風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
2024 年 9 月 16 日
如果中國停止拯救世界，會發生什麽？
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/16/opinion/china-solar-climate.html
David Wallace-Wells 專欄，紐約時報，2024 年 9 月 16 日
在氣候領域，曾經看似不可想象的事情現在可能正在發生。初步數據顯示，雖然全球碳排放量持續上升，但中國的排放量可能已經達到峰值——這個長期的氣候惡棍在整個地球之前就扭轉了碳排放的局麵。
這樣的預測並不完全可靠，但中國已經徹底改寫了全球綠色轉型的故事。您可能熟悉這個故事的大致內容：得益於太陽能、風能和電池技術成本數十年來的驚人下降、新一輪的氣候倡導浪潮以及政策支持的大幅增加，各種綠色能源技術的推出正呈現出驚人的指數上升曲線，每年都讓傳統行業分析師的謹慎預測成為笑柄。
然而，盡管這通常被譽為全球成功，但有一個國家主導了最近的進步。當你看看中國以外的世界時，那些令人瞠目結舌的全球曲線變得相當平坦——綠色能源仍在朝著正確的方向發展，但速度要慢得多。
以太陽能為例，它目前主導著全球綠色轉型，給世界帶來了美好的故事。2023 年，包括中國在內的世界安裝了 425 千兆瓦的新太陽能發電；不包括中國的世界隻安裝了 162 千兆瓦。中國占了 263 千兆瓦；美國僅占 33 個。就在 2019 年，中國新增太陽能裝機量約占全球新增裝機量的四分之一；去年，中國新增裝機量比世界其他國家總和高出 62%。在這五年裏，中國新增裝機量增長了八倍多；沒有中國的世界甚至沒有翻一番。
如果把中國從這些數字中剔除，這些數字看起來就沒那麽令人印象深刻了：2019 年安裝了 90 千兆瓦，2020 年安裝了 93 千兆瓦，2021 年安裝了 100 千兆瓦，2022 年安裝了 133 千兆瓦，2023 年安裝了 162 千兆瓦。中國以外的地區也取得了進展——2021 年至 2023 年期間新增裝機量增長了 62%。但在中國，增幅達到了 317%。
這種模式不僅限於太陽能。根據最近的一項估計，今年全球新建的大型太陽能和風能發電廠中，近三分之二在中國，中國部署的綠色能源規模是世界任何其他國家的八倍多。七國集團（美國、加拿大、法國、德國、意大利、日本和英國）加起來，2023 年的新增裝機量僅為中國的四分之一。2023 年，中國新增風電裝機容量為 74 千兆瓦；世界其他國家新增裝機容量為 43 千兆瓦，美國僅為 6 千兆瓦。2023 年，中國售出 810 萬輛電動汽車，而世界其他地區售出 560 萬輛，美國售出 140 萬輛。
可以肯定的是，其他地方也有令人鼓舞的故事。 （例如，在 2024 年的前六個月，歐洲從風能和太陽能中產生的電力超過了從化石燃料中產生的電力，而南非的屋頂太陽能在短短一年多的時間裏增長了 349%。）但在世界其他地區脫碳的程度上，中國也在幫助推動這些轉型。 2022 年，全球生產的太陽能晶圓和太陽能電池中約有 90% 來自中國——從某種程度上來說，這是世界其他地區準備安裝的數量的兩倍多。去年，全球 60% 以上的風力渦輪機是在中國製造的，全球 60% 的電動汽車銷量來自中國。 2004 年，美國在全球太陽能製造業中的份額為 13%，但到 2023 年，這一份額已降至 1% 以下。中國的份額現在為 80%；而之前隻有 1%。
就在五年前，西方氣候外交官們抱怨說，如果中國國家主席習近平不配合，即使是富裕國家最神奇的脫碳計劃也將毫無價值。中國是全球近三分之一的碳排放國。即使在今天，你也會聽到名義上具有氣候意識的人哀歎，氣候變暖是一個全球性問題，而國內解決方案卻很有限。他們認為，當地成本和全球收益的不匹配將打消不良或不情願的氣候行動者的積極性，有時他們還認為，這些動態表明我們也應該放慢步伐。
事實上，競爭邏輯現在正好相反。從某些方麵來看，我們的同行國家和歐洲的天然盟友在轉型方麵都比美國走得更遠。而我們的主要地緣政治和地緣經濟對手並沒有放慢脫碳步伐，而是在某種程度上把世界其他國家甩在了後麵。這並不意味著中國已經為我們解決了世界氣候問題——甚至它自己的問題，考慮到
就其持續碳排放的規模而言——正如布雷特·克裏斯托弗斯最近在《金融時報》上所言，“能源轉型並非單一的，而是一係列形式、速度和範圍各異的區域轉型”。亞當·圖茲寫道：“談論‘全球’時會讓人產生混淆，而事實上，有一個國家主導著整個能源轉型動態：中國。”
十年前，美國及其盟友在如何鼓勵中國（當時和現在都是世界上最大的排放國）加入我們的脫碳競賽這一戰略問題上投入了大量智力和外交精力。如今，美國政策製定者正在對綠色技術征收關稅，以保護美國的清潔能源產業——這表明，從價格點來看，我們已經輸掉了這場競賽，此外，從部署速度來看，我們也輸了。
中國對綠色科技的大規模投資既是對房地產泡沫後疲軟經濟的戰略刺激，也是對清潔能源對 21 世紀繁榮和力量重要性的一次帝國級賭注。類似的邏輯也指導著其他地方的綠色投資，包括美國，美國的《通脹削減法案》被稱為“世界上有史以來最大的清潔能源技術投資”。但如果這是一場競賽，中國將占據絕對優勢。
當然，如果用排放量來衡量，就會得到一幅略有不同的圖景。如今，中國產生的碳幾乎是美國的三倍，而美國是世界第二大氣候汙染國，而且在當今對地球未來氣候造成的破壞方麵，中國比世界其他國家高出更多。但在某些方麵，這讓中國的綠色繁榮更加令人印象深刻：作為世界曆史上碳排放最多的經濟體，在經濟增長放緩、未達到全球“高收入”水平的時期，中國將其未來的巨大賭注押在了新興能源技術上——並且遠遠超過了它對自身轉型速度做出的全球承諾。例如，今年，中國提前整整六年實現了 2030 年可再生能源總量目標。在美國，我們似乎更關注人工智能。
你可以通過幾種方式來衡量這一驚人的影響。可以說，電力是全球轉型的貨幣，根據 Ember 的數據，去年全球電力需求的淨增長總額為 627 太瓦時；中國自己就增加了 606 太瓦時。（一太瓦等於一萬億瓦。）
或者你可以看看國際能源署所說的“避免排放”——這是衡量新可再生能源影響的一種方式。中國新增太陽能發電量每年可減少 619 兆噸碳排放，是美國的六倍。
當然，這些增長在一定程度上反映了中國傳統能源結構有多麽肮髒，因為替代煤炭比替代天然氣減少的排放量更多。然而，這種對比令人震驚。根據國際能源署的數據，中國新建的風力發電廠“避免”了 487 兆噸的排放，而世界其他地區的所有風力發電僅減少了 343 兆噸的碳排放。在中國，電動汽車避免了 22 兆噸的排放，超過了美國（15 兆噸）、歐盟（14 兆噸）、英國（3 兆噸），是世界其他地區新建電動汽車（7 兆噸）的三倍。核能領域的競爭稍微公平一些，但即便如此，中國減少的排放量（74 兆噸）也比韓國（20 兆噸）、阿聯酋（15 兆噸）、歐盟（9 兆噸）和世界其他國家（44 兆噸）要多。
你也可以看看他們正在建設的簡單規模。中國用於太陽能發電廠的土地是美國的兩倍多。
所有這些加起來意味著什麽？將中國置於任何有關綠色轉型的故事或分析的無可爭議的中心意味著什麽？
這個問題很大，可能和地緣政治一樣大，和全球未來的可能性一樣廣闊。但在短期內，至少有兩個基本點對我來說很突出。
首先，目前，能源轉型在很大程度上是一個中國項目。世界各地都在取得進展，但中國與其他國家之間的差距比人們普遍承認的要大得多，也更令人生畏，如果你把中國放在一邊，全球形勢看起來就不那麽樂觀了——從某種程度上來說，這正是美國通過發動綠色技術貿易戰試圖做的事情。
這些關稅的大部分爭論都涉及中國補貼和“產能過剩”的挑戰——以及美國及其盟友可能會采取什麽措施，讓我們能夠與綠色經濟進行適當競爭，綠色經濟目前生產的太陽能電池板數量是世界需求的兩倍，而電動汽車公司正在接管世界雖然大多數國家都在虧損。但這種不平衡的另一個方麵可能更令人擔憂，至少對我們這些擔心脫碳速度的人來說是這樣：中國可能會退縮，減少對綠色產業的支持，就像它故意給自己的房地產泡沫放氣一樣，這在某種程度上使全球綠色轉型的引擎空轉，讓我們其他人陷入困境。
What Happens if China Stops Trying to Save the World?
In climate world, something that once seemed almost unthinkable may now be happening. Preliminary data shows that while global carbon emissions are continuing to rise, China’s emissions may already be peaking — the longtime climate villain turning the corner on carbon before the planet as a whole does.
Forecasts like these are not perfectly reliable, but already China has completely rewritten the global green transition story. You may be familiar with the broad strokes of that story: that thanks to several decades of mind-boggling declines in the cost of solar, wind and battery technology, a new wave of climate advocacy and dramatically more policy support, the rollout of various green energy technologies is tracing an astonishing exponential curve upward, each year making a mockery of cautious projections from legacy industry analysts.
But while this is often hailed as a global success, one country has dominated recent progress. When you look at the world outside of China, those eye-popping global curves flatten out considerably — green energy is still moving in the right direction, but much more slowly.
Consider solar power, which is presently dominating the global green transition and giving the world its feel-good story. In 2023, the world including China installed 425 gigawatts of new solar power; the world without China installed only 162 gigawatts. China accounted for 263 gigawatts; the United States accounted for just 33. As recently as 2019, China was installing about one-quarter of global solar capacity additions; last year, it managed 62 percent more than the rest of the world combined. Over those same five years, China grew its amount of new added capacity more than eight times over; the world without China didn’t even double its rate.
Take China out of these figures and the numbers look much less impressive: 90 gigawatts installed in 2019, 93 in 2020, 100 in 2021, 133 in 2022 and 162 in 2023. There has been progress outside of China — a 62 percent increase in new capacity between 2021 and 2023. But in China the increase was 317 percent.
The pattern extends beyond solar. According to one recent estimate, nearly two-thirds of all big solar and wind plants being built globally this year are in China, which is deploying green energy at more than eight times the scale of any other country in the world. Together, all the Group of 7 powers — the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain — managed barely one-quarter as many new installations in 2023 as did China. In 2023, China installed 74 gigawatts of new wind capacity; the rest of the world installed 43 gigawatts, and the United States just 6. In 2023, 8.1 million electric vehicles were sold in China, compared to 5.6 million everywhere else in the world and 1.4 million in America.
There are encouraging stories elsewhere, to be sure. (In the first six months of 2024, Europe produced more electricity from wind and solar than from fossil fuels, for instance, and rooftop solar increased by 349 percent in South Africa in just over a year.) But to the extent that the rest of the world is decarbonizing, China is helping power those transitions, too. In 2022, roughly 90 percent of the solar wafers and solar cells produced in the world were Chinese — by some measures more than twice as many as the rest of the world was even ready to install. Last year, more than 60 percent of the world’s wind turbines were manufactured in China and 60 percent of the world’s E.V. sales came from China. In 2004, the American share of global solar manufacturing was 13 percent, but by 2023, it had fallen below 1 percent. China’s share is now 80 percent; it had been just 1 percent.
Just five years ago, it was commonplace to hear Western climate diplomats complain that even the most miraculous decarbonization in the wealthy world would be worth little if the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, whose country single-handedly produces nearly a third of all emissions, didn’t play ball. Even today, you hear nominally climate-conscious people lament the fact that warming is a worldwide problem with domestic solutions, postulating that the mismatch of local costs and global benefits will disincentivize bad or reluctant climate actors, and sometimes arguing that these dynamics suggest we should slow our roll, as well.
In fact, the competitive logic is now something like the opposite. By some measures, our peer countries and natural allies in Europe are all considerably farther along in their transitions than the United States. And our major geopolitical and geoeconomic rival is not slow-walking its decarbonization, but somewhat leaving the rest of the world in the dust. That doesn’t mean China has solved the world’s climate problem for us — or even its own, given the scale of its ongoing carbon emissions — just that “there is not one single energy transition but a series of regional transitions of widely varying form, pace and scope,” as Brett Christophers argued recently in The Financial Times. “There is an obfuscation involved in talking about ‘the global,’” Adam Tooze has written, “when, in fact, there is one country that dominates the entire dynamic of the energy transition: China.”
A decade ago, an awful lot of intellectual and diplomatic energy was spent on the strategic question of how the United States and its allies might encourage China, then as now the world’s biggest emitter, to join us in the race to decarbonize. Today, U.S. policymakers are throwing up green-tech tariffs to protect American clean-energy industries — a sign that, measuring by price point, we are already losing that race, in addition to losing it as measured by rate of deployment.
China’s massive investments in green tech are both strategic stimulus for a flagging economy in the aftermath of a real-estate bubble and an imperial-scale bet on the importance of clean energy to prosperity and power in the 21st century. A similar logic guides green investment elsewhere, including in the United States, where the Inflation Reduction Act has been called “the world’s largest-ever investment in clean energy technologies.” But if this is a race, China has a commanding lead.
To measure instead by emissions, of course, yields a somewhat different picture. China today produces almost three times as much carbon as the United States, which is the world’s second-worst climate polluter, and towers even more dramatically above the other countries of the world in any tally of present-day damage to the future climate of the planet. But in certain ways this makes China’s green boom even more impressive: The most carbon-hungry economy in world history, during a period of slowing growth short of global “high-income” status, is wagering an enormous amount of its future on nascent energy technologies— and racing well ahead of the global promises it has made about the speed of its own transition. This year, for instance, China hit its 2030 target for total renewable energy six full years early. In the United States, we seem perhaps more focused on artificial intelligence.
You can measure the staggering impact in several ways. Electricity is the currency of the global transition, so to speak, and, last year, the total net growth in global electricity demand was 627 terawatt hours, according to Ember; China on its own added 606 terawatt hours. (A terawatt is one trillion watts.)
Or you can look at what the International Energy Agency calls “avoided emissions” — one way of measuring the impact of new renewables. New solar additions in China accounted for 619 megatons of annual avoided emissions, six times as much as the United States.
These gains partly reflect how dirty China’s legacy energy mix is, of course, since replacing coal reduces more emissions than replacing gas. Nevertheless the contrasts are eye-popping. New wind capacity built in China “avoided” 487 megatons of emissions, according to the I.E.A., while all the wind power elsewhere in the world only cut carbon by 343 megatons. In China, electric cars averted 22 megatons of emissions, more than in the United States (15 megatons), the European Union (14 megatons), Britain (3 megatons) and three times as much as new E.V.s in the rest of the world (7 megatons). Nuclear is a slightly more even race, but even there China avoided more emissions (74 megatons) than South Korea (20 megatons), the United Arab Emirates (15 megatons), the European Union (9 megatons) and the rest of the world (44 megatons).
You can also look at the simple scale of what they are building. China has devoted more than twice as much land to solar plants as the United States has.
What does all this add up to? What does it mean to place China at the incontrovertible center of any story about, or analysis of, the green transition?
The question is an enormous one, perhaps as large as geopolitics and as capacious as the scope of possible global futures. But in the short run, at least, two basic points stand out to me.
The first is that the energy transition is, at present, to a large degree, a Chinese project. There is progress being made around the world, but the gap between China and everybody else is much larger and more intimidating than is widely acknowledged, and the global story looks much less optimistic once you set China aside — which is, in some ways, precisely what America is trying to do by engaging in a green-tech trade war.
Much of the argument for those tariffs has concerned the challenge of Chinese subsidy and “overcapacity” — and what the United States and its allies might do, if anything, to enable us to properly compete with a green economy producing today twice as many solar panels as the world has demand for, as well as an E.V. company taking over the world while mostly posting losses. But another aspect of the imbalance is perhaps more worrying, at least for those of us concerned about the pace of decarbonization: that China might back off, reducing its support for green industry in much the way that it purposefully deflated its own real-estate bubble, somewhat idling the engine of the global green transition and leaving the rest of us in the lurch.
