Jeffrey Sachs 中國治國之道與新世界秩序

Jeffrey Sachs 中國治國之道與新世界秩序

傑弗裏·薩克斯：中國治國之道與新世界秩序

格倫·迪森 2025年5月2日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTLAX8hF7I

傑弗裏·薩克斯教授是世界知名的經濟學教授、暢銷書作家、創新型教育家，也是可持續發展領域的全球領導者。薩克斯教授探討了當前中美經濟戰的更廣泛的曆史意義，這場戰事標誌著以西方為中心的世界幾個世紀的終結。他還探討了西方地緣政治思維與中國地緣政治思維有何不同，以及為何如此不同。

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Glenn Diesen

大家好，歡迎討論美國和中國之間的經濟戰。我們邀請了 Jeffrey Sachs 教授，他是一位著名的經濟學家，他花費大量時間為世界各國政府提供谘詢。所以，歡迎回來參加我們的節目，很高興能一直和你在一起，Glenn。我們可以探討一下科技競爭，或者說，貨幣競爭，以及將供應鏈轉移回國的努力。但是，如果我們退一步來看，您認為更廣泛的發展是什麽？我們如何理解這個曆史時刻？因為這不是我們日常的貿易戰。這似乎……是的，幾個世紀以來，我們一直處於以西方為中心的世界秩序之下，而我們現在看到這種秩序受到了挑戰，或者至少不一定是……嗯，是的，中國現在正在超越西方，也就是說，世界正在變得不再以西方為中心，這種情況我們已經很久沒有見過了，或者說根本沒有。

Jeffrey Sachs

嗯，問這個問題的正確方式是……
要從長遠角度看待正在發生的事情……世界上大多數人口生活在亞洲……大約60%……在曆史的大部分時間裏，這意味著大約60%的世界經濟產出是在亞洲生產的。曆史學家回顧過去，試圖重建近幾個世紀的經濟估計，人們可以得出這樣的結論：隨著歐洲和北大西洋的崛起，情況發生了決定性的變化，因為在19世紀和20世紀，美國崛起成為世界最大的經濟體，而亞洲則黯然失色……當然，不僅僅是黯然失色……它被歐洲帝國主義……列強所主導，

如果你回顧1820年左右……亞洲仍然……占世界經濟的一半以上，但到…… 

1950年，在經曆了150年以歐美為主導的工業時代之後，整個亞洲經濟占世界產出的比重從之前的約60%下降到20%左右，這意味著中國完全被超越，事實上，中國當然遭到了西方的攻擊，並輸掉了許多戰爭。首先是第一次和第二次鴉片戰爭中被西方打敗，其次是19世紀中葉所謂的太平天國運動造成的混亂，最後是19世紀末歐洲列強在中國的治外法權或權利，以及日本的入侵，首先是1894-1895年的甲午戰爭，然後是20世紀的幾次日本入侵，以及20世紀30年代的大規模入侵，以及40年代的中國內戰，這意味著，到人民共和國成立的時候1949年中華民國成立時，中國經曆了大約110年的慘痛失敗，也就是中國所謂的百年屈辱。

據估計，截至20世紀50年代，中國在世界經濟中的份額大約為世界產出的2%，世界人口的20%。換句話說，從公元500年到公元500年，中國在世界上的悠久曆史地位至少有一千年的時間被完全掩蓋。在歐洲開始崛起之前，中國在許多技術領域，包括火藥、蒸汽機、紙幣、指南針、大規模航海等等，都占據了主導地位。

事實上，格倫，我們今天看到的這個故事，從非常非常長的曆史視角來看，就是中國重返世界強國的前列，在經濟、生產力和技術方麵。從某種意義上說，中國已經回歸了其在世界上更傳統的角色，這一點在過去2000年的大部分時間裏都可以看到。事實上，從這個意義上講，中國的崛起應該被理解為對絕對不平衡的重新平衡，而這個平衡就是歐洲主導的世界。當然，歐洲人和美國人很難理解，歐洲主導世界的想法已經成為一種絕對理所當然的備用方案，而且這種說法已經持續了幾百年。而隨著歐洲的崛起，歐洲帝國主宰了世界其他地區，完整的意識形態、信仰體係被改寫，曆史，甚至可以說是種族主義的重寫，即使是世界曆史的領軍思想家，西方也開始說，歐洲的主導地位是自然而然的，歐洲的文化優勢，也許是種族優勢，但無論爭論是什麽，歐洲的優勢都是自然

當然，現在我們正處於那個曆史階段的末期，我們應該明白，這不僅是中國的回歸，也是印度的快速發展，還有東南亞，也就是所謂的東盟國家的快速發展，還有西亞部分地區，比如海灣國家的快速發展。所有這些都從根本上終結了以歐洲為中心的世界觀，或者說，終結了19世紀末到21世紀初以北大西洋公約為中心的世界觀，以及20世紀末以美國為中心的世界觀。正如我所說，當出現這些暫時的經濟和權力失衡時，你也會在他們頭上施加壓力，或者我的意思是，你傾向於在意識形態、宗教或其他哲學意義上施加壓力，認為這種失衡在美國是自然而然的。美國例外論的觀念根深蒂固，認為美國當然統治著世界。是信仰體係的深層組成部分，而非膚淺之物，因此，人們對中國的崛起感到警惕，呃，人們不屑一顧，人們感到恐懼，人們並不以平和的態度看待中國。我不知道有哪位美國領導人會說：“當然，中國是一個擁有悠久文明曆史的大國，所以中國發展良好是理所當然的。”呃，你聽到的是“中國是世界的巨大威脅，中國的崛起必須被阻止，我們必須遏製中國，我們必須為戰爭做準備。中國通過欺騙和偷竊實現了經濟複蘇，否則就會倒閉，中國將會崩潰。換句話說，許多錯誤的、膚淺的、有偏見的、有時甚至是公然的種族主義觀點，都掩蓋了美國兩個多世紀以來積累的優越感。所以我感謝你從長遠角度看待問題，因為這通常正是我們理解當今世界相對經濟和技術表現的巨大變化所缺失的。對於那些在過去兩個世紀裏由於各種令人著迷且複雜的原因而遠遠落後的人來說，這是一個自然的追趕過程。但這種有利於北大西洋相對於世界其他地區的不平衡已經減弱，並且基本上正在走向終結。

Glenn Diesen

這真是太有趣了，極端的經濟不平衡是如何催生意識形態的，我想這可以解釋權力集中地的優越性。

Jeffrey Sachs

我想，如果要我說，格倫，有一件事對我來說很有趣，也很令人驚訝，如果你去讀歐洲最偉大的思想家的著作，比如哲學家伊曼紐爾·康德，他無疑是西方文明的偉大天才之一，他的著作中散布著許多觀點，但這並不是他的主要關注點，而是一種非常基於種族的歐洲優越性觀點。讀到這些觀點，你會感到有些震驚，因為他是一位偉大的普世主義者，他確實是一位絕對命令的偉大描述者，這種命令為行為設定了普遍的標準。但歐洲
天生就是優越文明的觀念深深植根於
各種意識形態之中，從文藝複興到啟蒙運動，當然，也包括
19世紀的浪漫民族主義時期，以及納粹主義和20世紀的其他意識形態，這些意識形態都基於種族或宗教的優越性，或者其他賦予統治權的歐洲文化屬性，而這正是歐洲優越性所在。呃，很多事情都出錯了。呃，在我們的思維中，這些信念根深蒂固，呃，也許並不明確，也許在某個時候甚至會被否定，但它們根植於我們政府、我們國家處理國際問題的方式中。去年在哈林堡慶祝了伊曼紐爾·K·哈林堡300周年誕辰，這確實讓我印象深刻，它背後的一些普世主義，以及某種優越感。但塞繆爾·亨廷的觀點很有意思，他指出，西方國家我們傾向於認為，我們幾個世紀以來一直統治著世界，是因為我們的優越思想、價值觀和意識形態。但他指出，真正原因是掌握了更高效的武器，控製了海上航線，並在工業革命中取得了領先，是的，世界其他國家不會忽視這一點。呃，不會忽視這一點。這是我們有組織的暴力，但是，呃，但這引出了一個問題：這會導致什麽？中國製定了不同的規則，因為如果以歐洲為中心的世界，是所有這些帝國都聚集在一個小小的大陸上，嗯，這如何形成了我們看待世界的方式？因為我們的政治理論家傾向於認為存在著不可避免的地緣政治競爭，這幾乎是自然規律。你認為中國的地緣政治心態會有什麽不同？會與例如歐洲人的行為方式有所不同，因為我們一直
認為這一切都是普遍的。我想說，這也是一個絕對引人入勝且備受爭議的問題，但我有自己的看法。我要分享的是，西方政治文化中最具決定性的事件，如果我可以這樣說的話，就是公元476年，也就是西羅馬帝國的覆滅，羅馬被日耳曼征服者
征服。當時，這是一個漫長的過程，但隨著西羅馬帝國的覆滅，歐洲分裂成多個政治實體，實際上是一個由城邦、王國、藩屬國以及所有可以想象的政治組織形式組成的複雜萬花筒，從中國層麵開始，這些帝國都未能真正達到查理曼大帝所開創的神聖羅馬帝國的規模。但正如人們所言，它從來都不是真正神聖的，也不是羅馬的，也從來都不是一個帝國，就其建立的方式而言。但關鍵是，盡管拿破侖有抱負，盡管查理曼有抱負，盡管希特勒曾努力嚐試，歐洲過去、現在和現在都從未成為一個統一的政治實體。今天的歐盟是一種不同類型的、仍然非常薄弱的??歐洲範圍的政治組織。歐洲四分五裂，基本上陷入了長達1500年的歐洲戰爭之中，戰爭成為了常態。關於治國之道的思考，實際上是在思考歐洲的衝突。因此，治國之道是無政府主義的，國際關係理論中著名的現實主義假設，是對大約公元500年到至少1950年歐洲現實的一個很好的初步預測。因此，各國之間會發生衝突、競爭、鬥爭、征服、擊敗、屈服等等，這些都是歐洲治國之道的思考方式。

中國的曆史與歐洲截然不同。中國在公元前221年統一於秦朝，這是第一次統一。中國的地理格局像一個盒子，盒子的北部是旱地，也就是所謂的階梯狀地區，西邊是熱帶地區。南麵是東南亞的森林，東麵是東海，太平洋，它是一個盒子，在2000多年前成為一個統一的行政國家。中國有時分裂，秦朝讓位於漢朝，漢朝分裂，後來在唐朝、宋朝、元朝、明朝和清朝重新統一。

但可以說，在過去的2200年裏，中國大部分時間都是一個中央集權的行政國家，中國的哲學是一種混亂的哲學，強調和諧在保持這個統一國家運轉方麵的重要性。現在人們爭論這是否會導致中國出現一種不同的治國方略，我的答案是肯定的，實際上中國並不以西方無政府主義的國際治國方略來思考問題，中國以一個龐大的中國國家來思考問題，在這個國家裏，內部秩序是決定性的，2000年來，對外帝國主義從未成為統治。

中國幅員遼闊，從未尋求海外領土。總的來說，是的，人們可以指出一些特定的地方和事件，但總的來說，中國與鄰國保持著和平關係。我舉個例子，從1368年明朝初年到1839年英國入侵中國，也就是第一次鴉片戰爭。大概有500年的時間，中國幾乎沒有與東亞鄰國發生過戰爭，比如日本、朝鮮和越南。

據我所知，15世紀，越南與朝鮮發生了大約17年的戰爭。中國從未入侵過朝鮮，但中國是當時的主導力量，按照西方國家的統治方式，你會說，中國會入侵並占領，從未嚐試過。在此期間，中國從未入侵過日本，一次也沒有。我相信，1592年，日本入侵過一次。或者至少，日本幕府將軍，一位軍事指揮官，試圖……入侵中國當然失敗了，但無論如何，東亞基本上享有長達五百年的和平，有時也被稱為儒家和平。

現在，當我與我們的朋友約翰·米爾希默（John Mirshimer）討論這個問題時，他是一位親愛的朋友，也是一位偉大的政治學家。在我看來，他說：“不，不，不，中國的行為方式將與任何其他大國一樣。” 他不同意中國擁有不同治國方略的觀點。我不敢苟同。我熱愛並欽佩約翰，但我不同意他的觀點。我認為中國對治國方略的看法不同，它是由兩千年不同的曆史塑造的。

薩克斯教授。與您交談總是令人著迷，所以，嗯，是的，非常感謝。我認為這將成為未來幾年的一個重點。中國的治國方略在多大程度上與西方截然不同。我希望看到您和米爾希默就此進行辯論。再次感謝您抽出時間，我們將繼續討論。很高興與您交談。非常感謝。

Jeffrey Sachs: Chinese Statecraft & a New World Order

 Glenn Diesen  2025年5月2日

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTLAX8hF7I

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs is a world-renowned economics professor, a bestselling author, an innovative educator, and a global leader in sustainable development. Prof. Sachs discusses the wider historical meaning of the current economic war between the US and China, which represents the end of centuries of a Western-centric world. Prof. Sachs also discusses how and why the Western geopolitical mindset is distinctively different from that of China.

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Hi everyone and welcome to discuss the
economic war between the United States
and China we are joined by professor
Jeffrey Sachs uh a renowned economist who
spends a lot of his time advising
governments uh across the world so
welcome back to the program well great
to be with you always Glenn so uh we can
look at this uh tech rivalry or yeah the
currency competition uh the efforts to
repatriate supply chains uh however if
we take I guess a step back what what do
you see as the wider developments here
how can we understand this uh point in
history because uh this is not your
everyday trade war this is um it seems
as if uh yeah we've had a western
centric world order now for centuries
and we now see this being contested or
at least not not necessarily the order
but um yeah China is now outpacing the
west that is the world is becoming much
less western centric we haven't really
seen this in a while or at all 

Jeffrey Sachs

well this is the right way to ask uh the question
of what's happening is to take the long
view uh most of of the world population
lives in Asia uh about 60% % uh for most
of history that means that roughly 60%
of the world economy world output was
produced in Asia as best one can tell
when historians look back and try to
recreate economic estimates in recent centuries that changed
decisively with the rise of Europe and
of the North Atlantic because in the
19th and 20th centuries of course the
United States rose to become the largest
economy in the world asia was eclipsed
in this and not only eclipsed of course
it was dominated by European imperial
powers if you look around 1820 or so
Asia was still uh more than half of the
world economy but by 1950 after 150
years of the industrial age dominated by Europe and the United
States uh the whole Asian economy had
declined to around 20% of world output
from what had been roughly 60% this
meant China completely being eclipsed and in
fact of course attacked uh and losing
many wars first to the west in the first
and second opium wars uh to chaos during
the so-called Taiping rebellion in the
middle of the 19th century uh to the
extr territorial privileges or rights or
dominance of European powers in China at
the end of the 19th century and then to
Japanese invasion uh in several episodes
starting with the SinoJapanese war in se
in 189495 and then several Japanese
invasions in fact in the 20th century
and the massive invasions of the
1930s civil war in China in the 1940s
and this meant that By the time
of the uh the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in
1949 China had gone through about 110
years of devastating defeats what China
calls the century of humiliation
china's share of the world economy uh
was estimated is estimated to be maybe
2% of world output and roughly 20% of
world population uh as of uh the 1950s
in other words China was completely
eclipsed from its long historical role
in the world uh for at least a millennium by the way from 500 to,500 AD
uh before the beginning of the European
ascendancy china clearly dominated the
world across many technologies gunpowder the steam engine
paper currency the compass uh largecale
ocean navigation and one could go on and
on in fact so the story Glenn that we
see today taken from a very very
long-term perspective in history is the
return of China to the front ranks of
power in the world and economic
productivity and technology uh in a
sense China has returned to its more
traditional role in the world which one
could see for much of the last 2,000
years in fact the rise of China in this
sense should be understood as a rebalancing of what was absolutely
unbalanced and that is a European
dominated world of course it's very hard
for Europeans and Americans to
understand that the idea of European
dominance in the world has become an
absolute natural standby and that's been
true for several hundred years actually
where as Europe rose in power as
European empires uh dominated the other
parts of the world uh full ideologies
belief belief systems uh rewriting of
history uh a lot of racism one can add
even by the leading thinkers of uh world
history in the west came to say well
Europe's dominance is natural European
cultural superiority maybe racial
superiority uh but whatever the argument
was European superiority is natural of
course now we're at the end of that
phase of history and one should
understand it's not only the return of
China it's also the rapid development of
India it's the rapid development of
Southeast Asia the so-called ASEAN
countries uh it's the rapid development
of parts of West Asia uh in the the Gulf
countries for example all of this is rather
fundamentally ending the eurosentric
view of the world or what in the late
19th century to the early 21st century
became the North Atlantic NATO centered
vision of the world and by the end of
the 20th century became the American
centered vision of the world and when
you have these temporary imbalances of
economy and power as I said you
also put a bull work under them or I say
you I mean the tendency is that a bull
work is put under them in
ideological or religious or uh some
other philosophical sense to say that
imbalance is natural in the United
States the idea of American
exceptionalism is very deep the idea
that yes of course America rules the
world is a deep part of the belief
system not a superficial item so the rise of China is
viewed with alarm uh it's viewed with
disdain it's viewed with fear it's not
viewed with equinimity i don't know any
American leaders that say "Well of
course China's a big power that has had
a long history of civilizational
greatness so it's natural that China's
doing well." Uh what you hear is "China
is the great threat to the world china's
rise must be stopped we must contain
China we must prepare for war china
cheated uh and stole its way to
economic recovery or return it's
artificial china will collapse in other
words many erroneous superficial biased sometimes blatantly
racist views to undergur this sense of superiority in
the US that built up over two centuries
so I thank you for taking the long view
because that's typically what is
precisely missing uh in understanding uh
the big changes of relative economic and
technological uh performance in our world today it's a
natural catching up of those who fell
far behind in the last two centuries for
a variety of fascinating and complex
reasons but that imbalance that
developed favoring the North Atlantic
relative to the rest of the world has
diminished and basically is coming to an
end at this point 

問
this is uh yeah fascinating how the extreme economic imbalances give rise to
ideologies I guess to explain the superiority of the where the power is concentrated 

Jeffrey Sachs

I think and and if I could say Glenn one thing that's interesting for me and very surprising if you go to the writings of of the greatest thinkers in Europe uh for example the philosopher Emanuel Kant who is no doubt one of the great geniuses of of Western
civilization he has scattered through his writings it wasn't his main preoccupation but a very race-based view of European superiority and one reads
that with some shock because he was the
great universalist he was the great
describer of indeed the categorical
imperative which set universal standards
for behavior but the idea that Europe is
inherently the superior civilization is deeply embedded of
course in a wide range of ideologies
stretching back from the Renaissance to
the Enlightenment of course to the
period of Romantic Nationalism in the
19th century and onto Nazism and other
ideologies of the 20th century that were
based on superiority of race or religion
uh or some other attribute of European
culture that gave the right to dominate
and this is where uh so much goes wrong
uh in our uh thinking uh these beliefs
become deeply embedded uh maybe not explicit maybe
they're even denied uh after a certain
point but they're embedded uh in the way
that our governments our states approach
international issues was it Emanuel's K's 300y year
birthday last year in Khalinrad and it
did strike me some of the universalism
behind it there was some sense of
superiority but what's interesting with
Samuel Hunting he made this point that
uh um that the western countries we we
tend to believe that we've been ruling
the world for these centuries because of
our superior ideas and values and
ideology but he made a point that it's
really the mastered more efficient
weaponry controlled the sea lanes and
got a head start in the industrial
revolution and yeah the rest of the
world do not uh do do not ignore this
that it was our organized violence but
uh but how but it begs the question how
will this lead to a different rule by
China because if if the euroentric world
was you all these empires on a small
continent um how this kind of formed our way of
looking at the world because our
political theorists tend to assume that
you have this unavoidable geopolitical
rivalry that is almost a law of nature
how do you think China would be
different its geopolitical mentality
would be different than for example the way the
Europeans have behaved because we always
assumed it's all universal
this is also an absolutely fascinating
and much debated question I would say
but I have my own views which I'll share
and that is that the decisive event in western
political culture if I may put it that
way is 476 AD uh which is the collapse
of the western Roman Empire when Rome is
conquered by German Germanic
conquerors and at that point it was a
long process but with the fall of the
western Roman Empire Europe uh
fragmented into multiple political
entities in fact a complete complex uh remarkable
kaleidoscope of political entities of
citystates and and kingdoms and dupdoms
and uh every conceivable form of uh
political organization from the Chinese
level up through would be Europeanwide
empires that never quite reached their
billing like the Holy Roman Empire that
Charlemagne in in effect began but it as
uh was famously said it was never quite
holy never Roman and never an empire uh
in in the way that it built itself but
the point is Europe was and is and
remained despite Napoleonic aspirations despite
Charlemagne's aspirations despite what
Hitler uh tried never uh became a
unified political entity and today's
European Union is a is is a different
kind and still very weak construction of
uh some kind of uh Europeanwide
political organization europe
fragmented and basically engaged in eur
within European war for uh 1500 years
and war became the standard and thinking
about statecraftraft is thinking about
conflict in Europe uh and so the idea
that statecraft is anarchctic the famous
assumption of realism in international
relations theory is a uh a good first
projection of European reality roughly
from around 500 AD to at least let's say
to 1950 and the idea that states
therefore collide with each other
compete with each other fight with each
other conquer each other defeat each
other succumb and so forth is European
state craft thinking china is very very
different in its history china unified
in 221 BCE uh in theQin dynasty the
first unification and China's uh
geographically kind of a box uh the box
has a dryland uh step region so-called
to the north the Himalayas to the west
the tropical forests of Southeast Asia
to the south and the East China Sea uh
the Pacific Ocean to the east it's a box
that became a state a unified
administrative state more than 2,000
years ago china fragmented at times uh
theQin dynasty gave way to the Han uh
era the Han era broke apart then became
later reunited in the Tang and the Song
and the Yuan and the Ming and theQing
dynasties but one could say that for
most of the last 2,200 years China's
been a centralized administrative state
and the philosophy underpinning China is
a confusion philosophy that emphasizes
the importance of harmony in keeping
this integrated state functioning now
it's debated does this lead to a
different kind of state craft of China
my answer uh is yes uh it does actually
china does not think in terms of western
anarchctic international statecraftraft
china thinks in terms of a large Chinese
state where internal order is decisive
and where external imperialism was never
the rule for 2,000 years china's vast
and did not look for overseas
territories by and large yes one can uh
point to particular places and episodes
but by and large China had peaceful
relations with its neighbors i'll just
give one example from 1368 which is the beginning of the Ming
dynasty to 1839 which is Britain's
invasion of China in the first opium war
so roughly uh for uh what is that uh uh
500 years China did not engage in almost almost
any fighting with its East Asian
neighbors with Japan with Korea and with
Vietnam uh with Vietnam there was about
a 17-year period of war in the 15th
century with Korea as far as I know
China never invaded Korea even once but
China was the dominant power and in
western state craft you'd say well China
would uh would invade and take over
never tried china never during this
period invaded Japan not even once uh it
was invaded by Japan once in
uh 1592 I believe it is or at least an
attempt by a uh Japanese shogun a
military commander to invade China it
failed of course but in any event you
had essentially a half a millennium of
peace in East Asia sometimes called the
Confucian peace now when I discussed
this with our our friend John Mirshimer
a dear friend and a great political
scientist as far as I'm concerned he
says "No no no no china will behave just
the same way as any other great power."
And he doesn't agree with this idea that
China has a different kind of state
craft i beg to differ i love and admire John but I disagree
with him i think China's view of
statecraft is different and it has been
shaped by a different 2,000 years of
history professor Sax it's always
fascinating to speak with you so uh yeah
thank you so much and I yeah I think
this will be a key focus in the years to
come to what extent China is uh its
statecraft is distinctively different
from that of the western so is I would
like to see you and Merchimer in a
debate about this thank you again for
your time we'll continue the discussion
great great to be with you thanks so much。