Niccolò Machiavelli 尼科洛·馬基雅維利

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

尼科洛·迪·貝爾納多·德·馬基雅維利

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

（1469-1527）是一位生活在意大利文藝複興時期的佛羅倫薩外交官、作家、哲學家和曆史學家。他最著名的作品是政治論文《君主論》（Il Principe），該書寫於1513年左右，但直到他去世五年後的1532年才出版。[6] 他常被稱為現代政治哲學和政治學之父。[7]

多年來，他一直擔任佛羅倫薩共和國的高級官員，負責外交和軍事事務。他還創作過喜劇、狂歡節歌曲和詩歌。他的私人信件對曆史學家和意大利書信學者也很重要。[8] 1498年至1512年，他擔任佛羅倫薩共和國第二大臣的秘書，當時美第奇家族已失去權力。

馬基雅維利去世後，他的名字開始讓人聯想到他在其著作《君主論》中最為著名的勸誡——那種不擇手段的行為。[9] 他關注統治者如何在政治中生存，並知道那些通過欺騙、背叛和犯罪而獲得成功的統治者。[10] 他建議統治者在政治需要時可以采取邪惡的手段，並曾指出，成功的政府創始人和改革者應該被原諒殺害反對他們的其他領導人。[11][12][13] 馬基雅維利的《君主論》自出版以來就備受爭議。有些人認為它是對政治現實的直白描述。許多人將《君主論》視為一本手冊，教導未來的暴君如何奪取和維持權力。[14] 即使在近代，一些學者，例如列奧·施特勞斯，也重申了馬基雅維利是“邪惡的導師”的傳統觀點。[15]

盡管馬基雅維利以其關於君主製的著作而聞名，但學者們也關注他其他政治哲學著作中的勸誡。《李維論》（約寫於1517年）雖然不如《君主論》那麽出名，但據說為現代共和主義鋪平了道路。[16] 他的作品對啟蒙運動作家產生了重大影響，他們重新激發了人們對古典共和主義的興趣，例如讓-雅克·盧梭和詹姆斯·哈靈頓。[17]馬基雅維利的政治現實主義持續影響著一代又一代的學者和政治家，他的方法常被拿來與奧托·馮·俾斯麥等人的現實政治進行比較。[18]

尼科洛·馬基雅維利
首次發表於2005年9月13日星期二；實質性修訂於2023年12月6日星期三
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

為什麽是馬基雅維利？任何人在哲學百科全書中看到關於他的條目，都會自然而然地想到這個問題。毫無疑問，馬基雅維利對西方思想中許多重要的論述做出了貢獻——其中最突出的是政治理論，但也包括曆史和史學、意大利文學、戰爭原則和外交。但馬基雅維利似乎從未將自己視為哲學家——事實上，他經常公開拒絕哲學探究，認為其無關緊要——他的資曆也表明他無法適應學院派哲學的標準模式。他的著作體係混亂、前後矛盾，有時甚至自相矛盾，令人發指，臭名昭著。他傾向於訴諸經驗和實例，而非嚴謹的邏輯分析。然而，將馬基雅維利列入最偉大的政治哲學家之列，並非沒有充分的理由，其中一些理由源於他的著作本身。盡管人們傾向於強調他的政治實用主義，但學術界仍在激烈爭論，爭論的焦點在於，他的思想核心中是否存在一種連貫而獨創的哲學，這種哲學探討的是哲學家們所關注的議題（Benner 2009；Zuckert 2017、2018；Baluch 2018；Bogiaris 2021）。此外，後來那些更明顯有資格被稱為一流哲學家的思想家們（現在仍然如此）感到有必要與他的思想互動，要麽對其進行批判，要麽將其洞見融入自己的學說。即使馬基雅維利的思想僅僅停留在哲學的邊緣，他廣泛思考的影響卻廣泛而持久。“馬基雅維利式的”或“馬基雅維利主義”這些術語在關注一係列倫理、政治和心理現象的哲學家中屢見不鮮，無論馬基雅維利本人是否發明了“馬基雅維利主義”（該術語顯然由皮埃爾·培爾在17世紀創造），或者他是否實際上是人們通常所認為的“馬基雅維利式的”。馬基雅維利對烏托邦哲學體係（例如柏拉圖的體係）的批判，以一種引人注目、值得思考和回應的方式挑戰了整個政治哲學傳統。最後，新一代所謂的“新羅馬”政治理論家（如菲利普·佩蒂特[1997]、昆汀·斯金納[1998]和馬

烏裏齊奧·維羅利（Urizio Viroli）[1999 [2002]]）從馬基雅維利的共和主義版本中汲取了靈感。因此，在任何一部全麵的政治哲學著作中，馬基雅維利都值得一提。

1. 傳記
2. 《君主論》：權力分析
3. 權力、美德與財富
4. 道德、宗教與政治
5. 國家與君主：語言與概念
6. 《論李維》：自由與衝突
7. 大眾自由與大眾言論
8. 共和派領袖的性格
9. 馬基雅維利在西方思想中的地位
參考文獻
意大利語一手資料
英譯一手資料
二手文獻
學術工具
其他網絡資源
相關文章
1. 傳記
與意大利文藝複興時期的許多重要人物相比，馬基雅維利的早年生活鮮為人知（以下部分引用了 Capponi 2010；Vivanti 2013；Celenza 2015；Lee 2020 的資料）。他於1469年5月3日出生於佛羅倫薩，幼年時師從一位著名的拉丁語教師，保羅·達·龍奇廖內。據推測他曾就讀於佛羅倫薩大學，即使粗略瀏覽他的著作，也能發現他接受過優秀的人文主義教育。然而，直到他進入公眾視野，並於1498年被任命為佛羅倫薩共和國第二任總理後，我們才開始對他的生平有完整而準確的了解。在接下來的十四年裏，馬基雅維利代表佛羅倫薩開展了一係列外交活動，足跡遍布意大利各大城市、法國王室以及馬克西米利安一世的帝國教廷。

自1494年起，佛羅倫薩一直處於共和政府的統治之下，當時主要的美第奇家族及其支持者被趕下台。在薩沃納羅拉領導四年（並最終垮台）之後，佛羅倫薩共和國尋求更穩定的政府，並相應地進行了機構改革。在此期間，馬基雅維利投身公共服務，並在終身執政官皮耶羅·索德裏尼（Piero Soderini）的庇護下蓬勃發展。索德裏尼於1502年當選為終身執政官。在擔任公職期間，馬基雅維利遊曆廣泛，撰寫了大量關於歐洲各地事件的快報（被稱為“使節信函”）。他還撰寫了私人信件、詩歌和簡短的政治分析（Nederman 2023）。然而，在1512年，在西班牙和教皇軍隊的協助下，美第奇家族擊敗了共和國的民兵（由馬基雅維利組織），並解散了政府。馬基雅維利是政權更迭的直接受害者：他立即被解職，並因被（錯誤地）懷疑密謀反對美第奇家族而於1513年初被監禁並遭受了數周的酷刑。此後，他隱居在佛羅倫薩郊外的家族農場，這為他轉向學術追求提供了契機和動力。

他第一部更具反思性的作品，也是最終最常與他的名字聯係在一起的作品——《君主論》。《君主論》寫於1513年底（或許是1514年初），但直到他去世後的1532年才出版。這部匆忙創作的作者，其動機之一就是試圖重拾自己在佛羅倫薩政壇的地位。（他在前共和政府的許多同僚很快便恢複了名譽，並在美第奇家族的領導下重返政壇。）這部作品最初是為獻給朱利亞諾·德·美第奇（他很可能很欣賞這部作品）而寫的，但在朱利亞諾去世後，獻詞改為獻給小洛倫佐·德·美第奇，而當這部作品於1516年落入小洛倫佐手中時，他幾乎肯定沒有讀過。

與此同時，馬基雅維利退出政壇後，他轉向了其他文學活動。他創作詩歌、戲劇和短篇散文，撰寫了《孫子兵法》研究（出版於1521年），並撰寫了傳記和曆史速寫。最重要的是，他撰寫了另一部對政治思想的重要貢獻——《論提圖斯·李維十書》，這部作品以對這位羅馬共和國著名曆史學家著作的評論為幌子，闡述了共和統治的原則。與《君主論》不同，《論》的寫作耗時很長（可能始於1514年或1515年，完成於1518年或1519年，盡管同樣是在他去世後的1531年才出版）。這本書的創作可能源於馬基雅維利在科西莫·魯切拉伊的讚助下，與佛羅倫薩一些重要的知識分子和政治人物進行的非正式討論。

在生命的盡頭，或許是得益於他那些人脈廣泛的朋友的幫助，他從未停止過懇求他們介入，馬基雅維利開始重新獲得美第奇家族的青睞。1520年，他受朱利奧·德·美第奇樞機主教委托，撰寫一部佛羅倫薩史（即所謂的《佛羅倫薩史》）。這項任務於1525年完成，並呈交給了這位後來已登基的樞機主教。

繼位為羅馬教皇，即克萊門特七世。美第奇政府還給他安排了一些小任務，但還沒等他有機會完全回歸公眾生活，就於1527年6月21日去世。

2. 君主論：權力分析
傳統上，過去的政治哲學家認為道德善與合法權威之間存在著特殊的關係。許多作家（尤其是在中世紀和文藝複興時期撰寫君主之鏡或王室忠告書籍的作家）認為，隻有當統治者的個人品德嚴格高尚時，政治權力的行使才是合法的。因此，統治者被勸告，如果他們想要成功——也就是說，如果他們渴望長期和平的統治，並致力於將權力傳給繼承人——他們必須確保按照傳統的道德標準行事，即美德和虔誠。從某種意義上說，人們認為，當統治者行善時，他們就是成功的；他們憑借其道德和宗教正直贏得了被服從和尊重的權利（參見Briggs and Nederman 2022）。

馬基雅維利在其最著名的著作《君主論》中對這種道德主義的權威觀進行了長篇批判。對馬基雅維利而言，沒有道德基礎來判斷權力的合法使用與非法使用之間的區別。相反，權威和權力本質上是平等的：擁有權力的人有權發號施令；但善良並不能確保權力，統治者也不會因為善良而獲得更多權威。因此，與源自道德的政治理論截然相反，馬基雅維利認為政治中唯一真正關心的是權力的獲取和維護（盡管他談論的與其說是權力本身，不如說是“維護國家”）。從這個意義上講，馬基雅維利對權威的概念進行了尖銳的批判，他認為，合法的統治權利概念對實際擁有權力沒有任何幫助。《君主論》旨在體現作者自覺的政治現實主義，他憑借在佛羅倫薩政府任職的親身經曆，深知善與正義不足以贏得並維持政治霸權。因此，馬基雅維利致力於學習和教授政治權力的規則。對他而言，任何成功的統治者都必須懂得如何有效地運用權力。馬基雅維利認為，隻有通過恰當地運用權力，才能使人民服從，統治者才能維護國家的安全和穩定。

因此，馬基雅維利的政治理論在政治決策和政治判斷的討論中，將道德權威和合法性問題排除在考慮範圍之外。這一點在他對法律與武力關係的處理上體現得最為明顯。馬基雅維利承認，良好的法律和強大的武器構成了秩序井然的政治體係的雙重基礎。但他緊接著補充道，由於強製手段能夠創造合法性，因此他將重點關注武力。他說：“既然沒有好的武器就不可能有好的法律，所以我不考慮法律，而隻談論武器”（《君主論》47）。換句話說，有效的法律完全建立在強製力的威脅之上；對馬基雅維利來說，權威作為一種權利，脫離了強製力的執行，是不可能存在的。馬基雅維利由此得出結論：對臣民來說，恐懼總是比感情更可取，正如暴力和欺騙在有效控製臣民方麵優於法律一樣。他觀察到，

人們可以普遍地這樣描述人類：他們忘恩負義、不忠誠、不真誠、虛偽、畏懼危險、貪圖利益……愛是一種義務的紐帶，這些可憐的生物會在任何時候覺得合適時打破它；但恐懼卻讓他們對懲罰的恐懼永不消逝。（《君主論》62；修訂版）
因此，馬基雅維利實際上不能說他擁有一種獨立於權力施加的義務理論；人們服從僅僅是因為他們害怕不服從的後果，無論是失去生命還是特權。當然，權力本身並不能約束一個人，因為義務是自願的，並且假設一個人可以有意義地做其他事情。隻有當一個人擁有反抗統治者的權力，或者願意承擔國家強製力優勢所帶來的後果時，他才能選擇不服從。

因此，馬基雅維利在《君主論》中的論證旨在表明，政治隻有根據強製力的有效運用才能得到恰當的定義，伊夫·溫特（2018）稱之為“暴力的命令”。權威作為一種命令的權利，並不具有獨立的地位。他通過參考政治事務和公共生活中可觀察到的曆史和當代現實，以及揭示所有人類行為的自利傾向的論證，來證實這一論斷。對馬基雅維利來說，這是毫無意義和徒勞的。

任何聲稱擁有指揮權，卻不擁有優越政治權力的統治者，都難免會因這些權利而衰敗甚至死亡。因為在政治衝突的混戰中，那些崇尚權力而非權威的人更有可能取得成功。毫無例外，如果沒有強大的力量支撐，使服從成為必然，那麽國家及其法律的權威永遠不會被承認。

3. 權力、美德與命運
馬基雅維利向讀者呈現了一種政治統治的願景，這種願景據稱已經擺脫了外來的道德影響，並充分認識到有效行使權力是政治的基礎。獲得服從的方法多種多樣，很大程度上取決於君主的遠見卓識。因此，成功的統治者需要特殊的訓練。最能體現馬基雅維利關於成功參與權力政治必須學習的技能的術語是“美德”。雖然意大利語中“virtue”（美德）一詞通常會被翻譯成英語，並通常傳達道德善德的傳統含義，但馬基雅維利在提及君主的“virtù”（德性）時，顯然意味深長。具體而言，馬基雅維利使用“virtù”的概念來指君主為了“維護國家”和“成就偉業”（這兩者是君主權力的兩大標準）而必須具備的一係列個人品質。這毫不留情地表明，傳統美德與馬基雅維利式的“virtù”之間根本無法等同。因此，馬基雅維利對“virtù之人”的理解可以概括為，他建議君主首先必須具備“靈活的性格”。按照馬基雅維利的說法，最適合擔任公職的統治者能夠“根據命運和環境”在善惡之間轉換行為（《君主論》66；參見Nederman和Bogiaris 2018）。

馬基雅維利在其著作《孫子兵法》中也使用了“美德”（virtù）一詞，用來描述將軍根據形勢變化適應不同戰場條件的戰略才能，這並非巧合。馬基雅維利認為政治是一種不同規模的戰場。因此，君主和將軍一樣，需要具備美德，也就是說，要知道哪些策略和技巧適用於哪些特定情況（Wood 1967）。因此，“美德”最終與馬基雅維利的權力概念緊密相關。具有美德的統治者必然善於運用權力；擁有美德（virtù）實際上意味著掌握了與有效運用權力相關的所有規則。美德之於權力政治，就如同傳統美德之於那些認為道德良善足以成為合法統治者的思想家：它是政治效力的試金石。

對於馬基雅維利來說，美德與權力的有效行使之間有何概念聯係？答案在於馬基雅維利的另一個核心概念——福爾圖納（Fortuna，通常譯為“命運”）。福爾圖納是政治秩序的敵人，是對國家安全保障的終極威脅。馬基雅維利對這一概念的運用一直備受爭議，但尚未達成令人滿意的結論。可以肯定的是，與美德一樣，他對福爾圖納的運用也獨具特色。傳統觀念將命運女神視為一位多半仁慈卻又反複無常的女神，既是人類福祉的源泉，也是人類邪惡的源泉；而馬基雅維利眼中的命運女神，則是邪惡且毫不妥協的源泉，帶來人類的苦難、痛苦和災難。雖然人類的命運女神或許能成就人類的成就，但當女神直接對抗時，任何人都無法有效地行動（《論語 CW》407-408）。

馬基雅維利對命運女神最著名的討論出現在《君主論》第25章，他提出了兩個類比來理解人類在麵對事件時的處境。首先，他斷言命運女神就像

我們毀滅性的河流，當它怒吼時，平原變成湖泊，樹木和建築物被掀翻，泥土從一個地方卷走，又轉移到另一個地方；每個人都在洪水麵前逃竄；每個人都屈服於它的狂怒，無人能擋。
然而，洶湧河流的狂暴並不意味著它的破壞超出了人類的控製範圍：在雨季來臨之前，人們可以采取預防措施，轉移自然因素帶來的最壞後果。“命運女神也麵臨同樣的情況，”馬基雅維利觀察到，

當美德和智慧尚未做好抵抗的準備時，她便會展現力量；當她知道沒有堤壩可以阻擋她時，她便會發泄憤怒。（《君主論》第90頁）
命運或許會被人類抵抗，但隻有在“美德和智慧”已經為她不可避免的到來做好了準備的情況下。

馬基雅維利強調了這種關聯

他解釋說，政治上的成功取決於對命運女神運作原則的理解，以此來將命運女神與自然的盲目力量聯係起來。他自身的經驗告訴他，

衝動勝於謹慎，因為命運女神是女人，為了控製她，必須毆打她、折磨她。
換句話說，命運女神要求那些想要控製她的人做出暴力回應。“她更容易被那些使用這種手段的男人打敗，而不是被那些冷漠行事的人打敗，”馬基雅維利繼續說道，“因此，她總是像女人一樣，是年輕男人的朋友，因為他們更不謹慎，更有活力，也更大膽地控製她。”（《君主論》92）命運女神的放蕩行為要求她做出咄咄逼人、甚至暴力的回應，以免她利用那些過於內斂或“女性化”而無法控製她的男人。

馬基雅維利的言論指向了關於命運女神及其在他思想世界中地位的幾個突出結論。在他的整個著作中，命運女神被描繪成暴力的根源（尤其是針對人類的暴力），並且與理性背道而馳。因此，馬基雅維利意識到，隻有做好準備，對命運女神的變幻莫測做出極端的回應，才能確保戰勝她。這就是美德所提供的：在任何必要時刻，以任何必要方式應對命運的能力。

4. 道德、宗教與政治
馬基雅維利思想的這些基本組成部分早在16世紀就在他的讀者中引發了相當大的爭議，當時他被斥為魔鬼的使徒，但也被那些宣揚“國家理性”理論的作家（和政治家）以同情的態度閱讀和運用（Meinecke 1924 [1957]）。爭議的主要根源在於馬基雅維利對人類行為的傳統道德和宗教標準的態度，這主要體現在《君主論》中。對許多人來說，他的教義宣揚的是非道德主義，或者至少是非道德主義。這種解讀最極端的版本認為馬基雅維利是“邪惡的導師”，用列奧·施特勞斯（1958：9-10）的名言來說，因為他建議領導者遠離正義、仁慈、節製、智慧和愛民等普遍價值觀，而應選擇使用殘忍、暴力、恐懼和欺騙。貝內代托·克羅齊（1925）等較為溫和的思想流派認為馬基雅維利隻是一個“現實主義者”或“實用主義者”，主張在政治事務中摒棄普遍的倫理道德。道德價值觀在政治領導人必須做出的決策中沒有地位，否則就是犯下最嚴重的範疇錯誤。或許，最溫和的非道德假說版本是由昆汀·斯金納（Quentin Skinner，1978）提出的，他聲稱統治者實施被傳統視為邪惡的行為是“最後最佳”的選擇。斯金納聚焦於《君主論》中的主張，即國家元首如果能夠行善，就應該行善；但如果必須作惡，就必須做好作惡的準備（《君主論》CW 58），並指出，在其他條件不變的情況下，馬基雅維利更傾向於順從而非道德美德。

對倫理問題的漠視也滲透在20世紀早期和中期流行的觀點中，即馬基雅維利隻是采取了科學家的立場——某種“政治界的伽利略”——來區分政治生活的“事實”和道德判斷的“價值”（Olschki，1945；Cassirer，1946；Prezzolini，1954[1967]）。因此，他被置於更普遍的科學革命背景中。馬基雅維利式“科學”的宗旨並非區分“正義”與“非正義”的政府形式，而是解釋政客如何運用權力謀取私利。因此，與亞裏士多德那套充斥著古典規範的美德政治學觀形成鮮明對比的是，馬基雅維利堪稱“現代”政治學的奠基人。近年來，將馬基雅維利視為科學家的解讀已基本失寵（Viroli 1998 1-3），盡管最近有人認為該論題的修訂版有其價值（例如 Dyer and Nederman 2016）。

馬基雅維利的其他讀者並未在他的思想中發現任何不道德或非道德主義的汙點。讓-雅克·盧梭很久以前就認為，《君主論》的真正教誨在於教導民眾君主行為的真相，從而揭露而非頌揚一人統治核心的不道德（引自Connell，2005，178）。近年來，這一論點的各種版本廣為流傳。一些學者，例如加勒特·馬丁利（1958），稱馬基雅維利是頂尖的諷刺作家，指出君主及其顧問的弱點。馬基雅維利後來創作了尖刻的通俗舞台喜劇，這一事實也被引用作為其強烈諷刺傾向的證據。因此，我們不應輕信馬基雅維利關於道德行為的言論，而應將其理解為對公共事務的尖銳幽默評論。

瑪麗·戴茨（Mary Deitz，1986）則認為，馬基雅維利的議程旨在通過提供精心設計的建議（例如武裝人民）來“誘捕”君主，而這些建議如果被認真采納並執行，就能推翻君主。

關於馬基雅維利對宗教，尤其是基督教的態度，也存在類似的觀點。馬基雅維利並不認同他所理解的製度化的基督教教會。《論君主論》明確指出，傳統的基督教會削弱了人類積極公民生活所需的活力（《論君主論》228-229，330-331）。而《君主論》對教會及其教皇的當代狀況既鄙視又讚賞（《論君主論》29，44-46，65，91-92）。許多學者認為，這些證據表明馬基雅維利本人是徹頭徹尾的反基督教者，他更傾向於羅馬等古代社會的異教公民宗教，認為這些宗教更適合一個擁有美德的城市。安東尼·帕雷爾（1992）認為，馬基雅維利的宇宙觀受星辰運行和體液平衡的支配，本質上帶有異教和前基督教的色彩。對另一些學者而言，馬基雅維利或許更適合被描述為一個秉持傳統（即便缺乏熱情）虔誠的人，他願意屈從於外在的崇拜，但無論是在靈魂還是精神上，都未曾深深地信奉基督教的教義。少數持不同意見的人，尤其是塞巴斯蒂安·德·格拉齊亞（1989）和毛裏齊奧·維羅利（2006 [2010]），試圖挽救馬基雅維利的聲譽，使其免受那些認為他敵視或漠視基督教的人的攻擊。《格拉齊亞》展現了聖經的核心主題如何貫穿馬基雅維利的著作，並揭示了以神為中心、秩序井然的宇宙觀，其中其他力量（“天道”、“命運”等等）都被納入神的意誌和計劃之中。卡裏·內德曼擴展並係統化了格拉齊亞的洞見，展示了恩典、自由意誌和祈禱等基督教神學核心教義如何構成馬基雅維利概念框架的重要元素（2009：28-49；內德曼和拉胡德，2023）。相比之下，維羅利則考察了馬基雅維利時代佛羅倫薩共和國對基督教的曆史態度。

5. 國家與君主：語言與概念
馬基雅維利也被認為（最近一次是斯金納，1978年）首次提出了“現代國家概念”。該概念在韋伯的廣義理解下，是指在固定領土邊界內擁有強製性權力壟斷權的非人格化統治形式。當然，“lo stato”（國家）一詞在馬基雅維利的著作中廣泛出現，尤其是在《君主論》中，與強製權力的獲取和運用有關，這使得其含義與其衍生自拉丁語“status”（地位或條件）的含義截然不同。此外，學者們還指出，馬基雅維利在塑造早期現代圍繞“國家理性”（即國家本身的利益優先於所有其他考慮，無論是道德還是公民的利益）的辯論中發揮了影響，以此證明他被其近同代人視為一位國家理論家（Meineke，1924[1957]）。馬基雅維利的名字和學說被廣泛援引，以證明專製主義時代國家利益的優先性。

然而，正如哈維·曼斯菲爾德（1996）所指出的，仔細解讀馬基雅維利在《君主論》及其他著作中對“國家”（lo stato）一詞的運用，並不能支持這種解讀。馬基雅維利的“國家”仍然是個人的遺產，一種更符合中世紀“主權”（dominium）作為統治基礎的觀念的財產。（Dominium是一個拉丁語詞，可以同樣有力地翻譯為“私有財產”和“政治統治權”。）因此，“國家”實際上歸任何恰好控製它的君主所有。此外，治理的性質取決於統治者的個人品質和特質——因此，馬基雅維利強調美德（virtù）是君主成功不可或缺的要素。《君主論》中對“國家”一詞運用的這些方麵，削弱了其思想的“現代性”。正如曼斯菲爾德所總結的那樣，馬基雅維利充其量隻是國家語言在近代早期歐洲興起過程中的一個過渡人物。

在評估馬基雅維利在《君主論》中的理論的普遍適用性時，必須牢記的另一個因素源於他的“德性君主”所處的境況。這樣的統治者並非憑借王朝傳承或民眾支持而掌權，而是純粹憑借自身的主動性、技能、才能和/或力量（所有這些詞在英語中都與“德性”對應，取決於其在文本中的位置）。因此，如上所述，馬基雅維利式的君主不能依賴任何先前存在的合法性結構。因此，為了“維護他的國家”，他隻能依靠自己的力量。

君主憑借豐富的個人特質來指導權力的運用，並確立其統治權。這是一個岌岌可危的處境，因為馬基雅維利堅持認為，命運的陣痛和他人的陰謀使君主時刻麵臨失去國家的風險。在馬基雅維利的君主政體構想中，反映現代政治思想（和實踐）基調的穩定憲政體製的理念卻毫無蹤影。

事實上，人們或許會懷疑，盡管馬基雅維利號稱現實主義，但他是否真的相信一位德性十足的君主真的存在？他有時似乎設想，一位成功的君主必須發展出一種與人類迄今為止所知完全不同的心理狀態，因為這位“新”君主

準備好隨著命運之風和不斷變化的環境的約束而改變自己的行為……並且……盡可能不偏離正確的行為，但在必要時也能夠走上錯誤的道路。 (MP 62)
這種靈活性構成了馬基雅維利為尋求維護國家統治者提供的“實用”建議的核心：不排除任何不可控的行動方案，但要時刻準備著執行政治環境所需的任何行動。

然而，馬基雅維利本人似乎對人類是否能夠在心理上產生這種靈活的傾向心存嚴重懷疑。盡管馬基雅維利列舉了大量的曆史事例，但他在《君主論》中卻未能指出任何一位統治者展現出他認為完全掌控命運所必需的那種多變的美德。相反，他對成功統治者的案例研究反複指出，君主的性格特征與其時代相符，但如果環境發生變化，其行為的一致性（例如教皇朱利葉斯二世的情況）“將導致其垮台”（《君主論》CW 92）。即使是馬基雅維利所推崇的塞維魯皇帝，也因其“為鞏固權力所采取的必要行動”而成功；然而，他並非人人皆可效仿（《君主論》73）。馬基雅維利對塑造一種新的、心理靈活的性格類型的可能性的評估極其謹慎，並且傾向於使用條件句和虛擬語氣：“如果一個人能夠根據時代和環境改變自己的性格，那麽他總是會成功的”（《君主論》91，修訂版）。這樣的觀察不禁讓我們懷疑，馬基雅維利關於君主應根據環境而獲得不同性格的建議是否真的像他所宣稱的那樣“實用”（即使在他自己看來也是如此）。

6. 《李維史論》：自由與衝突
雖然《君主論》無疑是馬基雅維利最廣為流傳的作品，但《李維史論》或許最真實地表達了馬基雅維利的個人政治信仰和承諾，尤其是他對共和主義的同情。《李維史論》無疑借鑒了與《君主論》相同的語言和概念，但前者卻引導我們得出與後者截然不同的結論——許多學者認為後者與前者相矛盾。尤其是在這兩部作品中，馬基雅維利始終如一地清晰地區分了“政治”或“公民”秩序的最低限度概念與完整概念，並由此在其對公共生活的總體論述中構建了一個目標的層級結構。最低限度的憲政秩序是指臣民安居樂業（vivere sicuro），由強大的政府統治，既能抑製貴族（grandi）的欲望，又能通過其他法律和製度機製保持平衡。然而，在完全憲政的政體中，政治秩序的目標是共同體的自由（vivere libero），這種自由是由貴族和人民的積極參與和相互競爭所創造的（Pedullà 2011 [2018]）。正如昆汀·斯金納（Quentin Skinner，2002，189-212）所論證的，自由構成了馬基雅維利政治理論的基石，並指導他對不同類型政體價值的評估。隻有在馬基雅維利明確表達了偏好的共和國，這一目標才能實現。

馬基雅維利采取這一立場既出於務實的考慮，也出於原則性的考量。在佛羅倫薩共和國擔任秘書和外交官期間，他積累了豐富的法國政府內部運作經驗，這成為他構建“安全”（但非自由）政體的典範。盡管馬基雅維利在《君主論》中對法國君主製的評論相對較少，但他在《論法國》中卻對法國傾注了大量心血。

為什麽馬基雅維利會在一部旨在宣揚共和國優越性的著作中，如此熱情地讚揚（更遑論分析）世襲君主製？答案在於，馬基雅維利的目的是將“君主製”與“君主製”的最佳情況進行對比。

君主政體，卻擁有共和政體的製度和組織。在馬基雅維利看來，即使是最優秀的君主政體，也缺乏某些顯著的特質，而這些特質正是正當的共和政體所特有的，也正是這些特質使得共和政體比君主更可取。

馬基雅維利斷言，法蘭西王國及其國王的最大美德在於對法律的執著。“法蘭西王國比我們所知的任何其他王國都更受法律的約束”，馬基雅維利宣稱（《論語》314，修訂版）。馬基雅維利對這種情況的解釋是高等法院的功能。他指出：“法蘭西王國比任何其他王國都更受法律和秩序的約束。這些法律和秩序由高等法院，尤其是巴黎高等法院來維護：每當高等法院對王國的君主采取行動或在其判決中譴責國王時，這些法律和秩序都會得到更新。迄今為止，高等法院一直通過堅持不懈地執行反對貴族的法律來維護自身。（《論辯》CW 422，修訂譯本）
《論辯》的這些段落表明，馬基雅維利對法國的製度安排十分欽佩（Nederman 2023: 52-55）。具體而言，法國國王和貴族的權力之大，足以壓迫民眾，但他們卻受到由獨立權威的高等法院強製執行的國內法律的製約。因此，肆無忌憚的暴政行為的機會在很大程度上被消除，使君主製變得溫和而“文明”。

然而，無論這樣的政體多麽井然有序、守法，都與“自由生活”（vivere libero）格格不入。在探討君主滿足人民自由願望的能力時，馬基雅維利評論道：

就……民眾恢複自由的願望而言，君主既然無法滿足他們，就必須審視他們渴望自由的原因。（《論語》CW 237）。
他的結論是，少數人渴望自由僅僅是為了指揮他人；他認為，這些人數量足夠少，要麽被消滅，要麽用榮譽收買。相比之下，絕大多數人混淆了自由和安全，以為前者與後者相同：“但所有其他人，他們是無限的，渴望自由是為了安全地生活（vivere sicuro）”（《論語》CW 237）。雖然國王無法賦予大眾這種自由，但他可以提供他們渴望的安全：

至於其餘的人，隻要安全地生活（vivere sicuro）就足夠了，他們很容易通過製定命令和法律來滿足，這些命令和法律與國王的權力一起，包含了每個人的安全。一旦君主做到了這一點，並且人民看到他從不違反這些法律，他們很快就會開始過上安全而滿足的生活（vivere sicuro）（《論語 CW》237）。
馬基雅維利隨後將這一普遍原則直接應用於法國，他指出：

人民生活安全（vivere sicuro）的唯一原因就是它的國王受製於無數的法律，這些法律涵蓋了全體人民的安全。（《論語 CW》237）
法國政??體的守法特征確保了安全，但這種安全雖然令人向往，卻絕不能與自由混為一談。這就是君主製的極限：即使是最好的王國，也隻能保證其人民享有安寧有序的政府。

馬基雅維利認為，這種“安全生活”的後果之一就是人民的解除武裝。他評論說，無論“他的王國多麽強大”，法國國王都“過著向外國雇傭兵進貢的生活”。

這一切都源於他解除了人民的武裝，並且寧願……享受掠奪人民的眼前利益，避免想象中的而非真實的危險，而不是去做那些能夠保障人民安全、使國家永久幸福的事情。這種混亂，如果能帶來一些平靜的時期，最終也會導致困境、損害和無法挽回的毀滅（《論語》410）。
一個將安全置於首位的國家無力武裝其民眾，因為擔心民眾會用武器對抗貴族（或許是王室）。然而，與此同時，這樣的政權也無可挽回地被削弱，因為它必須依靠外國人為其作戰。從這個意義上講，任何以“安全生活”為目標的政府，都不可避免地會導致民眾消極無能。從定義上講，這樣的社會永遠不可能是馬基雅維利所理解的“自由生活”（vivere libero）意義上的自由，因此它隻是最低限度的政治或公民社會，而非完全的。

馬基雅維利對君主製局限性的這種解讀，可以從他在《孫子兵法》中對人民裁軍及其影響的進一步探討中找到佐證。在探討公民軍隊是否優於雇傭軍的問題時，他

堅持認為，一個國家的自由取決於其臣民的軍事準備。馬基雅維利承認“（法國）國王解除了人民的武裝，以便能夠更容易地指揮他們”，但他仍然得出結論：“這種政策……是這個王國的一個缺陷，因為未能處理好這個問題正是使其軟弱的唯一原因”（《法國憲法》第584條、第586-587條）。在他看來，剝奪人民的軍事角色可能給國家帶來的任何好處，都不如這種解除武裝必然伴隨的自由的喪失重要。問題不僅僅在於一個解除武裝國家的統治者受製於外國的軍事力量。馬基雅維利認為，更重要的是，一支配備武器的民兵隊伍，是確保政府或篡位者不會對民眾施暴的終極保障：“羅馬自由四百年，並擁有武裝；斯巴達八百年；許多其他城邦在不到四十年的時間裏，手無寸鐵，卻擁有自由。”（《憲法》第585條）馬基雅維利堅信，公民將永遠為爭取自由而戰——反抗內外壓迫。事實上，這正是曆代法國君主讓人民解除武裝的原因：他們力求維護公共安全和秩序，對他們而言，這意味著消除臣民任何使用武器的機會。法國政權將安全置於一切之上（無論是人民還是統治者），因此不能允許馬基雅維利認為的促進自由的主要手段。

裁軍的例子體現了法國等最低限度憲政體製與羅馬共和國等完全政治化共同體之間更大的差異，即社會中階級地位的差異。根據馬基雅維利的觀察，在法國，人民完全被動，貴族在很大程度上依賴於國王。相比之下，在像羅馬這樣高度發達的共和國，自由的實現至高無上，人民和貴族都在自治中扮演著積極（有時甚至相互衝突）的角色（McCormick 2011; Holman 2018）。對馬基雅維利而言，整體的自由取決於其組成部分的自由。在他著名的《論語》中，他對此主題進行了著名的探討，並評論道：

在我看來，那些譴責貴族與平民之間騷亂的人，似乎恰恰是在挑剔羅馬保留自由的根本原因……他們沒有意識到，每個共和國都存在兩種不同的傾向：人民的傾向和偉人的傾向，所有有利於自由的立法都是由他們的分歧產生的（《論語 CW》202-203）。
馬基雅維利知道自己在這裏采取了一種不同尋常的視角，因為羅馬共和國的崩潰通常被歸咎於最終將其分裂的敵對派係。但馬基雅維利認為，正是同樣的衝突產生了一種“創造性的張力”，而這種張力正是羅馬自由的源泉。因為“那些被許多人輕率譴責的騷亂”直接催生了羅馬的良好法律和公民的道德行為（《論語 CW》202）。因此，

人民與元老院之間的敵意應該被視為一種不便，為了羅馬的偉大，必須忍受這種不便。（《論語》CW 211）
馬基雅維利認為，其他共和模式（例如斯巴達或威尼斯所采用的模式）將產生更弱、更不成功的政治體係，這些體係要麽停滯不前，要麽在環境變化時容易衰敗。

7. 大眾自由與大眾言論
馬基雅維利對人民促進公共自由的能力表現出特別的信心。在《論語》中，他認為民眾在各種情況下都擁有相當廣泛的能力來為公共利益做出判斷和行動，並明確地將普通公民的“審慎和穩定”與君主的不健全判斷力進行了對比。簡而言之，“人民比君主更審慎、更穩定，判斷力也更強”（《論語》CW 316）。這並非馬基雅維利個人偏好的任意表達。他認為，人民比君主或貴族更關心自由，也更願意捍衛自由（《論語》204-205）。後者將自由與統治和控製人民的能力混為一談，而群眾更關心的是保護自己免受壓迫，當他們沒有受到更強大勢力的虐待或威脅時，他們就認為自己是“自由的”（《論語》203）。反過來，當普通公民擔心這種壓迫的發生時，他們更傾向於反對並捍衛共同自由。人民的這種積極作用，雖然對於維護至關重要的公共自由是必要的，但從根本上來說，與……相悖。

君主製“安全生活”（vivere sicuro）所依賴的等級服從與統治結構。“自由生活”（vivere libero）的前提條件根本不利於君主立憲製所追求的安全。

馬基雅維利認為安全與自由最終無法兼容——而後者更受青睞——的主要原因之一無疑可以追溯到其共和主義的“修辭”特征。馬基雅維利明確地將言論視為解決共和公共領域衝突最合適的方法；在《論辯》中，辯論被提升為人民確定最明智行動方針和最合格領導者的最佳手段。他顯然熟悉古典修辭學的傳統，這種傳統將公開演講與爭論直接聯係在一起：在法庭和協商式修辭領域，言語的恰當運用是在對抗性的環境中進行的，每位演講者都試圖說服聽眾相信自身立場的有效性以及對手立場的無力。中世紀晚期的意大利修辭學實踐者和理論家也探討了這一主題，他們強調修辭學的主題是“輕盈”（衝突）。因此，馬基雅維利堅持將爭論作為自由的先決條件，也反映了他的修辭偏好（Viroli 1998）。相比之下，君主政體——即使是像法國這樣最安全的君主製——也會排除或限製公開話語，從而使自身處於明顯的劣勢。說服一位統治者采取災難性或錯誤的行動，遠比說服眾多民眾容易得多。公眾討論的不確定性自由所引發的明顯“騷動”，最終使得比宮廷的閉門談話更有利於公共利益的決策。

這與《羅馬政治論》中的主張相呼應，即社會中的民眾構成了公民自由的最佳保障，也是公共利益決策的最可靠來源。馬基雅維利對人民在維護共和國中所發揮的作用的讚揚，源於他對公共言論對公民群體普遍具有啟發性影響的信心。在《羅馬政治論》第一卷開篇，他指出，有些人可能會反對羅馬人民享有的廣泛集會、抗議和否決法律和政策的自由。但他回應說，羅馬人之所以能夠

維持自由和秩序，是因為人民在公共利益展現於他們麵前時，能夠辨別它。當普通羅馬公民錯誤地認為某項法律或製度旨在壓迫他們時，他們可以通過集會來說服自己，承認自己的信念是錯誤的……（通過）集會的補救措施，在集會上，一些有影響力的人會站起來發表演講，指出他們是如何自欺欺人的。正如塔利所說，人民雖然無知，但能夠理解真理，並且當一個值得信賴的人說出真相時，他們很容易屈服（《論語》CW 203）。
塔利，即西塞羅（《論語》中為數不多的西塞羅之一），證實了馬基雅維利在此想到的是古典共和主義的一個關鍵特征：當才華橫溢的演說家真誠地談論公共福祉時，人民有能力回應並支持他的言論。

馬基雅維利在《論語》第一卷的結尾再次談到了這個主題，並進行了更深入的探討。在旨在論證民治優於君主製的章節中，他指出，隻要在共同體中留有公開演講和商議的空間，人民就能井然有序，因此“審慎、穩定、感恩”。馬基雅維利引用“民之聲，天之聲”這一說法，堅稱

輿論的預測極其準確……就輿論的判斷而言，當聽到兩位技藝高超的演說家分別主張不同的方案時，人們很少會發現民眾沒有采納更好的觀點，或無法理解其所聽到內容的真相（《論語》第316頁）。
在馬基雅維利看來，當演說家們提出相互競爭的方案時，民眾不僅能夠辨別最佳行動方案，而且實際上比君主更有資格做出決策。例如，

人民永遠無法被說服，任命一個臭名昭著或腐敗的人擔任公職是件好事，而君主卻可以輕易地、以各種各樣的方式被說服這樣做。（《論語》第316頁）
同樣，如果人民背離守法之路，他們也很容易被說服恢複秩序：

對於一個不受控製、動蕩不安的人民來說，一個好人可以輕易地引導他們回到正道。但沒有人能與一個邪惡的君主對話，唯一的解藥就是鋼鐵……要治愈人民的弊病，言語就足夠了。（《論語》第317頁）
馬基雅維利的對比是鮮明的。一個由言語和人統治的共和國

總而言之，以公共言論為主導的說服力幾乎肯定能夠實現其公民的共同利益；即使它犯了錯誤，也始終可以通過進一步的討論尋求幫助。非共和政體由於排除或限製了話語實踐，最終依賴於強製性統治，隻能通過暴力手段來糾正。

8. 共和領袖的性格
馬基雅維利支持共和政體的論證也訴諸於他對任何個人獲得美德的懷疑態度，因此也暗示了一個真正穩定的君主國可能永遠無法實現。馬基雅維利式的二分法，即對靈活性的需求與不可避免的性格恒常性，其效果在於揭示單一統治者政體固有的實踐局限性。讀者很容易得出這樣的結論：正因為人類行為根植於堅定不移的性格，所以單人統治本質上是不穩定的、岌岌可危的。在《論語》中，馬基雅維利提供了一個心理學案例，即人類性格的現實往往有利於共和國而非君主國，因為前者“由於公民的多樣性，比君主更能適應不同的環境”（《論語》253）。

馬基雅維利以羅馬對抗漢尼拔的軍事戰略演變為例，闡述了這一觀點。在迦太基將軍在意大利取得初步勝利之後，羅馬的形勢需要一位審慎謹慎的領導者，他不會讓軍團在毫無準備的情況下采取激進的軍事行動。這樣的領導力體現在法比烏斯·馬克西姆斯身上，“他憑借自己的緩慢和謹慎，將敵人擋在了海灣。他所遇到的情況也再適合不過了”（《論語》452）。然而，當需要采取更具進攻性的姿態來擊敗漢尼拔時，羅馬共和國卻選??擇了西庇阿作為領導，他的個人品質更符合當時的時代特征。法比烏斯和西庇阿都未能擺脫“其行事方式和習慣”（《論語》452），但羅馬能夠在適當時機調動他們的力量，這在馬基雅維利看來，表明了共和體製的內在力量。

如果法比烏斯是羅馬國王，他很可能輸掉這場戰爭，因為他無法根據形勢變化調整策略。然而，由於他出生在一個公民構成多元、性格各異的共和國，正如共和國擁有一個在形勢需要時能夠維持戰爭的最佳人選法比烏斯一樣，後來共和國也擁有一個在適合戰爭勝利的時期能夠勝任的西庇阿（《論語》452）。
不斷變化的事件需要靈活的應對方式，而從心理學角度來看，人的性格不可能隨著時代而改變，因此共和國提供了一種可行的替代方案：不同品質的人能夠適應不同的緊急情況。公民政體的多樣性特征曾被馬基雅維利的前輩們所詬病，但事實證明，這恰恰是共和國相較於君主國的持久優勢。

這並不意味著馬基雅維利對共和政府能夠彌補人類性格中政治缺陷的能力抱有十足的信心。畢竟，他並沒有真正揭示共和國是如何甄別並授權那些與時俱進的領導人的。觀察到共和國內部存在這種多樣性是一回事，而證明這是共和體製的必要或本質特征則是另一回事。因此，馬基雅維利充其量隻是為我們提供了一種經驗性的概括，其理論基礎他並未深入探討。而《論君主》則指出，共和國在應對命運所需的靈活性方麵，存在著其自身的內在局限性。正如個人一樣，改變其個性特征即使並非不可能，也十分困難，

共和國的製度也不會隨著時代而變遷……而是緩慢地變化，因為改變製度更加痛苦，必須等到整個共和國都陷入動蕩；而單憑一人之力改變自身的程序是不夠的。（《君主論》CW 453）

如果說君主製的衰落源於人類性格的固有結構，那麽共和國的衰敗則源於對過時製度安排的執著追求。《君主論》並未直接探討，與要求君主個人特質靈活變通相比，對建立更具響應能力的共和製度抱有希望是否更為合理。

因此，馬基雅維利似乎堅持一種真正的共和立場。但我們如何才能將這一點與他在《君主論》中的論述相協調呢？人們很容易將《君主論》視為馬基雅維利“真實”觀點的虛假表達。

以及他的偏好，這些著作都是在短時間內寫成的，目的是向佛羅倫薩歸來的美第奇家族大師們證明他的政治價值。（這與《論王論》漫長的創作過程形成了鮮明對比。）然而，馬基雅維利從未否定過《君主論》，事實上，他在《論王論》中對《君主論》的引用方式表明，他視前者為後者的姊妹篇。盡管關於馬基雅維利究竟是君主和暴君的朋友，還是共和國的朋友，以及因此我們是否應該將他作品的某一方麵視為輔助或邊緣，存在諸多爭論，但這些問題似乎無法解答。因此，馬克·胡利翁（Mark Hulliung）認為“兩位”馬基雅維利都應該得到同等重視，這頗具道理（Hulliung 1983）。

9. 馬基雅維利在西方思想中的地位
在馬基雅維利的思想中，什麽是“現代”或“原創”？馬基雅維利在西方思想史上的“地位”又是什麽？探討這一問題的文獻數量，尤其是與《君主論》和《論辯》相關的文獻，已發展到令人咋舌的程度。例如，約翰·波考克（1975）追溯了馬基雅維利共和思想在所謂的大西洋世界的傳播，特別是影響了指導美國憲法製定者的思想。保羅·拉赫（2008）則認為存在著類似的影響，但其思想實質和意義與波考克不同。在波考克看來，馬基雅維利的共和主義屬於公民人文主義，其根源可追溯至古典時代；而在拉赫看來，馬基雅維利的共和主義則完全是新穎而現代的。“新羅馬”思想家（其中最著名的是佩蒂特、斯金納和維羅利）將馬基雅維利作為其“自由即非支配”原則的源泉，而他也被運用到捍衛民主準則和價值觀的活動中（McCormick 2011）。同樣，也有人認為馬基雅維利的政治道德觀、國家觀念、宗教觀點以及其著作的許多其他特征是其貢獻獨創性的獨特基礎。

然而，學術界尚未得出確切的結論。（Johnston 等人 2017 年的論文很好地體現了當前馬基雅維利研究中懸而未決的局麵。）對於這些“現代性”與“獨創性”問題無法解決，一個合理的解釋是，馬基雅維利在某種意義上陷入了創新與傳統、古老道路與現代道路（借用 Janet Coleman 1995 年的說法）之間的困境，這導致他的思想整體乃至個別文本內部都產生了概念上的張力（Nederman 2009）。這種曆史的模糊性使得學者們能夠對關於他基本立場的矛盾主張提出同樣令人信服的論證，而不會顯得對其學說進行了過分的破壞。這一點與某些學者的指責不同，他們指責馬基雅維利從根本上自相矛盾（參見Black 2022）或僅僅受“地方”議程驅使（Celenza 2015）。更確切地說，馬基雅維利獨特的政治方法的顯著特征應該歸因於曆史環境與思想可能性之間的不協調。馬基雅維利之所以成為一位令人不安卻又發人深省的思想家，是因為他試圖得出與受眾普遍期望不同的結論，同時又融入了他所挑戰的那些傳統觀念的重要特征。盡管他一再宣稱自己的獨創性（例如，《君主論》第10卷，第57-58頁），但他對既有傳統的謹慎關注意味著他始終無法完全擺脫自身思想的局限。因此，馬基雅維利實際上不應被歸類為純粹的“古代”或“現代”，而應被定位於兩者之間的夾縫之中（佩杜拉（Pedullà）2023 最近強調了這一點，他認為“馬基雅維利就像神話中的雅努斯，羅馬神話中掌管開始和結束的神……”[xi]）。

參考書目
意大利語主要資料
馬基雅維利，《歌劇》，科拉多·維萬蒂編，三卷本，都靈：艾諾第-伽利瑪出版社，1997年。
英文譯本主要資料
[CW] 馬基雅維利：《主要著作及其他》，艾倫·H·吉爾伯特編，三卷本，連續頁碼，北卡羅來納州達勒姆：杜克大學出版社，1965年。
《君主論》（第一卷，第10-96頁）
《論提圖斯·李維的第一個十年》（第一卷，第175-532頁）
《孫子兵法》（第二卷，第561-726頁）
[MP] 《君主論》，昆汀·斯金納和羅素·普萊斯編，（《劍橋政治思想史文本》），劍橋：劍橋大學出版社，1988年。
[MF] 馬基雅維利《馬基雅維利和他的朋友們：他們的私人通信》，詹姆斯·B·阿特金森和戴維·西斯編，伊利諾伊州迪卡爾布：北伊利諾伊大學出版社，1996年。
二手文獻
Anglo出版社，悉尼，2005年，《馬基雅維利：公元一世紀》（牛津-沃伯格研究），牛津：牛津大學出版社。
Baluch, Faisal，2018年，《作為哲學家的馬基雅維利》，《政治評論》，80(2): 289–300。doi:10.1017/S0034670517001097
埃裏卡·本納，2009，《馬基雅維利的倫理學》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社。
–––，2013，《馬基雅維利的君主論：新解讀》，牛津：牛津大學出版社。doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653638.001.0001
紀堯姆·博賈裏斯，2021，《馬基雅維利的柏拉圖問題：新柏拉圖主義、愛欲、神話構建和馬基雅維利思想中的哲學》，馬裏蘭州蘭納姆：列克星敦出版社。
羅伯特·布萊克，2022，《馬基雅維利：從激進到反動》，倫敦：Reaktion出版社。
查爾斯·F·布裏格斯 (Charles F. Briggs) 和卡裏·J·內德曼 (Cary J. Nederman)，2022年，《基督教西方君主的鏡像（12-15世紀）》，載《“君主的鏡像”文學指南》，諾埃爾-萊蒂西亞·佩雷 (Noëlle-Laetitia Perret) 和斯特凡·佩基尼奧 (Stéphane Péquignot) 編，萊頓：布裏爾出版社，160-196頁。
尼科洛·卡波尼 (Niccolò Capponi)，2010年，《一位不太可能的君主：馬基雅維利的生平與時代》，馬薩諸塞州劍橋：達卡波出版社。
恩斯特·卡西爾 (Ernst Cassirer)，1946年，《國家的神話》，康涅狄格州紐黑文：耶魯大學出版社。
克裏斯托弗·S·塞倫紮 (Christopher S. Celenza)，2015年，《馬基雅維利：肖像》，馬薩諸塞州劍橋：哈佛大學出版社。
Coleman, Janet，1995，《馬基雅維利的現代之路：中世紀與文藝複興時期的曆史態度》，《尼科洛·馬基雅維利的君主論：新的跨學科論文集》，Martin Coyle主編，英國曼徹斯特：曼徹斯特大學出版社，40-64頁。
Connell, William（主譯），2005，《尼科洛·馬基雅維利著《君主論》及相關文獻集》，波士頓：貝德福德/聖馬丁出版社。
Croce, Benedetto，1925，《政治要素》，巴裏：Laterza & Figli出版社。
Dietz, Mary G.，1986，《誘捕君主：馬基雅維利與欺騙政治》，《美國政治學評論》，80(3)：777-799頁。 doi:10.2307/1960538
Dyer, Megan K. 和 Cary J. Nederman，2016，《馬基雅維利與方法論：保羅·費耶阿本德的反理性主義與馬基雅維利式的政治‘科學’》，《歐洲思想史》，42(3): 430–445。doi:10.1080/01916599.2015.1118335
Femia, Joseph V.，2004，《重溫馬基雅維利》，威爾士卡迪夫：威爾士大學出版社。
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Grazia, Sebastian de，1989，《地獄中的馬基雅維利》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社。
Holman, Christopher，2018年，《馬基雅維利與民主創新政治》，多倫多：多倫多大學出版社。
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Johnston, David、Nadia Urbanati 和 Camila Vergara 編，2017年，《馬基雅維利論自由與衝突》，芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社。
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Najemy, John M.（主編），2010 年，《馬基雅維利劍橋指南》，劍橋：劍橋大學出版社。 doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521861250
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–––，2023，《繩索與鎖鏈：馬基雅維利的早期思想及其演變》，馬裏蘭州蘭納姆：列克星敦圖書/羅曼與利特菲爾德出版社。
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Nederman, Cary J. 和 Nellie Lahoud，2023，《‘這就是我祈禱的方式’：尼科洛·馬基雅維利著作中的祈願語》，《思想史評論》15(1): 161-182。
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–––，1999 [2002]，Repubblicanesimo，羅馬-巴裏：Laterza。譯為共和主義，安東尼·舒加爾（Anthony Shugaar）（譯），紐約：希爾和王
–––, 2006 [2010], Dio di Machiavelli e il Problemamorale dell’Italia, 羅馬-巴裏：Laterza。譯作《馬基雅維利的上帝》，安東尼·舒加爾（Antony Shugaar）譯，普林斯頓，新澤西州：普林斯頓大學出版社，2010年。
–––，2014年，《救贖君主：馬基雅維利傑作的意義》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社。
維萬蒂，科拉多，2013年，《尼科洛·馬基雅維利：一部思想家傳記》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社。
馮·瓦卡諾，迭戈·A.，2007年，《權力的藝術：馬基雅維利、尼采與美學政治理論的形成》，馬裏蘭州蘭納姆：列克星敦圖書公司。
溫特，伊夫，2018年，《馬基雅維利與暴力秩序》，劍橋：劍橋大學出版社。
尼爾·伍德 (Neal Wood)，1967 年，《馬基雅維利的美德概念再思考》，《政治研究》，15(2): 159–172。doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1967.tb01842.x
凱瑟琳·H·祖克特 (Catherine H. Zuckert)，2017 年，《馬基雅維利的政治學》，芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社。
–––，2018 年，《馬基雅維利：一個蘇格拉底式的人物？》，《政治學視角》，47(1): 27–37。doi:10.1080/10457097.2017.1385358
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相關條目
公民人文主義 | 腐敗 | 肮髒之手的問題 | 政治現實主義：在國際關係中 | 共和主義 | 主權

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

(1469 – 1527) was a Florentine diplomat, author, philosopher, and historian who lived during the Italian Renaissance. He is best known for his political treatise The Prince (Il Principe), written around 1513 but not published until 1532, five years after his death.[6] He has often been called the father of modern political philosophy and political science.[7]

For many years he served as a senior official in the Florentine Republic with responsibilities in diplomatic and military affairs. He wrote comedies, carnival songs, and poetry. His personal correspondence is also important to historians and scholars of Italian correspondence.[8] He worked as secretary to the second chancery of the Republic of Florence from 1498 to 1512, when the Medici were out of power.

After his death Machiavelli's name came to evoke unscrupulous acts of the sort he advised most famously in his work, The Prince.[9] He concerned himself with the ways a ruler could survive in politics, and knew those who flourished engaged in deception, treachery, and crime.[10] He advised rulers to engage in evil when political necessity requires it, at one point stating that successful founders and reformers of governments should be excused for killing other leaders who would oppose them.[11][12][13] Machiavelli's Prince has been surrounded by controversy since it was published. Some consider it to be a straightforward description of political reality. Many view The Prince as a manual, teaching would-be tyrants how they should seize and maintain power.[14] Even into recent times, some scholars, such as Leo Strauss, have restated the traditional opinion that Machiavelli was a "teacher of evil".[15]

Even though Machiavelli has become most famous for his work on principalities, scholars also give attention to the exhortations in his other works of political philosophy. While less well known than The Prince, the Discourses on Livy (composed c. 1517) has been said to have paved the way for modern republicanism.[16] His works were a major influence on Enlightenment authors who revived interest in classical republicanism, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Harrington.[17] Machiavelli's political realism has continued to influence generations of academics and politicians, and his approach has been compared to the Realpolitik of figures such as Otto von Bismarck.[18]

Niccolò Machiavelli

First published Tue Sep 13, 2005; substantive revision Wed Dec 6, 2023

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/

Why Machiavelli? That question might naturally and legitimately occur to anyone encountering an entry about him in an encyclopedia of philosophy. Certainly, Machiavelli contributed to a large number of important discourses in Western thought—political theory most notably, but also history and historiography, Italian literature, the principles of warfare, and diplomacy. But Machiavelli never seems to have considered himself a philosopher—indeed, he often overtly rejected philosophical inquiry as beside the point—nor do his credentials suggest that he fits comfortably into standard models of academic philosophy. His writings are maddeningly and notoriously unsystematic, inconsistent and sometimes self-contradictory. He tends to appeal to experience and example in the place of rigorous logical analysis. Yet there are good reasons to include Machiavelli among the greatest of political philosophers, some of which are internal to his writings. In spite of the temptation to emphasize his political pragmatism, a lively scholarly debate rages about the presence of a coherent and original philosophy, addressed to topics of concern to philosophers, at the core of his thought (Benner 2009; Zuckert 2017, 2018; Baluch 2018; Bogiaris 2021).

Moreover, succeeding thinkers who more obviously qualify as philosophers of the first rank did (and still do) feel compelled to engage with his ideas, either to dispute them or to incorporate his insights into their own teachings. Even if Machiavelli grazed at the fringes of philosophy, the impact of his extensive musings has been widespread and lasting. The terms “Machiavellian” or “Machiavellism” find regular purchase among philosophers concerned with a range of ethical, political, and psychological phenomena, regardless of whether or not Machiavelli himself invented “Machiavellism” (a term apparently coined by Pierre Bayle in the seventeenth century) or was in fact a “Machiavellian” in the sense commonly ascribed to him. Machiavelli’s critique of utopian philosophical schemes (such as those of Plato) challenges an entire tradition of political philosophy in a manner that commands attention and demands consideration and response. Finally, a new generation of so-called “neo-Roman” political theorists (such as Philip Pettit [1997], Quentin Skinner [1998] and Maurizio Viroli [1999 [2002]]) finds inspiration in Machiavelli’s version of republicanism. Thus, Machiavelli deserves a place at the table in any comprehensive survey of political philosophy.

1. Biography

Relatively little is known for certain about Machiavelli’s early life in comparison with many important figures of the Italian Renaissance (the following section draws on Capponi 2010; Vivanti 2013; Celenza 2015; Lee 2020) He was born 3 May 1469 in Florence and at a young age became a pupil of a renowned Latin teacher, Paolo da Ronciglione. It is speculated that he attended the University of Florence, and even a cursory glance at his corpus reveals that he received an excellent humanist education. It is only with his entrance into public view, with his appointment in 1498 as the Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence, however, that we begin to acquire a full and accurate picture of his life. For the next fourteen years, Machiavelli engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity on behalf of Florence, traveling to the major centers of Italy as well as to the royal court of France and to the imperial curia of Maximilian.

Florence had been under a republican government since 1494, when the leading Medici family and its supporters had been driven from power. After four years under Savonarola’s leadership (and eventual downfall), the Florentine Republic sought more stable government and reformed its institutions accordingly. During this time, Machiavelli entered public service and thrived under the patronage of the city’s gonfaloniere (or chief administrator) for life, Piero Soderini, who was elected to that position in 1502. In his official capacities, Machiavelli travelled considerably, producing a large body of dispatches (known as the Legations) reporting on events across Europe. He also composed personal correspondence, poetic works, and short political analyses (Nederman 2023). In 1512, however, with the assistance of Spanish and papal troops, the Medici defeated the republic’s civic militia (which Machiavelli had organized) and dissolved its government. Machiavelli was a direct victim of the regime change: he was immediately dismissed from office and, when he was (wrongly) suspected of conspiring against the Medici, was imprisoned and tortured for several weeks in early 1513. His retirement thereafter to his family farm outside of Florence afforded the occasion and the impetus for him to turn to intellectual pursuits.

The first of his writings in a more reflective vein was also ultimately the one most commonly associated with his name, The Prince. Penned at the end of 1513 (and perhaps early 1514), but only published posthumously in 1532, The Prince was composed in haste by an author who, among other things, sought to regain his status in Florentine political affairs. (Many of his colleagues in the previous republican government were quickly rehabilitated and returned to service under the Medici.) Originally written for presentation to Giuliano de’Medici (who may well have appreciated it), the dedication was changed, upon Giuliano’s death, to Lorenzo de’Medici (the Younger), who almost certainly did not read it when it came into his hands in 1516.

Meanwhile, Machiavelli’s retirement from politics led him to other literary activities. He wrote verse, plays, and short prose, authored a study of The Art of War (published in 1521), and produced biographical and historical sketches. Most importantly, he composed his other major contribution to political thought, the Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy, an exposition of the principles of republican rule masquerading as a commentary on the work of the famous historian of the Roman Republic. Unlike The Prince, the Discourses was written over a long period of time (commencing perhaps in 1514 or 1515 and completed in 1518 or 1519, although again only published posthumously in 1531). The book may have been shaped by informal discussions attended by Machiavelli among some of the leading Florentine intellectual and political figures under the sponsorship of Cosimo Rucellai.

Near the end of his life, and probably as a result of the aid of well-connected friends whom he never stopped badgering for intervention, Machiavelli began to return to the favor of the Medici family. In 1520, he was commissioned by Cardinal Giulio de’Medici to compose a history of Florence (the so-called Florentine Histories), an assignment completed in 1525 and presented to the Cardinal, who had since ascended to the papal throne as Clement VII, in Rome. Other small tasks were forthcoming from the Medici government, but before the opportunity arose for him to return fully to public life, he died on 21 June 1527.

2. The Prince: Analyzing Power

Traditionally, political philosophers of the past posited a special relationship between moral goodness and legitimate authority. Many authors (especially those who composed mirror-of-princes books or royal advice books during the Middle Ages and Renaissance) believed that the use of political power was only rightful if it was exercised by a ruler whose personal moral character was strictly virtuous. Thus rulers were counseled that if they wanted to succeed—that is, if they desired a long and peaceful reign and aimed to pass their office down to their heirs—they must be sure to behave in accordance with conventional ethical standards, that is, the virtues and piety. In a sense, it was thought that rulers did well when they did good; they earned the right to be obeyed and respected on account of their moral and religious rectitude (see Briggs and Nederman 2022).

Machiavelli criticized at length precisely this moralistic view of authority in his best-known treatise, The Prince. For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command; but goodness does not ensure power and the ruler has no more authority on account of being good. Thus, in direct opposition to morally derived theories of politics, Machiavelli says that the only real concern in politics is the acquisition and maintenance of power (although he talks less about power per se than about “maintaining the state”). In this sense, Machiavelli presents a trenchant criticism of the concept of authority by arguing that the notion of legitimate rights of rulership adds nothing to the actual possession of power. The Prince purports to reflect the self-conscious political realism of an author who is fully aware—on the basis of direct experience in the service of the Florentine government—that goodness and right are not sufficient to win and maintain political supremacy. Machiavelli thus seeks to learn and teach the rules of political power. For him, it is necessary for any successful ruler to know how to use power effectively. Only by means of its proper application, Machiavelli believes, can individuals be brought to obey and will the ruler be able to maintain the state in safety and security.

Machiavelli’s political theory, then, excludes issues of moral authority and legitimacy from consideration in the discussion of political decision-making and political judgment. Nowhere does this come out more clearly than in his treatment of the relationship between law and force. Machiavelli acknowledges that good laws and good arms constitute the dual foundations of a well-ordered political system. But he immediately adds that since coercion creates legality, he will concentrate his attention on force. He says, “Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I will not consider laws but speak of arms” (Prince CW 47). In other words, valid law rests entirely upon the threat of coercive force; authority is impossible for Machiavelli as a right apart from the power to enforce it. Machiavelli is led to conclude that fear is always preferable to affection in subjects, just as violence and deception are superior to legality in effectively controlling them. He observes that

one can say this in general of men: they are ungrateful, disloyal, insincere and deceitful, timid of danger and avid of profit…. Love is a bond of obligation which these miserable creatures break whenever it suits them to do so; but fear holds them fast by a dread of punishment that never passes. (Prince CW 62; translation revised)

As a result, Machiavelli cannot really be said to have a theory of obligation separate from the imposition of power; people obey only because they fear the consequences of not doing so, whether the loss of life or of privileges. And of course, power alone cannot bind one, inasmuch as obligation is voluntary and assumes that one can meaningfully do otherwise. Someone can choose not to obey only if he possesses the power to resist the ruler or is prepared to risk the consequences of the state’s superiority of coercive force.

Machiavelli’s argument in The Prince is thus designed to demonstrate that politics can only properly be defined in terms of the effective employment of coercive power, what Yves Winter (2018) has termed “the orders of violence.” Authority as a right to command has no independent status. He substantiates this assertion by reference to the observable realities—historical and contemporary—of political affairs and public life as well as by arguments revealing the self-interested tendencies of all human conduct. For Machiavelli it is meaningless and futile to speak of any claim to the authority to command detached from the possession of superior political power. The ruler who lives by his supposed rights alone will surely wither and die by those same rights, because in the rough-and-tumble of political conflict those who prefer power to authority are more likely to succeed. Without exception the authority of states and their laws will never be acknowledged when they are not supported by a show of power which renders obedience inescapable.

3. Power, Virtù, and Fortune

Machiavelli presents to his readers a vision of political rule allegedly purged of extraneous moralizing influences and fully aware of the foundations of politics in the effective exercise of power. The methods for achieving obedience are varied and depend heavily upon the foresight that the prince exercises. Hence, the successful ruler needs special training. The term that best captures Machiavelli’s vision of skill that must be learned in order to engage successfully in power politics is virtù. While the Italian word would normally be translated into English as “virtue”, and would ordinarily convey the conventional connotation of moral goodness, Machiavelli obviously means something very different when he refers to the virtù of the prince. In particular, Machiavelli employs the concept of virtù to refer to the range of personal qualities that the prince will find it necessary to acquire in order to “maintain his state” and to “achieve great things”, the two standard markers of power for him. This makes it brutally clear there can be no equivalence between the conventional virtues and Machiavellian virtù. Machiavelli’s sense of what it is to be a person of virtù can thus be summarized by his recommendation that the prince above all else must possess a “flexible disposition”. That ruler is best suited for office, on Machiavelli’s account, who is capable of varying her/his conduct from good to evil and back again “as fortune and circumstances dictate” (Prince CW 66; see Nederman and Bogiaris 2018).

Not coincidentally, Machiavelli also uses the term virtù in his book The Art of War in order to describe the strategic prowess of the general who adapts to different battlefield conditions as the situation dictates. Machiavelli sees politics to be a sort of a battlefield on a different scale. Hence, the prince just like the general needs to be in possession of virtù, that is, to know which strategies and techniques are appropriate to what particular circumstances (Wood 1967). Thus, virtù winds up being closely connected to Machiavelli’s notion of the power. The ruler of virtù is bound to be competent in the application of power; to possess virtù is indeed to have mastered all the rules connected with the effective application of power. Virtù is to power politics what conventional virtue is to those thinkers who suppose that moral goodness is sufficient to be a legitimate ruler: it is the touchstone of political efficacy.

What is the conceptual link between virtù and the effective exercise of power for Machiavelli? The answer lies with another central Machiavellian concept, Fortuna (usually translated as “fortune”). Fortuna is the enemy of political order, the ultimate threat to the safety and security of the state. Machiavelli’s use of the concept has been widely debated without a very satisfactory resolution. Suffice it to say that, as with virtù, Fortuna is employed by him in a distinctive way. Where conventional representations treated Fortuna as a mostly benign, if fickle, goddess, who is the source of human goods as well as evils, Machiavelli’s fortune is a malevolent and uncompromising fount of human misery, affliction, and disaster. While human Fortuna may be responsible for such success as human beings achieve, no man can act effectively when directly opposed by the Goddess (Discourses CW 407–408).

Machiavelli’s most famous discussion of Fortuna occurs in Chapter 25 of The Prince, in which he proposes two analogies for understanding the human situation in the face of events. Initially, he asserts that fortune resembles

one of our destructive rivers which, when it is angry, turns the plains into lakes, throws down the trees and buildings, takes earth from one spot, puts it in another; everyone flees before the flood; everyone yields to its fury and nowhere can repel it.

Yet the furor of a raging river does not mean that its depredations are beyond human control: before the rains come, it is possible to take precautions to divert the worst consequences of the natural elements. “The same things happen about Fortuna”, Machiavelli observes,

She shows her power where virtù and wisdom do not prepare to resist her and directs her fury where she knows that no dykes or embankments are ready to hold her. (Prince CW 90)

Fortune may be resisted by human beings, but only in those circumstances where “virtù and wisdom” have already prepared for her inevitable arrival.

Machiavelli reinforces the association of Fortuna with the blind strength of nature by explaining that political success depends upon appreciation of the operational principles of Fortuna. His own experience has taught him that

it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because Fortuna is a woman and it is necessary, in order to keep her under, to beat and maul her.

In other words, Fortuna demands a violent response of those who would control her. “She more often lets herself be overcome by men using such methods than by those who proceed coldly”, Machiavelli continues, “therefore always, like a woman, she is the friend of young men, because they are less cautious, more spirited, and with more boldness master her” (Prince CW 92). The wanton behavior of Fortuna demands an aggressive, even violent response, lest she take advantage of those men who are too retiring or “effeminate” to dominate her.

Machiavelli’s remarks point toward several salient conclusions about Fortuna and her place in his intellectual universe. Throughout his corpus, Fortuna is depicted as a primal source of violence (especially as directed against humanity) and as antithetical to reason. Thus, Machiavelli realizes that only preparation to pose an extreme response to the vicissitudes of Fortuna will ensure victory against her. This is what virtù provides: the ability to respond to fortune at any time and in any way that is necessary.

4. Morality, Religion, and Politics

These basic building blocks of Machiavelli’s thought have induced considerable controversy among his readers going back to the sixteenth century, when he was denounced as an apostle of the Devil, but also was read and applied sympathetically by authors (and politicians) enunciating the doctrine of “reason of state” (Meinecke 1924 [1957]). The main source of dispute concerned Machiavelli’s attitude toward conventional moral and religious standards of human conduct, mainly in connection with The Prince. For many, his teaching endorses immoralism or, at least, amoralism. The most extreme versions of this reading find Machiavelli to be a “teacher of evil”, in the famous words of Leo Strauss (1958: 9–10), on the grounds that he counsels leaders to avoid the common values of justice, mercy, temperance, wisdom, and love of their people in preference to the use of cruelty, violence, fear, and deception. A more moderate school of thought, associated with Benedetto Croce (1925), views Machiavelli as simply a “realist” or a “pragmatist” advocating the suspension of commonplace ethics in matters of politics. Moral values have no place in the sorts of decisions that political leaders must make, and it is a category error of the gravest sort to think otherwise. Perhaps the mildest version of the amoral hypothesis has been proposed by Quentin Skinner (1978), who claims that the ruler’s commission of acts deemed vicious by convention is a “last best” option. Concentrating on the claim in The Prince that a head of state ought to do good if he can but must be prepared to commit evil if he must (Prince CW 58), Skinner argues that Machiavelli prefers conformity to moral virtue ceteris paribus.

Disinterest in ethical concerns also permeates the claim, popular in the early- and mid-twentieth century, that Machiavelli simply adopts the stance of a scientist—a kind of “Galileo of politics”—in distinguishing between the “facts” of political life and the “values” of moral judgment (Olschki 1945; Cassirer 1946; Prezzolini 1954 [1967]). He is thereby set into the context of the scientific revolution more generally. The point of Machiavellian “science” is not to distinguish between “just” and “unjust” forms of government, but to explain how politicians deploy power for their own gain. Thus, Machiavelli rises to the mantle of the founder of “modern” political science, in contrast with Aristotle’s classical norm-laden vision of a political science of virtue. More recently, the Machiavelli-as-scientist interpretation has largely gone out of favor (Viroli 1998 1–3), although some have recently found merit in a revised version of the thesis (e.g., Dyer and Nederman 2016).

Other of Machiavelli’s readers have found no taint of immorality or amoralism in his thought whatsoever. Jean-Jacques Rousseau long ago held that the real lesson of The Prince is to teach the people the truth about how princes behave and thus to expose, rather than celebrate, the immorality at the core of one-man rule (quoted in Connell 2005, 178). Various versions of this thesis have been disseminated more recently. Some scholars, such as Garrett Mattingly (1958), have pronounced Machiavelli the supreme satirist, pointing out the foibles of princes and their advisors. The fact that Machiavelli later wrote biting popular stage comedies is cited as evidence in support of his strong satirical bent. Thus, we should take nothing Machiavelli says about moral conduct at face value, but instead should understand his remarks as sharply humorous commentary on public affairs. Alternatively, Mary Deitz (1986) asserts that Machiavelli’s agenda was driven by a desire to “trap” the prince by offering carefully crafted advice (such as arming the people) designed to undo the ruler if taken seriously and followed.

A similar range of opinions exists in connection with Machiavelli’s attitude toward religion in general, and Christianity in particular. Machiavelli was no friend of the institutionalized Christian Church as he knew it. The Discourses makes clear that conventional Christianity saps from human beings the vigor required for active civil life (CW 228–229, 330–331). And The Prince speaks with equal parts disdain and admiration about the contemporary condition of the Church and its Pope (CW 29, 44–46, 65, 91–92). Many scholars have taken such evidence to indicate that Machiavelli was himself profoundly anti-Christian, preferring the pagan civil religions of ancient societies such as Rome, which he regarded to be more suitable for a city endowed with virtù. Anthony Parel (1992) argues that Machiavelli’s cosmos, governed by the movements of the stars and the balance of the humors, takes on an essentially pagan and pre-Christian cast. For others, Machiavelli may best be described as a man of conventional, if unenthusiastic, piety, prepared to bow to the externalities of worship but not deeply devoted in either soul or mind to the tenets of Christian faith. A few dissenting voices, most notably Sebastian de Grazia (1989) and Maurizio Viroli (2006 [2010]), have attempted to rescue Machiavelli’s reputation from those who view him as hostile or indifferent to Christianity. Grazia demonstrates how central biblical themes run throughout Machiavelli’s writings, finding there a coherent conception of a divinely centered and ordered cosmos in which other forces (“the heavens”, “fortune”, and the like) are subsumed under a divine will and plan. Cary Nederman extends and systematizes Grazia’s insights by showing how such central Christian theological doctrines as grace, free will and prayer form important elements of Machiavelli’s conceptual framework (2009: 28–49; Nederman and Lahoud 2023). Viroli considers, by contrast, the historical attitudes toward the Christian religion as manifested in the Florentine republic of Machiavelli’s day.

5. The State and the Prince: Language and Concepts

Machiavelli has also been credited (most recently by Skinner 1978) with formulating for the first time the “modern concept of the state”, understood in the broadly Weberian sense of an impersonal form of rule possessing a monopoly of coercive authority within a fixed territorial boundaries. Certainly, the term lo stato appears widely in Machiavelli’s writings, especially in The Prince, in connection with the acquisition and application of power in a coercive sense, which renders its meaning distinct from the Latin term status (condition or station) from which it is derived. Moreover, scholars cite Machiavelli’s influence in shaping the early modern debates surrounding “reason of state”—the doctrine that the good of the state itself takes precedence over all other considerations, whether morality or the good of citizens—as evidence that he was received by his near-contemporaries as a theorist of the state (Meineke 1924 [1957]). Machiavelli’s name and doctrines were widely invoked to justify the priority of the interests of the state in the age of absolutism.

Yet, as Harvey Mansfield (1996) has shown, a careful reading of Machiavelli’s use of lo stato in The Prince and elsewhere does not support this interpretation. Machiavelli’s “state” remains a personal patrimony, a possession more in line with the medieval conception of dominium as the foundation of rule. (Dominium is a Latin term that may be translated with equal force as “private property” and as “political dominion”.) Thus, the “state” is literally owned by whichever prince happens to have control of it. Moreover, the character of governance is determined by the personal qualities and traits of the ruler—hence, Machiavelli’s emphasis on virtù as indispensable for the prince’s success. These aspects of the deployment of lo stato in The Prince mitigate against the “modernity” of his idea. Machiavelli is at best a transitional figure in the process by which the language of the state emerged in early modern Europe, as Mansfield concludes.

Another factor that must be kept in mind when evaluating the general applicability of Machiavelli’s theory in The Prince stems from the very situation in which his prince of virtù operates. Such a ruler comes to power not by dynastic inheritance or on the back of popular support, but purely as a result of his own initiative, skill, talent, and/or strength (all words that are English equivalents for virtù, dependent upon where it occurs in the text). Thus, the Machiavellian prince can count on no pre-existing structures of legitimation, as discussed above. In order to “maintain his state”, then, he can only rely upon his own fount of personal characteristics to direct the use of power and establish his claim on rulership. This is a precarious position, since Machiavelli insists that the throes of fortune and the conspiracies of other men render the prince constantly vulnerable to the loss of his state. The idea of a stable constitutional regime that reflects the tenor of modern political thought (and practice) is nowhere to be seen in Machiavelli’s conception of princely government.

Indeed, one might wonder whether Machiavelli, for all of his alleged realism, actually believed that a prince of complete virtù could in fact exist. He sometimes seems to imagine that a successful prince would have to develop a psychology entirely different from that known hitherto to mankind, inasmuch as this “new” prince is

prepared to vary his conduct as the winds of fortune and changing circumstances constrain him and … not deviate from right conduct if possible, but be capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when this becomes necessary. (MP 62)

This flexibility yields the core of the “practical” advice that Machiavelli offers to the ruler seeking to maintain his state: exclude no course of action out of hand, but be ready always to perform whatever acts are required by political circumstance.

Yet Machiavelli himself apparently harbored severe doubts about whether human beings were psychologically capable of generating such flexible dispositions within themselves. In spite of the great number of his historical examples, Machiavelli can point in The Prince to no single ruler who evinced the sort of variable virtù that he deems necessary for the complete control of fortune. Rather, his case studies of successful rulers repeatedly point to the situation of a prince whose characteristics suited his times but whose consistency of conduct (as in the case of Pope Julius II) “would have brought about his downfall” if circumstances had changed (Prince CW 92). Even the Emperor Severus, whose techniques Machiavelli lauds, succeeded because he employed “the courses of action that are necessary for establishing himself in power”; he is not, however, to be imitated universally (Prince CW 73). Machiavelli’s evaluation of the chances for creating a new, psychologically flexible type of character is extremely guarded, and tends to be worded in conditional form and in the subjunctive mood: “If it were possible to change one’s nature to suit the times and circumstances, one would always be successful” (Prince CW 91, translation revised). Such observations must make us wonder whether Machiavelli’s advice that princes acquire dispositions which vary according to circumstance was so “practical” (even in his own mind) as he had asserted.

6. The Discourses on Livy: Liberty and Conflict

While The Prince is doubtless the most widely read of his works, the Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy perhaps most honestly expresses Machiavelli’s personal political beliefs and commitments, in particular, his republican sympathies. The Discourses certainly draw upon the same reservoir of language and concepts that flowed into The Prince, but the former treatise leads us to draw conclusions quite different from—many scholars have said contradictory to—the latter. In particular, across the two works, Machiavelli consistently and clearly distinguishes between a minimal and a full conception of “political” or “civil” order, and thus constructs a hierarchy of ends within his general account of communal life. A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely (vivere sicuro), ruled by a strong government which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility (grandi) and people (Popolo), but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms. In a fully constitutional regime, however, the goal of the political order is the freedom of the community (vivere libero), created by the active participation of, and contention between, the nobility and the people (Pedullà 2011 [2018]). As Quentin Skinner (2002, 189–212) has argued, liberty forms a value that anchors Machiavelli’s political theory and guides his evaluations of the worthiness of different types of regimes. Only in a republic, for which Machiavelli expresses a distinct preference, may this goal be attained.

Machiavelli adopted this position on both pragmatic and principled grounds. During his career as a secretary and diplomat in the Florentine republic, he came to acquire vast experience of the inner workings of French government, which became his model for the “secure” (but not free) polity. Although Machiavelli makes relatively little comment about the French monarchy in The Prince, he devotes a great deal of attention to France in the Discourses.

Why would Machiavelli effusively praise (let alone even analyze) a hereditary monarchy in a work supposedly designed to promote the superiority of republics? The answer stems from Machiavelli’s aim to contrast the best-case scenario of a monarchic regime with the institutions and organization of a republic. Even the most excellent monarchy, in Machiavelli’s view, lacks certain salient qualities that are endemic to properly constituted republican government and that make the latter constitution more desirable than the former.

Machiavelli asserts that the greatest virtue of the French kingdom and its king is the dedication to law. “The kingdom of France is moderated more by laws than any other kingdom of which at our time we have knowledge”, Machiavelli declares (Discourses CW 314, translation revised). The explanation for this situation Machiavelli refers to the function of the Parlement. “The kingdom of France”, he states,

lives under laws and orders more than any other kingdom. These laws and orders are maintained by Parlements, notably that of Paris: by it they are renewed any time it acts against a prince of the kingdom or in its sentences condemns the king. And up to now it has maintained itself by having been a persistent executor against that nobility. (Discourses CW 422, translation revised)

These passages of the Discourses suggest that Machiavelli has great admiration for the institutional arrangements that obtain in France (Nederman 2023: 52–55). Specifically, the French king and the nobles, whose power is such that they would be able to oppress the populace, are checked by the laws of the realm which are enforced by the independent authority of the Parlement. Thus, opportunities for unbridled tyrannical conduct are largely eliminated, rendering the monarchy temperate and “civil”.

Yet such a regime, no matter how well ordered and law-abiding, remains incompatible with vivere libero. Discussing the ability of a monarch to meet the people’s wish for liberty, Machiavelli comments that

as far as the … popular desire of recovering their liberty, the prince, not being able to satisfy them, must examine what the reasons are that make them desire being free. (Discourses CW 237).

He concludes that a few individuals want freedom simply in order to command others; these, he believes, are of sufficiently small number that they can either be eradicated or bought off with honors. By contrast, the vast majority of people confuse liberty with security, imagining that the former is identical to the latter: “But all the others, who are infinite, desire liberty in order to live securely (vivere sicuro)” (Discourses CW 237). Although the king cannot give such liberty to the masses, he can provide the security that they crave:

As for the rest, for whom it is enough to live securely (vivere sicuro), they are easily satisfied by making orders and laws that, along with the power of the king, comprehend everyone’s security. And once a prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly begin to live securely (vivere sicuro) and contentedly (Discourses CW 237).

Machiavelli then applies this general principle directly to the case of France, remarking that

the people live securely (vivere sicuro) for no other reason than that its kings are bound to infinite laws in which the security of all their people is comprehended. (Discourses CW 237)

The law-abiding character of the French regime ensures security, but that security, while desirable, ought never to be confused with liberty. This is the limit of monarchic rule: even the best kingdom can do no better than to guarantee to its people tranquil and orderly government.

Machiavelli holds that one of the consequences of such vivere sicuro is the disarmament of the people. He comments that regardless of “how great his kingdom is”, the king of France “lives as a tributary” to foreign mercenaries.

This all comes from having disarmed his people and having preferred … to enjoy the immediate profit of being able to plunder the people and of avoiding an imaginary rather than a real danger, instead of doing things that would assure them and make their states perpetually happy. This disorder, if it produces some quiet times, is in time the cause of straitened circumstances, damage and irreparable ruin (Discourses CW 410).

A state that makes security a priority cannot afford to arm its populace, for fear that the masses will employ their weapons against the nobility (or perhaps the crown). Yet at the same time, such a regime is weakened irredeemably, since it must depend upon foreigners to fight on its behalf. In this sense, any government that takes vivere sicuro as its goal generates a passive and impotent populace as an inescapable result. By definition, such a society can never be free in Machiavelli’s sense of vivere libero, and hence is only minimally, rather than completely, political or civil.

Confirmation of this interpretation of the limits of monarchy for Machiavelli may be found in his further discussion of the disarmament of the people, and its effects, in The Art of War. Addressing the question of whether a citizen army is to be preferred to a mercenary one, he insists that the liberty of a state is contingent upon the military preparedness of its subjects. Acknowledging that “the king [of France] has disarmed his people in order to be able to command them more easily”, Machiavelli still concludes “that such a policy is … a defect in that kingdom, for failure to attend to this matter is the one thing that makes her weak” (Art CW 584, 586–587). In his view, whatever benefits may accrue to a state by denying a military role to the people are of less importance than the absence of liberty that necessarily accompanies such disarmament. The problem is not merely that the ruler of a disarmed nation is in thrall to the military prowess of foreigners. More crucially, Machiavelli believes, a weapons-bearing citizen militia remains the ultimate assurance that neither the government nor some usurper will tyrannize the populace: “So Rome was free four hundred years and was armed; Sparta, eight hundred; many other cities have been unarmed and free less than forty years” (Art CW 585). Machiavelli is confident that citizens will always fight for their liberty—against internal as well as external oppressors. Indeed, this is precisely why successive French monarchs have left their people disarmed: they sought to maintain public security and order, which for them meant the elimination of any opportunities for their subjects to wield arms. The French regime, because it seeks security above all else (for the people as well as for their rulers), cannot permit what Machiavelli takes to be a primary means of promoting liberty.

The case of disarmament is an illustration of a larger difference between minimally constitutional systems such as France and fully political communities such as the Roman Republic, namely, the status of the classes within the society. In France, the people are entirely passive and the nobility is largely dependent upon the king, according to Machiavelli’s own observations. By contrast, in a fully developed republic such as Rome’s, where the actualization of liberty is paramount, both the people and the nobility take an active (and sometimes clashing) role in self-government (McCormick 2011; Holman 2018). The liberty of the whole, for Machiavelli, depends upon the liberty of its component parts. In his famous discussion of this subject in the Discourses, he remarks,

To me those who condemn the tumults between the Nobles and the Plebs seem to be caviling at the very thing that was the primary cause of Rome’s retention of liberty…. And they do not realize that in every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the people and that of the great men, and that all legislation favoring liberty is brought about by their dissension (Discourses CW 202–203).

Machiavelli knows that he is adopting an unusual perspective here, since customarily the blame for the collapse of the Roman Republic has been assigned to warring factions that eventually ripped it apart. But Machiavelli holds that precisely the same conflicts generated a “creative tension” that was the source of Roman liberty. For “those very tumults that so many inconsiderately condemn” directly generated the good laws of Rome and the virtuous conduct of its citizens (Discourses CW 202). Hence,

Enmities between the people and the Senate should, therefore, be looked upon as an inconvenience which it is necessary to put up with in order to arrive at the greatness of Rome. (Discourses CW 211)

Machiavelli thinks that other republican models (such as those adopted by Sparta or Venice) will produce weaker and less successful political systems, ones that are either stagnant or prone to decay when circumstances change.

7. Popular Liberty and Popular Speech

Machiavelli evinces particular confidence in the capacity of the people to contribute to the promotion of communal liberty. In the Discourses, he ascribes to the masses a quite extensive competence to judge and act for the public good in various settings, explicitly contrasting the “prudence and stability” of ordinary citizens with the unsound discretion of the prince. Simply stated, “A people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince” (Discourses CW 316). This is not an arbitrary expression of personal preference on Machiavelli’s part. He maintains that the people are more concerned about, and more willing to defend, liberty than either princes or nobles (Discourses CW 204–205). Where the latter confuse their liberty with their ability to dominate and control the popolo, the masses are more concerned with protecting themselves against oppression and consider themselves “free” when they are not abused by the more powerful or threatened with such abuse (Discourses CW 203). In turn, when they fear the onset of such oppression, ordinary citizens are more inclined to object and to defend the common liberty. Such an active role for the people, while necessary for the maintenance of vital public liberty, is fundamentally antithetical to the hierarchical structure of subordination-and-rule on which monarchic vivere sicuro rests. The preconditions of vivere libero simply do not favor the security that is the aim of constitutional monarchy.

One of the main reasons that security and liberty remain, in the end, incompatible for Machiavelli—and that the latter is to be preferred—may surely be traced to the “rhetorical” character of his republicanism. Machiavelli clearly views speech as the method most appropriate to the resolution of conflict in the republican public sphere; throughout the Discourses, debate is elevated as the best means for the people to determine the wisest course of action and the most qualified leaders. The tradition of classical rhetoric, with which he was evidently familiar, directly associated public speaking with contention: the proper application of speech in the realms of forensic and deliberative genres of rhetoric is an adversarial setting, with each speaker seeking to convince his audience of the validity of his own position and the unworthiness of his opponents’. This theme was taken up, in turn, by late medieval Italian practitioners and theorists of rhetoric, who emphasized that the subject matter of the art was lite (conflict). Thus, Machiavelli’s insistence upon contention as a prerequisite of liberty also reflects his rhetorical predilections (Viroli 1998). By contrast, monarchic regimes—even the most secure monarchies such as France—exclude or limit public discourse, thereby placing themselves at a distinct disadvantage. It is far easier to convince a single ruler to undertake a disastrous or ill-conceived course of action than a multitude of people. The apparent “tumult” induced by the uncertain liberty of public discussion eventually renders more likely a decision conducive to the common good than does the closed conversation of the royal court.

This connects to the claim in the Discourses that the popular elements within the community form the best safeguard of civic liberty as well as the most reliable source of decision-making about the public good. Machiavelli’s praise for the role of the people in securing the republic is supported by his confidence in the generally illuminating effects of public speech upon the citizen body. Near the beginning of the first Discourses, he notes that some may object to the extensive freedom enjoyed by the Roman people to assemble, to protest, and to veto laws and policies. But he responds that the Romans were able to

maintain liberty and order because of the people’s ability to discern the common good when it was shown to them. At times when ordinary Roman citizens wrongly supposed that a law or institution was designed to oppress them, they could be persuaded that their beliefs are mistaken … [through] the remedy of assemblies, in which some man of influence gets up and makes a speech showing them how they are deceiving themselves. And as Tully says, the people, although they may be ignorant, can grasp the truth, and yield easily when told what is true by a trustworthy man (Discourses CW 203).

The reference to Tully, that is, Cicero (one of the few in the Discourses) confirms that Machiavelli has in mind here a key feature of classical republicanism: the competence of the people to respond to and support the words of the gifted orator when he speaks truly about the public welfare.

Machiavelli returns to this theme and treats it more extensively at the end of the first Discourse. In a chapter intended to demonstrate the superiority of popular over princely government, he argues that the people are well ordered, and hence “prudent, stable and grateful”, so long as room is made for public speech and deliberation within the community. Citing the formula vox populi, vox dei, Machiavelli insists that

public opinion is remarkably accurate in its prognostications…. With regard to its judgment, when two speakers of equal skill are heard advocating different alternatives, very rarely does one find the people failing to adopt the better view or incapable of appreciating the truth of what it hears (Discourses CW 316).

Not only are the people competent to discern the best course of action when orators lay out competing plans, but they are in fact better qualified to make decisions, in Machiavelli’s view, than are princes. For example,

the people can never be persuaded that it is good to appoint to an office a man of infamous or corrupt habits, whereas a prince may easily and in a vast variety of ways be persuaded to do this. (Discourses CW 316)

Likewise, should the people depart from the law-abiding path, they may readily be convinced to restore order:

For an uncontrolled and tumultuous people can be spoken to by a good man and easily led back into a good way. But no one can speak to a wicked prince, and the only remedy is steel…. To cure the malady of the people words are enough. (Discourses CW 317)

The contrast Machiavelli draws is stark. The republic governed by words and persuasion—in sum, ruled by public speech—is almost sure to realize the common good of its citizens; and even should it err, recourse is always open to further discourse. Non-republican regimes, because they exclude or limit discursive practices, ultimately rest upon coercive domination and can only be corrected by violent means.

8. The Character of Republican Leaders

Machiavelli’s arguments in favor of republican regimes also appeal to his skeptical stance toward the acquisition of virtù by any single individual, and hence the implication that a truly stable principality may never be attainable. The effect of the Machiavellian dichotomy between the need for flexibility and the inescapable constancy of character is to demonstrate an inherent practical limitation in single-ruler regimes. For the reader is readily led to the conclusion that, just because human conduct is rooted in a firm and invariant character, the rule of a single man is intrinsically unstable and precarious. In the Discourses, Machiavelli provides a psychological case that the realities of human character tend to favor a republic over a principality, since the former “is better able to adapt itself to diverse circumstances than a prince owing to the diversity found among its citizens” (Discourses CW 253).

Machiavelli illustrates this claim by reference to the evolution of Roman military strategy against Hannibal. After the first flush of the Carthaginian general’s victories in Italy, the circumstances of the Roman required a circumspect and cautious leader who would not commit the legions to aggressive military action for which they were not prepared. Such leadership emerged in the person of Fabius Maximus, “a general who by his slowness and his caution held the enemy at bay. Nor could he have met with circumstances more suited to his ways” (Discourses CW 452). Yet when a more offensive stance was demanded to defeat Hannibal, the Roman Republic was able to turn to the leadership of Scipio, whose personal qualities were more fitted to the times. Neither Fabius nor Scipio was able to escape “his ways and habits” (Discourses CW 452), but the fact that Rome could call on each at the appropriate moment suggests to Machiavelli an inherent strength of the republican system.

If Fabius had been king of Rome, he might easily have lost this war, since he was incapable of altering his methods according as circumstance changed. Since, however, he was born in a republic where there were diverse citizens with diverse dispositions, it came about that, just as it had a Fabius, who was the best man to keep the war going when circumstances required it, so later it had a Scipio at a time suited to its victorious consummation (Discourses CW 452).

Changing events require flexibility of response, and since it is psychologically implausible for human character to change with the times, the republic offers a viable alternative: people of different qualities fit different exigencies. The diversity characteristic of civic regimes, which was so reviled by Machiavelli’s predecessors, proves to be an abiding advantage of republics over principalities.

This does not mean that Machiavelli’s confidence in the capacity of republican government to redress the political shortcomings of human character was unbridled. After all, he gives us no real indication of how republics manage to identify and authorize the leaders whose qualities are suited to the circumstances. It is one thing to observe that such variability has occurred within republics, quite another to demonstrate that this is a necessary or essential feature of the republican system. At best, then, Machiavelli offers us a kind of empirical generalization, the theoretical foundations of which he leaves unexplored. And the Discourses points out that republics have their own intrinsic limitation in regard to the flexibility of response needed to conquer fortune. For just as with individual human beings, it is difficult (if not impossible) to change their personal characteristics, so

institutions in republics do not change with the times … but change very slowly because it is more painful to change them since it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is in a state of upheaval; and for this it is not enough that one man alone should change his own procedure. (Discourses CW 453)

If the downfall of principalities is the fixed structure of human character, then the failing of republics is a devotion to the perpetuation of institutional arrangements whose time has passed. Whether it is any more plausible to hold out hope for the creation of more responsive republican institutions than to demand flexibility in the personal qualities of princes is not directly examined by the Discourses.

Machiavelli thus seems to adhere to a genuinely republican position. But how are we to square this with his statements in The Prince? It is tempting to dismiss The Prince as an inauthentic expression of Machiavelli’s “real” views and preferences, written over a short period in order to prove his political value to the returned Medici masters of Florence. (This is contrasted with the lengthy composition process of the Discourses.) Yet Machiavelli never repudiated The Prince, and indeed refers to it in the Discourses in a way that suggests he viewed the former as a companion to the latter. Although there has been much debate about whether Machiavelli was truly a friend of princes and tyrants or of republics, and hence whether we should dismiss one or another facet of his writing as ancillary or peripheral, the questions seems irresolvable. Mark Hulliung’s suggestion that “both” Machiavellis need to be lent equal weight thus enjoys a certain plausibility (Hulliung 1983).

9. Machiavelli’s Place in Western Thought

What is “modern” or “original” in Machiavelli’s thought? What is Machiavelli’s “place” in the history of Western ideas? The body of literature debating this question, especially in connection with The Prince and Discourses, has grown to truly staggering proportions. John Pocock (1975), for example, has traced the diffusion of Machiavelli’s republican thought throughout the so-called Atlantic world and, specifically, into the ideas that guided the framers of the American constitution. Paul Rahe (2008) argues for a similar set of influences, but with an intellectual substance and significance different from Pocock. For Pocock, Machiavelli’s republicanism is of a civic humanist variety whose roots are to be found in classical antiquity; for Rahe, Machiavelli’s republicanism is entirely novel and modern. The “neo-Roman” thinkers (most prominently, Pettit, Skinner and Viroli) appropriate Machiavelli as a source of their principle of “freedom as non-domination”, while he has also been put to work in the defense of democratic precepts and values (McCormick 2011). Likewise, cases have been made for Machiavelli’s political morality, his conception of the state, his religious views, and many other features of his work as the distinctive basis for the originality of his contribution.

Yet few firm conclusions have emerged within scholarship. (The unsettled state of play in current research on Machiavelli is well represented in Johnston et al. 2017.) One plausible explanation for the inability to resolve these issues of “modernity” and “originality” is that Machiavelli was in a sense trapped between innovation and tradition, between via antiqua and via moderna (to adopt the usage of Janet Coleman 1995), in a way that generated internal conceptual tensions within his thought as a whole and even within individual texts (Nederman 2009). This historical ambiguity permits scholars to make equally convincing cases for contradictory claims about his fundamental stance without appearing to commit egregious violence to his doctrines. This point differs from the accusation made by certain scholars that Machiavelli was fundamentally inconsistent (see Black 2022) or simply driven by “local” agendas (Celenza 2015). Rather, salient features of the distinctively Machiavellian approach to politics should be credited to an incongruity between historical circumstance and intellectual possibility. What makes Machiavelli a troubling yet stimulating thinker is that, in his attempt to draw different conclusions from the commonplace expectations of his audience, he still incorporated important features of precisely the conventions he was challenging. In spite of his repeated assertion of his own originality (for instance, Prince CW 10, 57–58), his careful attention to preexisting traditions meant that he was never fully able to escape his intellectual confines. Thus, Machiavelli ought not really to be classified as either purely an “ancient” or a “modern”, but instead deserves to be located in the interstices between the two (a point recently underscored by Pedullà 2023, for whom “Machiavelli resembles the mythical Janus, the Roman god of openings and ending …” [xi]).

Bibliography

Primary Sources in Italian

Machiavelli, Opere, Corrado Vivanti (ed.), 3 volumes, Turin: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997.

Primary Sources in English Translation

[CW] Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, Alan H. Gilbert (ed. and trans.), 3 volumes, continuous pagination, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965.
- The Prince (in Volume 1, pp. 10–96)
- Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius (in Volume 1, pp. 175–532)
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[MP] The Prince, Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (eds.), (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
[MF] Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal Correspondence, James B. Atkinson and David Sices (eds.), Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.

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Other Internet Resources

The Prince, translation by W.K. Marriott, London: J.M. Dent, 1908.
- available at Medieval Sourcebook, Fordham University.
- available at Project Gutenberg
English translations of Machiavelli’s other works at Project Gutenberg
Italian Translations of Machiavelli’s works, at IntraText CT.

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers, with links to its database.

風蕭蕭_Frank

Niccolò Machiavelli 尼科洛·馬基雅維利

Niccolò Machiavelli

1. Biography

2. The Prince: Analyzing Power

3. Power, Virtù, and Fortune

4. Morality, Religion, and Politics

5. The State and the Prince: Language and Concepts

6. The Discourses on Livy: Liberty and Conflict

7. Popular Liberty and Popular Speech

8. The Character of Republican Leaders

9. Machiavelli’s Place in Western Thought

Bibliography

Primary Sources in Italian

Primary Sources in English Translation

Secondary Literature

Academic Tools

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