美國後麵將要麵臨的另外一個巨大問題（組內討論稿）
(2011-05-31 23:16:32)
文章來源http://www.niwota.com/submsg/5788837
Alt-A和option ARM或將引發新一輪金融危機
次級抵押貸款危機（簡稱次貸危機）之後，Alt-A和選擇性可調整利率貸款（option ARM）將是另外兩顆等待引爆的定時炸彈。
美國住房抵押貸款市場可分為三個檔次，優質(Prime)貸款麵向信用等級高的客戶(信用分數在660分以上)；次級（Subprime）貸款通常指信用分數低於620分，收入證明缺失，負債較重的人；而Alt-A貸款介於兩者之間。
對於選擇性可調整利率貸款來說，買房者在最初幾年隻需要每月按揭支付非常低的利息（如1%），人們給這種利率取了個名字“引逗利率”，因為等到2年、3年或者5年之後，重新設定利率時，買房者每月還款會大幅增加，甚至上漲數倍。
Alt-A和選擇性可調整利率貸款的利率正開始大規模調整，而現在它們的違約率已經非常驚人。Alt-A和option ARMs貸款的違約率最終將和次級貸款一樣高，達到50%，而毒性更大的option ARM可能會高達70%。
整個美國房屋抵押貸款的市場規模是10萬億美元，其中次級貸款1萬億美元，Alt-A貸款1萬億美元，優質貸款8萬億美元。
在2005-2006年，次級貸款“最風光”的時候，對次級貸款承銷的標準非常寬鬆，Alt-A雖然比次級貸款要好一點，但是“放鬆的尺度可能差不多，因此今後Alt-A會比次級貸款的傷害更厲害，70%的Alt-A借款者都誇大了他們的收入情況，當借款者和貸款經紀人在申請貸款，填寫收入和工作一欄時，他們可以任意填寫，有時候他們甚至什麽都不填，因為沒有必要。
次級貸款的人不用擔憂未來他們欠的貸款額度會上升15%，但Alt-A卻有這一問題。因為Alt-A違約都是在後期發生的，我們將看著這場緩慢的崩潰持續很長時間。
違約率或將在2009年到2011年一直都會呈加速上升的態勢，因為這一類的貸款在3年或者5年之後都需要進行利率調整。出現30天以上拖欠債務的違約情況，次級貸款為45%，選擇性可調整利率貸款為30%，而Alt-A為20%。
選擇性可調整利率貸款的規模約為5000億-6000億美元，主要是貸款給優先級的借款人。銀行主要依據對房屋的估值以及信用評級公司FICO的信用評分來發放貸款。從2004年到2007年，83%的選擇性可調整利率貸款的借款者都是低收入或者沒有檔案的，因此，此類貸款可以稱為“說謊者貸款”。
借款人可以選擇三種方式還款：其一，償還全部本金和利息；其二， 償還全部利息 ；其三， 隻償還非常低的“引逗利息”（通常是2%-3%，甚至1%）。在第三種情況下，沒有支付的利息差額每個月將記入本金中。
典型的選擇性可調整利率貸款都是30年或者40年的貸款，一般都是在5年後重新調整利率的。在這場房價下跌中，遭受損失最嚴重的地方是發行選擇性可調整利率貸款最多的地方。
很多選擇性可調整利率貸款借款人的情況比次級借款人的情況還要糟糕，因為他們要和這種掠奪性的貸款抗爭。他們欠的錢在不斷增加，而利率的調整則會產生更大的影響。次級貸款是從2006年底2007年初開始出問題的，而Alt-A和選擇性可調整利率貸款實際上在2007年底也開始了，最近是在持續惡化。
選擇性可調整利率貸款是抵押貸款中毒性最大的“東西”。例如：如果某人獲得了固定利率為5.5%，5萬美元的浮動利率抵押貸款，那麽每個月還款可以有三種選擇。其一，將本金和利息分攤後每月支付2839美元；其二，隻支付利息2292美元；其三，每月隻支付1%的利息，416美元。
第二種還款方式與第三種還款方式的區別在於，如果按照第三種方式付款，那麽每個月1875美元的差額將會記入本金之中。當本金上漲15%至7.5萬美元時，也就是第三年，就必須重設利率，要開始同時支付本金和利息了。
貸款標準在2000年開始鬆動了很多，而到2005年初之後，就變得更加糟糕了，其中最糟糕的貸款就是兩年“引逗利率”的貸款。他們目前的違約率高到“前所未有”的程度，特別是當利率調整了之後會更差。這種引逗利率的第一批貸款是在2005年發行的，兩年之後，2007年第一季度開始出現大量違約，次貸危機由此爆發。但是在2005年一季度之後，人們發行了一些質量更低的此類貸款。這些貸款在2007年不斷重新調整利率，引發了越來越多的違約，於是這場危機持續惡化。從買房人第一個月欠款開始，一般需要平均15個月的時間把房屋清算掉，通常是通過拍賣的方式。
如此算來，2005年第一季度發放的貸款，在2007年第一季度止贖，然後到2008年上半年拍賣出去。
考慮到2005年下半年貸款的標準進一步放鬆，一直持續到2007年上半年，2009年以及之後的違約、止贖以及拍賣情形會進一步加劇，這些都會進一步拉低房價。
2008年，一共有約4400億美元的抵押貸款利息進行了重新調整，人們原本預計“引逗利率”的貸款永遠都不會重新調整。借款者和貸款者都認為房價會一直上漲，獲得信貸也會一直很容易，這樣借款人在利率調整之前都可以再貸款。而現在房價不斷下跌，抵押貸款市場凍結，很少有人能夠重新貸款，這樣就導致了違約大量上升，許多情況下，甚至是在利率重新設置之前就違約了。
當Alt-A和選擇性可調整利率貸款的利率大規模調整後，大量買房者在未來三年將支付更高的利率。Alt-A和選擇性可調整利率貸款的利率調整將在2010年和2011年達到高峰，規模則將大大超過次級抵押貸款。
具體參考下麵的圖
上一波的高峰是次級貸款Subprime到期重置，形成大量違約，時間點在07-08年。這一波高峰是選擇性可調整利率貸款 Option ARM集中到期。時間點是2011下半年到2012年春，預計會形成比次貸更嚴重的違約。
再看下麵這篇最新的新聞
文章來源：http://blog.hsh.com/index.php/2011/05/is-now-the-time-to-dump-your-arm/
May 24th, 2011
Is now the time to dump your ARM?(現在應該回避選擇性利率房貸嗎?)
by Peter Miller
Despite continuing low mortgage rates, one prominent Detroit bankruptcy attorney says ARMs remain a looming danger and should be avoided. （雖然暫時來說貸款利率還是比較低，但一位破產法資深律師已經警告說應該回避 選擇性浮動利率房貸AMR）
“The problem is that a significant part of our housing is still mortgaged with ARMs,” said Michael A. Greiner, a bankruptcy specialist. “Interest rates have been at historic lows for years now. But we are already starting to see upward pressure on interest rates. Once interest rates start to rise again, ARM payments will start to rise again.” （問題的根源是我們很大一部分的房屋都是選擇了選擇性浮動利率房貸，利率水平已經保持連續幾年曆史低位，同時我們也觀察到了利率上調的壓力。一旦利率向上調整，浮動利率房貸AMR的還款額度會開始攀升。）
Greiner explained that “The ARMs are what originally caused this crisis. People were unable to afford their mortgage payments when the rates adjusted…and that is what started the foreclosures. Since then, the foreclosure crisis has been driven by the larger economy, not by the ARMs adjusting. But when interest rates start rising again, we will see another wave of foreclosures due to the ARMs going up again.”（當浮動利率房貸的還款額度大幅攀升，人們就會無力支付，而選擇放棄，那時候大量的斷供就會出現。）
ARM trends
Greiner, of course, is right that if rates rise, a lot of marginal ARM borrowers–individuals who cannot afford steeper monthly costs–could face foreclosure and bankruptcy. That said, borrowers have been dumping ARMs recently:
Eighty-four percent of borrowers who had a hybrid ARM chose to refinance into a fixed-rate product during the first quarter, continuing a pattern of the past few years of borrowers revealing a strong preference for fixed-rate over variable-pay contracts.
During the first quarter of 2011, the ARM share of applications was 6 percent in Freddie Mac’s monthly ARM survey, which includes purchase-money as well as refinance applications.
The ARM issue may be overblown
Even if ARM rates were to rise, I think the problem they present may be overblown. I do not agree with the idea that “ARMs are what originally caused this crisis.”
Instead, let’s be more specific: what set off the mortgage meltdown was the creation of “affordable” loan products, many of which looked like ARMs but were radically different and more dangerous forms of financing.
Option ARMs: the evil twin
To give an example, since the 1970s, ARMs have generally had two forms of interest rate caps–an annual cap and a lifetime cap. Interest rate increases were typically limited to 2 percent per year, with a 6 percent cap over the original rate of the loan.
However, in 2002 and 2003 we began to see the “option ARM” concept emerge–a product under various names which allowed borrowers to make several payment choices during the loan’s start period. This loan also was distinguished by the fact that it often had three payment caps–a 2 percent annual limit, a 6 percent lifetime limit and a 6 percent limit when the loan was re-cast.
In other words, with this third payment cap, an option ARM rate could increase by as much as 6 percent at one time.
We knew Option ARMs were bad news
This problem was not unknown to the lending industry. Six years ago, John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency and a major bank regulator, explained the dangers:
In the case of a typical $360,000 payment option mortgage that starts at 6 percent interest, monthly payments could increase by 50 percent in the sixth year if interest rates do not change. If rates jump two percentage points, to 8 percent, monthly payments could double. （舉例說明，一個資產價值 36萬美元的貸款，如果開始是 6%的利率，在第六年的時候（AMR一般是3—5年），在利率不變的情況下，月供會增加到50%。可是如果利率上調2%，到8%，那麽月供就翻了一倍了）
“Is this an appropriate product to mass market to customers who may be looking at the less than fully amortizing minimum payment as the only way to afford a larger mortgage–at least for the five years before the onset of payment shock?” Mr. Dugan asked. “And are lenders really prepared to deal with the consequences–including litigation risk–of providing such products in markets where real estate prices soften or decline, or where interest rates substantially increase?”
“Too many consumers have been attracted to products by the seductive prospect of low minimum payments that delay the day of reckoning, but often make ultimate repayment of growing principal far more difficult,” he added. “At the same time, too many lenders have been attracted to the product by the prospect of booking immediate revenue without receiving cash in hand, a process that often masks underlying credit problems that could ultimately produce substantial losses.”
What should you do if you still have an option ARM?
The easy answer is to refinance or get a loan modification. However, if you’re underwater or behind on your monthly payments, getting approved for either is going to be extremely difficult.
What if you just have a plain ARM? If you do, take a look at the potential monthly payment increases to see if you’re able to meet them given your current budget. If not, seek some stability by refinancing into a fixed-rate product. If you’ve had your ARM for at least a few years, you may want to consider a fixed-rate loan with a shorter term, say 20 or 15 years, as opposed to a new 30-year loan.
