河南 除此之外，還有一些朝代，要麽是亡於地緣衝擊、要麽是亡於氣候變化，要麽是亡於通脹失控。而和所有這些中國曆史上的封建王朝相比，今天的美國從某種程度上講屬實稱得上是個超越了中國人認知的存在，因為美國的毛病是“綜上所述”。所有中國古代封建王朝的死因，現如今的美國多多少少都沾了一點。
為什麽我今天要重提這麽個老段子呢？因為我最近在美網上刷到了一篇畫風非常清奇的文章，原始信源是美國知名時政媒體《國會山報》，作者是美國學者約翰·麥克格利恩（John Mac Ghlionn）。他在這篇文章中無奈地向美國社會發出了一個警告，稱“一場前所未有的大衰退正在逼近美國人。而且，這一次很可能是美國曆史上‘最糟糕的一次’。”
為什麽這麽說呢？在麥克格利恩看來，眼下美國遭遇的麻煩是史無前例的。它不再是西方經濟學家口中那種可以被粉飾敷衍的周期性波動，而是一場由於地緣政治危機、能源供應鏈斷裂、沉渣泛起的經濟滯脹，以及深層的社會結構性崩塌等一係列病症共同造成的全方位綜合症。
而所有患上了這種綜合征的國家，在人類曆史上無一例外，最後全都死翹翹了。
麥克格利恩提到，眼下美國最大的一條危機導火索，毫無疑問是中東的地緣政治危機。由於貿然對伊朗發動軍事入侵，霍爾木茲海峽航運受阻，直接導致國際油價飆升。過去的美國，總能通過在全球製造衝突來收割利益，但這一次，過度幹預的回旋鏢終於打到了自己頭上，高昂的能源成本，正在將美國經濟拖入滯脹的泥潭。
從表麵上看，過去幾年的美國經濟似乎是一場烈火烹油的全民狂歡。美股飆升，資產價格膨脹，擁有操盤資本和內部關係的人因此得以迅速積累財富。這幫人腰包的膨脹速度，甚至讓10多年前的華爾街都感到汗顏。
然而，這樣的狂歡注定隻能是極少數既得利益者的盛宴。對於既沒有信托基金，也沒有操盤資本，甚至連商業醫保都夠嗆能交得起的普通美國人來說，他們過去幾年的日子實際上是在慢慢墜入無底深淵的。
受高企的通脹影響，現如今的美國物價早就從悄悄慢漲變成了百米衝刺。數據顯示，高達60%的美國人連1000美元的應急資金都掏不出來。這種情況或許算不上赤貧，但這卻是一種更為隱蔽的社會慢性病，麥克格利恩將其稱為“僅能勉強糊口的永久溫飽狀態”。
換一個我們中國人更熟悉的說法，其實就是60%的美國人的斬殺線也就是1000美元的水平。隻要遇到點風吹草動需要他們掏出這筆錢江湖救急，這群美國人就有可能會被他們身處的社會體製輕鬆斬殺。
另外，再過去幾十年，美國每次遭遇經濟衰退都能緩過來，不管情況有多殘酷但過程終歸是短暫的。不管有多少就業崗位在衰退期間消失了，等經濟一好轉它們還是會回來的。
但現在的情況不一樣了，隨著人工智能的飛快普及，從初級開發人員到律師助理，從數據分析師到營銷部門，白領工作的入門架構正在被AI有條不紊且毫不留情地暴力拆解。即便日後美國的經濟還有望複蘇，這些被AI替代的崗位也不會再回來了，因為它們已經被永久封印在了企業利潤率擴張的財報裏。
在文章的後半段，麥克格利恩的論述堪稱字字泣血。他拿1973年做對比，說類似的處境對美國來說其實並不新鮮，因為那一年美西方同樣麵臨著經濟滯脹、地緣動蕩和結構撕裂等問題。那為什麽當年美國能緩過來而今天卻不行呢？因為今天的美國已經不是1973年的美國了。
由於川普的胡搞瞎搞和驢象的朋黨之爭，美國乃至世界民眾對美國政府的信任度已經跌到了曆史最低點，堪稱現代版的禮崩樂壞和黨爭極化；而由阿片類藥物和芬太尼引發的成癮危機，則像晚清的鴉片流毒一樣，成建製地摧毀美國的社區基層。
曾經支撐美國社會熬過大蕭條和二戰的那種文化自信，那種相信忍耐會有回報、相信明天會更好的信念，現在已經消退為一種誰都知道有問題，但就是誰也不敢說出口的虛無主義了。
一個依然相信長期主義的社會，是很有希望熬過經濟危機的。但一個完全建立在消費主義和即時滿足之上的社會，一旦遭遇大幅收縮，那麽它要麵臨的恐怕就是事關生死存亡的終極考驗了。
其實美國變成了今天這副德性，麥克格利恩這群美國學者的無奈是可以理解的。他在文章中並沒有說美國會爆發1929年那種GDP一下暴跌30%的大蕭條，因為現代金融工具確實更多了。但與此同時，麥克格利恩卻揭示了另一種殺傷力同樣巨大，甚至猶有過之的後果，那就是美國的中產階級，有可能會因為這次大衰退而徹底淪為一個曆史名詞。
長此以往，美國的社會結構可能將演變成比金字塔形更加極端的倒T字型。也就是頂層的一小撮人贏家通吃，而底層的億萬普羅大眾則連渣都沒有。
曆史不會簡單重複，但總是押著相同的韻腳。中國曆朝曆代的死因，美國挨個撞上，不是巧合，而是規律。一個帝國到了末期，都是這樣：外麵打仗，裏麵通脹；底層互害，中層塌陷，上層隻顧自己。想扭轉頹勢、實現中興，從來都是極難的事。美國現在百病纏身，但真正要命的是，它已經沒有刮骨療毒的決心，也快沒有時間了。
America is heading for a recession — and it may be the worst yet
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/5814974-middle-class-decline-permanent-crisis/
BY JOHN MAC GHLIONN, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/04/26
A recession is coming — not the manicured kind economists dress up in euphemism, but a real one, the kind that redefines the word retroactively. Niall Ferguson has been mapping the terrain: geopolitical shocks, energy disruption, inflation that won’t be reasoned with. History, he notes, does not reward economies caught in that particular combination. It never has.
But this one carries something extra, something structural.
For years, the American economy ran on a dangerous illusion. Markets soared. Asset prices ballooned. Those already inside the system — with capital, with cushions, with connections — accumulated wealth at a pace that would have seemed obscene even a decade ago. Stocks surged. Property values became punchlines told at the expense of renters.
For everyone else — those without a trust fund or a safety net — it has been a slow slide into the abyss. Groceries crept upward, then sprinted. Rent became a monthly reckoning. Credit cards filled the gap, then tightened it. The middle class now occupies an unfamiliar position in American life — more likely to descend the ladder than to climb it.
Recessions do not hit such societies evenly. They amplify what already exists. The wealthy absorb, the rest surrender.
Roughly 60 percent of Americans cannot cover an unexpected $1,000 expense without borrowing. Not a calamity. A surprise. A busted transmission. A root canal. A single night in an emergency room. More than half the country is living within one ordinary piece of bad luck from a crisis. Not poverty, exactly. Something arguably more insidious: the permanent condition of almost fine. And almost fine, it turns out, has a very low tolerance for what comes next.
The layoffs have already arrived. It is no longer unusual to open the news and find another company — sometimes a ridiculously profitable one — shedding hundreds or thousands of positions in a single announcement. Compounding this, fewer graduates are finding work in the fields they trained for, entering a market that is contracting precisely as they arrive. To understand why, you cannot discuss what is happening to employment without discussing what is simultaneously happening to intelligence itself. Artificial intelligence is no longer something to prepare for. It has arrived as a co-worker, a contractor, a first draft, a diagnosis — fully, practically and indifferent to the lives it is replacing.
It is moving, and it is moving through the wrong neighborhoods — wrong, at least, for those who thought proximity to a desk conferred some protection. From junior developers to paralegals, analysts to marketing departments, the entry-level architecture of white-collar work is being disassembled, methodically and without apology.
Previous recessions were brutal but temporary. Jobs disappeared, then returned when conditions improved. Industries contracted, then recovered. There was pain, often profound, but there was always a path back. That path is no longer guaranteed.
AI-displaced roles do not come back when the economy recovers. They are simply gone. Permanently retired behind a wall of efficiency gains and margin expansion.
That changes the psychology of a downturn entirely. The question shifts from when will things improve to improve for whom? Those who own the technology — who build it, fund it, deploy it — stand to benefit enormously. For those replaced by it, there is the cheerful advice to retrain, to pivot, to adapt. All reasonable suggestions in theory. Less so when entire categories of work are shrinking simultaneously, and the competition includes systems that do not sleep, do not negotiate, and require no benefits.
Tie that to the wealth gap, and what was troubling becomes something closer to a verdict.
The last time the West faced a comparable collision of forces — stagflation, geopolitical upheaval, structural economic disruption — the social fabric frayed in ways that didn’t fully mend. Trust retreated and never fully returned. Institutions survived but emerged diminished. Recovery followed, in time, but the marks it left were permanent.
That was 1973. The foundations today are considerably more fragile. Faith in institutions sits near historic lows. Communities have been decimated by addiction, and the social infrastructure that once absorbed such shocks has been coming apart for decades. The cultural confidence that once carried societies through genuine hardship — the belief that sacrifice was worth something, that tomorrow warranted patience — has faded into a nihilism that is difficult to condemn in people who arrived at it honestly.
A society that still believes in endurance can survive contraction. A society built entirely on consumption faces a harder test.
Because economies are not merely systems. They are expressions of collective belief — about work, about fairness, about who gets ahead, and whether the game is rigged. When enough people conclude, simultaneously, that the answer to that last question is obviously yes, what follows is not a reckoning so much as its overture.
John Mac Ghlionn is a writer and researcher who explores culture, society and the impact of technology on daily life.
