風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
中國總是重新崛起
YouTube：妖魔化中國是對中華文明的不了解 西方政客不懂天下的概念 簡單化地看待中國事務?!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWjhqqctDck&ab_channel=
April 25, 2023, mansion House, city of Londun. The UK government's position on China
Fames Cleverly, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom
我的出發點是認識到中國歷史和文明的深度與複雜性, 以及其對我們自身政策的啟示。中國是為數不多能夠追溯到兩千多年前的文明古國之一。幾個世紀以來，一次又一次內戰或外敵入侵，中國分裂為幾個敵對的王國，但每次動盪之後，中國總是重新崛起。
My starting point is a recognition of the depth and complexity of Chinese history and
civilization and therefore by extension of our own policy China is one of the few countries; which can trace its existence back over two Millennia time and time again down the centuries Civil War or foreign invasions fractured China into rival
kingdoms; but after every period of turmoil China has always reemerged.
曆史告訴我們，國內的壓製往往會轉化為國外的侵略。
And history teaches us that repression at home often translates into aggression abroad.
我們關於中國的立場：外交大臣2023年在倫敦金融城市長官邸的演講
外交大臣詹姆斯·克萊弗利在倫敦金融城市長官邸發表的講話中概述了英國政府對中國的立場。
從: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon James Cleverly 發布 25 April 2023
位置: Mansion House, London
提交日期: (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
外交大臣詹姆斯·克萊弗利在倫敦金融城市長官邸發表的講話中概述了英國政府對中國的立場。 倫敦金融城市長大人，各位閣下，議長先生，各位勳爵，女士們，先生們，感謝各位邀請我今晚在此發言。
根據傳統，今天的發言一般要談及所有的國際時政。 但請原諒我隻集中談論我們麵臨的幾個問題，因為如果不從目前的蘇丹危機開始談起的話，那將是我的失職。
正如大家所料，我參加了內閣緊急狀況委員會會議（COBR）和其他會議，討論了我們如何應對如今的局勢。我可以告訴大家，一架載著英國國民的皇家空軍飛機今晚已經離開蘇丹，飛機將把他們送到安全的地方。我們也將隨後派出更多飛機。 從這場危機一開始，我們就一直在計劃如何讓我們的人民撤離。現在，我們和國際社會對喀土穆停火的呼籲得到了響應，我們就著手執行這些計劃，並且優先考慮那些最需要幫助的人，例如家庭、病人和老人。
令我感到鼓舞的是，兩派都同意停火72小時，盡管當然我們不能確定停火會持續多久，況且從一個飽受戰爭創傷的城市撤離本身就很危險。 英國正在與我們世界各地的夥伴密切合作。這次行動之後，我們將盡一切可能，與我們在該地區的朋友們一起合作，確保這場悲劇性衝突得到持久的解決。 當然，蘇丹的局勢並沒有分散我們支持烏克蘭抗擊俄羅斯侵略的工作。我知道我們七國集團（G7）和世界各地的其他同事們都會同意我們這一工作重點。 雖然當前的緊急事件似乎占據了全部精力，我們也不能忽視最大的長期問題，這一點至關重要。因此，今晚我打算集中談論一個將界定我們時代的主題，那就是中國，以及英國對中國的政策。
經常有人請我用一個短語來表達對中國的政策，或者用一個詞來概括中國，是“威脅”，還是“夥伴”，亦或“對手”。首先我想解釋為什麽這樣做是不可能的、不切實際的，而且最重要的，是不明智的。
中國是少數幾個其存在可以追溯到2000多年前的國家之一，可以追溯到公元前221年，當時秦朝統一了中國。 接下來的幾個世紀，一次又一次的內戰或外國入侵將中國分裂成對立的王國，但在每一段動蕩時期之後，中國總是會重新崛起。中國史詩《三國演義》的開篇描述了這一循環： “天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。”
而早在他們合並成一個政體之前，中國人就創造了他們的語言和文明。他們的文字出現在公元前兩千年的商朝。 他們發明的紙、印刷術、火藥、指南針改變了整個人類的命運。這些創新是幫助我們理解的關鍵，理解為什麽中國經濟在過去22個世紀中，有20個世紀的時間一直是世界最大經濟體之一，理解為什麽在1820年，中國占全球GDP的三分之一，超過美國、英國和歐洲的總和。
後來災難一個接一個地襲來，有的是外來侵略造成的，有的來自中國本身。其中最致命的一次是毛澤東時代的饑荒。那次饑荒奪去了數千萬人的生命，超過了人類曆史上任何一次饑荒。
然而，過去的45年間又發生了一次驚人的逆轉。通過釋放人民的創業精神，中國實現了全世界有史以來規模最大、速度最快的經濟擴張。在這個占世界人口五分之一的國家中，至少有8億人擺脫了貧困。
這個國家幅員遼闊，幾乎與從大西洋到烏拉爾山脈的歐洲大陸一樣大。 因此，請原諒我說，沒有任何有力的短語或者合理的形容詞能夠準確地描述這樣一個國家，描述與其打交道的任何明智的方法。如果你想通過簡明扼要的語句尋找英國的外交政策，恐怕你要失望了。
我的出發點是認識中國曆史和文明的深度和複雜性，進而認識我們自己的政策。 我把這一政策建立在一係列前提之上。第一個前提是，無論我們與中國領導人有什麽分歧，我都為如此之多的中國人擺脫了貧困而感到高興。我們並非生活在一個悲慘的零和世界，他們的收益就是我們的收益。一個穩定、繁榮、和平的中國對英國有利，對世界也有利。
展望未來，我拒絕任何必然性的概念。之前沒有人預測到中國會從大規模饑荒中迅速崛起，實現相對繁榮，今天也沒有人能夠確定中國的經濟巨輪會無限期地向前滾動。
去年，自1976年毛澤東逝世以來，中國的經濟增長首次沒有超過世界經濟。這意味著中國占全球GDP的份額在2022年保持不變。即使中國在未來十年成為了世界上最大的經濟體，它也可能不會保持很長時間，因為中國不斷人口總量下降和人口老齡化對未來增長的壓力越來越大。
我也不認為中國和美國以及更廣泛的西方之間的衝突是不可避免的。
我們不會被迫陷入格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）所謂的“修昔底德陷阱”（Thucydides trap），即一個崛起的大國沿著古代雅典的軌跡前進，與一個老牌超級大國正麵碰撞。
我們有能動性；我們有選擇；中國也是如此。 我們的任務是塑造未來事件的進程，而不是屈從於宿命論。
我們必須麵對一個不可回避的現實：沒有中國，任何重大的全球問題，從氣候變化到預防疫情，從經濟不穩定到核擴散，都無法解決。 放棄與中國對話就等於放棄解決人類最大的問題。
更糟糕的是，等於忽略對我們的安全和繁榮至關重要的顯著事實。 如今，世界上最大的健康數據庫在中國，世界藥品活性成分的最大來源在中國，最大的碳排放源也在中國。
事實上，中國在過去10年排放到大氣中的碳比英國自18世紀工業革命以來排放的還要多。 中國如何監管其數據，中國如何開發藥物，中國如何進行醫學研究，都將對整個人類產生重大影響。中國是否減少碳排放很有可能決定我們的星球是能避免氣候變化的最嚴重破壞，還是遭受巨大災難。
我們已經付出了代價，知道中國對疫情的處理會如何影響整個世界。因此，毫無疑問，北京方麵做出的決定將影響我們的生活。 難道我們不應該為了自己的利益去努力影響這些決定嗎？假設我宣布進入某種新冷戰，說我們的目標是孤立中國，那麽這樣說是很清晰、很容易、甚至很令人滿意的。清晰、容易、令人滿意，但卻是錯的，因為這將是對我們國家利益的背叛，是對現代世界的刻意誤解。
事實上，本屆政府將與我們的盟友一樣，直接與中國打交道，推進英國的利益，同時堅定不移地捍衛我們的國家安全和價值觀。我們預期會有深刻的分歧；我可以向各位保證，與中國打交道不是懦夫能做的事；他們代表了一種無情的專製傳統，與我們的傳統截然不同。 但我們對子孫後代有義務，我們必須與他們來往，否則我們就沒有盡到維護和塑造國際秩序的責任。
逃避這一挑戰不是強大的表現，而是軟弱的表現。 弗拉基米爾·普京對烏克蘭發動猛攻時，他的意圖從來不是展示團結一致的西方的力量。但我們的回應表明，當英國、美國、歐洲和我們在世界各地的其他夥伴團結一致時，我們可以應對任何挑戰。 我們應該充滿信心，我們有與中國進行積極、建設性交往的集體能力，這種交往本身不是目的，而是為了管理風險和取得成果。我們已經取得了成果。 讓我給大家舉幾個例子。在2017年的研究中，英國的研究成果說服中國農業部限製粘菌素（一種用於動物飼料的抗生素）的使用，以此來對抗抗生素耐藥性的危險。銷售下降了90%，讓世界上的每個人都更安全了。
去年，我們在中國的外交官幫助說服政府修改了一項采購法草案，增加了英國公司競標國有企業合同的機會。今年，他們獲得了價值6億英鎊的許可證，讓英國機構可以在中國成立基金管理公司。 英國作為亞洲基礎設施投資銀行創始成員國的地位也使我們能夠影響中國對這一新機構的態度，防止它成為“一帶一路”倡議的政治延伸。中國是亞投行的最大股東，該銀行總部設在北京，但在俄羅斯全麵入侵烏克蘭的一周內，它凍結了在俄羅斯的每一個項目。
但即使交往能夠成功，事實是，像我們這樣一個致力於自由和民主的國家，將永遠在為了我們的國家利益與中國打交道，與我們對北京濫用權力的憎惡之間糾結。當我們看到專製國家如何對待自己的人民時，我們會想，如果他們有機會，他們會如何對待我們。
曆史告訴我們，國內的壓製往往會轉化為國外的侵略。
因此，我們的政策必須結合兩個方麵：我們必須在必要的領域與中國交往，同時要堅定地、現實地看待中國的威權主義。 這意味著永遠不要動搖一個明確的原則。我們並不期望我們與中國的分歧會很快得到解決，但我們確實期望中國遵守它自願承擔的法律和義務。
因此，作為聯合國安理會常任理事國，中國肩負著維護《聯合國憲章》的特殊責任。作為《中英聯合聲明》的締約國，中國同意保持香港的自由。作為《世界人權宣言》、《禁止酷刑公約》和許多其他國際法文件的簽署國，中國接受了一係列義務。 如果中國違反了這些承諾，我們有權說出來，我們有權采取行動，我們也將會這樣做。就像中國違反自己的承諾，剝奪香港的自由一樣。
這就是為什麽我們給了近300萬香港人獲得英國公民身份的機會。 和平共處必須從尊重基本法律和製度開始，包括遵守保護每個國家不受侵略的《聯合國憲章》。這意味著每一個國家：一名中國駐巴黎的外交官不可以、也絕不能、也不會決定主權國家的法律地位。 通過攻擊烏克蘭，俄羅斯給我們上了一堂關於一個聯合國成員國不應該做什麽的實物課。普京也踐踏了中國自己宣稱的不幹涉和尊重主權的原則。 當這種情況發生時，一個強大和負責任的國家不能簡單地棄權，或靠近侵略者，或援助和慫恿侵略。一個想要在世界秩序頂端獲得尊重的國家，應該捍衛自己的原則，履行自己的莊嚴義務，捍衛作為秩序基礎的法律。 這一責任與中國發揮與其規模和曆史相稱的全球作用的權利是緊密相連的。
像烏克蘭這樣的主權國家的權利不能僅僅因為根除者享有與中國的“戰略夥伴關係”就被根除。 因此，英國對中國的政策有三大支柱。 首先，在北京的行動對我們的人民或我們的繁榮構成威脅的時候，我們將加強我們的國家安全保護。 我們不會對幹涉我們的政治體係、技術盜竊或工業破壞保持沉默。我們將做更多的工作來保障學術自由和研究活動。 當與其他目標發生衝突時，我們將始終把國家安全放在第一位。因此，我們正在以最安全的方式建設我們的5G網絡，而不是最快或最便宜的方式。
中國領導人定義他們的核心利益，他們這樣做也是很自然的。但我們也有核心利益，其中之一就是促進建設我們想要生活的世界，在這樣的世界裏，各地的人們都有一項普遍的人權，那就是受到有尊嚴的對待，不受酷刑，不受奴役，不受任意拘留。 這些價值觀並沒有什麽獨特的“西方”之處，因為酷刑對任何人造成的傷害都是一樣的。
因此，當英國譴責在新疆大規模監禁維吾爾族人時，我希望中國不要相信自己的說辭，相信我們僅僅是在尋求幹涉他們的內政。正如我們應該更努力地理解中國一樣，我希望中國官員也能夠理解，當他們的政府建造一個21世紀版本的古拉格群島，在這場運動的高潮中關押了100多萬人，而這些人往往什麽都沒做，僅僅是信奉自己的宗教，這也激起了我們內心深處的某些東西。
當聯合國發現中國在新疆的鎮壓可能，我引用聯合國的話，“構成國際犯罪，特別是反人類罪”時，我們的憎惡是發自內心的，是全國上下一致認同的。我們不會讓新疆發生的事情不了了之或被置之不理。我們不會僅僅因為這些事情發生在國境的另一邊，或者因為提出這一點以後可能會被認為是不和諧或不禮貌而忽視它。 第二，英國將深化我們的合作，加強我們與印度—太平洋地區和全世界的朋友和夥伴的聯盟。 我們的目標將是加強集體安全，深化商業聯係，維護國際法，並在必要時進行平衡和競爭。
因此，我很高興看到英國將很快成為跨太平洋夥伴關係的第12個成員國，加強我們與快速增長的經濟體的貿易聯係。 我們已經是東南亞國家聯盟對話夥伴中唯一的歐洲國家。我們正在深化與印度的長期夥伴關係。我們正在和日本一起開發下一代飛機。我們與美國一起，幫助澳大利亞在奧庫斯（AUKUS）夥伴關係下建造核動力常規武裝潛艇。
英國將與我們的朋友一起，努力實現印度—太平洋地區的開放和透明。此時此刻，中國正在進行和平時期曆史上最大規模的軍事集結。在短短4年的時間裏，從2014年至2018年，中國推出的新戰艦超過了英國皇家海軍整個現役艦隊的總噸位。
當我們看到這一切發生的時候，當我們看到新的基地出現在南中國海和其他地方時，我們必然會問自己：這一切是為了什麽？為什麽中國要進行如此巨大的軍事投入？ 如果讓我們自己得出結論，審慎的態度要求我們必須做最壞的打算。然而，當然我們有可能事錯的：我們可能會過於謹慎和悲觀。
英國和我們的盟友準備公開我們在印度太平洋地區的存在。我也敦促中國同樣公開其軍事擴張背後的原則和意圖，因為透明肯定符合所有人的利益，秘密隻會增加悲劇性誤判的風險。 這讓我引入台灣的話題。英國的長期立場是，我們希望看到海峽兩岸的分歧得到和平解決。因為每年大約有一半的世界集裝箱船通過這些重要的水域，它們裝載著運往歐洲和世界遙遠角落的貨物。蓬勃發展的、民主的台灣，也是全球供應鏈中至關重要的一環，尤其是對先進半導體而言。
據《日經亞洲》報道，海峽兩岸的戰爭不僅將是一場人類悲劇，還將摧毀價值2.6萬億美元的世界貿易。沒有一個國家能夠獨善其身。距離將無法保護全球經濟免受這場災難性打擊，尤其是中國。想到隨之而來的人類和經濟的毀滅，我不寒而栗。因此，任何一方都不能采取單方麵行動來改變現狀，這一點至關重要。 我們政策的第三個支柱是與中國進行直接的雙邊和多邊交往，以保持和創造開放、建設性和穩定的關係，反映中國的全球重要性。 我們相信積極的貿易和投資關係，同時避免對關鍵供應鏈的依賴。
我們希望英國公司與中國開展業務，就像目前美國、東盟、澳大利亞和歐盟公司所做那樣。我們將支持他們努力使條款對雙方可行，推動公平的競爭環境和更公平的競爭。 我們也希望繼續受益於中國的投資，但我們不希望中國共產黨的長臂伸向我們國家的中樞神經係統。
在過去，我們未能總是做到在開放和安全之間取得完美的平衡。現在，我們正在獲得適當的法律權力來保護我們必須保護的東西，同時盡可能地開放。 最重要的是，我們需要具備應對這一挑戰的適當技能，因此我們將政府各部門對有關應對中國能力的資金增加了一倍；我們已經撥出資源在北京建造一個新的英國大使館，我決心與中國政府達成協議，推進這項工作。
因此，我們對中國的做法必須結合所有這些方麵，保護我們的國家安全，與我們的朋友結盟，在利益趨同的領域與中國交往和貿易，避免片麵的標語製定政策，並始終堅持英國所珍視的普世價值觀。 我堅信沒有什麽是不可避免的：未來是由我們來塑造的，依我拙見，我深信，我們現在如何應對這一挑戰將有助於定義現代世界。
Our position on China: Foreign Secretary's 2023 Mansion House speech
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-position-on-china-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary?
Speaking at Mansion House in the City of London, the Foreign Secretary James Cleverly outlined the UK government's position on China.
From: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon James Cleverly Published 25 April 2023
Location: Mansion House, London
Delivered on: (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
My Lord Mayor, Your Excellencies, Mr Speaker, lords, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak with you this evening and whilst it is traditional in this speech to cover the full breadth of world affairs.
You will I hope forgive me for focusing on a smaller number of issues which confront us because it would be remiss of me not to begin with the current crisis in Sudan.
As you would expect I’ve been in COBR meetings and other meetings on our response to the situation today. I can inform you that a Royal Air Force flight has now left Sudan, carrying British nationals to safety this evening, and more will follow.
From the onset of this crisis, we’ve been planning how to get our people out. And now that our and international calls for a ceasefire in Khartoum have been heeded, we are putting those plans into effect, giving priority to those in greatest need: family groups, the sick, and the elderly.
I’m encouraged that both factions have called a 72-hour ceasefire, though of course we cannot be sure for how long it will hold, and any evacuation from a battle-scarred city is inherently dangerous.
Britain is working hand-in-glove with our partners across the world. And after this operation, we will do everything possible – alongside our friends in the region – to secure a lasting settlement for this tragic conflict.
And of course the situation in Sudan does not distract us from our work to support Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression, and I know that my G7 colleagues and other colleagues around the world will agree on our focus on that.
Even when the emergencies of the day are seemingly all-consuming, it is vital never to lose sight of the biggest long-term questions. So tonight I propose to focus on a subject that will define our epoch, and that is China and the UK’s policy towards it.
I’m often asked to express that policy in a single phrase, or to sum up China itself in one word, whether ‘threat’, or ‘partner’, or ‘adversary’. And I want to start by explaining why that is impossible, impractical and – most importantly – unwise.
China is one of the few countries which can trace its existence back over 2 millennia, to 221BC, when it was united by the Qin Dynasty.
Time and time again down the centuries, civil war or foreign invasions fractured China into rival kingdoms, but after every period of turmoil, China has always re-emerged. The opening line of the Chinese epic ‘Romance of the Three Kingdoms’ describes this cycle:
Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce.
And long before they coalesced into one polity, the Chinese people created their language and their civilisation. Their written characters appeared in the Shang Dynasty in the second millennium BC.
Their inventions – paper, printing, gunpowder, the compass – these things transformed the fortunes of the whole of humanity. These innovations are the key to understanding why China’s economy was among the biggest in the world for 20 of the last 22 centuries, and why China, in 1820, comprised a third of global GDP – more than America, the UK and Europe combined.
Then calamities struck, one after another; some caused by foreign aggression; others coming from within China itself. The deadliest of which was Mao’s famine, which claimed tens of millions of lives, more than any other famine in human history.
Yet the last 45 years have seen another astonishing reversal. By releasing the enterprising genius of its people, China has achieved the biggest and fastest economic expansion the world has ever known. No less than 800 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty, in a nation that encompasses a fifth of all humanity, and a vast area almost as large as continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
So forgive me when I say that no punchy catchphrase or plausible adjective can do justice to such a country or to any sensible approach towards it. If you are looking for British foreign policy by soundbite, I’m afraid you will be disappointed.
My starting point is a recognition of the depth and complexity of Chinese history and civilisation, and therefore, by extension, of our own policy.
And I rest that policy on a series of premises, the first of which is that whatever our differences with China’s leaders, I rejoice in the fact that so many Chinese people have escaped poverty. We do not live in a miserable zero-sum world: their gain is our gain. A stable, prosperous and peaceful China is good for Britain and good for the world.
Looking ahead, I reject any notion of inevitability. No-one predicted China’s rapid rise from mass starvation to relative prosperity, and today no-one can be sure that China’s economic juggernaut will roll on indefinitely.
Last year, for the first time since Mao’s death in 1976, China’s economy grew no faster than the world economy, meaning that China’s share of global GDP stayed constant in 2022. And even if China does become the world’s largest economy in the coming decade, it may not hold that place for long, as a declining and ageing population weighs ever more heavily on future growth.
Nor do I see anything inevitable about conflict between China and the United States and the wider West. We are not compelled to be prisoners of what Graham Allison called the ‘Thucydides trap’, whereby a rising power follows the trajectory of ancient Athens, and collides head-on with an established superpower.
We have agency; we have choices; and so do our Chinese counterparts.
Our task is to shape the course of future events, not succumb to fatalism. And we must face the inescapable reality that no significant global problem – from climate change to pandemic prevention, from economic instability to nuclear proliferation – can be solved without China.
To give up on dialogue with China would be to give up on addressing humanity’s greatest problems. Even worse, we would be ignoring salient facts, vital to our safety and our prosperity.
As I speak, the biggest repository of health data in the world is in China. The biggest source of active ingredients for the world’s pharmaceuticals is in China. And the biggest source of carbon emissions is also in China. Indeed, China has pumped more carbon into the atmosphere in the last 10 years than this country has since the dawn of the industrial revolution in the 18th century.
How China regulates its data, how China develops its pharmaceuticals, how China conducts medical research, will be of seminal importance to the whole of humanity. And whether or not China cuts its carbon emissions will probably make the difference between our planet avoiding the worst ravages of climate change, or suffering catastrophe.
We have already learned to our cost how China’s handling of a pandemic can affect the entire world. So have no doubt: decisions taken in Beijing are going to affect our lives.
Do we not owe it to ourselves to strive to influence those decisions in our own interests? It would be clear and easy – and perhaps even satisfying – for me to declare some kind of new Cold War and say that our goal is to isolate China. It would be clear, it would be easy, it would be satisfying – and it would be wrong, because it would be a betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world.
Indeed, this government will advance British interests directly with China, alongside our allies, while steadfastly defending our national security and our values. And we can expect profound disagreements; dealing with China I can assure you, is not for the fainthearted; they represent a ruthless authoritarian tradition utterly at odds with our own.
But we have an obligation to future generations to engage because otherwise we would be failing in our duty to sustain – and shape – the international order. Shirking that challenge would be a sign not of strength but of weakness.
Vladimir Putin never intended to demonstrate the power of a united West when he launched his onslaught against Ukraine. But our response shows that when Britain and America and Europe and our other partners across the world stand united, we are a match for anything.
We should have every confidence in our collective ability to engage robustly and also constructively with China, not as an end in itself, but to manage risks and produce results. And we have achieved results.
Let me give you some examples. In 2017 research, British research, convinced the Chinese agriculture ministry to act against the danger of antibiotic resistance by restricting colistin, an antibiotic used in animal feed. Sales fell by 90%, making everyone in the world safer.
Last year, our diplomats in China helped to persuade the authorities to amend a draft procurement law, improving the chances of UK companies bidding for contracts from state-owned enterprises. This year, they secured licences worth £600 million for UK institutions to launch fund management companies in China.
Britain’s position as a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has also allowed us to influence China’s approach towards this new institution, preventing it from becoming a politicised extension of the Belt and Road Initiative. China is the biggest shareholder of this Bank, the Bank is headquartered in Beijing, and yet within a week of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it froze every single project in Russia.
But even though engagement can succeed, the truth is that a country like ours, devoted to liberty and democracy, will always be torn between our national interest in dealing with China and our abhorrence of Beijing’s abuses. When we see how authoritarian states treat their own people, we wonder what they would do to us if they had the chance. And history teaches us that repression at home often translates into aggression abroad.
So our policy has to combine 2 currents: we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism.
And that means never wavering from one clear principle. We do not expect our disagreements with China to be swiftly overcome, but we do expect China to observe the laws and obligations that it has freely entered in to.
So, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has shouldered a special responsibility to uphold the UN Charter. As a party to the Joint Declaration, China has agreed to preserve Hong Kong’s freedom. As a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Convention Against Torture and many other instruments of international law, China has accepted an array of obligations.
And if China breaks them, we are entitled to say so, and we are entitled to act – and we will – as we did when China dismantled the freedoms of Hong Kong, violating its own pledge, which is why we gave nearly 3 million of Hong Kong’s people a path to British citizenship.
Peaceful co-existence has to begin with respecting fundamental laws and institutions, including the UN Charter, which protects every country against invasion. And that means every country: a Chinese diplomat in Paris cannot, and must not, and will not, decide the legal status of sovereign countries.
By attacking Ukraine, Russia has provided an object lesson in how a UN member state should not behave. And Putin has also trampled upon China’s own stated principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty.
A powerful and responsible nation cannot simply abstain when this happens, or draw closer to the aggressor, or aid and abet that aggression. A country that wants a respected place at the apex of the world order should stand up for its own principles, and keep its solemn obligations, obligations to defend the laws at the very foundation of that order.
This responsibility goes hand-in-hand with China’s right to play a global role commensurate with its size and its history. And the rights of a sovereign nation like Ukraine cannot be eradicated just because the eradicator enjoys a ‘strategic partnership’ with China.
So, British policy towards China has 3 pillars.
First, we will strengthen our national security protections wherever Beijing’s actions pose a threat to our people or our prosperity.
We are not going to be silent about interference in our political system, or technology theft, or industrial sabotage. We will do more to safeguard academic freedom and research.
And when there are tensions with other objectives, we will always put our national security first. Hence we are building our 5G network in the most secure way, not the fastest or the cheapest way.
China’s leaders define their core interests – and it’s natural that they do. But we have core interests too, and one of them is to promote the kind of world that we want to live in, where people everywhere have a universal human right to be treated with dignity, free from torture, free from slavery, free from arbitrary detention.
And there is nothing uniquely ‘Western’ about these values: torture hurts just as much whoever it is inflicted upon.
So when Britain condemns the mass incarceration of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, I hope our Chinese counterparts do not believe their own rhetoric that we are merely seeking to interfere in their domestic affairs. Just as we should try harder to understand China, I hope that Chinese officials will understand that when their government builds a 21st century version of the gulag archipelago, locking up over a million people at the height of this campaign, often for doing nothing more than observing their religion, this stirs something deep within us.
When the United Nations finds that China’s repression in Xinjiang may – and I quote – “constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”, our revulsion is heartfelt and shared unanimously across our country and beyond. We are not going to let what is happened in Xinjiang drop or be brushed aside. We cannot ignore this simply because this is happening on the other side of a frontier, or that to raise it might be considered unharmonious or impolite.
Second, the UK will deepen our cooperation and strengthen our alignment with our friends and partners in the Indo-Pacific and across the world.
Our aim will be to bolster collective security, deepen commercial links, uphold international law, and balance and compete where necessary. So I’m delighted that Britain will soon be the 12th member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, reinforcing our trading ties with rapidly growing economies.
Already we are the only European country to be a Dialogue Partner of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. We are deepening our long-term partnership with India. And we are developing the next generation of our aircraft alongside Japan. And we’ve joined the United States to help Australia to build nuclear-powered conventionally-armed submarines under the AUKUS partnership.
Together with our friends, the UK will strive for openness and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. At this moment, China is carrying out the biggest military build-up in peacetime history. In a period of just 4 years – between 2014 and 2018 – China launched new warships exceeding the combined tonnage of the Royal Navy’s entire active fleet.
And as we see this happening; as we watch new bases appearing in the South China Sea and beyond, we are bound to ask ourselves: what is it all for? Why is China making this colossal military investment?
And if we are left to draw our own conclusions, prudence dictates that we must assume the worst. And yet of course we could be wrong: it is possible that we will be too cautious and too pessimistic.
The UK and our allies are prepared to be open about our presence in the Indo-Pacific. And I urge China to be equally open about the doctrine and intent behind its military expansion, because transparency is surely in everyone’s interests and secrecy can only increase the risk of tragic miscalculation.
Which brings me to Taiwan. Britain’s longstanding position is that we want to see a peaceful settlement of the differences across the Strait. Because about half of the world’s container ships pass through these vital waters every year, laden with goods bound for Europe and the far corners of the world. Taiwan is a thriving democracy and a crucial link in global supply chains, particularly for advanced semi-conductors.
A war across the Strait would not only be a human tragedy, it would destroy world trade worth $2.6 trillion, according to Nikkei Asia. No country could shield itself from the repercussions. Distance would offer no protection from this catastrophic blow to the global economy – and least China’s most of all. I shudder to contemplate the human and financial ruin that would follow. So it’s essential that no party takes unilateral action to change the status quo.
And the third pillar of our policy is to engage directly with China, bilaterally and multilaterally, to preserve and create open, constructive and stable relations, reflecting China’s global importance.
We believe in a positive trade and investment relationship, whilst avoiding dependencies in critical supply chains. We want British companies to do business with China – just as American, ASEAN, Australian and EU companies currently do – and we will support their efforts to make the terms work for both sides, pushing for a level playing field and fairer competition.
We have an interest in continuing to benefit from Chinese investment, but we don’t want the long arm of the Chinese Communist Party reaching towards the central nervous system of our country. And in the past, we haven’t always struck the perfect balance between openness and security. Now we are gaining the right legal powers to safeguard what we must and be open where we can.
Above all, we need to be properly skilled for the challenge, so we are doubling our funding for China capabilities across government; we’ve allocated the resources to build a new British Embassy in Beijing, I’m determined to reach agreement with China’s government so this can proceed.
So our approach to China must combine all of these currents, protecting our national security, aligning with our friends, engaging and trading with China where our interests converge, avoiding policy by soundbite, and always standing up for the universal values which Britain holds dear.
I fervently believe there are no inevitabilities: the future is ours to shape, in the humble knowledge that how we respond to this challenge now will help define the modern world.
Thank you.
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