中國政治新時代的共產主義與儒家思想

中國政治新時代的共產主義與儒家思想

貝淡寧教授
https://www.ykeith.com/danielbell/

貝淡寧教授是香港大學法學院政治理論係教授、講座教授。他曾於2017年至2022年擔任山東大學（青島）政治與公共管理學院院長。

他的研究方向為比較政治理論，尤其關注儒家思想和法家思想。

他的著作包括《山東院長》（2023年）、《公正等級》（與王培合著，2020年）、《中國模式》（2015年）、《城市精神》（與阿夫納·德沙利特合著，2012年）、《中國新儒家》（2008年）、《超越自由民主》（2007年）和《東西方相遇》（2000年），均由普林斯頓大學出版社出版。他也是《社群主義及其批評者》（牛津大學出版社，1993年）一書的作者。

貝淡寧的最新著作《山東院長》以內部人士的視角，探討了中國學術界和中國政治體製。

章節
00:00 引言
00:50 中國學術界的現實
06:05 賢能政治作為一種替代理想
11:02 規模在政治中的重要性
16:30 中國的腐敗與治理
23:20 法家思想的實踐
24:43 儒家思想對中國政治的影響
32:58 馬克思主義在中國政治中的應用
43:19 一人統治的迷思
51:14 中國的公關問題
56:12 中國賢能政治與民主的未來
01:00:04 對“可愛”的批判
01:04:56 文化洞察：加拿大 vs. 中國
01:08:49 香港精神
01:10:30 給即將步入職場的畢業生的建議
01:13:03 哪裏可以找到貝爾教授

Keith Yap 00:00

我首先想到的一個問題我讀您最近的著作《山東院長》時，遇到過一個問題，是關於您對西方和中國學術環境的比較。大多數人認為中國到處都是審查製度，沒有學術自由，但您似乎有不同的看法和生活經曆。

Daniel Bell 00:24

雖然中國大陸存在審查製度，而且審查製度還在不斷加強，但我並不否認這一點。然而，許多領域都存在著大量的知識交流和論證。例如，在儒家思想領域，就存在著多元化且激烈的爭論。最近，有一篇頗具影響力的文章，認為從儒家的角度來看，性愛機器人是理想的，這引發了儒家女權主義者的強烈反應。

這體現了不涉及高層政治的辯論如何能夠蓬勃發展。這些討論通常涉及一些中國以外的人不太感興趣的問題，因為像儒家思想這樣的傳統在中國並沒有得到廣泛的研究。

人們也不再那麽在意政治正確的術語。雖然這種情況可能隨著美國新政府的上台而有所改變，但許多西方學者在討論與性別或種族相關的問題時仍感到如履薄冰。在中國，這種非正式的審查製度較少。

在我的書《山東院長》中，我首先列舉了中國所有的問題，因為你必須表達這些觀點才能真正表達出你想表達的意思。中國存在一種非正式的審查機製，你很容易被貼上“中國辯護者”的標簽。所以你必須首先承認中國侵犯人權的行為，人們才會聽取你的意見。

即使在學術界，如果你想在期刊上發表文章，卻不使用威權主義的語言來描述中國的政治體製，也很難發表。幸運的是，在英語世界，以書籍形式出版能帶來更多的自由和原創思維。

另一個關鍵的區別是中國對服務社會的堅定承諾。在中國，尤其是在人文或社會科學領域，將自己的工作與為社區做貢獻完全割裂開來的想法並不常見。這種想法的根源遠流長，遠超政治體製——它與儒家思想息息相關，即認為人生的至善在於服務社會。

這種觀點因領域、時期和地區而異。例如，香港的體製更接近西方，你的薪酬幾乎完全取決於你在頂尖學術期刊和大學出版社發表的論文。你是否為社區做出貢獻幾乎與你的聘用和晉升完全無關。然而，香港比中國大陸擁有更大的學術自由。它與新加坡類似，隻要不涉及當地政府，你基本上可以隨心所欲地做事、說事。

Keith Yap 04:33

我認為，近年來新加坡為批評進入公共論壇開辟了更多空間。

Daniel Bell 04:40

我同意。我的第一份工作是在新加坡國立大學，從1991年到1994年。那段時期學術自由並不理想。但當我撰寫《中國模式》時，我在新加坡待了一個學期，因為在中國，很難以平衡的學術方式探討政治敏感問題。新加坡擁有優秀的中英文圖書館，以及幾乎完全的學術自由。新加坡已經改善了

從那時起，情況就一直很糟糕。

Keith Yap 05:15

關於《中國模式》，您質疑了我們應該將民主與專製政府進行比較的假設，認為自由民主顯然是更優的選擇。您為什麽認為這是一種錯誤的二分法？

Daniel Bell 05:35

這些標簽太模糊了。民主意味著通過自由公正的競爭性選舉選出政治領導人，通常涉及法治、權力分立和保護個人權利等自由主義價值觀。它也是規範性的，表明該製度優於其他製度。

民主和專製的標簽都涵蓋了如此多樣化的政府形式，以至於它們對於政治世界的分類作用不大。我剛開始在新加坡工作時，它在西方被貼上了專製政府的標簽——同樣的標簽也被用來描述朝鮮和沙特阿拉伯，而這兩個國家是完全不同的體製。

要理解中國的政治體製，首先必須理解其激勵理念，然後思考這些理念如何在實踐中實現，以及如何縮小理想與現實之間的差距。我之前在加拿大和英國生活，多少被這樣一種觀點洗腦：隻有一種合法的政治體製——通過自由公正的競爭性選舉選出領導人，並賦予其相應的自由。我帶著這種觀念來到了新加坡。

我花了很長時間才適應，甚至可能在新加坡我也沒有適應好。直到我在北京清華大學工作了八年，我才意識到我的同事們關注的問題截然不同：我們如何培養、選拔和提拔能力和德行均超群的領導者？我們如何衡量能力和德行？它們之間究竟是什麽關係？

我意識到，這種思維方式在中國既是一種理想，也是一種製度，源遠流長。我稱之為“賢能政治”，中文譯為“賢能政治”。賢良政治 我寫《中國模式》一書是為了理解這一理想，展示其優缺點，並提出縮小理想與現實差距的方法。

Daniel Bell 07:35

這是一種極不完善的政治賢能政治，就像美國的民主製度會被認為是極不完善的民主製度一樣。我們需要理解其背後的理念、其優缺點，以及如何縮小理想與現實之間的差距。如果我沒有在北京的一所大學與未來的領導人共事多年，我就不會想到這個問題。

在新加坡，盡管在那裏待了三年，但對我的政治體製仍然構成了衝擊。我很難擺脫那種教條主義的觀點，認為新加坡的政治體製從根本上來說是不合法的，因為它與我從小就接受的理想不符。現在我認為新加坡也是一種政治賢能政治——雖然不完美，但可能是世界上所有政治體製中最接近理想的。

我非常欽佩您在播客中采訪過的許多領導人，比如馬凱碩。我在新加坡的時候認識吳慶瑞，非常欽佩他。但即便如此，我依然固執己見，認為隻有一種合法的政府形式，而新加坡的政府形式並非如此。

Keith Yap 09:56

那麽，關於賢能政治，您心目中理想的政府形式應該如何體現？

Daniel Bell 10:12

規模對政治至關重要。在較小的政治共同體中，民主機製更為重要。這是讓-雅克·盧梭等哲學家提出的古老觀點。我在新加坡的經曆也充分說明了這一點。我非常欽佩楊榮文，但他落選後我感到很失望。

不久之後，我在新加坡的一輛出租車上與司機討論了這個問題。司機也承認楊偉雄很優秀，但他沒有投票給他，因為“他沒來參加我父親的葬禮”。這讓我意識到，這種人脈關係隻在小型政治社區中才重要。在中國，習近平主席不可能出席所有人的葬禮。

在中國這樣的大社區中，不同級別的政府，選拔和提拔領導人的方式各不相同。通過采訪包括負責領導層選拔的組織部部長在內的領導人，我了解到，不同層級的領導人能力也有所不同。

在中低層，民主機製更為重要——觀察領導人如何獲得民眾支持，服務當地社區。在中高層，治理變得更加複雜。領導者需要考慮影響眾多利益相關者的政策，這些政策不僅關乎當地社區，還關乎整個國家、子孫後代以及國際關係。這需要經濟學、國際關係、哲學、曆史和環境科學方麵的知識，以及良好的政治判斷力。

中國現行體製的目標是

在基層建立民主的領導選拔製度，在高層逐步推行精英管理。在這兩個極端之間，存在著實驗的空間。中國的成功部分源於其在中層政府領導的選拔和提拔方式上的創新。

Daniel Bell 13:40

對於高層職位，領導者需要具備超乎尋常的分析能力，因為問題複雜，需要多學科的知識。中國的政治體製與新加坡類似，高層領導者通常都非常傑出。

但政治不像學術界，僅僅坐在辦公室裏讀書或做實驗就能取得成功。政治需要花費大量時間與利益相關者打交道，這需要良好的人際交往能力或情商。如果沒有這些能力，很難在政治體係中立足。

最重要的是，領導者必須展現美德——願意服務社會，而不是濫用公共資源謀取個人或家庭利益。換句話說，就是不要腐敗。中組部，就像世界上最大的人力資源部門，負責評估這些技能。盡管這個體係極不完善，並且不斷在試驗，但它對於理解中國政治至關重要。

Keith Yap 15:14

談到政治賢能政治的實踐，借鑒袁元昂等經濟學家的觀點，中國在很大程度上是實行賢能政治的。想想薄熙來這樣的人，他確實幫助重慶走向了更加繁榮。他們麵臨的問題是地方腐敗問題。

Daniel Bell 15:40

我剛開始擔任山東大學校長時，正值反腐風暴的高峰期。山東大學是一億人口省份的頂尖大學。我們的辦公室很小，包括市委書記的辦公室就在我隔壁。我們必須記錄每道菜的點餐情況，公費消費不允許飲酒。這些措施使得花錢變得複雜，也使得包括我在內的人們比我們原本應該的樣子更加保守，缺乏創新精神。

這並非一個原創的觀點，但根據我的經驗，過度使用法家手段來處理腐敗問題，會使公職人員規避風險，不願接受新的挑戰。這對國家的長遠發展不利。

反腐運動也影響了信任的建立。在人均酒精消費量較高的山東省，人們傳統上將聚餐飲酒視為建立信任的方式。然而，這些嚴格的措施在很大程度上終結了信任的建立，使人們變得更加原子化和個人主義。

現在情況有所改變——人們對懲罰的恐懼減少了，規則也放寬了。不必記錄每道菜，而且公費啤酒也允許。但還有很長的路要走。最終，我們需要減少對懲罰恐懼的依賴，更多地依賴其他機製，包括像新加坡那樣提高工資，盡管中國作為一個相對貧窮的國家，無法達到新加坡的工資水平。道德自律很重要，而這正是儒家傳統可以借鑒的地方。

Keith Yap 18:59

您談到法家思想時，在書中提到過自己與法律的衝突。這是一個有趣的故事，講述了政府如何通過法家思想實施嚴厲的措施，然後逐漸開始使用儒家思想等較為溫和的手段，迫使人們通過道德手段進行自我約束。

Daniel Bell 19:24

沒錯。新加坡應該對這種做法並不陌生，它曾被稱為“文明之都”，但現在人們已經內化了不亂穿馬路或不亂扔垃圾等行為，因此不再依賴罰款。中國的情況也類似。法家思想意味著嚴厲的懲罰，嚴格且統一地適用，沒有例外或特殊情況，這對於需要快速解決的嚴重問題可能是必要的。

例如，十多年前中國的酒駕問題，統計數據顯示事故頻發，因此政府采取了嚴厲的措施。在北京，他們進行隨機檢查，如果駕駛員的酒精含量略微超過限值，他們的車輛就會被暫時沒收，駕駛資格也會被暫停六個月。這件事發生在我身上，而且很有效——我再也沒有酒後開車。

最終，隨著人們的觀念從法律監管轉向道德自律，需要的檢查也越來越少。這項運動開始後不久就變得更加嚴格——如果幾個月後被抓到，我肯定會被判入獄。現在在北京，酒精檢查很少，但酒駕卻很少見。他們還開發了一些實用的解決方案，比如一項服務，如果你喝酒了，可以打電話叫人騎自行車來接你回家。

Keith Yap 22:30

看來，嚴厲的法律是在這個國家建立你所期望的道德文化的先導。

Daniel Bell 22:40

沒錯，但如果人們不知道……，嚴厲的法律就行不通。

內心深處，你覺得有些事情不對勁。真正的先兆是某種道德信念，認為你正在做的事情是錯的，但這並沒有影響你的行為。然後，法律措施就會出台，強化這種信念。

Keith Yap 23:15

這就像在新加坡隨地吐痰。我們都知道不應該這樣做，但過去人們經常在街上吐痰。現在幾乎沒有人這樣做了，也很少有人因為隨地吐痰而被罰款了。

Daniel Bell 23:18

沒錯，亂扔垃圾、衝廁所等等都是如此。

Keith Yap 23:31

到目前為止，我們已經討論了很多關於法家思想的問題，但我們也看到儒家思想對中國政治哲學的影響很大。您能解釋一下儒家思想在當今是如何影響中國政治的嗎？

Daniel Bell 23:53

儒家思想是一個非常豐富多元的傳統。其核心是將美好生活視為滋養人道和諧的社會關係。雖然這聽起來微不足道，但對美好生活還有其他看法，例如脫離社群或家庭的宗教生活。儒家認為，最好的生活是成為一名公職人員服務社群，因為一旦擁有政治權力，這樣做才能最大程度地造福社會。

這聽起來可能顯而易見，但許多人並不認同。一些宗教理想主張脫離社群。在柏拉圖的《理想國》中，最好的生活是追求真理，服務社群是其次。儒家認為，最好的生活是服務社群，而要做到這一點，你必須致力於在一個基於卓越能力和美德選拔和提拔公職人員的機製中不斷自我完善。

Keith Yap 25:40

這一理想在中國曆史上的政治體係中有著巨大的影響，最著名的是通過科舉製度實現的。近年來，這種理想在中國經濟改革時期再次興起。公職人員的選拔基於其能力——通過在基層政府的經驗和成就來衡量——以及德行，即避免腐敗並展現服務社會的意願。

人們常說中國進行了經濟改革，卻沒有政治改革。但這究竟意味著什麽呢？如今的政治體製與文化大革命時期截然不同。如今，中國擁有一個非常強大、製度化且複雜的官僚體係，旨在選拔和提拔德才兼備的公職人員。盡管它極不完善且不斷變化，但它的存在源於古代儒家賢能政治理念。

這並非純粹的儒家思想——墨家或許也持有類似的觀點。即使是法家也重視能力，而非德行。影響了中國秦始皇的商鞅建議用敵軍首級的數量來衡量功績——這是一種非常客觀的標準。法家對德行持懷疑態度，認為德行全是虛偽的。但儒家強調德才兼備，德才兼備不僅僅意味著軍事上的成功，更意味著能夠有效地服務社會。

儒家價值觀以非常具體的方式影響著政治體係。在儒家文化的發源地山東曲阜，公職人員的晉升部分取決於他們的孝道。他們會親自麵試候選人的父母——如果年邁的父母說他們的孩子不孝，就會對他們的晉升產生負麵影響。這在加拿大是不可想象的。但在中國，如果人們不能對父母表現出尊敬和關愛，就很難將這種關愛擴展到家庭之外。

此外，成為一名公職人員需要通過高考進入一所好大學，這包括學習儒家經典。學生必須學習和解讀孔子、孟子和荀子的經典。

有時，儒家的影響是自下而上的。清明節之所以成為全國性節日，是因為數千萬工人會在這一天休假祭拜祖先。政府最終將這一傳統正式化。

Keith Yap 30:02

李光耀曾發表過一篇關於“士農工商”的公開演講，他認為學者是人們應該努力追求的最高職業，是理想的人生。因此，在中國的政治生活中，似乎最優秀、最有德行的人應該努力成為政治家。這與美國形成了鮮明對比，美國的文化效仿資本家，人才集中在資本主義領域。您如何看待這種觀點？

Daniel Bell 30:49

我認為這是對的，但請記住，中國是一個非常多元化的國家。儒家思想在山東省及相關地區的影響更大。在南方，企業家精神更為濃厚，更接近於“成功就是賺錢”的理念。

這體現在非常具體的事情上。在中國大部分地區，尤其是南方，幸運數字是8，因為它聽起來像“賺錢”。你可以在駕照上看到它。

晚安和電話。但在山東省，幸運數字是七。俗話說“七上八下”——如果你在政府部門幹到57歲，還有晉升的希望，但到了58歲，你就走下坡路了。在我所在的大學，七號辦公室比八號辦公室更有聲望。

Keith Yap 32:08

這就引出了我的下一個問題：馬克思主義對當今中國政治的影響。大多數西方評論員和媒體都持有一種粗略的看法，將共產主義等同於壓迫和缺乏政治權利。更細致入微的看法是什麽？

Daniel Bell 32:32

共產主義傳統是多元的，盡管它可以說是相當新的，而且不如儒家思想多元。馬克思對共產主義的最初設想認為，資本主義的問題在於資本被資本家擁有，而工人必須工作才能賺錢——工作變成了謀生的手段，而不是生活的主要目的。目標是建立一個工人不再被迫工作以謀生的社會。

如何實現？通過發展經濟，讓先進的機器完成社會必需的工作，滿足人們的基本需求，並解放人們，讓他們自由地發揮創造力。這需要經曆一個資本主義的過程——馬克思的曆史理論——因為隻有通過資本主義，才能有效地發展技術，因為資本家必須通過競爭，通過改進技術來獲取利潤。

資本主義的副產品是技術進步和機器的改進。最終，根據馬克思的觀點，資本主義可以被推翻，走向共產主義製度，在這個製度下，技術歸人民所有，機器完成必要的工作，人們可以自由地發揮他們的創造力。

Daniel Bell 38:36

如今在中國，馬克思主義正在卷土重來，因為人們對人工智能持樂觀態度。如果對其進行管理和監管，使其有利於社會發展，幾十年後，我們或許能夠實現這樣的目標：先進的機器完成社會必需的、肮髒的、危險的、重複性的工作，解放人們，讓他們自由地發揮他們的創造力。這就是馬克思主義複興的原因之一——馬克思主義的共產主義理想如今似乎更有可能實現。

鄧小平說得對：我們需要經曆資本主義來發展生產力，但這隻是達到目的的手段。最終，我們需要走向一個更加共產主義的社會。這與儒家通過和諧人道的社會關係實現自我的理想不同。對馬克思主義者來說，我們是通過創造性勞動來實現我們的創造性本質。

這些理想在實踐中可能會發生衝突。有一次，在中國介紹了這些理念後，一位年輕女士告訴我，她感受到了這種緊張——她想通過工作實現自我，同時又要對年邁的父母盡義務，這造成了時間和精力上的衝突，而這些衝突很難協調。

我認為這兩種理想對於理解中國的政治體製都很重要。從曆史上看，馬克思主義之所以成為主流意識形態，部分原因是馬克思認為政府的最終目標是為人民提供物質福利。儒家很久以前就持有這種觀點——就連孟子也說過，人需要穩定的財產或基本的物質需求，才能有道德。如果你總是為生活必需品而掙紮，就不可能有道德。

縱觀中國曆史，早在西方政府將扶貧視為政府義務之前，各國政府就一直致力於應對饑荒和貧困。這也是馬克思主義在20世紀中國紮根的原因之一。

馬克思主義的陰暗麵在於列寧主義的觀點——需要強大的中央組織來統治，並使用極端手段清除政治對手。這種觀點在戰時非常有效，幫助共產黨通過更強大的列寧主義組織贏得了內戰。但在和平時期，用這種方法治理國家可能會導致災難，就像1949年之後發生的那樣。

Keith Yap 38:15

我接下來關於馬克思主義的問題是關於這樣一種觀點：一旦你榨幹了所有你能榨幹的東西，一旦你的機器變得如此先進，國家就會逐漸消亡。但在中國，你認為情況並非如此——即使在理想狀態下，國家也將繼續扮演著非常強大的角色。為什麽？
Daniel Bell 38:36

馬克思沒有預見到現在顯而易見的幾個發展。他對機械和技術最終完成社會必需的工作持樂觀態度。但他沒有預見到機械會變得如此先進，以至於可以主宰人類，甚至構成生存威脅。隨著人工智能的發展，我們需要一個強大的國家來監管它，確保人工智能服務於人類的需求，而不是讓我們成為技術的奴隸。

同樣，馬克思也無法預見到技術會發展到通過氣候變化和全球變暖破壞環境的地步。我們也需要一個強大的國家來監管它。這同樣適用於核武器、流行病——所有這些生存威脅都是馬克思無法預見的。

馬克思認為，一旦我們擁有先進的機械，人們的基本需求得到滿足，我們就會

不需要國家，因為國家的主要目的是對統治階級實施強製。沒有統治階級，就不需要強製性的國家——它會消亡。但現在我們知道，即使擁有先進的機械和社會平等，我們仍然需要一個國家來預防生存威脅。

Keith Yap 40:53

所以，國家實際上是為了提供護欄，確保生產資料不會反過來對付你。

Daniel Bell 41:03

是的，這是一部分原因。但它不僅僅是提供護欄——在我們達到更高程度的共產主義狀態，即人們的基本物質需求通過先進的機械得到滿足之前，我們需要一個積極的國家來確保技術服務於人民，而不是反過來。

在中國的政治體製中，人們傾向於認為一個人決定一切。 2012年，中國麵臨三大挑戰：猖獗的腐敗威脅著政治體係；快速經濟增長導致的巨大貧富差距引發的不滿；以及發展帶來的災難性環境後果。無論誰掌權，都必須應對這些問題。

自2012年以來，情況大致如此——更加重視減少腐敗、縮小收入差距和促進環境可持續性。現任領導人是平等中的佼佼者。政治局常委從九人減少到七人，這使得處理阻礙必要變革的既得利益集團變得更加容易。無論誰是第一把手，這種情況可能都會發生。

Keith Yap 45:29

我想說，他們在這三個問題上取得了巨大的進步。即使在我去年訪問中國時，你也能看到汽車電氣化的普及以及主要城市在短短十年內空氣質量的改善。在2012年，人們可能無法想象這一點。

Keith Yap 45:55

這個問題的延伸是：對許多外部人士和西方媒體來說，中國政治非常不透明。由於過於注重內部溝通，中國未能將自身形象充分地傳達給外部公眾。請舉例說明中國未能很好地向外界傳達自身形象的例子。

Daniel Bell 46:25

這部分與政治體製和反腐運動有關。反腐運動的弊端在於，它使公職人員變得更加保守，規避風險。要想與中國以外的人進行有說服力的溝通，你不能隻說中國有什麽好處——這聽起來像是空洞的宣傳。你需要承認中國存在的問題，並以更現實、更人性化的方式描繪中國。

但由於政治體製的這種保守性，試圖描繪更平衡形象的記者或學者經常會遇到審查或當局的質疑。即使在政府內部，私下裏也承認這一點，尤其是在中層官員中，公職人員仍然非常規避風險。

即使在我最近出版的新書《山東院長》中，我也試圖以一種平衡的方式展現公職人員和官僚中的人性和幽默感。我得到了一些官員的許可，但由於內容並非完全正麵，它尚未被中國大陸接受出版——不過它在香港出版了，展現了香港更大的學術自由。

話雖如此，情況正在好轉。最近，我們看到“TikTok難民”湧向中國應用小紅書。便捷的在線翻譯讓中國的人性和幽默感，包括問題，得到了更多的傳播，這實際上比官方隻展現好的一麵更能提升中國的軟實力。

Keith Yap 50:03

此外，還有關於命名規範的問題。您指出，他們通常不會試圖在海外樹立更溫和的形象，或者可能不太了解語言差異。

Daniel Bell 50:24

一個明顯的例子是2008年北京奧運會開幕式，他們選擇了“和”字來代表中國文化。我記得在NBC上看過，當時解說員指著齊步走的士兵說：“看看這中國式的和諧”。他們說，每個人的思維和行為都一樣，這很可怕。

但任何了解中文和孔子的人都知道，“和”指的是和諧中的多元，而不是千篇一律或千篇一律。中國人的和諧理念包含著對多樣性的熱愛。他們使用的比喻清楚地表達了這一點：隻有鹽的湯不會好喝——你需要很多配料。隻有一個音符的音樂很枯燥——你需要很多音符。在政治上，這個概念被明確地用來表明，一個隻聽從一種政治觀點的統治者永遠無法發現錯誤並糾正它。

正確的翻譯可以避免誤解。為避免誤解，中國文化中“和”的核心思想應翻譯為“和而不同”。

Keith Yap 52:37

多年來，政府的部門職能不斷變化

名稱本身就需要更新。例如，新加坡有相當於通訊及新聞部的部門，由於信息傳輸涉及數字化，現在應該改名為數碼發展及信息部。

Daniel Bell 53:01

一些政府部門名稱的翻譯存在問題。“宣傳部”最初被翻譯為“propaganda”，現在被翻譯為“publicity”，但這聽起來帶有貶義——“communication”可能更中性。“統戰部”——在戰爭時期，指的是共產黨和國民黨聯合抗日。現在，這個戰時術語並不合適，應該根據新的現實進行修改。

即使是黨委書記的職責，尤其是在基層政府部門，其主要職責也並非是讓人們遵守黨的路線。在大學裏，他們大部分時間都在處理人際關係和處理非學術工作。西方大學沒有黨委書記，這意味著審查較少，但有人負責社會問題可能很有價值。

例如，在山東大學，我們發生了一起嚴重的車禍，黨委書記不得不去安慰家長。我們可以稱他們為“和諧書記”。這種職能，如果脫離了政治審查，或許值得借鑒。有趣的是，隨著中國曆史上心理治療的蓬勃發展，許多心理治療師之前都擔任過黨委書記，因為他們擅長處理人際關係衝突和協調人際關係。

Keith Yap 55:22

您寫了一篇關於2050年中國麵貌的有趣文章，描繪了一幅賢能政治與民主政治相輔相成的願景，在保持公職人員能力的同時，擁有更廣泛的政治參與。那麽，一個更加賢能民主的中國會是什麽樣子呢？

Daniel Bell 55:47

嗯，這很難說——那篇文章比較具有推測性，也包含一些幽默。執政的組織現在大約有1億人，20到30年後可能會達到1.2億。這是一個龐大的組織，內部有必要保持多元化。執政組織內部還有更多民主的空間。

如何在不引發公開衝突和派係鬥爭的情況下將其製度化至關重要，但不能一直壓製民主。在中國，當你與人們進行非正式交談時，一旦建立了信任，就能進行非常開放的對話。人們強烈認識到執政組織內部需要更多民主，以便所有黨員在政治體係中都有發言權，不像現在這樣自上而下。

民主可以采取不同的形式。可以采用抽簽製，在執政組織內部隨機選出人員，因為這本身就是一種質量檢驗，讓他們在政策製定中擁有發言權。執政組織內部或許可以有更多的選舉機製和協商機製。

對於執政組織之外的人來說，確保整個政治體係擁有持久的合法性至關重要。這可以是隱性的，也可以采取不同的形式——或許是未來的人工智能允許民眾進行協商，或者通過全民公投賦予黨30年的執政時間，足夠做出影響子孫後代的決策，並培養長期人才，應對氣候變化等問題，而不必擔心每隔幾年就舉行一次選舉。但30年後，體製會受到某種製約。

在中國的知識分子中，幾乎所有50歲以下的人都支持更多的言論自由——這幾乎是將自由主義者、社會主義者和儒家思想聯係在一起的唯一紐帶。因此，可以有更多的言論自由，更多的政治組織和表達聲音的方式，同時承認執政機構對重大問題擁有最終決定權。這是將更強大的民主機製與精英管理製度相結合的一種方式。

Keith Yap 59:14

你對“可愛”的批評是什麽？

Daniel Bell 59:16

乍一看確實很奇怪，但秉承儒家傳統的東亞文化也擁有這種“萌”文化——社交媒體上可愛的動物、表情符號。雖然其他地方也存在這種現象，但程度不如其他地方。即使是作為一名官僚，我也會用表情符號和笑臉與其他官僚交流。當我把我的社交媒體賬號展示給一位美國頂尖大學的教授時，他笑著說，他們肯定沒有這些。

這種“萌”文化的好處在於，它軟化了原本尖銳的溝通。精英主義的弊端在新加坡非常明顯，它創造了一個競爭激烈的社會，人們雄心勃勃，害怕丟臉。這種“萌”文化與此背道而馳——它告訴我們，我們不在乎，隻想享受生活。它就像道家無憂無慮的生活方式，平衡了競爭激烈和雄心勃勃的一麵。

並非巧合的是，這種萌文化起源於日本，少女們逐漸形成了這種萌文化，並傳播到了其他擁有儒家傳統的國家。然而，這種文化的弊端??在於，公職人員可能會利用萌來逃避責任。

責任，或者在應該做出艱難決定的時候開玩笑。比如鮑裏斯·約翰遜——我覺得他很有魅力，我很想和他共進晚餐，但一到做決定的時候，他就很糟糕，逃避責任，撒謊。

我在擔任院長的時候就看到了自己的這個缺陷。有時我會開玩笑，裝可愛，以此來逃避責任和艱難的決定。這就是這種可愛文化的弊端??。

Keith Yap 1:02:11

在新加坡，我們看到政客們更多地利用社交媒體來博取好感，而不是傳達政策立場。他們追逐舞蹈潮流，炫耀自己的公務行程。即使在最近的美國大選中，營銷也更多地依靠個性而非政策。

Daniel Bell 1:02:55

另一方麵，公職人員展現人性化的一麵是可以的，隻要這不會占用他們太多思考惠及民眾的政策的時間，也不會被用來逃避責任和艱難的決定。

Keith Yap 1:03:15

你必須找到中庸之道——恰如其分地展現可愛。

Daniel Bell 1:03:16

沒錯。吳慶瑞就具備這樣的能力。他私下裏魅力十足，可愛又不失風度，而且才華橫溢、富有創造力。真希望我當時在吃飯的時候能做筆記，講講我們的故事。我隻記得當時我被他深深地迷住了。

Keith Yap 1:03:43

人們也記得他如此——私下裏魅力十足，但在公眾麵前卻顯得嚴肅沉悶。

Daniel Bell 1:03:50

所以他可能掌握了中庸之道，因為你必須做出艱難的決定，而他當然不會讓自己的可愛妨礙你。

Keith Yap 1:03:58

你自己是加拿大人，也在中國。你希望更多人了解中國和加拿大最棒的一點是什麽？

Daniel Bell 1:04:06

加拿大有兩大魅力。首先是蒙特利爾，我的家鄉。這座城市很酷，充滿創意，也很安全，秩序井然，和諧共存，同時又熱愛多元文化。它極具創造力，而且是雙語城市。和新加坡一樣，大多數人都會說兩種語言。在蒙特利爾，幾乎每個人都能完美地掌握法語和英語。雙語能讓你更容易地從他人的角度看待自己，從而產生更多的同理心和同情心。缺點是冬天非常寒冷——我已經很多年沒在冬天回去過了。

另一大魅力是冰球——在加拿大，我們簡稱為“曲棍球”。它在其他地方鮮為人知，但它是一項將優雅、美麗與力量完美結合的運動。如果你像我一樣喜歡運動，那麽曲棍球就是最能體現優雅與力量的運動。它非常強調傳球和服從。即使在采訪冰球運動員時，他們也幾乎是儒家式的，把自己放在第一位，聲稱自己所做的一切都是為了球隊。目前，蒙特利爾加拿大人隊或許是冰球界最令人興奮的年輕球隊。

至於中國，它實際上是一個大陸，而不是一個國家。差異不僅存在於城鄉之間，那是完全不同的世界，也存在於城市之間。上海人和北京人差異很大，而且常常互相看不順眼。我和來自耶路撒冷的合著者阿夫納·德沙利特合著了一本名為《城市精神》的書，試圖闡述其中的一些內容。即使在山東省，濟南和青島之間的差異也很大。

中國國內的這種多樣性在國外並不為人所知。此外，日常生活中也充滿了人性和幽默。人們總是想到政治體製和政客，他們往往極其沉悶和嚴厲，但正如我在新書中試圖展現的那樣，在日常生活和中層官僚機構中，存在著如此多的人性和幽默，這些都值得向世界傳達。

Keith Yap 1:07:54

如果說今天的香港有一種精神，它會是什麽樣子？

Daniel Bell 1:07:59

香港之所以引人入勝，是因為它致力於資本主義——這寫進了基本法。在一個共產主義國家裏，人們熱衷於賺錢，但這種熱衷往往以醜陋的形式出現。香港貧富差距巨大，一半人住在公共住房裏，與新加坡相比，情況糟糕透頂。資本主義的弊端顯而易見。

但你也有這樣的社會秩序。有句俗話說，如果你在美國最貧窮的地區開著勞斯萊斯，你會被人扔石頭砸到車窗上。但在香港最貧困的地區，人們會羨慕金色的勞斯萊斯。香港人對財富有著一種奇特的崇敬，這種崇敬在香港相當強烈。

但這受到儒家精神的緩和。香港沒有經曆試圖摧毀儒家思想的革命。因此，日常的家庭生活在很大程度上受到儒家倫理及其服務家庭和社區的承諾的影響，將愛和關懷從家庭成員擴展到外部世界。這緩和了資本主義的過度膨脹。這就是我對香港精神的詮釋。

Keith Yap 1:09:36

您通常會給畢業生在進入職場時什麽建議？

Daniel Bell 1:09:40

我的學生非常多元化。孔子是一位

老師們，他有著出色的教學模式，會根據不同學生的需求和興趣給出相互矛盾的建議。他沒有泛泛而談的建議——我需要了解每個學生所有精彩的個性。

但如果說有一點是普遍的：未來是絕對不確定的。如果我們足夠幸運，能夠避免毀滅人類的戰爭，唯一確定的就是快速的技術和社會變革。我上大學的時候，我們覺得一旦找到工作，就一直到退休。現在，尤其是在新加坡，這個國家在培養學生方麵可能比其他任何地方都做得更好，我們需要不斷學習，並做好準備，在一生中去做完全不同的事情。

Keith Yap 1:10:59

實際上，從這個角度來看，你教會了我兩點。你教會了我閱讀《論語》（《論語》）的正確框架，那就是不要泛泛而談，而是要理解每篇文本的具體語境。

Daniel Bell 1:11:12

這是孔子和他的學生的故事，每個學生都是不同的。你必須把它想象成一出戲，並具備背景知識。孔子在教學生時，故意隻說他認為正確的部分，希望他們自己能發展出剩下的部分。了解學生是誰、他們的興趣愛好以及他們在後來的中國曆史上因何而聞名，這一點很重要。

這就是高考存在問題的原因——學生必須記住包括《論語》在內的部分經典文本，並學習“正確”的解讀。孔子會感到震驚，因為沒有單一的正確解讀。有些解讀比其他解讀更好，但解讀會隨著新知識、新挑戰以及解讀者在何種語境下的變化而變化。理解這一點對於理解和欣賞文本至關重要。

Keith Yap 1:12:14

那麽，我們可以在哪裏找到你的作品呢？

Daniel Bell 1:12:15

我的最新著作是《山東院長：一位中國大學小官僚的自白》。本書試圖展現人性和幽默感，同時也從我擔任院長的經曆中汲取啟示。

《中國模式》更具學術性，係統地探討了什麽是賢能政治、它的優勢和劣勢，以及如何在中國的環境下縮小理想與現實之間的差距。

我與香港大學的同事兼妻子王佩合著的《等級製度》表明，任何現代社會都需要等級製度。我們知道哪些等級製度不好——基於種族、性別或階級——但哪些等級製度好，以及為什麽好？我們用許多例子來解釋這一點。這些書在亞馬遜等常見網站上都有售。

Keith Yap 1:13:15

謝謝教授的到來。

Daniel Bell 1:13:18

感謝您的參與。我很喜歡你的播客，我把關於吳慶瑞博士的那期播客看完了，非常精彩。期待你更多的播客，也希望你能學到更多。謝謝。

Communism and Confucianism In The New Age of Chinese Politics

 Professor Daniel Bell
https://www.ykeith.com/danielbell/

Professor Daniel A. Bell is Professor, Chair of Political Theory with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. He served as Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University (Qingdao) from 2017 to 2022.

He specialises in Comparative Political Theories, focusing on Confucianism and Legalism.

His books include The Dean of Shandong (2023), Just Hierarchy (co-authored with Wang Pei, 2020), The China Model (2015), The Spirit of Cities (co-authored with Avner de-Shalit, 2012), China’s New Confucianism (2008), Beyond Liberal Democracy (2007), and East Meets West (2000), all published by Princeton University Press. He is also the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1993).

Bell's latest book, The Dean of Shandong, is an insider’s perspective of Chinese academia and China’s political system.

Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:50 The Reality of Chinese Academia
06:05 Political Meritocracy As An Alternative Ideal
11:02 Why Scale Matters In Politics
16:30 Corruption and Governance in China
23:20 Legalism in Practice
24:43 The Influence of Confucianism in Chinese Politics
32:58 Marxism in Chinese Politics
43:19 The Myth of The One Man Rule
51:14 China's PR Problems
56:12 Future of Meritocracy and Democracy in China
01:00:04 Critique Of Cuteness
01:04:56 Cultural Insights: Canada vs. China
01:08:49 The Spirit of Hong Kong
01:10:30 Advice for Graduates Entering the Workforce
01:13:03 Where To Find Prof Bell

Keith Yap 00:00

One of the first questions I had when I was reading your most recent book, The Dean of Shantung, was about your comparison between Western and Chinese academic environments. Most people assume that in China it's all censorship with no academic freedom, but you seem to have a different view and different lived experience.

Daniel Bell 00:24

While there is censorship and increased censorship in mainland China, I don't want to deny that. However, there are many areas with tremendous intellectual engagement and argumentation. In Confucianism, for example, there are diverse and heated debates. Recently, there was an influential article arguing that sex robots are ideal from a Confucian perspective, which prompted furious reactions from Confucian feminists.

This exemplifies how debates that don't touch on high-level politics can and do flourish. These discussions often address issues that wouldn't be of great interest to people outside China, where traditions like Confucianism aren't widely studied.

There's also less concern about politically correct terminology. While this may be changing with the new U.S. administration, many Western academics have felt they're treading on eggshells when discussing issues related to sex or race. In China, there's less of this informal censorship.

In my book, The Dean of Shandong, I began by listing everything wrong with China because you have to express those views to get to what you really want to say. There's an informal censorship mechanism where you can easily be labeled a China apologist. So you must first acknowledge China's human rights abuses before people will listen.

Even in academia, if you want to publish in a periodical and don't use the language of authoritarianism to describe the Chinese political system, it's very hard to get published. Fortunately, publishing in book form allows more freedom and original thinking in the Anglophone world.

Another key difference is China's strong commitment to serving the community. The idea that you would do your work, especially in humanities or social sciences, completely separate from contributing to the community's good is less common in China. This has roots deeper than the political system – it connects to Confucian ideas that the best life involves serving the community.

This varies by field, time period, and region. Hong Kong, for instance, is closer to the Western system where you're rewarded almost exclusively for your publishing record in leading academic journals and university presses. Whether you contribute to the community is almost completely irrelevant for hiring and promotion. However, Hong Kong has more academic freedom than mainland China. It's similar to Singapore, where you can generally do and say what you want, as long as it's not about the local government.

Keith Yap 04:33

I think in Singapore in recent years there's been an opening up of spaces for critiques to enter the public fora.

Daniel Bell 04:40

I agree. My first job was at NUS in Singapore from '91 to '94. Those days weren't ideal for academic freedom. But when I wrote The China Model, I spent a semester in Singapore because it was very hard to address politically sensitive issues in China in a balanced academic way. Singapore offered great libraries in English and Chinese and almost complete academic freedom. Singapore has improved tremendously since then.

Keith Yap 05:15

Regarding The China Model, you've challenged the assumption that we should compare governments between democracy and autocracy, with liberal democracy being the clearly superior alternative. Why do you think that's a false dichotomy?

Daniel Bell 05:35

The labels are too vague. Democracy means selecting political leaders through free and fair competitive elections, usually involving liberal values like rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of individual rights. It's also normative, suggesting that system is better than the alternatives.

Both democratic and authoritarian labels encompass such diverse forms of government that they're not very useful for classifying the political world. When I first worked in Singapore, it was labeled in the West as an authoritarian government – the same label used to describe North Korea and Saudi Arabia, which are completely different systems.

To understand China's political system, we must first understand its motivating ideals, then consider how those ideals are realized in practice and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. Having spent my previous life in Canada and the UK, I was somewhat brainwashed by the view that only one legitimate political system exists – one that selects leaders through free and fair competitive elections, with associated freedoms. I carried that baggage with me to Singapore.

It took a long time to adjust, and maybe I didn't even adjust well in Singapore. It wasn't until I spent eight years at Tsinghua University in Beijing that I realized my colleagues were focused on different questions: How do we train, select, and promote leaders with above-average ability and virtue? How do we measure ability and virtue? What's the relationship between them?

I realized this way of thinking has such a long history, both as an ideal and as an institution in China. I use the label "political meritocracy" – in Chinese, "xian lang zheng zhi." (賢良政治) I wrote The China Model to make sense of that ideal, show its advantages and disadvantages, and suggest ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality.

Daniel Bell 07:35

It's a highly imperfect political meritocracy, just as democracy in the U.S. would be considered a highly imperfect democracy. We need to understand the underlying idea, its advantages and disadvantages, and ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. I wouldn't have conceived this question had I not spent years at a university in Beijing with future leaders.

In Singapore, despite spending three years there, it was a shock to my political system. It was difficult to shed this dogmatic view that Singapore's political system was fundamentally illegitimate because it didn't match the ideals I had learned since childhood. Now I think Singapore is also a political meritocracy – imperfect, but probably the closest to the ideal of any political system in the world.

I have great admiration for many of the leaders you've interviewed on your podcast, like Kishore Mahbubani. When I was in Singapore, I knew Goh Keng Swee and admired him immensely. Yet even that didn't change my dogmatic view that there was only one legitimate form of government, and it wasn't Singapore's.

Keith Yap 09:56

So regarding political meritocracy, what would be the ideal version in your mind as to how it should manifest itself in government?

Daniel Bell 10:12

Scale matters for politics. It's more important to have democratic mechanisms in smaller political communities. This is an old point made by philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I had an enlightening experience in Singapore that illustrated this. I greatly admired George Yeo and was disappointed when he lost his election.

Shortly after, I was in a taxi in Singapore, discussing this with the driver. The driver agreed that Yeo was outstanding but said he didn't vote for him because "he didn't come to my father's funeral." This made me realize that such personal connections only matter in small political communities. In China, President Xi couldn't attend everyone's funeral.

In a large community like China, at different levels of government, there are different ways of selecting and promoting leaders. Through interviews with leaders, including the head of the Organization Department which handles leadership selection, I learned that different abilities matter at different levels.

At lower to mid levels, democratic mechanisms are more important – seeing how leaders have support from people and serve their local community. At mid to higher levels, governance becomes more complex. Leaders need to think about policies affecting huge numbers of stakeholders, not just the local community, but the entire country, future generations, and international relations. This requires knowledge of economics, international relations, philosophy, history, and environmental science, plus a track record of good political judgments.

The underlying system in China aims to have democratic systems for selecting leaders at lower levels, becoming progressively more meritocratic at higher levels. Between these extremes, there's room for experimentation. Part of China's success comes from innovation in how they select and promote leaders at mid-levels of government.

Daniel Bell 13:40

For higher-level positions, leaders need above-average analytical ability because the issues are complex and require knowledge of many disciplines. One thing you can say about the Chinese political system, similar to Singapore, is that the leaders at higher levels are typically quite brilliant.

But politics isn't like academia where you can succeed just by staying in your office reading books or conducting experiments. In politics, you spend much time dealing with stakeholders, requiring good people skills or EQ. It's very hard to get through the system without those skills.

Most importantly, leaders must show virtue – a willingness to serve the community rather than misuse public resources for personal or family interest. In other words, don't be corrupt. The Organization Department, which is like the world's largest human resources department, assesses these skills. While highly imperfect and constantly experimenting, this system is fundamental to understanding Chinese politics.

Keith Yap 15:14

When you talk about political meritocracy in practice, drawing from economists like Yuan Yuanang, China has been meritocratic for the most part. If you think about someone like Bo Xilai, he did help propel Chongqing to a more prosperous state. The problem they face is the issue of endemic corruption.

Daniel Bell 15:40

When I began as dean at Shandong University, the premier university in a province of 100 million people, it was at the height of the anti-corruption campaign. We had to have small offices, including the party secretary whose office was next to mine. We had to record every dish ordered at meals, with no alcohol allowed at public expense. These measures made it complicated to spend money and made people, including me, more conservative and less innovative than we might have been.

This isn't a very original point, but from my experience, excessive legalist means of dealing with corruption makes public officials risk-averse and unwilling to consider new challenges. This isn't good for the country's long-term future.

The anti-corruption campaign also affected trust-building. In Shandong province, which has high per capita alcohol consumption, meals and drinking are traditionally viewed as ways to build trust. Much of that ended with these strict measures, making people more atomized and individualistic.

Things are changing somewhat now – there's less fear of punishment, and the rules have relaxed. You don't have to record every dish, and beer is allowed on public expense. But there's still a long way to go. Ultimately, there needs to be less reliance on fear of punishment and more on other mechanisms, including higher salaries like in Singapore, though China as a relatively poor country can't match Singapore's salary levels. Moral self-regulation is important, and this is where the Confucian tradition has much to add.

Keith Yap 18:59

As you spoke about legalism, you mentioned in your book your run-in with the law. That was an interesting anecdote about how the government implemented harsh measures through legalism, and then over time started using softer means like Confucianism where you were pushed to self-regulate through moral means.

Daniel Bell 19:24

That's right. It shouldn't be unfamiliar to Singapore, which was known as the "fine city," but now relies less on fines because people have internalized behaviors like not jaywalking or littering. It's similar in China. Legalism, meaning harsh punishment applied rigorously and uniformly without exceptions or special circumstances, might be necessary for serious problems requiring quick results.

For example, with drinking and driving in China over ten years ago, statistics showed many accidents, so the government took serious action. In Beijing, they conducted random checks, and if drivers were slightly above the limit, their cars would be temporarily confiscated and driving privileges suspended for six months. This happened to me, and it worked – I never drove after drinking again.

Eventually, fewer checks were needed as people's views changed from legal regulation to moral self-regulation. The campaign became even stricter shortly after it began – I would have been jailed if caught a few months later. Now in Beijing, there are very few alcohol checks, yet hardly any drunk driving. They've also developed practical solutions, like a service where you can call someone to come on a bicycle and drive your car home if you've been drinking.

Keith Yap 22:30

It seems the harsh laws served as a precursor to establishing the moral culture you want in the country.

Daniel Bell 22:40

Right, but harsh laws wouldn't work if people don't know deep down that something is wrong. The real precursor is some moral belief that what you're doing is wrong, but it just doesn't affect behavior. Then legalist measures can come in to reinforce that.

Keith Yap 23:15

It's like spitting in Singapore. We all knew we shouldn't do it, but people used to spit a lot on the streets. Now pretty much no one does it and no one really gets fined for it anymore.

Daniel Bell 23:18

Exactly, or littering, or flushing toilets, or whatever.

Keith Yap 23:31

So far we've talked a lot about legalism, but we also see that Confucianism informs a lot of Chinese political philosophy. Could you illuminate how Confucianism today informs Chinese politics?

Daniel Bell 23:53

Confucianism is a very rich and diverse tradition. At its core, it views the good life as nourishing humane and harmonious social relations. While this might sound trivial, there are other views of the good life, such as a religious life separate from community or family. For Confucians, the best possible life is serving the community as a public official because that's how you can do the most good once you have political power.

Again, this might sound obvious, but many disagree. Some religious ideals advocate separation from the community. In Plato's Republic, the best life involves seeking truth, with serving the community as a second choice. Confucians say the best life is serving the community, and to do that, you must be committed to constant self-improvement within a mechanism that selects and promotes public officials based on superior ability and virtue.

Keith Yap 25:40

This ideal has had huge influence in the Chinese political system throughout history, most famously institutionalized through the imperial examination system. More recently, this ideal has been revived during China's economic reform period, where public officials are selected according to their ability – measured through experience and success at lower levels of government – and virtue, meaning avoiding corruption and showing willingness to serve the community.

People say China has had economic reform but no political reform. But what does that mean? The political system is completely different from what it was during the Cultural Revolution. Now there's a very strong institutionalized and complex bureaucratic system aiming to select and promote public officials with superior ability and virtue. Though highly imperfect and in constant flux, it's there, motivated by this ancient Confucian ideal of political meritocracy.

This isn't distinctly Confucian either – the Mohists arguably had a similar view. Even the legalists cared about ability, though not virtue. Shang Yang, who influenced the first emperor of China, suggested measuring merit by counting severed heads of enemy soldiers – a very objective measure. The legalists were skeptical about virtue, thinking it was all hypocrisy. But Confucians insisted on both ability and virtue, with ability meaning more than just military success but serving the community effectively.

Confucian values affect the political system in very concrete ways. In Qufu, the home of Confucian culture in Shandong province, public officials' promotion depends partly on their filial piety. They literally interview candidates' parents – if elderly parents say their child isn't filial, it negatively affects their promotion chances. This would be unthinkable in Canada. But in China, if people can't show reverence and care for their own parents, it's considered difficult for them to extend that care beyond family.

Additionally, becoming a public official requires getting into a good university through the Gaokao (高考) examination system, which includes studying Confucian classics. Students must learn and interpret passages from Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.

Sometimes Confucian influence comes from the bottom up. The Grave Sweeping Festival became a national holiday because tens of millions of workers would take the day off to pay respect to their ancestors. The government eventually formalized what was already happening.

Keith Yap 30:02

Lee Kuan Yew gave a public lecture about shi nong gong shang (士農工商) , where the scholar is seen as the highest vocation that one should strive for as the ideal life. So in China's political life, it seems the best and most virtuous people should strive to become politicians. This contrasts with America, where the country's culture emulates capitalists, with talent concentrating in the capitalist sector. What do you think of that view?

Daniel Bell 30:49

I think that's right, but remember China is a very diverse country. The Confucian influence is stronger in Shandong province and related areas. In the South, there's much more of an entrepreneurial spirit, closer to the ideal that success means making money.

This manifests in very concrete ways. In most of China, especially the South, the lucky number is eight because it sounds like "making money." You see it on license plates and phones. But in Shandong province, the lucky number is seven. There's a saying, "at qi shang ba xia"(七上八下) – if you're 57 in government, you still have hope for promotion, but at 58, you're on the way down. At my university, an office with number seven would be more prestigious than one with eight.

Keith Yap 32:08

This brings me to my next question about the influence of Marxism in Chinese politics today. Most Western commentators and media have a crude view, equating communism with suppression and lack of political rights. What would be the more nuanced view?

Daniel Bell 32:32

The communist tradition is diverse, though arguably quite new and less diverse than Confucianism. Marx's original vision of communism identified capitalism's problem as capital being owned by capitalists while workers must work to make money – work becomes a means to life rather than life's prime want. The goal was moving toward a society where workers aren't forced to work as a means to life.

How? By developing the economy so advanced machinery does the socially necessary work, meeting people's basic needs and freeing them to realize their creative talents. This requires going through a capitalist process – Marx's theory of history – because only through capitalism can you develop technology effectively, as capitalists must compete to make profit through improving technology.

The byproduct of capitalism is increased technology and better machinery. Eventually, according to Marx, capitalism can be overthrown, moving toward a communist system where technology is owned by the people, machines do necessary work, and people are free to realize their creative talents.

Daniel Bell 38:36

Now in China, Marxism is making a comeback because there's an optimistic view about AI. If managed and regulated for social benefit, several decades from now we might achieve the possibility where advanced machinery does the socially necessary, dirty, dangerous, repetitive work, freeing people to realize their creative talents. This is one reason why Marxism is being revived – the Marxist ideal of communism seems more possible now.

Deng Xiaoping had it right: we need to go through capitalism to develop productive forces, but that's a means to an end. Eventually, we need to move toward a more communist society. This differs from the Confucian ideal of realizing ourselves through harmonious and humane social relations. For Marxists, it's through creative work that we realize our creative essence.

These ideals can conflict in practice. Once, after presenting these ideas in China, a young woman told me she feels this tension – wanting to realize herself through work while owing obligations to elderly parents, creating conflicts in time and energy that aren't easily harmonized.

I think both ideals are important for understanding China's political system. Historically, Marxism became the dominant ideology partly because Marx saw government's ultimate aim as providing for people's material well-being. The Confucians had this view long ago – even Mencius said people need stable property or basic material needs before they can be moral. You can't be moral if you're always struggling for necessities.

Throughout Chinese history, governments have focused on dealing with famine and poverty, long before Western governments considered alleviating poverty as a government obligation. That's one reason Marxism took hold in 20th century China.

The dark side is the Leninist view of Marxism – needing strong central organization to rule and using extreme measures to purge political opponents. This was effective in wartime, helping the communists win the civil war through stronger Leninist organization. But ruling a country in peacetime with that approach can lead to disasters, as happened after 1949.

Keith Yap 38:15

The follow-up question I had regarding Marxism was about the view that the state will fade away once you've extracted everything you can, once your machinery is so advanced. But in China, you argue that's not going to be the case – that the state will continue playing a very strong hand even in the ideal version of itself. Why?
Daniel Bell 38:36

Marx didn't anticipate several developments that are now obvious. He was optimistic about machinery and technology eventually doing socially necessary work. But he didn't anticipate that machinery could become so advanced it could dominate human beings, even posing an existential threat. With AI development, we need a strong state to regulate it, ensuring AI serves human needs and doesn't make us slaves to technology.

Similarly, Marx couldn't anticipate that technology would develop to the point where it could destroy the environment through climate change and global warming. We need a strong state to regulate that too. The same applies to nuclear weapons, pandemics – all existential threats Marx couldn't foresee.

Marx thought once we had advanced machinery and people's basic needs were met, we wouldn't need a state because its main purpose was exercising coercion for the ruling class. Without a ruling class, there'd be no need for a coercive state – it would wither away. But now we know that even with advanced machinery and social equality, we'll still need a state to prevent existential threats.

Keith Yap 40:53

So the state is really there to provide guardrails to ensure the means of production doesn't turn against you.

Daniel Bell 41:03

Yes, that's part of it. But it's not just providing guardrails – until we reach this state of higher communism where people's basic material needs are met through advanced machinery, we need an active state to ensure technology serves people rather than the other way around.

There's a tendency to think one person decides everything in the Chinese political system. In 2012, China faced three major challenges: rampant corruption threatening the political system, a huge rich-poor gap from rapid economic growth causing resentment, and catastrophic environmental consequences from development. These issues had to be dealt with regardless of who was in charge.

That's more or less what happened since 2012 – more emphasis on reducing corruption, income inequality, and promoting environmental sustainability. The current leader is first among equals. The Politburo Standing Committee was changed from nine leaders to seven, making it easier to tackle vested interests blocking necessary changes. This probably would have happened regardless of who was number one.

Keith Yap 45:29

I would say they've made tremendous progress on those three issues. Even when I visited this past year, you could see the widespread electrification of vehicles and improved air quality in major urban cities within just ten years. In 2012, people probably couldn't imagine that.

Keith Yap 45:55

The offshoot of that question would be: looking at Chinese politics, to many outsiders and Western media, it's very opaque. China hasn't been able to translate itself to be sufficiently intelligible to the outside public because they've been so focused on communicating inwards. What are some examples where China hasn't translated itself well to the outside world?

Daniel Bell 46:25

It's related partly to the political system and the anti-corruption campaign. The downside of the anti-corruption campaign is that it makes public officials more conservative and risk-averse. To communicate persuasively to people outside China, you can't just say what's great about China – that sounds like empty propaganda. You need to acknowledge problems and portray China in a more realistic and humane way.

But because of this conservatism in the political system, journalists or academics who try to portray a more balanced picture often run into problems with censorship or authorities. This is recognized privately, even within government, but especially at mid-tier levels, public officials remain very risk-averse.

Even with my recent book, The Dean of Shandong, I tried to show the humanity and humor among public officials and bureaucrats in a balanced way. I got permission from certain officials, but because it's not wholly positive, it hasn't been accepted for publication in mainland China – though it has in Hong Kong, showing Hong Kong's greater academic freedom.

That said, things are improving. Recently, we've seen the phenomenon of "TikTok refugees" moving to Xiaohongshu, the Chinese app. With easy online translation, there's more communication of China's humanity and humor, including problems, which actually does more to promote China's soft power than official attempts to show only the good side.

Keith Yap 50:03

There's also the idea of having proper naming conventions. You've pointed out that they often don't try to promote a softer image overseas or maybe aren't too familiar with linguistic differences.

Daniel Bell 50:24

A clear example was the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, where they chose the character "He"和 (harmony) to represent Chinese culture. I remember watching on NBC, and the commentators were saying, "Look at this Chinese harmony," pointing to soldiers marching in unison. They said it was scary to have everyone thinking and acting the same way.

But anyone who knows Chinese and Confucius knows that "he" means diversity in harmony rather than sameness or uniformity. The Chinese idea of harmony includes a love of diversity. The metaphors used express this clearly: a soup with only salt won't taste good – you need many ingredients. Music with one note is boring – you need many notes. In politics, this idea was explicitly used to show that a ruler who only listens to one political view will never find out what's wrong and be able to correct it.

Just getting translations right would prevent misunderstandings. The central idea of "he" in Chinese culture should be translated as "diversity in harmony" to prevent misinterpretation.

Keith Yap 52:37

Over the years, the government has changed ministry names to refresh itself. For example, we have Singapore's equivalent to the Ministry of Communication and Information, which would now be the Ministry of Digital Development and Information because of the digital dimension in information transmission.

Daniel Bell 53:01

Some translations of government ministry names are problematic. The Xuanquanbu (宣傳部) was originally translated as "propaganda," now "publicity," but that sounds pejorative – "communication" would be more neutral. Or Tongzhanbu, (統戰部) "united front" – in wartime, this referred to the communists and Kuomintang uniting against Japan. Now this wartime terminology isn't appropriate and should be changed to reflect new realities.

Even the party secretary role, especially at lower levels of government, isn't mainly about making people follow the party line. In universities, they spend most time smoothing out human relations and handling non-academic work. Western universities don't have party secretaries, which means less censorship, but having someone in charge of social problems can be valuable.

For instance, at Shandong University, we had a serious car accident, and the party secretary had to comfort the parents. We could call them "harmony secretaries." This function, stripped of political censorship, might be worth learning from. Interestingly, with the huge increase in psychotherapy in Chinese history, many therapists were formerly party secretaries because they were skilled at handling human conflict and harmonizing relations.

Keith Yap 55:22

You wrote an interesting essay about how China will look in 2050, painting a vision where meritocracy and democracy could complement each other, with wider political participation while maintaining competent public officials. What would that look like for a more meritocratic and democratic China?

Daniel Bell 55:47

Well, it's hard to know – that essay was quite speculative and involved some humor. The ruling organization now has about 100 million people, maybe 120 million in 20-30 years. That's a huge organization with necessary internal diversity. There's room for much more democracy within the ruling organization.

How to institutionalize this without leading to open conflict and factions is important, but it can't be constantly suppressed. When you talk to people off the record in China, once you have trust, you get very open conversations. There's strong recognition of the need for more democracy within the ruling organization, so all party members have some say in the political system, less top-down than now.

This could take different forms. There could be sortition where people are randomly selected within the ruling organization, as it's already a quality check, to have some say in policy making. There might be more electoral mechanisms and deliberation within the ruling organization.

For those outside the ruling organization, it's important to have lasting legitimacy for the whole political system. This could be implicit or take different forms – perhaps some future AI allowing consultation among the people, or a referendum giving the party 30 years of ruling time, long enough to make decisions affecting future generations and train people for the long term, dealing with issues like climate change without worrying about elections every few years. But after 30 years, there would be some check on the system.

Among intellectuals in China, almost anyone under 50 favors more freedom of speech – it's almost the only thing uniting liberals, socialists, and Confucians. So there could be more freedom of speech, more ways of organizing politically and making voices heard, while recognizing the ruling organization makes final decisions on big issues. That's one way of combining stronger democratic mechanisms with a meritocratic system.

Keith Yap 59:14

What is your critique of cuteness?

Daniel Bell 59:16

It's really odd on the face of it, but East Asian cultures with Confucian heritage share this culture of cuteness – cute animals in social media, emojis. While this exists elsewhere, not to the same extent. Even as a bureaucrat, I would use emojis and happy faces when communicating with other bureaucrats. When I showed my social media to a professor at a leading U.S. university, he laughed and said they definitely don't have this.

The good side of this culture of cuteness is that it softens otherwise hard-edged communication. The downside of meritocracy, very evident in Singapore, is that it creates a hyper-competitive society where people are ambitious and afraid of losing face. This culture of cuteness rebels against that – it's saying we don't care, we just want to enjoy ourselves. It's like a Taoist carefree way of life, counterbalancing the hyper-competitive, ambitious side.

Not coincidentally, it started in Japan with teenage girls developing this culture of cuteness that spread to other countries with Confucian heritage. The downside is when public officials use cuteness to evade responsibility or make jokes when they should be making hard decisions. Take Boris Johnson – I found him very charming, and I'd love to have dinner with him, but when it came to making decisions, he was horrible, evading responsibility and lying.

I saw that flaw in myself as Dean. Sometimes I made jokes and tried to be cute to avoid responsibility and hard decisions. That's the downside of this culture of cuteness.

Keith Yap 1:02:11

In Singapore, we see politicians using social media more to endear themselves rather than communicate policy stances. They follow dance trends and show their official trips. Even in recent American elections, marketing runs on personality more than policy.

Daniel Bell 1:02:55

On the other hand, it's okay for public officials to show their human side, as long as it doesn't take too much time away from thinking about policies that benefit people, and isn't used to evade responsibility and hard decisions.

Keith Yap 1:03:15

You have to find the golden mean – be appropriately cute.

Daniel Bell 1:03:16

Right. Goh Keng Swee had that. He was charming and cute in private, besides being brilliant and creative. I wish I'd taken notes during our meals to tell stories. I just remember being so charmed by him.

Keith Yap 1:03:43

That's what people remember of him as well - privately charming, but much more serious and stale in public.

Daniel Bell 1:03:50

So probably he had the golden mean because you have to take hard decisions, and he certainly didn't let his cuteness get in the way of that.

Keith Yap 1:03:58

You're Canadian yourself and also in China. What's the best part about China and Canada you wish more people knew about?

Daniel Bell 1:04:06

For Canada, there are two lovely parts. First is Montreal, where I'm from. It's a cool and creative city that's also safe, combining order and harmony with love of diversity. It's super creative and bilingual. Like Singapore, most people speak two languages. In Montreal, almost everybody is perfectly bilingual in French and English. Bilingualism lets you imagine yourself through other people's perspectives more easily, leading to more empathy and compassion. The downside is the very cold winter - I haven't been back in winter for many years.

The other part is ice hockey - in Canada we just call it hockey. It's hardly well known elsewhere, but it's such a beautiful sport combining grace and beauty with power. If you like sports, which I do, hockey is the sport that best combines gracefulness with power. There's strong emphasis on passing and deferring to others. Even when you interview hockey players, they're almost Confucian, putting themselves down and saying they're doing everything for the team. Currently, the Montreal Canadiens is perhaps the most exciting young team in hockey.

As for China, it's really a continent, not a country. The differences aren't just between city and rural areas, which are completely different worlds, but between cities too. People in Shanghai and Beijing are very different and often dislike each other. I wrote a book called The Spirit of Cities with my co-author Avner de-Shalit from Jerusalem, trying to articulate some of this. Even within Shandong province, the differences between Jinan and Qingdao are huge.

This diversity within China isn't well known outside. There's also the humanity and humor of everyday life. People think of the political system and politicians who are often deadly boring and stern, but in everyday life and mid-levels of bureaucracy, as I tried to show in my latest book, there's so much humanity and humor that's important to communicate to the rest of the world.

Keith Yap 1:07:54

If there was a spirit of Hong Kong today, what would it look like?

Daniel Bell 1:07:59

Hong Kong is fascinating because it's committed to capitalism - it's in the basic law. Inside a communist country, there's this celebration of making money which can often take ugly forms. Hong Kong has a huge gap between rich and poor, with half the people living in public housing that's terrible compared to Singapore's. The downside of capitalism is very clear.

But you also have this social order. There's a saying that if you drove a Rolls Royce in the poorest parts of the U.S., you'd get rocks thrown at your window. But in Hong Kong's poorest areas, people would admire a gold Rolls Royce. There's this odd respect for wealth, which is quite powerful in Hong Kong.

But it's moderated by a Confucian ethos. Hong Kong didn't go through the revolution which attempted to destroy Confucianism. So everyday family life is very much informed by Confucian ethics and its commitment to serve the family and community, expanding love and care from family to outsiders. This moderates capitalism's excesses. That's how I would articulate Hong Kong's ethos.

Keith Yap 1:09:36

What advice do you usually give to your graduates as they enter the workforce?

Daniel Bell 1:09:40

My students are very diverse. Confucius was a teacher of teachers, with a wonderful model of teaching where he would give contradictory advice to different students depending on their needs and interests. There's no general advice - I need to know the student in all their glorious individuality.

But if there's one general point: the future is absolutely uncertain. The only certainty, if we're lucky enough to avoid war that destroys humanity, is rapid technological and social change. When I was in university, we thought once you found a job, that was it until retirement. Now, especially in Singapore, which is probably doing better than anywhere else at preparing students, there's a need for constant learning and readiness to do completely different things throughout your life.

Keith Yap 1:10:59

Actually, in that light you taught me two lessons. You taught me the right frame to read the Lunyu (論語), the Analects, which is not to take a general view but to appreciate the individual context of each text.

Daniel Bell 1:11:12

It's Confucius and his students, and each student is different. You have to think of it like a play and have background knowledge. He deliberately only says part of what he thinks is correct when teaching students, hoping they'll develop the rest on their own. It's important to understand who the students are, their interests, and what they're famous for in subsequent Chinese history.

This is why the Gaokao is problematic - students must memorize parts of classic texts, including the Analects, and learn the "correct" interpretation. Confucius would be shocked because there's no single correct interpretation. Some are better than others, but interpretations change over time based on new knowledge, new challenges, and who's interpreting in what context. Understanding this is important to make sense of and enjoy the text.

Keith Yap 1:12:14

With that, where can we find your work?

Daniel Bell 1:12:15

My latest book is The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University. It tries to show the humanity and humor while drawing implications from my experiences as dean.

The China Model is more academic, discussing systematically what political meritocracy is, its advantages and disadvantages, and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality in the Chinese setting.

Just Hierarchy, co-written with Wang Pei, my colleague and wife at the University of Hong Kong, shows that any modern society needs hierarchies. We know which ones are bad - based on race, sex, or class - but which ones are good and why? We theorize about that with many examples. These books are available in the usual places, like Amazon.

Keith Yap 1:13:15

Thank you, Prof, for coming on.

Daniel Bell 1:13:18

Thank you for this engagement. I love your podcast and watched the whole one about Dr. Goh Keng Swee, which was wonderful. I look forward to more of your podcasts and to learning more. Thank you.