活動籌錢。

蓋氏是一位有智慧、有經驗的公務員。他對於金融業未來的觀點能左右世界。而這也是為何我們正在奔向麻煩的原因。

西蒙•約翰遜曾任IMF首席經濟學家，MIT斯隆管理學院教授，彼得森研究所國際經濟學高級研究員。他與郭庾信合著有《13位銀行家》

 

Geithner's Gamble

Geithner remains the senior public official worldwide who is most in thrall to the self-serving ideology of big banks.

By Simon Johnson

LOS ANGELES – In a recent interview, United States Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner laid out his view of the nature of world economic growth and the role of the US financial sector. It is a deeply disturbing vision, one that amounts to a huge, uninformed gamble with the future of the American economy – and that suggests that Geithner remains the senior public official worldwide who is most in thrall to the self-serving ideology of big banks.

Geithner argues that the world will now experience a major “financial deepening,” owing to growing demand in emerging markets for financial products and services. He is thinking, of course, of “middle-income” countries like India, China, and Brazil. And he is right to emphasize that all have made terrific progress and now offer great opportunities for the rising middle class, which wants to accumulate savings, borrow more easily (for productive investment, home purchases, education, etc), and, more generally, smooth out consumption.

But then Geithner takes a leap. He wants US banks to take the lead in these countries’ financial development. His words are worth quoting at length:

I don’t have any enthusiasm for…trying to shrink the relative importance of the financial system in our economy as a test of reform, because we have to think about the fact that we operate in the broader world…It’s the same thing for Microsoft or anything else. We want US firms to benefit from that…Now, financial firms are different because of the risk, but you can contain that through regulation.

There are three serious problems with this view. First, Geithner ignores everything that we know about the pattern of financial development around the world. It is very rare for financial systems to develop without major crises. In fact, experience in recent decades confirms what should have been obvious from previous centuries: as countries grow and accumulate savings, they become increasingly prone to financial collapse. Given Geithner’s extensive international crisis-fighting experience at the US Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the New York Federal Reserve, his current naïveté on this point is simply stunning.

Second, Geithner assumes that risks at the largest US firms can be contained through regulation, when all our knowledge points directly to the contrary. Even the strongest supporters of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation emphasize that it only went part way towards reducing the incentives for major financial institutions to take big risks. Looking at the combined effect of the new law, plus the weak additional capital requirements agreed under Basel III and the hands-off approach already signaled by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (which Mr. Geithner chairs), it is hard to believe that anything has really improved.

In fact, given that our largest banks are now undoubtedly too big to fail, they have even more incentive to increase their debt levels relative to their equity. Higher leverage increases their payoffs when times are good – as executives and traders are paid based on their “return on equity.” And when times are bad, for example in a crisis episode, losses are transferred to creditors. If those creditor losses are large and spread so as to undermine the broader financial system, pressure for a government bailout will mount. Bankers get the upside and taxpayers (and people laid off as credit is disrupted) get the downside.

The US financial sector went mad for high-risk loans to emerging markets during 1970s – arguing that this was the new frontier. This loan portfolio blew up in the debt crisis of 1982. A version of same thoughtless cross-border lending is again underway, extolled by leading financial sector executives (e.g., Jamie Dimon from JP Morgan Chase) – who have apparently persuaded Mr. Geithner to tag along intellectually.

And third, Geithner completely overlooks what has brought significant parts of Europe to its economic knees. He should spend more time with the authorities in Iceland or Ireland or Switzerland, countries where “financial globalization” allowed banks to become big relative to the economy.

In Iceland, the three largest banks built global balance sheets that were between 11 and 13 times the size of the economy. And then they collapsed.

In Ireland, the three largest banks went crazy for commercial real estate – financed by large-scale borrowing from other eurozone countries (including Germany). The politicians looked the other way – or were paid off, some claim – while these banks built balance sheets valued at two times Irish GDP. And then they collapsed, causing enormous damage to the government’s own solvency.

In Switzerland, the two largest banks (UBS and Credit Suisse) had a combined balance sheet in fall 2008 of around 8 times Swiss GDP – mostly based on their global activities. Mortgage traders in London – not many of whom were Swiss – took on enormous risks that almost brought down UBS. The Swiss government could afford the bailout, just. And now the Swiss National Bank is moving in the exact opposite direction to Geithner – they are pushing these big banks to become smaller and to finance more of their activities with equity, rather than debt.

Geithner is a very smart and experienced public servant. His views concerning the future of finance will help shape what happens. And that is why we are headed for trouble.

Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the IMF, is co-founder of a leading economics blog, http://BaselineScenario.com, a professor at MIT Sloan, and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. His book, 13 Bankers, co-authored with James Kwak, is now available in paperback.