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Ulv Hanssen 美國關於中國是修正主義強權的敘事顛倒了

(2026-04-22 23:22:58) 下一個

美國關於中國是修正主義強權的敘事顛倒了

美國已經變成了它長期以來警告我們中國會成為的那種危險的修正主義強權。

The American Narrative About a Revisionist China Is Upside-Down

https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/the-american-narrative-about-a-revisionist-china-is-upside-down/? 

By Ulv Hanssen   March 12, 2026 作者:烏爾夫·漢森 2026年3月12日

美國總統唐納德·特朗普極具侵略性的外交政策清楚地表明了一件事:華盛頓關於中國是修正主義強權的敘事是顛倒的。美國外交政策分析人士、軍方官員和兩黨議員都就中國問題達成了一種共識敘事。根據這種敘事,中國是一個致力於破壞國際法和威脅世界和平的修正主義強權。但任何觀察過特朗普衝動且暴力的外交政策的人都應該明白,這些美國對中國的描述更適用於美國自身。

自2025年1月上任以來,特朗普已經:轟炸了七個國家;綁架了一位國家元首,殺害了另一位;以武力封鎖古巴石油進口,企圖引發政權更迭;在加勒比海地區對約150名涉嫌毒品走私者進行法外處決;威脅吞並或占領巴拿馬運河、加拿大和格陵蘭島;對全世界發動貿易戰;退出包括世界衛生組織和《巴黎氣候協定》在內的66個國際組織和條約;大幅削減對聯合國的資助,同時建立由美國主導的替代機構;宣布針對拉丁美洲的“新門羅主義”;當然,還發動了對伊朗的無端戰爭,而特朗普政府似乎無人知曉其原因。

這才是修正主義強權的真麵目。更準確地說,這是一個正在衰落的超級大國的真麵目,它正拚命地試圖通過破壞其曾經建立的秩序的每一個要素來阻止自身的衰落。美國正在政治、外交、經濟、文化乃至道德層麵上失去其全球影響力。美國影響力唯一未減的方麵是軍事力量。因此,美國越來越依賴軍事力量來解決國際問題。這一趨勢在特朗普時期達到頂峰,他對實力的癡迷導致軍隊在美國政治中扮演了極其重要的角色。

但特朗普治下的美國所展現的殘暴並非力量的象征,而是軟弱的表現。軍事力量正日益成為華盛頓迫使其他國家服從其意願的唯一手段。然而,過度依賴武力從長遠來看行不通。它隻會激怒其他國家,促使它們聯合起來反對美國,從而加速美國的衰落。

諷刺的是,美國的行為恰恰印證了許多美國專家此前對中國的預測。華盛頓“政治圈”普遍認為,崛起中的中國將開始以越來越魯莽和危險的方式行事。當然,也有學者和分析人士對這種說法提出質疑。但華盛頓的普遍觀點是,中國正在破壞“基於規則的秩序”,並尋求全球霸權。其結果當然是美國必須不惜一切代價阻止中國的崛起。

這些分析存在嚴重缺陷。事實上,它們與其說是對中國目標和行動的客觀描述,不如說更像是一種投射。

在美國,這種危言聳聽的中國分析不勝枚舉,但我特別想強調哈爾·布蘭茲和邁克爾·貝克利合著的《危險地帶:即將到來的與中國的衝突》一書,因為它完美地體現了美國對中國的錯誤認知。

首先,正如書名所示,這本書的前提是中美關係必然是衝突關係。合作從一開始就被排除在外。作者在2022年撰文指出,中國已經達到頂峰,即將進入快速衰退期。為了阻止這種情況發生,他們預測中國將越來越多地訴諸武力來實現其外交政策目標。因此,2020年代是一個“危險時期”,中國的魯莽行動有可能引發與美國的軍事衝突。

作者的論點是,如果美國能夠順利度過危險的2020年代,中國將變得如此虛弱,以至於不再對美國構成真正的挑戰。為了度過這個危險時期,美國必須在遏製和削弱中國的同時增強自身的軍事實力。

這類分析帶有某種一廂情願的成分,因為它們既高估了美國遏製中國的能力,又低估了中國抵禦經濟挑戰的能力。但美國對華敘事最嚴重的問題在於,它將中國的地緣政治目標歪曲為修正主義。

毋庸置疑,如今的中國實力遠勝以往。

中國比美國更捍衛自由國際秩序。這並非因為中國本質上比美國更具道德感,而是因為中國認為這一秩序有利於其崛起,而美國則開始將其視為自身衰落的原因。正如美國國務卿馬可·盧比奧所言:“戰後全球秩序不僅過時,如今更成了用來對付我們的武器。”

因此,在兩大超級大國中,中國如今最可靠地捍衛著自由貿易和國際機構。而美國則試圖以符合自身國家利益的方式強行修改這一秩序。換言之,美國才是真正的修正主義強權。

但這引出了一個問題:中國究竟想要什麽?值得一提的是,三位學者去年在《國際安全》雜誌上提出了這個問題,並試圖給出答案。作者分析了大量中共官方文本和講話,發現中國的目標“明確”、“持久”且“有限”。中國所求的是其邊界得到承認,其在邊界內的主權得到尊重,以及其經濟關係不受幹涉。這些是中國所謂的“核心利益”,中國絕不妥協。

重要的是,作者發現中國領導人始終沒有表達過全球霸權的願望,反而經常明確否認這種野心。中國領導人也始終表示,他們沒有取代美國的野心。當然,這並不意味著中國的言論就是事實,但無論如何,它遠沒有美國的言論那麽雄心勃勃。美國的言論公開宣稱:“美國絕不允許任何國家變得如此強勢,以至於威脅到我們的利益。”

盡管中國的目標“有限”且主要著眼於內部,但不可否認的是,這些目標也蘊含著潛在的衝突風險。這主要是因為中國的邊界存在爭議。台灣、釣魚島/尖閣諸島以及南海都是潛在的衝突爆發點。但鑒於中國需要地區穩定才能持續增長和發展,除非其他行為體積極試圖改變現狀,否則中國不太可能就這些領土爭端訴諸武力。

值得注意的是,中國自1979年以來就沒有發動過戰爭。中國經濟奇跡的開端,恰恰是在北京放棄將暴力作為傳統外交政策工具之後,這絕非偶然。對中國而言,教訓顯而易見:隻有和平與穩定才能保障增長和發展。

這並非意味著中國在國際舞台上從未有過魯莽或不理智的行為。也並非意味著中國在國內民主和人權方麵不存在嚴重的缺陷。這裏的論點僅僅是,從中國的言行來看,幾乎沒有證據表明中國有稱霸全球的野心,或者試圖破壞戰後建立的國際機構。

上述研究的作者對中國目標的結論切中要害,值得華盛頓的對華鷹派深思:“我們發現,中國並不構成傳統觀點所認為的那種軍事威脅。因此,沒有必要在太平洋地區采取敵對的軍事姿態,事實上,美國可能是在不必要地製造緊張局勢。”

中國確實帶來了諸多挑戰,但修正主義並非其中之一。美國的情況則截然不同。特朗普政府對聯合國的持續攻擊以及動用武力的低門檻,正是修正主義強權的典型特征。

特朗普領導下的美國修正主義和破壞常規的後果令人震驚。但特朗普在中東的最新行動可能開啟了一個新的無法無天的時代。2月28日,美國與以色列(其本身也是一個修正主義國家)聯手,在與伊朗進行談判的同時,對伊朗發動了無端攻擊。

伊朗戰爭爆發首日,超過150名伊朗女學生在疑似美軍對一所女子學校的空襲中喪生。然而,自封為美國戰爭部長的皮特·赫格塞斯非但沒有表現出悔意,反而誓言美國士兵不會被“愚蠢的交戰規則”所束縛,並嘲諷美國盟友(以色列除外)“對使用武力猶豫不決、畏首畏尾”。同樣,特朗普及其白宮也對美國襲擊造成的破壞幸災樂禍。

在華盛頓,為自己的道德敗壞感到自豪已成為一種新的風氣。特朗普政府每天都在向世界宣告,它漠視國際法。它每天都在破壞社會規範,奪走生命。美國已經變成了它長期以來警告我們中國將會成為的那種危險的修正主義強權。

烏爾夫·漢森

烏爾夫是日本創價大學的副教授, 副研究員

hanssen@soka.ac.jp   +81 (0)70 1490 1605(日本)

烏爾夫·漢森是創價大學亞洲項目的副研究員。

烏爾夫的研究領域是東亞國際關係,尤其關注日本戰後安全政策。

烏爾夫是日本創價大學的副教授。他於2017年獲得柏林自由大學日本研究博士學位,博士論文研究戰後日本安全政策。他於2011年在奧斯陸大學獲得碩士學位,碩士論文研究日朝關係。自2012年以來,他一直擔任創價大學的副研究員。

研究領域:國際關係、日本安全政策、日本和平主義、日本民族認同、日朝關係、朝鮮、東北亞政治。

奧斯陸大學人文學院文化研究與東方語言係,挪威,2008年畢業

柏林自由大學東亞研究研究生院日本研究專業,德國,2017年3月完成

學位

柏林自由大學博士,2017年3月

柏林自由大學日本研究博士,2017年7月

職業經曆

2011年8月 - 2012年8月 挪威駐日本大使館實習生及政治事務官員

2012年9月 - 2013年9月 瑞典國際事務研究所實習生及研究助理

2017年7月 - 2017年9月 瑞典國際事務研究所研究員

2017年9月 - 2017年10月 瑞典國防大學兼職講師

2017年10月 - 2018年3月 歐洲日本研究所研究員

Ulv Hanssen

Associate Research Fellow

Ulv Hanssen is an Associate Research Fellow at UI's Asia programme.

Ulv’s research field is international relations in East Asia with a particular focus on Japan’s postwar security policy.

Ulv is an Associate Professor at Soka University in Japan. He received his PhD in Japanese Studies from Freie Universität Berlin in 2017, writing his dissertation on security policy in postwar Japan. He finished his MA dissertation at Oslo University in 2011 in which he wrote about Japan-North Korea relations. He has been a UI Associate Research Fellow since 2012.

Areas of expertise: International relations, Japanese security policy, Japanese pacifism, Japanese national identity, Japan-North Korea relations, North Korea, Northeast Asian politics

University of OsloFaculty of HumanitiesThe Department of Culture Studies and Oriental LanguagesNorway 2008 Graduated

Freie Universität BerlinGraduate School of East Asian StudiesJapanese studiesGermany March 2017 Completed

Degree

Doctor, Freie Universität Berlin March 2017

Doctor of Japanese studies, Free University Berlin July 2017

Career

August 2011 - August 2012Royal Norwegian Embassy in Japan Trainee and political affairs official

September 2012 - September 2013The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Trainee and research assistant

July 2017 - September 2017The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Research fellow

September 2017 - October 2017Swedish Defence University Part-time lecturer

October 2017 - March 2018European Institute of Japanese Studies Research fellow

The American Narrative About a Revisionist China Is Upside-Down

https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/the-american-narrative-about-a-revisionist-china-is-upside-down/?

The United States has become the dangerous revisionist power it long warned us that China would be. 

By Ulv Hanssen   March 12, 2026
 

U.S. President Donald Trump’s hyper-aggressive foreign policy has made one thing crystal clear: Washington’s narrative about China as a revisionist power is upside-down. U.S. foreign policy analysts, military officials, and lawmakers in both parties have converged on a consensus narrative regarding China. According to this narrative, China is a revisionist power bent on undermining international law and threatening world peace. But anyone who has observed Trump’s impulsive and violent foreign policy should understand that these American descriptions of China are far more applicable to the U.S. itself. 

Since taking power in January 2025, Trump has: bombed seven countries; kidnapped one head of state and killed another; militarily blocked Cuban oil imports in an attempt at sparking regime change; carried out extrajudicial killings of approximately 150 alleged drug smugglers in the Caribbean; threatened annexation or occupation of the Panama CanalCanada, and Greenland; waged a trade war against the whole world; withdrawn from 66 international organizations and treaties, including the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement; massively cut funding to the United Nations while setting up alternative U.S.-led institutions; declared a new Monroe Doctrine for Latin America; and, of course, started an unprovoked war against Iran for reasons no one in the Trump administration seems to know. 

This is the true face of a revisionist power. More accurately, it is the face of a declining superpower that is desperately trying to prevent its downfall by disrupting every element of the order it once created. The United States is losing global influence politically, diplomatically, economically, culturally, and, indeed, morally. The only aspect of U.S. influence that has not diminished is military power. The United States is therefore increasingly relying on military power to solve international problems. This trend has culminated with Trump, whose obsession with strength has led to a supersized role for the military in American statecraft.

But U.S. brutality under Trump is a sign not of strength, but of weakness. Military force is increasingly becoming the only means by which Washington can get other countries to do what it wants. But over-reliance on brute force is not going to work in the long term. It will only antagonize other countries and unite them against the United States, thus hastening U.S. decline. 

The irony is that the United States is behaving exactly like many American experts have predicted that China would. The consensus among the Washington “blob” has been that a rising China would begin to behave in increasingly reckless and dangerous ways. There are of course scholars and analysts who push back on this narrative. But the conventional wisdom in Washington is that China is disrupting the “rules-based order” while seeking global hegemony. The upshot is of course that the U.S. has to prevent China’s rise at all costs. 

These analyses are deeply flawed. In fact, they often seem more of an exercise of projection than an objective description of China’s goals and actions.

There are countless examples of this kind of fearmongering China analysis in the United States, but I want to highlight a book called “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China,” written by Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, as it perfectly epitomizes the misguided American narrative on China. 

First of all, as the title indicates, the book is based on the premise that the China-U.S. relationship must be one of conflict. Cooperation is ruled out from the beginning. The authors, writing in 2022, argued that China has already peaked and is about to enter a period of rapid decline. To prevent this, they predicted that China would increasingly resort to force to achieve its foreign policy goals. The 2020s are therefore a “danger zone” where China’s reckless actions risk causing a military conflict with the United States. 

The authors’ thesis is that if the U.S. can simply get through the dangerous 2020s, China will become so weak that it no longer poses a real challenge to the United States. To get through the danger zone, the U.S. must build up its military strength while containing and weakening China.

There is an element of wishful thinking in these types of analysis as they simultaneously overestimate the U.S. ability to contain China and underestimate China’s ability to withstand economic challenges. But the most serious problem with the United States’ China narrative is that it misrepresents China’s geopolitical goals as revisionist. 

It should not be controversial to state that China is today a far stronger defender of the liberal international order than the United States. This is not because China is inherently a more moral superpower than the U.S., but because China perceives this order as beneficial to its rise while the U.S. has begun to regard it as a cause of its decline. In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio: “The post-war global order is not just obsolete, it is now a weapon being used against us.” 

Of the two superpowers, it is therefore China that most reliably defends free trade and international institutions today. The United States, on the other hand, is trying to forcefully revise this order in ways that it sees as beneficial to its national interests. In other words, it is the U.S. that is acting as a revisionist power.

But that begs the question: what does China want? Helpfully, a trio of scholars asked and tried to answer this question in the pages of International Security last year. The authors analyzed a large set of authoritative CCP texts and speeches and found that China’s goals are “unambiguous,” “enduring,” and “limited.” What China wants is recognition of its borders, respect for its sovereignty within these borders, and non-interference in its economic relations. These are China’s so-called “core interests” on which it will not compromise. 

Importantly, the authors found that Chinese leaders consistently do not express desire for global hegemony, but instead often explicitly deny such ambitions. Chinese leaders also consistently state that they have no ambition of replacing the United States. Of course, this does not mean that China’s rhetoric is true, but it is at any rate far less ambitious than U.S. rhetoric which openly states that “[t]he United States cannot allow any nation to become so dominant that it could threaten our interests.”

Even though China’s goals are “limited” and mainly inward-looking, they do admittedly contain potential for conflict. This is mainly because China’s borders are contested. Taiwan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea are all potential flashpoints. But given that China needs regional stability for continued growth and development, it seems unlikely that China would resort to violence over these territorial disputes unless other actors actively tried to change the status quo. 

It is worth remembering that China has not fought a war since 1979. It is no coincidence that China’s economic miracle began as soon as Beijing abandoned violence as a conventional foreign policy tool. For China, the lesson has been obvious: only peace and stability can guarantee growth and development. 

This is not to say that China never acts rashly or unreasonably on the international stage. Nor is it to say that China does not have serious domestic shortcomings in terms of democracy and human rights. The argument is simply that, judging by its words and actions, there is little evidence that China has ambitions of global hegemony or that it seeks to undermine the international institutions of the postwar period.

The conclusion by the authors of the aforementioned study on China’s goals is pertinent and should be reflected on by Washington’s China hawks: “We find that China does not pose the type of military threat that the conventional wisdom claims it does. Consequently, there is no need for a hostile military posture in the Pacific, and indeed the United States may be unnecessarily creating tensions.”

China does present many challenges, but revisionism is not one of them. The same cannot be said about the United States. The Trump administration’s relentless attacks on the United Nations and the low threshold for use of military force are the hallmarks of a revisionist power. 

The consequences of U.S. revisionism and norm-breaking under Trump have been shocking. But Trump’s latest actions in the Middle East may have ushered in a new age of lawlessness. On February 28, the United States in concert with Israel (a revisionist in its own right) launched an unprovoked attack on Iran while negotiations with the same country were ongoing. 

On the first day of the Iran War more than 150 Iranian school girls were killed in what appears to have been a U.S. strike on a girls’ school. Instead of showing remorse, the self-styled U.S. secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, vowed that American soldiers would not be restrained by “stupid rules of engagement” and mocked U.S. allies (except Israel) who “wring their hands and clutch their pearls, hemming and hawing about the use of force.” Similarly, both Trump and his White House have been gleeful about the destruction caused by the American attacks. 

Expressing pride in one’s moral transgressions has become the new ethos in Washington. Every day, the Trump administration is telling the world that it does not care about international law. Every day, it destroys norms and lives. The United States has become the dangerous revisionist power it long warned us that China would be.   

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