澳學者：澳大利亞必須停止敵視中國
湖北荊楚網 2022年11月20日21:53 來源： 參考消息網
http://news.cnhubei.com/content/2022-11/20/content_15248166.html
參考消息網11月20日報道 英國《衛報》網站11月15日文章發表題為《澳大利亞要想修複與中國的關係，必須停止敵視中國》的文章，作者是澳大利亞悉尼大學中國近代史高級講師戴維·布羅菲。
全文摘編如下：
盡管人們對中澳領導人的會晤充滿期待，但從工黨那裏很難得到除了製式文件以外的有關中國的信息。澳大利亞外長黃英賢在13日的一次演講中稱，我們將“在能合作的方麵合作……在必要的方麵存在分歧”。那麽工黨的對華政策到底是什麽？
自上台以來，工黨已經宣布希望“穩定”與中國的關係。這是一個模棱兩可的詞語，或許有意為之，以讓不同的選民用自己的方式進行解讀。對中澳關係樂觀主義者來說，穩定將被視為一種改善；對華鷹派人士則把該詞解讀為鞏固兩國緊張關係的新常態。這個概念有什麽實質內容嗎？
從堪培拉的角度來看，亞洲的最理想情況看起來大體上一直如此：在美國的鋼鐵之牆後麵，澳大利亞的出口源源不斷地流向中國。當這堵牆開始顯露弱化的跡象時，澳大利亞政府就會故意引導我們轉過來將中國說成敵人，試圖讓美國牽頭的遏華行動更堅定。這裏的結論是，當美國步步為營的時候，澳大利亞就避免讓自己太出風頭。
堪培拉可能覺得在這種環境下可以避免槍打出頭鳥的風險，或許還可以獲得一些回旋的餘地，以防美國遏製中國崛起的努力失敗。如果說“穩定”在政策方麵有什麽意義的話，指的就是這點。
然而，事實是，工黨仍然堅持最初讓我們走到這一步的一整套政策。雖然澳大利亞媒體現在焦急地期待外交裂痕修複的跡象，但就在幾周前，新聞頭條還在歡呼B-52轟炸機抵達北部地區。澳英美聯盟已經讓我們走上一條與美國不斷深化軍事融合的道路。當我們公開為了針對一個國家而武裝自己時，呼籲與之建立“穩定”關係的意義何在？
一係列以中國是敵對的危險國家為前提的舉措仍然存在。僅舉兩個例子，對中國投資的荒謬限製，以及對從事澳大利亞研究的中國學者實施簽證禁令。
與含糊其辭的“穩定”相比，取消一些這種不利措施將給澳大利亞外交官一個更好的切入點來向中國表達不滿。然而，悲哀的是，一些對華鷹派人士把任何的政策變化都描述為對北京做出的不可容忍的讓步。
我並不是第一個指出這種言論的反常後果的人士：我們的政策視中國的態度而定。北京若是反對澳大利亞某項新舉措，必定會促使我們強化該舉措。這是我們需要擺脫的思維習慣。
當人們對國際外交的激烈交鋒極為感興趣時，這樣說似乎有些奇怪，但我們需要多想想希望澳大利亞成為什麽樣的國家和社會。澳大利亞對中國的軍事化回應正在加劇全球分歧，並分裂我們自己的社會。簡而言之，正在破壞穩定。
反對這種未來的境遇與迎合北京無關。相反，正視澳大利亞自身對當前緊張關係的推波助瀾作用，是與北京展開嚴肅對話的唯一可靠途徑。
If Australia wants to mend relations with China, we must stop viewing it as the enemy
David Brophy， 15 Nov 2022, Dr David Brophy; MA PhD Harvard
Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese History; Department of History
+61 2 9114 0778 Fax +61 2 9351 3918
david.brophy@sydney.edu.au
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/nov/15/if-australia-wants-to-mend-relations-with-china-we-must-stop-viewing-it-as-the-enemy
What is the point of calling for 'stable' relations with a country while we openly arm ourselves for war against it?
‘Australia’s militarised response to China is exacerbating global faultlines and fracturing our own society; it is, in a word, destabilising.’ Photograph: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
So what exactly is Labor’s China policy?
In opposition, Labor stood alongside the Coalition’s every move, only grumbling when the government descended into partisan point-scoring. Since coming to office, it has declared its desire to “stabilise” relations with China. It’s an ambiguous term, probably deliberately so, allowing different constituencies to each put their own spin on it. For Sino-Australian optimists, stabilisation will be seen as an improvement. China hawks interpret the term as consolidating a new normal of heightened tensions, with possibly a little less dog-whistling.
Is there any substance to the concept?
From Canberra’s point of view, the best-case scenario in Asia has always looked roughly the same: a world in which Australia directs an endless flow of exports to China from behind a wall of American steel. It was when that wall started showing signs of weakening that the Coalition led us on a deliberate turn towards talking up China as an enemy, in an effort to catalyse a more determined American-led containment effort.
The corollary here is that when America looks to be stepping up, Australia need not keep itself in the spotlight. Biden is doing enough now to signal a renewed American commitment to containing China. His most recent tranche of hi-tech export controls has convinced even skeptics that Washington is embarked on a policy of slowing China’s economic growth.
In this situation, Canberra may sense an opportunity to undo a little of the damage incurred while putting itself “out in front” (as Malcom Turnbull’s insiders termed his shift), and maybe also gain some wriggle room in case US efforts to stymie China’s rise fall flat.
If “stabilisation” has any meaning in policy terms, it is this.
The fact is, though, that the ALP remains committed to the whole suite of policies that got us here in the first place. While the Australian media now anxiously anticipates signs of repair to the diplomatic rift, only a few weeks ago headlines were hailing the arrival of B-52s in the Northern Territory. Whether or not the submarines ever eventuate, Aukus has put us on a path towards ever-deepening military integration with the US, all aimed at China.
What is the point of calling for “stable” relations with a country while we openly arm ourselves for war against it?
A series of measures premised on the notion of China as a singularly hostile, dangerous country, remain in place: absurd restrictions on Chinese investment, visa bans on Chinese scholars of Australian studies, to name two examples. The accompanying rise in anti-Chinese racism has been well documented.
Rolling back some of this harmful legacy would give Australian diplomats a far better entry point to air their grievances with China than vague talk of “stabilisation”. Sadly, though, some China hawks have succeeded in framing any change to today’s policy settings as an intolerable concession to Beijing. That being the case, Albanese is likely to bring little concrete to the table in his meeting with Xi today.
I’m not the first to point out the perverse consequence of this kind of rhetoric: that our policies do end up being determined by China. Beijing’s opposition to a new Australian move all but ensures that we double down on it. It’s a habit of mind we need to get out of.
At a time of heightened interest in the cut-and-thrust of international diplomacy this may seem an odd thing to say, but we need to worry less about what China thinks, and more about the kind of country and society we want Australia to be. Australia’s militarised response to China is exacerbating global faultlines and fracturing our own society; it is, in a word, destabilising.
Yes, China is moving in a more authoritarian direction under Xi. But prolonged tensions between China and the west will see concerns with human rights jettisoned on both sides. The recent race to arm strongman Manasseh Sogavare’s Solomon Islands police gives us, in microcosm, a picture of what a future of regional rivalry looks like.
Opposing this vision of the future has nothing to do with pandering to Beijing. On the contrary, confronting Australia’s own contribution to current tensions is the only credible way to start a serious conversation with Beijing about its.
David Brophy
David Brophy is a senior lecturer in modern Chinese history at the University of Sydney and an author
China is far from alone in taking advantage of Australian universities’ self-inflicted wounds
Having long encouraged universities to find funding elsewhere, politicians now home in on their ties to China to argue that they’ve lost their way
Sanctions only escalate tensions. It's time to tackle the Uyghurs' plight differently
We have to make a credible case that western opposition to China’s policies is not geopolitical manoeuvring, says Australian academic David Brophy
