空色一體
千江有水千江月，萬裏無雲萬裏天。
拉賈：負債民主國家的三條道路
發自芝加哥——
典型的投資手法講究先在短期內支付一定成本，然後獲取長期收益，但民主國家的政府往往都缺乏製定類似決策的動機。倘若要在民主製度下實施這類投資行為的話，要麽需要一位勇氣可嘉的領導人，要麽要求選民能明白回避這類痛苦決策所導致的弊端。
有勇氣的領導人堪稱鳳毛麟角，而那些信息充分而且富有參與精神的選民也為數不多，因為那些提供給選民的所謂專家意見本身都模棱兩可。不同學派的 經濟學家都發現就任何政策的必要性達成共識非常艱難。比如說關於政府支出的激烈爭論：它究竟是唯一能將蕭條拒之門外的手段，還是一條毀滅之路？最終這些爭 論無法達成任何共識，中間派選民根本不知道該選擇哪一方，而政策選擇最終往往會走上避重就輕的道路——直到碰壁了為止。
發達國家逐漸堆積的債務（其實早就在迅速增長，隻不過最近這場大蕭條將其推到了幾乎無法維持的境地）就反映了類似的算計。民主政府著手應對由競 爭性市場所引發的經濟下跌風險，而公眾也對此表示讚賞——不管它是通過支出來創造就業，還是拯救那些在資產負債表中擁有有毒債券的銀行。
就算不作為（或者是著眼於長遠的行動）才是最佳政策，但對那些通過民主選舉出來的政客來說這可不是一個選項，選民希望他們能有所行動，於是無法 避免地意味著采取一些追求短期效應的行為。同情心泛濫的媒體大肆渲染那些關於失業或者無家可歸的心碎故事，使得那些反對政府幹涉或者建議采取長期性措施的 人看上去就像冷血動物。民主製度一般都是溫情脈脈的，而市場又總是殘酷無情；於是政府出現，填補了其中空白。
但如今許多發達國家的政府已經無力填補可以空白，因此出現三種負麵情況的可能性正逐漸增加（除非各國最終走投無路隻能實施那些被長期推遲的改 革，創造需要更少政府緩衝作用的可持續增長，這是個積極的情況）。其一是政府直接幹涉國內外市場以減少競爭和波動性，並借機重建自身的危機緩衝能力。另一 個則是壓製民主以抑製民眾的憤怒。第三則是尋找替罪羊。
上述三個做法都在1930年代的大蕭條中嚐試過了，而結果也都不甚樂觀。
一個減少政府更直接幹預市場的因素是最近這場危機不但令民眾喪失了對金融部門的信任，也極大打擊了政府的威信。但當年大蕭條時情況可不是這樣 的。經濟崩潰使得民眾對私人部門和市場失去了信心，但卻令政府的號召力不斷上升。比如在1930年代的美國，羅斯福新政就是受到民眾普遍歡迎的。
造成新舊兩種不同情況對比的一個可能原因就是1930年代的銀行家們都在眾目睽睽下受到了懲罰。類似格拉斯-斯蒂高爾法案（Glass- SteagallAct）這樣的立法斷了他們後路。許多銀行家都在銀行倒閉後受到了直接經濟損失，或者相關調查使他們在公眾麵前蒙羞，甚至有些人被投進了 監獄。
但如今大部分公眾看到的卻是在同一批精英們掌控下的大銀行和大國政府，是這些人製造了危機，卻又巧立名目用納稅人的錢去拯救那些銀行。一麵是銀 行家們重新坐擁大筆花紅，另一麵卻是納稅人苦苦支撐為經濟崩潰買單。許多勞動者都麵臨著失業以及被銀行收回物業的危險，卻沒有一個大銀行家獲罪入獄。
在享受了政府的援助之後，那些大銀行如今的市場份額反而還增加了，而類似《多德-弗蘭克法案》（Dodd-FrankAct）這類試圖對銀行采取更多限製的法案則在國會遊說者的影響下變了味。看上去那些精英，無論身處政府還是商界，都隻管自己逍遙，不顧他人死活。
在美國，這種情緒鼓動了茶黨運動，它們聯合起來反對政府擴張（或者更普遍地反對精英政治），連那些旨在規管大型銀行的政府擴張行為了不放過（大 概是因為政府的監管條文往往都是那些被監管者中的大佬們製定的）。像茶黨這樣的運動因此傾向於反對那些在經曆了美國這麽一場危機後希望有更多政府行動（包 括限製市場和競爭）的人。
失信的政府可不僅僅是美國一家。在歐元區，除了察覺到的政府和銀行勾結之外，政府精英實現歐洲整合的願望，以及用納稅人稅款支付跨國財政援助 ——都是在沒有事先谘詢公眾——也激發了類似的情緒。在日本，持續20年的無情經濟癱瘓已經使公眾對政治家和政府完全失去了信心。
第二個負麵情況——那些沒有足夠財力來花錢平息民眾憤怒的政府轉而開始壓製民主和言論自由——出現的幾率目前還很小。相對與1930年代來說，發達國家的民主體製已經發展得相當根深蒂固了。
這就剩下了第三個負麵情況，那就是找一個容易欺負的替罪羊以便轉移公眾的憤怒情緒。不幸的是，許多國家都走上了這條道路，而非法移民和穆斯林則成為了首要受害者。
那些找提替罪羊的政客可能會辯解說他們其實不是想傷害這些人，而是在幫助他們的社會去避免出現更壞的情況。但1930年代的經驗告訴我們，沒有比這種行為所造成的後果更遭糕的情況了。
拉古蘭·拉賈為前國際貨幣基金組織首席經濟學家，芝加哥大學布斯商學院經濟學教授，著有《斷層：隱藏的斷裂是如何持續威脅世界經濟的》一書。他的博客http://blogs.chicagobooth.edu/faultlines
One is that they intervene directly in markets, both domestic and across borders, to reduce competition and volatility while they rebuild their buffering capacity. Another is that they muzzle democracy to suppress public anger. A third is that they find scapegoats.
By Raghuram Rajan
CHICAGO – Democratic governments are not incentivized to take decisions that have short-term costs but produce long-term gains, the typical pattern for any investment. Indeed, in order to make such investments, democracies require either brave leadership or an electorate that understands the costs of postponing hard choices.
Brave leadership is rare. So, too, is an informed and engaged electorate, because the expert advice offered to voters is itself so confusing. Economists of different persuasions find it difficult to reach a consensus about the necessity of any policy. Consider, for example, the cacophony of arguments about government spending: is it the only thing keeping depression at bay, or is it moving us steadily down the road to perdition? The debate does not lead to agreement, moderate voters do not know what to believe, and policy choices ultimately follow the path of least resistance – until they run into a brick wall.
The build-up of public debt in industrial countries (which was rising briskly well before the Great Recession pushed it to near-unsustainable levels) reflects this kind of calculus. The public rewards democratic governments for dealing with the downside risk caused by competitive markets – whether by spending to create jobs or by rescuing banks that have dodgy securities on their balance sheets.
Even if inaction (or action oriented towards the longer term) is the best policy, it is not an option for democratically elected politicians, whom voters expect to govern, which inevitably means action with the potential for quick results. A sympathetic press amplifies heart-rending stories of lost jobs and homes, making those counseling against intervention or advocating longer-term fixes appear callous. Democracies are necessarily softhearted, whereas markets are not; government action has expanded to fill the gap.
With governments in many developed countries now reaching the limits of their gap-filling capacity, three undesirable possibilities loom large (in addition to the desirable possibility that they will have no choice but to undertake long-postponed reforms that will create sustainable growth with less need for government buffers). One is that they intervene directly in markets, both domestic and across borders, to reduce competition and volatility while they rebuild their buffering capacity. Another is that they muzzle democracy to suppress public anger. A third is that they find scapegoats.
All three were tried during the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The results were not encouraging.
One factor diminishing the likelihood of governments intervening more directly in markets is that the recent crisis seems to have discredited government as much as it discredited the financial sector. During the Great Depression, matters were different. As economic collapse caused the public to lose faith in the private sector and markets, faith in government grew. For example, in the United States, public support for President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal was broad-based throughout the 1930’s.
One possible reason for the difference in attitudes today is that bankers were visibly punished in the 1930’s. Legislation such as the US Glass-Steagall Act clipped their wings. Many bankers also suffered direct losses as their banks collapsed, or as investigations exposed them to public ridicule, and even jail.
Today, by contrast, broad segments of the public see the big banks and big government as being run by the same elites who created the crisis, and then spent public money under one guise or another bailing the banks out. Even as bankers are back to reaping enormous bonuses, taxpayers have been left to foot the bill for the economic collapse. Many workers are unemployed and in danger of being evicted from their homes, while no important banker has been put in jail.
The biggest banks now account for an even larger share of the financial sector after benefiting from a government rescue, while efforts like the Dodd-Frank Act to legislate more constraints on banks have been lobbied into shadows of their original selves. The elite, whether in government or big business, seems to look after itself and no one else.
In the US, this sentiment has fueled the Tea Party, which coalesces around opposition to government expansion (and to elites more generally), even if that expansion is aimed at regulating big banks (presumably because government regulations tend to be shaped by the powerful among the regulated). Movements like the Tea Party have thus tended keep in check those who, after a crisis of the sort that America has had, typically want more government action, including curbing markets and competition.
The US is not alone in having a discredited government. In the eurozone, in addition to the perceived nexus between banks and governments, the governing elite’s willingness to embrace European integration, and taxpayer-financed cross-border financial support, without broad public consultation has generated a similar sentiment. In Japan, two decades of relentless economic malaise has decimated the public’s faith in politicians and the government bureaucracy.
The second undesirable possibility – that governments with little spending capacity to assuage public anger turn against democracy and free expression – is also remote for now. Democratic institutions in industrial countries are stronger, and have deeper roots, than was the case in the 1930s.
That leaves the third undesirable possibility, the search for unprotected scapegoats upon whom public anger can be dissipated. Unfortunately, several countries are taking this path, with undocumented immigrants and Muslims being the first targets.
Politicians who seek scapegoats might argue that they mean no harm to their targets, and that they are helping their societies to avoid worse possibilities. But, as the 1930’s showed, it is hard to imagine any possibility worse than where this type of behavior can lead.
Raghuram Rajan, a former chief economist of the IMF, is a professor of finance at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. His blog is at http://blogs.chicagobooth.edu/faultlines.
