在該雜誌上發表的所有文章都不署名。雜誌有若幹固定專欄，比如關於中國的專欄為 “Chaguan” （茶館），亞洲的專欄為 “Banyan” （菩提樹），英國政壇的專欄為“Bagehot”。Bagehot 是《經濟學人》的首任主編。
探討職場生涯的專欄為“Bartleby”。Bartleby 是美國著名作家 Herman Melville （Moby Dick 的作者）一短篇小說裏的主角。 小說全名為 “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street”。Bartleby 可比當今”996工作製下”的職員悲慘多了，他一天24小時吃喝拉撒都在公司。該專欄用他來命名不言而喻。
股市專欄的名稱是”Buttonwood” (梧桐樹)。230年前（1792年5月17日），一些從事股票交易的經紀人在華爾街的一棵梧桐樹下聚會，商訂的一項協議，約定每日在梧桐樹下聚會從事證券交易並訂出了交易傭金的最低標準及其他及其他交易條款。這是紐約股票交易所的雛形。
最近讀了一篇很有趣的文章，發表在最新一期的《經濟學人》雜誌股市專欄。這篇文章是該專欄寫手（沒署名）上任四年的最後一篇，算是臨別贈言或感慨吧。
文章不長，全文附在最後。裏麵提到了 Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 這本書。這也是我最喜歡的一本書，讀了不止一遍。這本書記述了一百多年前一位股市操盤手的股市沉浮。文中提到的 bucket shops，是那些與股市投機者對賭的小經紀公司 （莊家）。在那裏，客戶用保證金交易 （buying on margin），買賣股票時隻交一小部分金額，不付全額，可謂一兩撥千斤。客戶的買單或賣單，並不傳遞到紐約股票交易所，而是與莊家對賭。如果客戶贏了，那是贏莊家的錢；如果客戶輸了，那是輸給莊家。
如果公平對賭，輸贏的概率差不多 （假定股價隨機波動）。但莊家有莊家的優勢，比如擴大買賣差價（bid/offer spread）, 或提高對 保證金的要求 （margin call)。莊家甚至可以趕走那些贏多輸少的客戶。這種現象聽起來耳熟，因為在拉斯維加斯賭場也時常出現。
遙想當年，股票價格信息靠電報傳遞的美國各地，用那種卷紙（誰還記得？）打印出來，然後由抄遞員抄寫在經紀公司的大廳的顯著位置。Reminiscences of a Stock Operator的作者一開始就是幹這種活的。不過他很快發現他對數字和股價規律（reading the tape) 特別有天賦。Reading the tape 就是現在我們所謂的技術分析 （technical analysis)。於是他就開戶交易，與莊家對賭，隨後越發不可收拾。。。。
不多說了。有興趣的，可以把那本書找來讀讀。
一百多年後，股市已今非昔比。
但投資者的心理一點也沒有沒變。華爾街金融機構的貪婪--想盡一切辦法從客戶那裏賺錢--也沒有變。確實如此！
Finance & economics | Buttonwood
Jul 28th 2022
The Economist
Reminiscences of a financial columnist
There is nothing new on Wall Street
It is telling that one of the best books about financial markets was published almost a century ago. “Reminiscences of a Stock Operator”, by Edwin Lefevre, is a fictionalised account of the exploits of Jesse Livermore, a speculator. Livermore made a fortune selling the market short during the financial panic of 1907. He would repeat the trick in 1929. The book captures a particular time—of bucket shops, insider pools and dandy tips on Western Union or American Steel. But it is also timeless.
As this writer finishes a four-year stint as Buttonwood, the one tentative conclusion he draws from the experience is something that Livermore realised a century ago: there is nothing new on Wall Street. What happens today in the markets has happened before and will happen again. Every extreme of greed or fear has a precedent. Technology changes, but people do not.
The beginning for this Buttonwood was May 2018. At the time there was a good deal of optimism among American and European asset managers about business prospects in China. There was much talk about its “Wild West” stockmarket—with lots of retail trading on tips and a rapid turnover of shares. Rich-world entrants fancied they would add a dash of professionalism. But instead of China’s market becoming more American, the reverse happened. In 2020 there was a surge in new accounts at no-fee brokers, notably Robinhood, catering to small investors in America. A gaggle of social-media pundits emerged to mobilise this new army of speculators. They piled into tech darlings, such as Tesla, but also bombed-out stocks, such as GameStop, a video-games retailer.
This “meme-stock” craze seemed new, but it wasn’t. What it most resembled was the bucket shops of early-20th-century America, where Livermore first learned to read the markets. Here ordinary punters exchanged tips and could bet on the direction of favoured stocks for a tiny initial outlay. The Robinhood crowd, though they had better technology, had similar preferences. They were keen on call options on stocks that had the characteristics of long-odds bets. As with bucket-shop punts, these options mostly expire worthless, but can reap a spectacular profit if the share price surges.
Manias, scams and iffy schemes are recurring evils. “I used to think that people were more gullible in the 1860s and 1870s than the 1900s,” says the narrator of “Reminiscences”. But Livermore only had to pick up his newspaper to read about the latest Ponzi scheme or crooked broker. More recently, there has been the Wirecard fraud, the Archegos blow-up, the shell-company boom and any number of dodgy digital currencies.
This year has so far been a rejoinder to such excesses. As Livermore knew well, tighter money and a giddy stockmarket are a dangerous mix. His big short in 1907 was in response to signals from the money markets, which were “megaphoning warnings to the entire world”. But they were not the only warnings he ever heard. In the world of “Reminiscences”, bull markets are marked by the “calamity howling” of “old-stagers [who] said everybody—except themselves—had gone crazy”. Doom-mongers are forever with us. Indeed, there is a kind of punditry that echoes the millenarian sects of medieval Europe, the adherents of which believed they were living in the “last days”. It anticipates an endgame in which all excesses will be washed from the markets.
Perhaps such a reckoning is already in train. But it cannot be the endgame, because the game never ends. If history is anything to go by, a big bust would merely set the stage for another phase of play. Injuries heal with time. Memories of the last brutal bear market eventually fade. The unceasing contest between fear and greed resumes. The thoughtful investor has a lot to reckon with, and that won’t change either. There are constant judgments to be made about company managers, business strategy, economic policy, politics and geopolitics—as well as the opinions and likely reactions of other investors, who may or may not be as thoughtful.
And as Livermore knew well, any investor has also to fight the “expensive enemies within himself”. This endless wrestling with powerful emotions, such as hope, doubt and fear, is a big part of what makes Wall Street so fascinating. It has been a great privilege to watch the unfolding drama from this perch and to try to make sense of it all. The honour now passes to others. Thank you so much for reading.
既然你如此反對投資，金融機構，那你還投錢進去。
哈哈。 】
樓主明顯反對股市投機，你不懂投資和投機的區別而已。
哈哈。