辛恩：歐央行秘密救市告終

辛恩：歐央行秘密救市告終

本文來源於《財經網》　 2011年05月04日

---如果還要維持現有狀態，繼續為這四個國家提供貸款，那麽在六到七年內，歐央行的基礎貨幣將被耗費一空

漢斯·沃納·辛恩為慕尼黑大學經濟和財政學教授，德國Ifo經濟研究所主席

 

慕尼黑——

為何希臘，愛爾蘭，葡萄牙紛紛在歐盟的保護傘下尋求救援？為何西班牙也接踵而至，即將采取類似行動？

對於多說人來說，答案不言自明。因為國際市場不再打算為這四國提供經濟援助。而這隻說對了一半。實際上，國際市場在過去的三年裏並未給這四個國 家提供多少援助。而歐洲中央銀行才是背後的救助者。盡管長期以來一直被媒體忽視，但是從其所謂的“目標”賬戶上可以看出，歐央行所采取的很多援助措施並不 為人所知。

而今，歐央行計劃終止該援助政策，並敦促歐盟各國成員接替此項重任。

通常，一個國家的收支往來賬戶赤字（貿易赤字減去其他國家的轉移支付）多來自外國私人資本。然而，在一個貨幣聯盟裏，如果外來私人資本不足，那麽中央銀行則應用貸款來填補空缺。2007年中旬便有過一次，當時銀行同業拆放市場已經崩潰。

而葡萄牙，愛爾蘭，希臘，西班牙這四國所屬的中央銀行則大印鈔票，並將這些錢借給私有銀行。從而，用以填補收支往來賬戶赤字造成的空缺。而這些 貨幣則輸入到一些出口型的國家，並在那些國家作為常規貨幣進行流通。這些出口國家的央行則為此采取應對措施，減少發放用以國內經濟發展的新錢。因而，這些 國家央行所發放的貸款則被導向了這四國，而這其中最典型的就是德國央行。

而歐央行的行為本身並不具有通脹導向，因為其發放的貸款在整體份額上並不會對歐盟造成影響。但是，這四個國家的貸款主要源自於各出口國家的央行，因而這一政策則等同於一個強製性的資金輸出。

而歐央行的“替代性借款”則通過所謂的目標賬戶表現出來。而這一賬戶則用於衡量一個國家與其他國家經濟交易之中的出超和入超狀況。由於該賬戶包 含有貨物以及債權的國際支付，因而，一個國家的目標賬戶有赤字記錄，那麽這就意味著通過歐央行而獲取的外國貸款；反之，出超則意味著通過歐央行發放貸款。

而差額並沒有出現在歐央行的資產負債報表上。盡管其總額為零，但是在各國國有央行資產負債報表上這些差額則有深入的體現，具體表現在對於歐央行的有息借款以及敦促其還貸。

直到2007年，目標賬目已經接近零，但實際上，從那時起目標賬目每年都以1000億歐元的數額在增長。

比如，德意誌聯邦銀行的目標賬戶從2006年的50億歐元飆升至2011年3月的3230億歐元。而與之相對的是葡，愛，希，西這四國的債務額 已經於去年年末達到3400億歐元。值得注意的是，這四國從2008到2011年的累計收支往來賬戶赤字幾乎與其債務值一樣——準確的說是3650億歐 元。

如果歐央行未能填補這些赤字的空缺，那麽這四國則將通過尋求資金來支付其淨進口帶來的空缺，這必定是一大難題。如果這四國最終能實現此目標，那 麽高貸款利息將會促使其“勒緊腰帶”，實行緊縮政策。那麽這四國現在的收支往來賬戶赤字將有所減少，以希臘和葡萄牙為例，這兩個國家的赤字已經超過其國內 生產總值的10%。

但我們也不應將這四個國家在經濟危機中欠下的巨額債務歸咎於歐央行。為防止其經濟衰退，有時候我們的確需要采取一些不同尋常的措施。但是，要知 道這並不是一種自成一格的貨幣政策，而是救市措施。而今世界經濟水平有了較大的恢複，那麽現在是時候摒棄這種政策了，尤其是在歐央行自身資金幾近耗盡的狀 況下。

去年年末，歐央行在歐盟地區的資金總額為1.07萬億歐元，而3800億歐元已經耗費在這四個國家的貸款之中。因而，如果還要維持現有狀態，繼續為這四個國家提供貸款，那麽在六到七年內，歐央行的基礎貨幣將被耗費一空。

為了從此項政策中脫身，歐央行希望盧森堡救援機構，歐洲金融穩定機製或是歐洲穩定機製來接替自己。一些國家甚至呼籲發布歐洲債券。但是這隻是延 長了歐盟對於這四個國家的援助，繼續提供資金來填補收支往來賬戶赤字。如今這已經是第四個年頭，也許還能持續個兩三年。但是到了那個時候，我們可能麵臨的 是歐盟的衰退，或者另一個新構建的聯盟機構，而在這個聯盟中，這些赤字將由各國的捐款來解決。

如果歐盟繼續將盧森堡基金保留，用以解決真正棘手的問題，那麽情況也許會有所好轉。同時，歐央行規定這四個國家的央行在提供貸款時要求貸款方提 供更高的擔保。限定目標差額最額度帶來的促進因素使得這些國家願意去執行這一規定。盡管該限定不會徹底清除現有的赤字，但是可以將赤字減少到私人資金能夠 解決的範圍內。

較之新的工資政策，設定最高貸款額度相對來說更為可行。它能更好的將現有的赤字製約在一定範圍內。而工資政策隻適用於中央計劃經濟體係。

或許這四個國家會好奇意大利是如果渡過難關的。即便其需要支付利率風險貼水，加之麵臨財政赤字。馬裏奧·德拉基（今秋接管歐央行的有力競爭者） 在整個經濟危機中很好地將意大利央行的借款控製在合理的範圍內。盡管頗具誘惑力，但是意大利並沒有選擇債台高築。而是選擇更為理性的節製緊縮。

漢斯·沃納·辛恩為慕尼黑大學經濟和財政學教授，德國Ifo經濟研究所主席

 

The ECB's Secret Bailout Strategy

05-04 15:07

So financing a continued PIGS current-account deficit of about €100 billion a year would consume the entire stock of base money within another six or seven years.

By Hans-Werner Sinn

MUNICH – Why did Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have to seek shelter under the European Union’s rescue umbrella, and why is Spain a potential candidate?

For many, the answer is obvious: international markets no longer want to finance the “PIGS.” But that is only half true. In fact, international markets have not financed any of them to a considerable extent for the past three years; the European Central Bank has. The so-called “Target” accounts, hitherto ignored by the media, show that the ECB has been much more involved in rescue operations than is commonly known.

But now the ECB no longer wants to do it, and is urging eurozone members to step in.

Normally, a country’s current-account deficit (trade deficit minus transfers from other countries) is financed with foreign private capital. In a currency union, however, central-bank credit may play this role if private capital flows are insufficient. This is what happened in the eurozone when the interbank market first broke down in mid-2007.

The PIGS’ own central banks started to lend newly printed money to their private banks, and this money was then used to finance the current account deficit. These funds went to the exporting countries, where they circulated as part of normal transactions. The exporting countries’ central banks responded by reducing their emissions of fresh money to be lent to the domestic economy. In effect, central-bank money lending in exporting countries, above all in Germany, was diverted to the PIGS.

The ECB’s policy was not inflationary, because the aggregate stock of central-bank money in the eurozone was unaffected. But, as PIGS’ central-bank lending came at the expense of central-bank lending within the eurozone’s exporting countries, the policy amounted to a forced capital export from these countries to the PIGS.

The amount of the ECB’s “replacement lending” is shown by the so-called Target2 account, which measures the deficit or surplus of a country’s financial transactions with other countries. As the account includes international payments for both trade in goods and financial claims, a deficit in a country’s Target account indicates foreign borrowing via the ECB, whereas a surplus denotes foreign lending via the ECB.

The balance is not reported on the ECB’s balance sheet, since it is zero in the aggregate, but it does show up on the respective balance sheets of the national central banks as interest-bearing claims against, and liabilities to, the ECB system. Until mid-2007, the Target accounts were close to zero, but since then, they have grown by about €100 billion per year.

For example, the Bundesbank’s Target claims ballooned from €5 billion in 2006 to €323 billion by March 2011. The counterpart to these claims were the PIGS’ liabilities, which had grown to about €340 billion by the end of last year. Interestingly, the PIGS’ cumulative current-account deficits from 2008 through 2010 were of roughly the same order of magnitude – €365 billion, to be precise.

Had the ECB failed to finance these deficits, the PIGS would have had a hard time finding the money to pay for their net imports. If they succeeded at all, high interest rates would have induced them to tighten their belts, and their current-account deficits, which in the case of Greece and Portugal exceeded 10% of GDP, would have diminished.

One should not criticize the ECB for propping up the PIGS’ current accounts during the global crisis. Unconventional measures were necessary to prevent their economies from collapsing. But it should be clear that this was not a sui generis monetary policy; it was a bailout. Now that the world economy has largely recovered from the crisis, it is time to end this policy – not least because the ECB is running out of ammunition.

By the end of last year, the aggregate stock of central-bank money in the euro area was €1.07 trillion euros, and €380 billion euros was already absorbed by ECB credit to the PIGS. So financing a continued PIGS current-account deficit of about €100 billion a year would consume the entire stock of base money within another six or seven years.

To exit this policy, the ECB wants the EU’s Luxembourg rescue facility, EFSF or ESM to take over, and some countries even call for the issuance of eurobonds. But this would simply prolong community financing of the PIGS’ current-account deficits, now in its fourth year, for another couple of years. In the end, either the euro will collapse, or a transfer union will be established in Europe, in which the current-account deficits will be financed with inter-country donations.

It would be better if the EU kept the Luxembourg fund for real emergency measures, and if the ECB instructed its member institutions in the PIGS to demand significantly better collateral for their lending operations. Tight national caps on Target balances could provide the right incentive to comply. Such a cap would not eliminate current-account deficits, but it would reduce deficits to the flow of private capital willing to finance them.

Setting a cap on Target accounts is a fundamentally more appropriate policy to keep current-account deficits in check than the wage policies contemplated by the new Pact for the Euro. Wage policies are appropriate only for centrally planned economies.

Perhaps the PIGS should ponder how Italy handled itself. Even though it had to pay interest premiums and was running a current-account deficit, Mario Draghi (the leading contender to take over the ECB this autumn) kept his central bank’s lending under tight control throughout the crisis. Although it must have been sorely tempted, Italy did not accumulate Target deficits. It opted for virtuous abstention.

Hans-Werner Sinn is Professor of Economics and Public Finance, University of Munich, and President of the Ifo Institute.