黃循財在戰略與國際研究中心的對話

副總理兼財政部長黃循財於 2023 年 10 月 13 日在戰略與國際研究中心 (CSIS) 進行對話。會議由 CSIS 高級顧問兼日本主席克裏斯托弗·約翰斯通 (Christopher B. Johnstone) 先生主持。黃副總理於2023年10月5日至15日對美利堅合眾國進行工作訪問。以下是對話的編輯文字記錄。

克裏斯托弗·約翰斯通 (Christopher B. Johnstone) 是戰略與國際研究中心 (CSIS) 的高級顧問兼日本主席。在加入戰略與國際研究中心之前，約翰斯通先生在政府工作了 25 年，擔任過各種高級職位，重點關注美國對日本和印度-太平洋地區的政策。他曾兩次擔任國家安全委員會成員，分別在拜登總統領導下擔任東亞事務主任和奧巴馬總統領導下的日本和大洋洲事務主任（2014-2016 年）。在國防部長辦公室，約翰斯通先生領導負責南亞和東南亞（2017-2021）以及東亞（2016-2017）的辦公室； 2010年至2014年，他擔任東北亞部主任，主要負責製定美日同盟戰略。約翰斯通先生的職業生涯始於中央情報局的情報官員，負責東北亞的國家安全問題，並在海外實地站任職。約翰斯通先生擁有普林斯頓大學公共與國際事務學院公共事務碩士學位和斯沃斯莫爾學院文學學士學位。他能說一口流利的日語。

歡迎來到我們的現場觀眾和在線觀眾。我叫克裏斯·約翰斯通。我是戰略與國際研究中心的高級顧問兼日本主席，我非常高興並榮幸地歡迎新加坡共和國副總理兼財政部長黃循財。今天有機會在這裏與您交談，我們真的很榮幸。介紹一下，黃先生於2011年5月首次當選為國會議員。他曾在國防部、通訊及新聞部、文化、社區及青年部、國家發展部擔任職務和教育部——這是一個範圍相當廣泛的職業，涉及政策的許多不同方麵。重要的是，我們剛才討論的是這個，他在威斯康星大學麥迪遜分校和密歇根大學安娜堡分校獲得了經濟學學士和碩士學位，他還擁有哈佛大學肯尼迪學院的公共管理碩士學位。因此，我認為可以公平地說，部長先生，您非常了解我們，並且您以我認為許多美國人可能不了解的方式了解美國的不同地區。因此，部長與我們在一起真的很高興。今天在座的各位，我們要做的就是邀請黃部長在高層提出一些想法，然後他和我將在台上進行一些對話，然後我們將邀請黃部長提出一些問題在場的您以及在線的您。因此，請和我一起歡迎黃部長。

非常感謝克裏斯的評論和介紹。我很高興來到戰略與國際研究中心，感謝您主持這次對話。不幸的是，我對美國的訪問恰逢中東和世界正處於非常困難的時期。但盡管有眼前的事情，我很高興在這周的訪問期間，我與政府成員舉行了非常重要的會議。這次訪問的目的實際上是為了肯定新加坡和美國兩國之間密切而持久的夥伴關係。事實上，這是我為期一周的訪問的最後一天。我把最好的留到最後。這實際上是我飛回新加坡前一天的最後一次活動。但我認為通過這次對話來結束這次訪問會非常好。也許我會在開場白中從三個要點開始，然後我們稍後可以提問。首先，新加坡讚賞並重視美國在亞太地區的重要和建設性存在。美國在該地區的存在已近80年。你有很多戰略利益；您在該地區有很多朋友；我們都希望您繼續積極、持續地參與世界這一地區的活動。不隻是一年、兩年；不僅僅是下一屆政府；但在接下來的 80 年及以後。其次，正是美國的領導力塑造了我們今天所擁有的基於規則的全球秩序，並造福了世界上的每個人。它使國家得到提升；它幫助了所有國家——包括美國。我們確實越來越多地聽到人們對全球秩序缺陷的擔憂，即它沒有充分解決對國家安全、供應鏈彈性等方麵的擔憂。因此，對該體係的批評越來越多。我們非常願意與美國合作，共同探討全球化的新模式。我們如何更新全球新秩序的規則，使其適合我們的時代。第三，我們希望繼續發展我們的雙邊夥伴關係。事實上，防務是我們雙邊夥伴關係的關鍵支柱之一。自1990年以來，新加坡允許美軍使用我們的港口和基地。我們接待你們的輪換部署，我們提供後勤支持，同時，我們的部隊——來自新加坡武裝部隊的部隊——在美國接受訓練，這就是為什麽我開始在亞利桑那州進行為期一周的訪問，我們的飛行員在那裏進行訓練F-16 在盧克空軍基地進行訓練。事實上，新加坡這個小國卻在美國擁有第二大外國軍事存在，這充分說明了我們彼此之間的信心和信任。我們正在繼續加強新領域的防務合作，包括網絡安全和我們已經獲得的F-35。更廣泛地說，我們也在其他新領域繼續加強合作。因此，昨天我們發起了一場關於關鍵和新興技術的對話，其中包括人工智能等領域。和生物技術。我們正在考慮深化我們在太空探索方麵的合作。我們正在研究如何在新的低碳能源方麵進行合作——考慮到我們的國土麵積以及實現淨零排放的需要，這對新加坡來說非常重要。我們還共同努力向第三國提供技術援助。我們為東南亞國家這樣做，但我們

將其擴展到太平洋島嶼國家。因此，我們的雙邊關係處於良好狀態。我們麵前有一個完整的議程，我們將繼續發展這種夥伴關係。我們要傳達的信息是，幾十年來，新加坡一直是美國的一個具有前瞻性和可靠的合作夥伴，我們不僅在言語上，而且在行動中證明了這一點，我們將在未來幾年中繼續盡一切努力進一步加強這種夥伴關係來。

主持人：
了不起。這是對你的活動、你對兩國關係的看法的非常全麵的闡述，部長先生，我必須說，作為在五角大樓南亞和東南亞辦事處工作多年的人，我親眼目睹了這一真正重要的作用新加坡在促進和支持美國在東南亞的前沿存在方麵發揮著作用；非常感謝您在這些方麵的評論。首先我要問一個可能適合您作為財政部長的問題，那就是您對區域和全球經濟的看法。公平地說，我認為慢慢地擺脫了新冠疫情。但許多國家都經曆著低增長、高通脹。我認為近幾個月來我們已經看到了經濟放緩——這在某種程度上可能是中國意想不到的。我不知道您如何看待區域經濟、新加坡經濟，特別是中國經濟增長的未來？
黃副總理：
更廣泛的背景是，我們正在從良性的全球化時代轉向大國競爭的新時代。因此，這將是一個更加分散的世界，一個更加不確定的世界，並且將會有更多的尾部風險、更多的波動性，不幸的是，更多的動蕩事件可能會給全球經濟帶來巨大的不確定性。因此，在這樣的大環境下，我認為我們還麵臨著另一個變化，從過去10年的寬鬆貨幣、極低利率，到另一個可能更正常化的時期，即利率將在更長時間內保持較高水平，以及寬鬆貨幣時代結束了。我認為這是世界各國都麵臨的更廣泛的背景，在這種環境下，我認為我們將看到更緩慢的增長。我們正在經曆這種情況，因為新加坡對此非常適應，因為我們是一個規模較小的開放經濟體，外部需求在我們的 GDP 增長中占了很大一部分。我們是礦井裏的金絲雀，當外部環境惡劣時，我們最能第一時間感受到。我們已經感受到了增長緩慢的影響。希望通脹趨勢將會下降；我們充滿希望。我們看到美國的情況有所放緩，但我們擔心石油的下行風險。中東發生的事情可能會產生影響。至於厄爾尼諾現象和其他未知風險帶來的糧食供應，情況也可能會變得更糟。在中國，我認為他們現在正在經曆一種具有挑戰性的情況，因為青年失業率很高。他們決定刺破房地產泡沫，這樣做將會帶來痛苦的後果。我認為這是正確的做法，因為房地產行業出現了過度行為。但房地產業約占經濟的20-30%。它是經濟的重要組成部分。一旦刺破泡沫，就會產生各種各樣的後果，連鎖反應會波及整個經濟，他們必須應對這些後果。與此同時，他們必須重新平衡經濟，使其更加以消費為基礎。這並不容易，因為他們還必須在社會保障方麵進行改革，這需要時間。考慮到他們國家的麵積，這是相當複雜的。但與他們的官員交談後，我認為他們明白需要做什麽。這是一個溝通的問題，也是確保實施順利的問題。總的來說，我們的感覺是，你聽到很多評論員和人們在談論巔峰中國。我們認為這被誇大了；我們認為中國將繼續增長。也許有問題的，也是很多人問的，是中國經濟會增長到什麽程度，也許是 4%，也許是 5%。但它能在多大程度上擁有與以前一樣的創業活力和活力呢？我認為現在沒有人能給出答案。我認為中國政府本身必須找出正確的平衡點。每個人都在關注持續市場改革的明確跡象，然後才決定這確實是正確的前進軌跡。我想說我不會低估中國人天生的動物精神。他們足智多謀。他們決心為自己爭取更好的生活。你永遠不應該低估中國人民的巨大動力和活力。
主持人：
說得很好。有趣的是，這些敘述在這裏是如何發生的，而且你說的非常準確，中國巔峰現在就在這裏的環境中。我欣賞這種更全麵、更平衡的態度。非常感謝你的幫忙。讓我有點了解相關問題。您指出了美國領導力在塑造該地區方麵的重要性。我感興趣的是您如何看待美國今天在印太地區的經濟參與。當然，美國仍然處於《全麵與進步跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》（CPTPP）之外。相反，它正在通過其在供應鏈、基礎設施、貿易便利化、腐敗方麵的工作來推動印太經濟框架（IPEF）。我歡迎您對 IPEF 的想法：新加坡希望看到 IPEF 帶來什麽，以及您認為它在多大程度上帶來了切實的好處，以及您提到的領導力非常重要。
黃副總理：
我們長期以來一直主張美國更多地參與亞洲、特別是東南亞的經濟活動。我們的首選是區域貿易協定。我們有TPP（跨太平洋夥伴關係協定），但那隻是橋下的水。如果可能的話，我們希望看到市場準入和貿易自由化，但我認為在美國目前的國內政治和環境下，很難談論這些事情。現在沒有心情談論這些問題。但我認為我們應該在這些領域保持雄心壯誌，希望在未來幾年，情況可能會發生變化，我們仍然可以努力實現貿易自由化和市場準入。但與此同時，我們有IPEF，這仍然是非常實質性的，通過IPEF仍然可以取得很好的成果。我們正在 IPEF 的不同領域和不同方麵密切合作，以確保我們取得實質性成果。我認為在供應鏈、綠色經濟、數字經濟等領域，這些都是我們正在追求的事情，我們當然希望能夠在今年11月舉行的APEC峰會之前取得一些實質性進展。
主持人：
我認為 11 月是展示 IPEF 進展的關鍵時刻。部長先生，請允許我談談中國和美中關係。你知道，就在一分鍾前，我們正從全球化時代過渡到大國競爭及其附帶影響的時代。我認為可以公平地說，毫無疑問，您在這裏期間也聽說過，中美關係正處於充滿挑戰的狀態——我認為，隨著台灣大選的臨近，未來幾個月可能會非常困難，美國的政治季節。新加坡政府如何應對中美經濟和政治競爭的動態？你怎麽看？你如何駕馭它？
黃副總理：
那麽，關於中美關係，我首先想說，雙方都非常明確地表示，他們不希望發生對抗。希望人們會認為這不是一場零和競賽——不是一方獲勝，另一方失敗。世界足夠大，容得下美國和中國，兩國可以共存、共同發展。近幾個月來恢複談判和接觸是非常好的事情。希望通過這些對話和接觸，能夠減少誤解、誤會，實現更多的相互包容和共識。我們願意看到、希望看到的是，兩國元首，習主席和拜登總統，希望能夠有機會在APEC上麵對麵交談，為重建戰略夥伴關係做出貢獻。信任對於推動兩國關係積極向前發展非常重要。積極的方式意味著在某些領域仍然存在競爭，但也會在某些領域進行接觸，建設性的接觸，因為兩國可以通過雙邊合作和解決問題來互惠互利。全球關注的問題，例如氣候變化。我們希望這會發生。他們之間的關係既有競爭的成分，也有建設性接觸的成分。如果這種情況不發生，關係惡化，那麽這對兩國來說將是一個大問題，對世界其他國家來說也是一個大問題。每個人的處境都會更糟。從新加坡的角度來看，當我們看待美國和中國之間的關係時，我們的觀點是，這不是美國和中國之間的平衡。最終，我們根據自己的利益做出決定，我們的國家利益將在很大程度上以國際法原則為指導。作為一個小國，我們需要法治框架來運作，這就是我們做出決定的方式。這意味著，根據具體情況，在某些情況下，我們可能會做出似乎有利於一方而不是另一方的決定；但這並不意味著我們親中或親美。這隻是意味著我們支持新加坡。
主持人：
很公平，正如你應該的那樣。
黃副總理：
確實如此，每個國家都會如此。
溫和或者：
嗯，確實如此。因此，如果可以的話，讓我更進一步，了解您對此的想法。這是一個如此重要的話題，我認為新加坡的觀點對我們來說非常重要。拜登政府的印太戰略稱——這是引言——“中華人民共和國正在結合其經濟、外交、軍事和技術實力，在印太地區追求自己的勢力範圍，並力求成為世界上最有影響力的國家” 。中國的脅迫和侵略遍及全球，其中在印太地區最為嚴重”。這是正確的框架嗎？從新加坡的角度，你如何看待這個框架？

中國人談論他們的國家建設曆程的三個階段。他們要站起來，他們要富，他們要強。我認為，在他們看來，他們正處於國家建設之旅的“變得強大”階段，這意味著他們覺得自己的時代已經到來，他們需要在世界上占據應有的位置，而且他們應該對海外利益更加自信。我認為中國也知道必須謹慎行事，而且必須成長。然後，中國必須在不讓其他國家感到壓力、脅迫或擠壓的情況下擴大自己的影響力。因為如果他們這樣做，或者如果他們最終這樣做，我認為將會出現針對中國的強烈抵製，這不符合他們的國家利益，所以中國必須學會如何溫和和調整。但從新加坡的角度來看，當然從東南亞所有國家的角度來看，我們珍視與美國的友誼。長期以來，美國一直是非常好的朋友。中國現在也是東南亞各國的好朋友。我們希望與兩者保持朋友關係。畢竟，應該可以擁有不止一個最好的朋友。

說得好，請允許我再問一個關於中國的問題，然後我們請觀眾開始提問。我們房間的兩側都有麥克風，如果您想問問題，可以走到麥克風前排隊。但與此同時，部長先生，我承認這是一個敏感問題，但我覺得有義務提出這個問題。這涉及到中國在新加坡以及更廣泛的東南亞，尤其是新加坡的影響力問題。你可能知道，七月，《華盛頓郵報》發表了一篇探討這個話題的長文，特別關注華文媒體在新加坡的作用，該報在文章中斷言——這是引文——“這個媒體現在經常呼應北京一些最刺耳的謊言”。我們應該如何理解中國在新加坡的影響力以及新加坡正在采取哪些措施來打擊虛假信息？

該報紙——《華盛頓郵報》強調了這一點——該報紙強烈否認了《華盛頓郵報》的描述。它捍衛了自己的編輯立場。如果你問新加坡人，絕大多數每天閱讀華文報紙的新加坡人不會覺得《華盛頓郵報》的描述是準確的。因為我們可以親眼看到有關中國的文章，而且涉及麵很廣，其中有很多批評中國做法的文章。最終，新加坡的報紙必須反映新加坡的觀點，就像它們必須反映我們的社會一樣。我們的報紙不能像《華盛頓郵報》，我們也不要求《華盛頓郵報》變得像新加坡報紙。關於中國的影響力，或任何其他國家的影響力，我們注意到我們是一個小型、開放和多元化的社會。我們是一個多種族、多文化的社會。我們的大多數人口都是華裔，因此我們的祖先可以追溯到中國，但隨著時間的推移，我們逐漸形成了自己的新加坡身份。我們是新加坡華人，新加坡華人與中國華人有很大不同——價值觀、觀點、身份。正如新加坡馬來人與來自馬來西亞或印度尼西亞的馬來人有很大不同，或者新加坡印度人與來自印度的人有很大不同。美國作為一個移民國家，你必須非常了解這一點。鑒於我們是一個如此小的、開放的多元文化社會，我們知道我們很容易受到其他地方的影響。這就是為什麽我們對此非常警惕。從政府的角度來看，我們不斷地讓公眾參與、教育、解釋什麽是我們的國家利益——為什麽我們要做出某些決定。不是因為選邊站隊或因為外部影響，而是因為新加坡自身的利益。我們花了很多時間來做這件事。事實上，如果你看看新加坡人消費的很大一部分新聞和娛樂內容，實際上，其中很多都是英文的；其中很多來自美國和英國。坦白說，對新加坡的批評並不缺乏西方媒體上不乏強調我們製度缺陷、要求我們更像西方自由主義理想的評論和文章。我們深知，作為一個小國，我們很容易受到各方麵的影響。歸根結底，對我們來說重要的是，盡管我們可能很小，但我們是我們自己的人民，我們做出自己的選擇，這實際上取決於新加坡人，決定我們國家的未來。不是中國，也不是西方。

謝謝您，部長先生。我想我們有一個。有人站在麥克風旁邊嗎？我邀請你提出你的問題。
謝伊·韋斯特：我是亞洲協會政策研究所的謝伊·韋斯特。我的問題是在這次旅行結束時，我認為無論你事先讀到了什麽，或者別人告訴你什麽，麵對麵地與人交談可以讓你有一定的認識。您認為您會帶回哪些內容並告訴新加坡內閣或該地區的其他同事？另一個問題是關於 IPEF 的經濟學。如果您要求美國在這方麵可以做更多的事情，您還會建議美國政策製定者在 IPEF 或其他領域做些什麽？

當然。嗯，正如我所說，我從這次旅行中得到的主要收獲是，我們在美國和新加坡之間有一個堅實且不斷發展的雙邊議程。雙方對世界的戰略觀非常相似。長期以來，我們在從國防到經濟的廣泛問題上一直保持密切合作。現在人們越來越渴望看到我們如何在我剛才提到的領域進一步加強這種夥伴關係。政府也承認，他們一直告訴我們，他們不希望新加坡被迫選邊站隊。他們認識到我們的觀點以及東南亞國家的觀點，因此與美國保持密切關係並不意味著我們必須疏遠和排除與包括中國在內的其他國家的接觸。希望東南亞和新加坡能夠繼續擁有一個開放包容的地區，不僅與美國接觸，而且與中國、歐盟和其他大國都參與我們所在的世界地區。在世界變得越來越不確定和動蕩之際，擴大我們的共同點，最大限度地增加我們實現穩定和共同繁榮的機會。這是我們的觀點，也是我這次訪問的主要收獲。關於 IPEF，正如我所說，我們正在研究如何為 IPEF 的不同支柱增添實質內容。這項工作正在進行中——我們希望在亞太經合組織峰會之前能夠宣布一些事情。我們向美國朋友們提供的是，在某些情況下，IPEF大家庭的所有成員可能很難達成共識。我們還可以雙邊合作，首先是美國和新加坡，雙邊合作可以成為探路者。我們設定了高標準，它可以是一個探路者，它可以是我們在擴展到更廣泛的地區之前一起做的測試平台。

謝謝。我們為什麽不回答在線觀眾的問題呢？我在這裏想說的是，您如何看待新加坡在信息和技術領域的領先地位以及吸引該地區的年輕人進入該領域的能力。新加坡在 IT 領域的角色。

這是我們非常關注的一個領域，因為考慮到我們的經濟發展階段，我們真正前進的唯一途徑是投資於創新、研發並推動創新前沿。 IT變得非常重要，數字技術非常重要。不僅作為一個部門本身，而且作為我們經濟所有支柱的推動者。先進製造業、金融服務、建築環境。我們正在大力投資 IT。我們繼續鼓勵年輕人進入新加坡的領域，並繼續吸引該地區的人才來新加坡學習並在 IT 領域取得好成績。我們的優勢是我們規模小，我們靈活，我們是一個城邦。雖然我們可能並不處於 IT 的最前沿，但我認為最新的想法和創新仍將來自美國大學、美國公司，但我們可以成為快速采用者。我們可以非常快速地擴展應用程序。不僅僅是在一個部門，而是整個經濟和整個社會。我們確實還有另一個優勢，那就是我們的人口擁抱科技。我們本質上是技術樂觀主義者。是的，科技確實擾亂了人們的生活。它確實使一些工作變得過時。幾十年來，我們找到了重新培訓、提高工人技能的方法，確保任何受到技術顛覆影響的人都能找到更好的工作，利用機器和工具來提高工人的工資。這不是什麽新鮮事，這是我們一直在做的事情

幾十年來，年複一年，人們對技術能夠幫助改善生活有了信任和信心，這就是為什麽我們能夠擁抱技術，包括人工智能等新技術，我們有望繼續保持經濟增長和改善我們人民的生活。

主持人：您在白宮與傑克·沙利文會麵時提到，兩國政府將啟動關鍵的新興技術對話。您能多談談這方麵的重點領域嗎？

黃副總理：我們正在努力解決的關鍵問題之一——世界各地的國家都在努力解決——是如何利用人工智能的好處。和創新以及人工智能的影響同時最大限度地降低下行風險。並且存在許多下行風險。我的意思是，你可以擁有一個人工智能。該模型在 99% 的情況下都運行良好，但 1% 的失敗如果應用於極具潛在破壞性的場景，可能會對許多人產生連鎖反應。我們如何應對此類風險？對於負責任的人工智能來說，合適的治理框架應該是什麽？用法？不能讓企業擺脫困境——當然，企業不能說我們做了一切，然後當出現問題時，政府來救援，那肯定為時已晚。公司在應用人工智能時可以使用什麽正確的框架？對於不同的用例，這將確保他們承擔一些責任？政府和私營部門密切合作，製定了這個框架和一套管理負責任的人工智能的原則。我們在這方麵為新加坡做了一些工作。我認為美國也對這個領域感興趣，我們希望我們能夠在負責任的人工智能領域共同努力和合作。我認為現階段很難談論全球標準，但我們會一步一步來，希望能夠讓更多誌同道合的國家加入我們並擴大聯盟。

主持人：這確實是當今的問題，不是嗎，A.I.治理，對我們許多人來說都是一個大主題。我們這裏還有一個問題，您能介紹一下自己並簡潔地提出您的問題嗎？

馬文：馬文，前聯邦政府，現在約翰·霍普金斯大學和威爾遜中心。這是一個與南海有關的問題，我知道新加坡不是直接聲索國，但肯定有興趣。我認為可以公平地說，中國在南海問題上的態度是毫不妥協的——習近平自古以來就將南海稱為中國領土。新加坡與中國官員和安全官員進行了非常活躍、長期的對話。我感興趣的是你讀到的內容，中國未來在南海問題上的姿態是否有任何潛在的讓步，或者中國人是否如此頑固、如此僵化，以至於我們將麵臨當前的局勢無限期地。

黃副總理：關於南海問題，各島嶼和環礁已經有既定事實。有些主張在許多複雜的方麵都有重疊。正如您所強調的那樣，我們不是一個聲索國。我們不是索賠人之一。有四個東盟國家是聲索國；中國是聲索國之一。我想東盟國家都不會願意在這個問題上與中國走極端，因為他們在中國有大量的賬目，而這隻是他們與中國打交道的眾多問題之一。希望中國和東盟國家能夠和平解決爭端。我們沒有直接參與，但我們作為東盟的一部分參與其中，東盟正在與中國討論《行為準則》。我們正在製定一項行為宣言，一項具有約束力的行為準則。這花了很長時間，非常複雜，而且正在進行中。新加坡在這件事上的利益如下：第一，航行自由；第二，《聯合國海洋法公約》所反映的國際法；第三，和平解決而不升級，不給該地區帶來不確定性和潛在的衝突。我們希望和平解決爭端。這是我們的利益，我們將在力所能及的範圍內，通過東盟努力實現這些成果。

主持人：謝謝。我們將向在線觀眾提出另一個問題。這更多的是關於新加坡本??身。來自 Grant Alexander：2020 年代新加坡最大的國內挑戰是什麽？

黃副總理：我們最大的挑戰是——新加坡始終是一個不可能的國家。我們很小，沒有自然資源，你不會把賭注押在 1965 年的新加坡。你不會指望新加坡能夠生存下來，但我們做到了。這簡直就是一個奇跡。我們的挑戰是盡可能長時間地維持這個名為新加坡的小奇跡。我對此印象最深刻的是當我還是密歇根大學的學生時。在密歇根州，有一個鬼城，名叫新加坡。它位於密歇根湖附近

卡拉馬祖河。它成立於1830年代。沒有人知道為什麽叫新加坡。但據推測，由於新加坡是英國人於 1819 年作為英國港口建立的，很快我們就成為英國人的繁榮港口。也許消息是從異國情調的遠東傳播開來的，那裏有一個叫做新加坡的地方，你知道在那個時代新聞傳播是多麽需要時間。於是在1830年代，有人決定在密歇根州建立一個小鎮，這是一個造船和木材港口，並一度做得不錯。但50年後，移動的沙丘吞沒了這座小鎮。如果你現在去那裏，你隻能看到一個路標，上麵寫著這裏是新加坡的廢墟。所以密歇根州的新加坡並沒有持續很長時間，大約有50年。我們的使命是讓新加坡在東南亞長久存在。

馬裏奧·馬薩亞（Mario Masaya），美國-東盟商業理事會：副總理，非常感謝您抽出寶貴的時間。我想讓我們回到圍繞 IT 的討論，以及您對新興技術的樂觀態度。你談到了CPTPP，你談到了IPEF。我想談談東盟數字經濟框架協議（DEFA）——您如何看待該協議以及您認為它將如何積極改善東南亞數字經濟。關於東南亞數字經濟未來將如何呈指數級增長的報道已經有很多。那麽通過這項協議，我們是否期望在該領域取得很大的進步？謝謝。

黃副總理：謝謝你的提問。這確實是我們新加坡的優先事項，我認為也是東南亞許多國家的優先事項。東盟取得了長足的進步，因為自成立以來，東盟不斷努力加強東南亞多元化國家之間的一體化。在貨物貿易自由化方麵，我們已經基本實現了這些目標。我們可以在服務上做得更好；我們可以更好地連接我們的基礎設施，包括能源和交通；我們現在正在研究的一個新領域是數字連接。這有幾個要素。例如，一個想法就是連接我們在東盟的支付係統。我不認為我們能夠像歐盟那樣獲得共同貨幣——我們太多元化了——但如果我們甚至可以連接我們的實時支付係統，這樣就可以實現快速、廉價和高效跨境流動，我認為這對我們東南亞所有人、個人和企業來說都是一個很大的好處，我們正在為此努力。數字協議的另一個方麵是數據的無縫流動，在這樣的安排下，我認為東盟在吸引企業來到東盟方麵具有相當的競爭力，企業可以利用相對競爭優勢東盟不同國家的情況。例如，你無法在新加坡進行低成本製造，我們的成本太高了。但你可以在馬來西亞擁有它，你可以在印度尼西亞擁有它，你可以在越南擁有它。您的數據中心可以位於東盟的任何地方，然後您可以在東盟內部無縫地進行互操作，如果有無縫的數據流動，這肯定會使東盟對跨國公司更具吸引力。這些是我們正在為數字協議所做的一些事情。我們認為有很大的潛力，我們希望將其向前推進。

紮卡裏·阿布紮：副總理，非常感謝您今天加入我們。我叫紮卡裏·阿布紮 (Zachary Abuza)，來自國家戰爭學院和喬治城大學。我無意無禮，但我要問一個關於緬甸的棘手問題。

紮卡裏：聯合國最近的一份報告發現，自 2021 年 2 月政變以來，有 138 家總部位於新加坡的公司向緬甸政權供應了價值約 2.54 億美元的武器、零部件和機床。另一份報告發現，緬甸中央銀行的資金約有四十五億美元存放在九家不同的新加坡銀行中。這些似乎與新加坡所宣稱的對緬甸外交政策背道而馳。我注意到外交部長來到這裏；它們違背了他的一些非常公開的聲明。新加坡還能做些什麽來結束一個針對平民發動多條戰線戰爭的政權呢？

黃副總理：緬甸正在發生的事情非常悲慘。我們的外交部長在這裏，他的公開聲明確實是我們正在做的事情。如果有任何證據超出我們所知，請告訴我們。我們將這一點告訴我們美國政府的朋友。除非有聯合國安理會決議，否則新加坡很少實施製裁。當俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭時，因為這嚴重違反了《聯合國憲章》和領土主權，我們覺得我們必須做點什麽。因此，如果有具體證據，我們已經將此告知美國國務院和財政部，如果有的話

如果有證據，請具體告知我們，我們一定會配合並盡自己的一份力量。這就是新加坡的角色。但除了新加坡之外，我們大家還能做些什麽來解決緬甸的問題呢？不幸的是，我們必須現實一點。事情不會那麽簡單，因為局外人——無論是新加坡、美國、東盟、歐盟，在聯合國你可以選擇——幾乎沒有什麽局外人可以做的事情來影響軍隊、國家和軍隊。緬甸的將軍或事件。我們在曆史上已經看到過這種情況。東盟有計劃，我們正在繼續落實五點共識。我們將繼續與包括美國在內的合作夥伴一起盡我們所能，但我們必須麵對現實，這需要時間。希望正如我們過去所看到的那樣，我們采取的方法已經奏效，威懾和外交的胡蘿卜加大棒相結合在過去已經奏效，但這花了很長時間。希望隨著時間的推移，我們也能看到緬甸取得進展。

主持人：如果可以的話，我想再談一下東盟的問題，以及它在緬甸的作用。我認為可以公平地說，華盛頓對東盟提出了相當多的批評，部分原因是它無法解決緬甸局勢，正如你所指出的那樣，它有多麽困難。與此同時，在過去的幾年裏，該地區的合作機製有所擴散——當然，四國集團的崛起，還有我們所謂的小型多邊組織。我不知道你對東盟的未來以及新加坡在其中的作用有何看法？那麽與這些新組織及其與東盟的關係相關的問題是什麽？

黃副總理：首先，關於東盟因被認為在緬甸問題上無效而受到批評，我想如果你的基礎和出發點是東盟能否對緬甸采取行動，那麽不，因此東盟失敗了——好吧，公平足夠了，這是評估指標之一。但如果你要采取更廣泛的視角，請記住，正如我剛才強調的那樣，該地區是多麽多元化。東南亞國家有君主製國家、民主國家、各種程度的民主國家、共產主義國家；非常廣泛的國??家。東盟成立之初，各個國家、成員國之間都存在著衝突。這就是東盟的起源，東盟在很多方麵幫助維護了該地區的和平。東盟不僅做到了這一點，而且還幫助將非常多樣化的國家聚集在一起，采取更加一體化的社區建設方法。無論是我們剛才討論的貿易服務、交通能源聯動還是數字服務等問題，我們都在取得進展。整個東盟共有6.5億人口。它一點也不小。它擁有強大的經濟基礎、年輕人口和不斷崛起的中產階級。我們認為，如果我們能夠確保東盟的強大一體化，拋開緬甸問題，但東盟其他國家團結起來，我認為我們將在這個不確定的世界中發揮作用。東盟的做法是什麽？東盟的做法實際上是建立一個開放、包容的地區。這就是為什麽我們歡迎新配置，無論是 Quad 還是 AUKUS。四方機製和AUKUS成員是東盟的密切對話夥伴。我們歡迎這些安排，隻要它們在東盟中心地位的框架內發揮作用，並有助於維護以國際法為基礎、以規則為基礎的國際秩序。這是我們的出發點。在此基礎上，我們與 AUKUS、Quad 以及任何其他合作夥伴密切合作。正如我剛才所說，東盟希望有一個開放、包容的安排，能夠與中國、美國、歐盟和所有其他夥伴合作。希望在這種配置中，擴大我們彼此之間的共同點和相互依賴關係。冷戰時期的東盟發生了衝突。冷戰時期，我們是代理人戰爭的競技場。我們不希望東南亞再次發生這種情況。冷戰時期，東南亞國家或者說很多國家采取了不結盟運動的方針。東盟現在的做法實際上不再是被動的旁觀者，而是真正的積極多方參與——與所有不同的主要大國接觸，並盡最大努力建立一個能夠為我們帶來穩定與和平的最佳機會的配置。

Ryo Nakamura：我叫 Ryo Nakamura，來自日本日經媒體。我想問你有關與美國的防務關係的問題。新加坡允許美軍在新加坡輪換美軍艦艇或飛機，並長期提供支持。所以我想知道，在戰爭時期你也會這樣做嗎？

黃副總理：嗯，這是一個假設的場景。首先，如果發生戰爭，我們都會遇到很大很大的麻煩。讓我們希望沒有戰爭。我們不是

非常明確的是，它是美國的盟友。我們是相當獨特的。我認為我們是世界上唯一一個主要安全合作夥伴（MSCP）的國家，所以我們不是美國的盟友。我們讓美國軍隊使用我們的港口和基地。我們提供輪換支持、後勤支持，我們允許他們進行輪換部署，但這些都是和平時期的安排，這對美國和新加坡來說都是雙贏的。如果有其他情況，那麽我認為我們必須考慮情況的背景並仔細考慮，就像我說的，始終從符合新加坡利益的角度出發。我們的出發點必須是讓我們不要陷入亞洲發生衝突或戰爭的情況。

主持人：我們這裏先做最後一個問題。我們就從網上獲取：您認為美國在多元文化存在方麵可以向新加坡學習什麽？

黃副總理：我不會冒昧地告訴美國，你們可以向我們學習。但我們有一個適合我們的情況和需求的模型。首先要認識到人們來自不同的背景、不同的種族、不同的宗教。我們並不尋求同化為一個中心身份。相反，我們希望每個人都能保留自己的文化、自己的傳統。我們希望每個人都感到他們在我們的社會中占有一席之地。即使是最小的少數群體也必須感到自己受到重視並且可以為社會做出貢獻。與此同時，在我們鼓勵這一點的同時，我們也希望各群體能夠聚集在一起，盡可能多地相互互動，以便通過這種互動，我們找到共同點。作為新加坡人，我們共同分享的是什麽？我們有很多共同點。然後希望隨著時間的推移，通過互動、通過共同的經曆、通過共同的記憶，我們能夠擴大彼此之間的共同點。這就是我們對新加坡多元文化主義的看法。這是一項正在進行的工作，因為國家建設、建立新加坡人的身份始終是一項正在進行的工作；但我們發現這也是一個需要相互遷就和妥協的過程。決不能將妥協視為壞詞。因為如果每個群體都主張最大的權利，那麽一切都必須是100%——我必須做每件事，如果我不能實現我想要的所有目標，我認為這是一種輕視，我認為這是對我的部落的侮辱——那麽它變成每個部落對每個部落的戰爭，沒有共同點。多年來我們了解到，互相包容是可以的，在某些事情上妥協是可以的。再次，嚐試從對方的角度來看什麽是重要的。隨著時間的推移，通過這一互動過程，我們擴大了新加坡人的共同點。我們是一個相對年輕的國家，獨立還不到60年。但在這些年和幾十年的國家建設過程中，我認為我們已經對獨特的新加坡身份產生了非常強烈的認識，我們希望這種情況能夠在未來的許多年裏持續下去，我們可以繼續維護新加坡的和平與和諧。我們的多元文化社會在未來的許多年裏也是如此。

DPM Lawrence Wong's Dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

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Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Lawrence Wong's dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 13 October 2023. The session was moderated by Mr Christopher B. Johnstone, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, for the CSIS. DPM Wong was on a working visit to the United States of America from 5 to 15 October 2023. The following is an edited transcript of the dialogue.

Host Christopher B. Johnstone

Christopher B. Johnstone:

Welcome to our in-person audience and to our audience online as well. My name is Chris Johnstone. I am Senior Advisor and Japan Chair here at CSIS, and it is really a delight and a privilege to welcome Lawrence Wong who is the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Republic of Singapore. Really a privilege for us to have this opportunity for a conversation with you here today. By way of introduction, Mr Wong was first elected as a member of parliament in May 2011. He has held positions in the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Communications and Information, the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, the Ministry of National Development, and the Ministry of Education — quite a wide-ranging career touching a number of different aspects of policy. And importantly, we were just discussing this, he obtained his bachelor's and master's degrees in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and he also holds a master's degree in public administration from the Harvard Kennedy School. So I think it is fair to say, Mr Minister, you know us very well, and you know different parts of America in a way that I think many Americans may not. So it is really a delight to have the Minister here with us. For all of you here today, what we will do is we will invite Minister Wong to offer some thoughts at the top, then he and I will have a bit of a conversation here on stage, and then we will invite questions both from those of you in the room as well as those of you online. So with that, please join me in welcoming Minister Wong.

DPM Lawrence Wong:

Thanks very much, Chris, for the remarks and the introduction. I am very happy to be here at the CSIS and thank you for hosting this dialogue. My visit to America has coincided unfortunately with a very difficult time in the Middle East and the world. But despite the immediate preoccupations, I am glad that during this week of my visit, I have had very big meetings with members of the administration. And the purpose of this visit is really to affirm the close and enduring partnership between our two countries, Singapore and America. This is in fact the last day of my week-long visit; I am saving the best for last. This is literally my last event of the day before I fly home to Singapore. But I thought it would be very good to wrap up the visit with this dialogue. And perhaps I will start with three broad points in my opening remarks and then we can have questions later. First, Singapore appreciates and values America’s important and constructive presence in the Asia-Pacific. America has been in the region for nearly 80 years. You have many strategic interests; you have many friends in the region; and we would all like you to continue to stay actively and consistently engaged in this part of the world. Not just for one, two years; not just even for the next administration; but for the next 80 years and beyond. Second, it is American leadership that has shaped the rules-based global order that we have today, and that has benefited everyone in the world. It has uplifted countries; it has helped all countries – including the US. Increasingly, we do hear concerns about shortcomings in the global order, that it does not adequately address concerns around national security, supply chain resilience etc. And so there are more and more criticisms about the system. We would like very much to work with America on what a new model of globalisation might be. How can we update the rules of the new global order, so that it is fit for our time. And then thirdly, we want to continue growing our bilateral partnership. Defence is in fact one of the key pillars in our bilateral partnership. Since 1990, Singapore has allowed US troops to use our ports and bases. We host your rotational deployments, we provide logistical support, and at the same time, our troops — troops from the Singapore armed forces — train here in America, and that is why I started my week-long visit in Arizona, where our pilots do F-16 training at Luke Air Force Base. In fact, Singapore, tiny little country that we are, has the second-largest foreign military presence here in America, and that speaks volumes to the confidence and trust that we have in one another. And we are continuing to strengthen this defence cooperation in new areas, including cybersecurity and F-35s, which we have acquired. More broadly we are continuing to grow our cooperation in other new areas too. So yesterday we launched a dialogue on critical and emerging technologies, which includes areas like A.I. and biotech. We are looking at deepening our collaboration in space exploration. We are looking at how we can cooperate in new sources of low carbon energy — something which is very important for Singapore given how small we are, and the need to get to net zero. And we also work together to deliver technical assistance with third countries. We do that for Southeast Asian countries, but we are expanding that to the Pacific Islands states. So our bilateral relations are in excellent shape. We have a full agenda ahead of us and we will continue to grow the partnership. Our message is that Singapore has over the decades been a forward-leaning and reliable partner of the US, that we demonstrate that not just in words but in actions, and we will continue to do everything we can to further strengthen this partnership in the years to come.

Moderator:

Terrific. That was a really comprehensive lay down of your activities, your views on the relationship, and I must say, Mr Minister, as someone who worked in the South and Southeast Asia office at the Pentagon for many years, I saw firsthand the really vital role that Singapore plays in promoting, supporting the US forward presence in Southeast Asia; so very much appreciate your remarks on those lines. If I may start with a question that is perhaps suited to your hat as Finance Minister, and that is your views of the regional and global economy. Slowly, I think it is fair to say, emerging from COVID. But many countries experience low growth, high inflation. I think we have seen a slowdown — perhaps to some extent unexpected in China — in recent months. I wonder how do you see the regional economy, Singapore's economy, and in particular, also sort of the future of China’s economic growth?

DPM Wong:

The broader context is that we are moving from an era of benign globalisation to a new period of great power competition. So it is going to be a more fragmented world, a more uncertain world, and there will be more tail risks, more volatility, more – unfortunately – events of turbulence that can create huge uncertainties in the global economy. So amidst that broad environment, I think we are also facing another change from the last 10 years of easy money, very low interest rates, to another perhaps a more normalised period where interest rates will be higher for longer, and the era of easy money is over. I think that is the broader context that all countries everywhere are facing, and in that environment, I think we will see more sluggish growth. We are experiencing it because Singapore is very attuned to this, because we are such a small, open economy, and external demand makes up so much of our GDP growth. We are the canary in the mine — when the external environment is bad, we feel it most instantly. We feel the effects of sluggish growth already. Hopefully, inflationary trends will come down; we are hopeful. We see some moderation like in the US but we are worried about downside risks with regards to oil. What is happening in the Middle East can have an impact. With regards to food supplies with El Nino and other unknown risks, things can also take a turn for the worse. On China, I think they are going through a challenging sort of situation now because there is high youth unemployment. They have decided to prick the real estate bubble, and there will be painful consequences from doing so. I think it is the right thing to do because there were excesses building up in the real estate sector. But real estate is about 20-30% of the economy. It is a big part of the economy. And once you prick the bubble, there are all sorts of consequences, knock-on effects cascading throughout the entire economy, which they will have to manage. At the same time, they will have to rebalance the economy towards one that is more consumption-based. It is not easy because they will also have to undertake reforms on the social security front, which will take time. It is quite complex given the size of their country. But talking to their officials, I think they understand what needs to be done. It is a matter of communicating and also making sure that the implementation is done well. So overall, our sense is that you hear a lot of commentators and people talking about Peak China. We think that is overstated; we think China will continue to grow. What is perhaps in question, and what many people are asking is to what extent — China's economy will grow, maybe 4%, maybe 5%. But to what extent will it have that same entrepreneurial vitality and dynamism that it had before. I do not think anyone has the answer now. I think the Chinese government itself will have to figure out what is the right balance. And everyone is watching for clear indications of sustained market reforms before they decide that this is indeed the right trajectory going forward. I would say I would not underestimate the natural animal spirit of the Chinese person. They are highly resourceful. They are determined to secure a better life for themselves. And you should never underestimate their tremendous sense of drive and energy in the Chinese people.

Moderator:

It is very well said. It is funny how these narratives take hold here, and you are very much accurate that Peak China is now sort of in the environment here. I appreciate that sort of more comprehensive and balanced take on things. So thank you for that. Let me sort of pick up on a related question. You noted the importance of US leadership in shaping the region. I am interested in how you see US economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific today. Of course, the United States still remains on the outside of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Instead, it is promoting the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with its work on supply chains, infrastructure, trade facilitation, corruption. I welcome your thoughts on IPEF: what Singapore hopes to see emerge from IPEF, and to what degree you see it as delivering tangible benefits and that leadership that you noted is so important.

DPM Wong:

We have long advocated for more economic engagement by the US in Asia, and in particular Southeast Asia. Our preference would have been a regional trade agreement. We had the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), but that is water under the bridge. If possible, we would like to see market access and trade liberalisation, but I think it is very hard to talk about these things under current circumstances in the US domestic politics and the environment in America. There is no mood to talk about these issues now. But I think we should maintain high ambition in these areas, and hopefully down the road in years to come, the conditions may change, and we can still strive for trade liberalisation and market access. But in the meantime, we have IPEF and that is still very substantial, and there can still be good outcomes achieved through IPEF. We are working closely on the different areas and different aspects of IPEF to make sure that we achieve substantial outcomes. I think in areas like supply chains, green economy, digital economy — these are things that we are pursuing and we hope certainly that there can be some substantial progress in particular, by the time that the APEC Summit is held in November this year.

Moderator:

November is the key sort of moment, I think, for demonstrating progress on IPEF. Let me turn if I may, Mr Minister, to China and US-China relations. You know that a minute ago that we are sort of transitioning from an era of globalisation to one of great power competition and the ancillary effects of that. I think it is fair to say, and no doubt you have heard during your time here, relations between China and the United States are in a challenging state — the coming months, I think are likely to be quite difficult as we approach election in Taiwan, political season here in the United States. How is Singapore's government navigating the US-China economic and political rivalry, this dynamic? How do you see it? How are you navigating it?

DPM Wong:

Well, on US-China, I would say first of all, both sides have made very clear that they do not want a confrontation. And hopefully there will be a view that this is not a zero-sum contest — it is not one side wins, the other side loses. The world is big enough to accommodate both US and China, and the two can coexist and develop together. It is very good that talks and engagements have resumed in recent months. Hopefully through these dialogues and engagements there can be an effort to reduce misperceptions, misunderstanding, and enable more mutual accommodation and meeting of minds. What we would like to see and what we hope to see is that the Presidents on both sides, President Xi and President Biden, hopefully will have a chance to meet and talk face to face in APEC and they will be able to help rebuild the strategic trust that is so important to take the relationship forward in a positive way. The positive way means there will still be competition in some areas, but there will also be areas where there is engagement, constructive engagement, because there is so much that both countries can benefit mutually by working together — both bilaterally and also in tackling issues of global concern like climate change. We hope this will happen. It is a relationship that they will have some elements of competition, but also many elements of constructive engagement. If this does not happen and if the relationship turns sour, then it will be a big problem for the two countries, but it is also a huge problem for the rest of the world. Everyone will be worse off. From Singapore's point of view when we look at this relationship between US and China, our perspective is that this is not about balancing between America and China. Ultimately, we make decisions based on our own interests and our national interests will very much be guided by principles of international law. As a small country, we need that rule of law framework to operate and so that is how we will make our decisions. Which means that depending on the circumstances, in some instances, we may make decisions that seems to favour one side versus the other; but that does not mean that we are pro-China or pro-America. It simply means that we are pro-Singapore.

Moderator:

Fair enough, as you should be.

DPM Wong:

Indeed so, as every country would.

Moderator:

Well, exactly. So let me take it a step further if I may, to get your thoughts on this. It is such an important topic and I think Singapore's perspective is very important for us to hear. The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy says – this is a quote – “The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military and technological might, as it pursues its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world's most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe and it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific”. Is this the right framing? How do you see this framing from the standpoint of Singapore

DPM Wong:

The Chinese talk about three phases in their nation building journey. They want to stand up, they want to get rich, and they want to get strong. And I think they are, in their minds, in the “get strong” phase of their nation-building journey, which means they feel that their time has come, they need to take their rightful place in the world, and they ought to be more assertive with regards to their interests abroad. I think China also knows that it has to play its cards carefully, and they have to grow. Then China has to grow its influence without making other countries feel pressured, coerced or squeezed. Because if they do so, or if they end up doing so, I think there will be a backlash against China and that will not be in their national interest so China will have to learn how to moderate and adjust. But from Singapore's perspective, and certainly from the perspective of all the countries in Southeast Asia, we value the friendship we have with the US. America has been very good friend for a very long time. China now is also a good friend with all the countries in Southeast Asia. And we would like to stay friends with both. After all, it should be possible to have more than one best friend.

Moderator:

Well said, permit me to ask one more question on China, then we will invite the audience to begin to ask questions. We have mics on both sides of the room, if you would like to ask a question, maybe make your way to the mics and line up. But in the meantime, Mr Minister, I recognise this is a sensitive question, but I feel sort of obligated to ask it. And it relates to the question of PRC influence in Singapore, and in Southeast Asia more broadly, but Singapore in particular. In July, you may know, the Washington Post published a long article exploring this topic, focusing in particular on the role of Chinese language media in Singapore, which the Post asserts in the article – and this is a quote – that “this media now routinely echoes some of Beijing's most strident falsehoods”. How should we understand PRC influence in Singapore and what is Singapore doing to combat disinformation?

DPM Wong:

The newspaper in question — this was highlighted in the Washington Post — the newspaper in question has strongly rejected the portrayal by the Washington Post. It has defended its editorial stance. If you were to ask Singaporeans, the vast majority of Singaporeans reading the Chinese newspaper daily will not feel that what was portrayed in the Washington Post was accurate. Because we can read and see for ourselves articles on China, and they cover a wide range, including many articles that criticise China's approach. Ultimately, Singapore's newspapers have to reflect Singapore's perspectives as they have to reflect our society. Our newspapers cannot resemble the Washington Post, neither do we ask the Washington Post to become like Singapore newspapers. On PRC influence, or the influence of any other country for that matter, we are mindful that we are a small, open and diverse society. We are a multiracial, multicultural society. The majority of our population are ethnic Chinese, so we have ancestral roots going back to China but we have over time evolved our own Singaporean identity. We are Singaporean Chinese, and the Singaporean Chinese is very different from the Chinese from China — in values, in outlook, in identity. Just as a Singaporean Malay would be very different from a Malay from Malaysia or Indonesia, or a Singaporean Indian would be very different from someone that comes from India. And America, being a nation of immigrants, you must understand this very well. Given that we are such a small, open multicultural society, we know that we are susceptible to influences from elsewhere. And that is why we are very vigilant about this. From the government's point of view, we continually engage our public, educate, explain what is our national interest — why do we take certain decisions. Not because of choosing sides or because of external influence, but really because of Singapore's own interest. We spend a lot of time doing that. In fact, if you look at the large proportion of what Singaporeans consume, in news and entertainment, actually, a lot of it is in English; and a lot of it comes from the US and UK. To be candid, there is no shortage of criticism about Singapore in the Western media, no shortage of commentaries and articles highlighting the shortcomings in our system and asking us to be more like Western liberal ideals. We are very aware that as a small country we are susceptible to influences from all sides. At the end of the day, what is important for us, small though we may be, it is that we are our own people, we make our own choices, and it really comes down to Singaporeans, deciding on the future of our country. Not China, nor the West.

Moderator:

Thank you, Mr Minister. I guess we have one. Do we have someone standing over at the microphone here? I invite you to ask your question.

Shay Wester: I am Shay Wester with the Asia Society Policy Institute. My question relates to at the end of this trip, I think no matter what you read beforehand, or what people tell you, talking to people face to face can bring you to certain realisations. What kind of takeaways do you think you will bring back and tell the Cabinet in Singapore or other colleagues in the region? And an additional question is just on the economics on IPEF. What more would you advise policymakers in the US to do either on IPEF or on other areas, if you had kind of one ask of something more that the US could do on that front?

DPM Wong:

Sure. Well, the main takeaway I have from this trip is, as I said, we have a solid and growing bilateral agenda between America and Singapore. Both sides share a very similar strategic outlook of the world. We have long had close cooperation across a broad range of issues from defence to economics. And there is now a growing desire, mutual desire to see how we can further strengthen that partnership in the areas which I have just mentioned. There is also recognition in the administration, which has consistently told us that they do not want Singapore to be in a position to have to choose sides. They recognise what our perspectives are and the perspectives of countries in Southeast Asia so having a close relationship with the US, does not mean we have to alienate and exclude engagements with other countries, including China. Hopefully, that modus vivendi where Southeast Asia and Singapore can continue to have an open inclusive region, engaging not just America, but China, EU, other major powers all engage in our part of the world. Expanding the common ground we share and maximising our chances for stability and shared prosperity at a time when the world is increasingly becoming very uncertain and turbulent. That is our perspective and that is my main takeaway from this visit. On IPEF, as I said we are working on how we can add substance to the different pillars of IPEF. The work is ongoing — we hope there will be something to announce by the time of the APEC Summit. What we have offered to our friends in America is that in some instances, it may be difficult to get consensus amongst all the members of the IPEF family. We can also do things together bilaterally, between America and Singapore first, and that bilateral cooperation can be a pathfinder. We set high standards, it can be a pathfinder, it can be a testbed that we do together before it is expanded to the broader region.

Moderator:

Thank you. Why don't we take a question from our online audience? What I have here is how do you see Singapore in leading the region in the information and technology sector as well as engaging youth from across the region to enter into the fields. Singapore’s role in IT.

DPM Wong:

It is a sector that we pay a lot of attention to because given our stage of economic development, the only way for us to move forward really is to invest in innovation, R&D and push the frontiers of innovation. IT becomes very important, digital technologies are very important. Not just as a sector in itself, but as an enabler across all the pillars of our economy. Advanced manufacturing, financial services, built environment. We are investing heavily in IT. We continue to encourage young people to enter the space in Singapore and we are continuing to attract talent from around the region to come to Singapore to study and do well in IT. Our advantages is that we are small, we are nimble, we are a city-state. While we may not be at the cutting edge of IT, I mean the latest ideas and innovations I think will still come from American universities, American companies, but we can be a fast adopter. We can scale up applications very quickly. Not just in one sector, but across the entire economy and across our entire society. We do have the other advantage of a population that does embrace technology. We are techno-optimists by nature. Yes, technology does disrupt people's lives. It does make some jobs obsolete. Over the decades we have found ways to reskill, upskill our workers, make sure that anyone who is affected by technological disruptions can get placed to a better job, make use of machines and tools to increase the salaries of our workers. This is not something new, this is something we have been doing year after year for decades, so that trust and confidence that technology can help make lives better is there, and that is why we are able to embrace technology, including new technologies like A.I., and we can hopefully continue to keep the economy growing and improve the lives of our people.

Moderator: You mentioned in your meeting with Jake Sullivan at the White House that the two governments will be launching a critical and emerging technologies dialogue. Could you say a little more about the areas of focus for this?

DPM Wong: One of the key issues that we are grappling with – countries everywhere are grappling with – is how to harness the benefits of A.I. and innovation and the impact of A.I. while minimising the downside risks. And there are a number of downside risks. I mean, you can have an A.I. model that works well 99% of the time, but that 1% failure, if applied in a very potentially damaging scenario, can have knock-on implications for many, many people. How do we tackle these sorts of risks? What should be an appropriate governance framework for responsible A.I. usage? It cannot be that companies are let off the hook — surely companies cannot say we do everything and then when there is a problem, governments come to the rescue, that surely is too late. What is the right framework that companies can use in applying A.I. for different use cases that will ensure they take some responsibility? And governments and the private sector work closely together in having this framework and a set of principles governing responsible A.I. We have done some work in this respect for Singapore. I think the US is also interested in this space and we hope that we can work together and collaborate in this area of responsible A.I. I think it is going to be hard to talk about global standards at this stage, but we take it step by step and hopefully we can get more like-minded countries to join us and expand the coalition.

Moderator: It is really the issue of the day, isn’t it, A.I. governance, big theme for many of us. We have another question over here, if you could introduce yourself and offer your question concisely.

Marvin: Marvin, formerly federal government, now Johns Hopkins University and the Wilson Center. This is a question related to the South China Sea, and I realise Singapore is not a direct claimant but certainly interested. I think it is fair to say that China's posture on the South China Sea has been uncompromising — Xi Jinping has referred to the South China Sea as Chinese territory since ancient times. Singapore has a very robust, long-standing conversation with Chinese officials and security officials. I am interested in what your reading is, of whether there is any potential give in China's posture on the South China Sea going forward, or whether the Chinese are so dug-in, so rigid, that we are going to be facing the current situation indefinitely.

DPM Wong: On the South China Sea, there are already facts established across the different islands and atolls. There are claims that overlap in many complicated ways. We are not a claimant state as you highlighted. We are not one of the claimants. There are four ASEAN states that are claimants; China is one of the claimants. I think none of the ASEAN countries will want to go to the extreme on this matter with China because they have substantial accounts with China, and this is but one of the many issues they have dealing with China. Hopefully all parties, China and these ASEAN countries, can work out a peaceful resolution of the dispute. We are not involved directly but we are involved as part of ASEAN, and ASEAN is in the midst of talking about the Code of Conduct with China. There is a Declaration of Conduct we are working on, a binding code of conduct. It has taken a long time, it is very complicated and it is work in progress. Singapore's interests in this matter are as follows: Number one, freedom of navigation; number two, international law as reflected in the UNCLOS; and number three, peaceful resolution without escalation, and without causing uncertainty and potential for conflicts in the region. We want the disputes to be resolved peacefully. That is our interest and to the extent that we can, through ASEAN, we will work towards these outcomes.

Moderator: Thank you. We will do another question from our online audience. This is more about Singapore itself. From Grant Alexander: What is Singapore's biggest domestic challenge in the 2020s?

DPM Wong: Our biggest challenge is this – Singapore is always an improbable nation. We are so tiny, and with no natural resources, and you would not have bet on Singapore in 1965. You will not expect Singapore to survive, but we did. It is nothing short of a miracle. Our challenge is to sustain this little miracle called Singapore for as long as possible. My vivid impression of this is when I was a student at Michigan. In Michigan, there is a ghost town called Singapore. It is by Lake Michigan near the Kalamazoo River. It was founded in the 1830s. No one knows why it is called Singapore. But presumably, because Singapore was founded by the British as a British port in 1819, and very quickly, we became a thriving port for the British. Perhaps word had spread from the exotic Far East, there was something called Singapore, and you know how it takes time for news to travel in those days. So in the 1830s, someone decided to set up a town in Michigan, and it was a shipbuilding and lumber port, and it did well for a while. But after 50 years, the shifting sand dunes swallowed up the town. And if you go there now, you can only see a signpost that says these are the ruins of Singapore. So Singapore in Michigan did not last for very long, about 50 years. Our mission is to make Singapore in Southeast Asia last for a very long time.

Mario Masaya, US-ASEAN Business Council: Deputy Prime Minister, thank you very much for your time. I want to bring us back to the discussion around IT, and your optimism about emerging technologies. You talked about CPTPP, you talked about IPEF. I want to bring ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) in front – how you see that agreement and how you think it will positively improve Southeast Asian digital economy. There are a lot of reports already on how Southeast Asian digital economy will exponentially grow for the next future. So with this agreement, are we expecting a lot of improvement in that area? Thank you.

DPM Wong: Thank you for that question. It is indeed a priority for us in Singapore and I think for many countries in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has come a long way because since it was founded, ASEAN has continually tried to strengthen our integration amongst very diverse countries in Southeast Asia. On trade liberalisation in goods, we have pretty much achieved these goals. We can do better in services; we can connect better our infrastructure, including energy and transport; and then one new area which we are working now on is digital connectivity. There are several elements to this. One idea, for example, is just to link up our payment systems in ASEAN. I do not think we are going to be able to get a common currency like in the EU – we are just too diverse – but if we can even link up our real-time payment systems, so that there can be fast, cheap and efficient cross-border flows, that will be I think a big plus for all of us in Southeast Asia, for individuals as well as for businesses, and we are working on that. Another aspect of what could be part of a digital agreement is to have seamless flow of data, and under such an arrangement, then ASEAN I think can be quite competitive in attracting businesses to come to ASEAN, and businesses can tap on the relative competitive advantages of the different ASEAN countries. You cannot do low cost manufacturing in Singapore, for example, we are just too expensive. But you can have that in Malaysia, you can have that in Indonesia, you can have that in Vietnam. Your data centres can be in any part of ASEAN, and then you can inter-operate seamlessly within ASEAN itself, if there is seamless flow of data, and that would certainly make ASEAN a lot more attractive and appealing to multinational companies. Those are some of the things that we are working on for the digital agreement. We think there is a lot of potential and we hope to take this forward.

Zachary Abuza: Thank you very much for joining us today, Deputy Prime Minister. My name is Zachary Abuza, I am from the National War College and Georgetown University. I do not mean to be rude, but I am going to ask a hard question about Myanmar.

DPM Wong: Sure, fire away.

Zachary: A recent United Nations report found that 138 companies based in Singapore were supplying some $254 million worth of weapons, parts and machine tools to the Myanmar regime since the February 2021 coup. Another report found that some four and a half billion dollars of Central Bank of Myanmar funds were sitting in nine different Singaporean banks. These seem to go in the face of what Singapore’s stated foreign policy is towards Myanmar. I note the Foreign Minister’s presence here; they go against some of his very public statements. What more can Singapore do to bring an end to a regime that is waging a multi-front war against their civilian population?

DPM Wong: What is happening in Myanmar is very tragic. Our Foreign Minister is here and his public statements are indeed what we are doing. If there is any evidence that goes beyond what we know, please let us know. We tell this to our friends in the US administration. Singapore very, very rarely imposes sanctions unless there's a United Nations Security Council Resolution. When Russia invaded Ukraine, because it was such an egregious breach of the United Nations Charter and territorial sovereignty, we felt we had to do something. So if there is specific evidence, and we have told this to the US State Department, to the Treasury, that if there is evidence, let us know specifically and we will certainly cooperate and do our part as well. That is Singapore’s role. But beyond Singapore, what else can all of us do to address the issue in Myanmar? Unfortunately, we have to be realistic. It is not going to be so simple, because there is very little that outsiders — be it Singapore, America, ASEAN, EU, name your pick in the United Nations — there is very little that outsiders can do that would influence the military, the generals or events in Myanmar. We have seen this before in history. ASEAN has a plan, we are continuing to implement the Five-Point Consensus. We are continuing to do whatever we can, together with our partners, including in America, but we just have to be realistic that it will take time. Hopefully as we have seen in the past, the approaches that we have made have worked, the combination of carrots and sticks of deterrence and diplomacy have worked in the past, but it took a long time. Hopefully, with the passage of time, we might see progress in Myanmar too.

Moderator: I want to pick up on this question of ASEAN for a second if I may, and its role in Myanmar. I think it is fair to say that in Washington, there has been a fair amount of criticism of ASEAN, partly as a result of its inability to address the situation in Myanmar, recognising as you pointed out how difficult it is. And along with that, in the last few years, there has been something of a proliferation of what you might call the mechanisms of cooperation in the region — the rise of the Quad, of course, other what we might call minilateral groupings. I wonder what is your view of the future of ASEAN and Singapore's role in it? And then relatedly this question of these new groupings, and their relationship to ASEAN?

DPM Wong: First of all, on the criticism of ASEAN because of its perceived ineffectiveness with regards to Myanmar, I suppose if your basis and your starting point is can ASEAN do something on Myanmar, and no, therefore ASEAN has failed — well, fair enough, that is one metric of assessment. But if you were to take a broader perspective, remember, as I highlighted just now, how diverse the region is. We have in Southeast Asia countries ranging from monarchies to democracies, various shades of democracies, to communist countries; a very wide range of countries. ASEAN started out with countries, member states, in conflict with one another. That was the genesis of ASEAN, and ASEAN in many ways has helped to keep the peace in the region. ASEAN has not only done that, but also helped to bring together very diverse countries towards a more integrated approach of community building. Whether it is the issues we discussed just now around trade services, transport energy linkages, or digital services, we are making progress. ASEAN as a whole has a combined population of 650 million people. It is not small at all. It has got strong economic fundamentals, young population, rising middle class. We think that if we are able to ensure a strong integrated ASEAN, setting aside the issue of Myanmar, but the rest of ASEAN coming together, I think we will have some agency in navigating this uncertain world. What is ASEAN’s approach? ASEAN’s approach is really to have an open and inclusive region. That is why we welcome new configurations, be it the Quad, or AUKUS. The members in the Quad and AUKUS are close dialogue partners of ASEAN. We welcome these arrangements as long as they work within the framework of ASEAN’s centrality, and they help to uphold the rules-based international order that is underpinned by international law. That is our starting point. On that basis, we work very closely with AUKUS, with the Quad, with any other partners. As I said just now, ASEAN wants to have an open, inclusive arrangement where we are able to work with China, America, EU and all the other partners. And hopefully within that configuration, expand the common ground and the interdependencies we have with one another. ASEAN in the Cold War, saw conflict. We were an arena for proxy wars during the period of the Cold War. We do not want that to happen again in Southeast Asia. In the Cold War, Southeast Asian countries or many countries adopted a non-aligned movement approach. ASEAN’s approach now is really about not so much being passive bystanders, but really about active multi-engagement — engaging all the different major powers and trying our best to have a configuration that will give us the best chances for stability and peace.

Ryo Nakamura: My name is Ryo Nakamura from Japan’s Nikkei Media. I want to ask you about the defence relationship with the US. Singapore allows the US military to rotate the US military ships or aircraft in Singapore and provides support for a long time. So I wonder, will you do the same during war time as well?

DPM Wong: Well, it is a hypothetical scenario. First of all, if there is war, we are all in big, big trouble. Let us hope that there is no war. We are not a US ally, to be very clear. We are quite unique. I think we are the only country in the world which is a Major Security Cooperation Partner (MSCP) so we are not an ally of the US. We let American troops use our ports and bases. We provide rotational support, logistical support, we allow them to come through for their rotational deployment, but these are peacetime arrangements, and it has been a win-win for both US and Singapore. If there were to be other circumstances, then I think we will have to consider the context of circumstances and think through carefully, like I said, always from the perspective of what is in Singapore's interest. Our starting point must be let us not even get into a situation where there is a conflict or a war in Asia.

Moderator: We will do one last question here. We will take it from online: what do you think the United States can learn from Singapore in terms of its multicultural existence?

DPM Wong: I am not going to be so presumptuous as to tell the US that you can learn from us. But we have a model that works for our circumstances and needs. It starts off by recognising that people come from different backgrounds, different races, different religions. We do not seek to assimilate into one central identity. Rather, we want everyone to preserve their own cultures, their own traditions. We want everyone to feel that they have a place in our society. Even the smallest of minorities must feel that they are valued and they can contribute to society. At the same time, while we encourage that, while we provide for that, we also want groups to come together and interact with one another as much as possible so that through that interaction, we find common ground. What is it that we share together as Singaporeans? There are many things that we have in common. Then hopefully over time, through interactions, through shared experiences, through shared memories, we expand the common ground that we share with one another. That is how we think of multiculturalism in Singapore. It is a work in progress, because nation-building, building a Singaporean identity is always a work in progress; but it is also a process which we have found requires mutual accommodation and compromise. Compromise must never be seen to be a bad word. Because if every group asserts maximum entitlement, everything must be 100% — I have to do everything, and if I cannot achieve all of what I want, I see that as a slight, I see that as an insult to my tribe — then it becomes war of every tribe against every tribe and there is no common ground. We have learnt over the years that it is okay to accommodate one another, it is okay to compromise in some things. Again, try to see what is important from the other side's perspective. Over time, through that process of interaction, we expand the common ground we have as Singaporeans. We are a relatively young nation, not even 60 years of independence. But over these years and decades of nation-building, I think we have grown a very strong sense of a distinctive Singaporean identity and we hope that this will continue for many more years to come, and we can continue to preserve that peace and harmony in our multicultural society for many years to come too.

Topics: Economy , Science and technology

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