Jeffrey Sachs 美國和歐盟保護主義抬頭 中國經濟取得成功

麵對美國和歐盟保護主義抬頭，中國經濟取得成功

https://english.news.cn/20240404/3c9664cd50bb47ffb43cabd105056109/c.html

Jeffrey Sachs  2024年4月4日  新華社

西方媒體充斥著對中國經濟的不祥預感。我們經常被告知，中國的快速增長已經結束，中國的數據被操縱，中國的金融危機迫在眉睫，中國將在過去的四分之一世紀中遭受與日本同樣的停滯。 這是美國的宣傳，而不是現實。是的，中國經濟麵臨著阻力—主要是美國造成的。然而，中國能夠—而且我相信將會—克服美國造成的阻力，繼續走經濟快速發展的道路。

基本事實是，2023年中國國內生產總值（GDP）增長5.2%，而美國為2.5%。按人均計算，增長差距更大：中國為5.4%，而美國為2%。2024年，中國將再次大幅超過美國。 盡管美國媒體發表了激烈的言論，但並沒有出現嚴重的增長危機。是的，中國在變得更加富裕的過程中正在放緩，但其增長速度仍然比美國和歐洲快得多。

問題是肯定存在的，但主要來自美國，而不是來自中國經濟內部。

首先是認知問題。美國正在推動對中國的負麵敘述。事實上，我們最近了解到，美國前總統唐納德·特朗普從2019年開始就責成中央情報局在社交媒體上散布有關中國經濟的惡意宣傳。中央情報局的一項具體策略是唱衰中國重要的“一帶一路”倡議。

其次，美國保護主義抬頭。從2000年到2020年的20年裏，中國忙於建設新型綠色數字產業：掌握電動汽車、5G、電池供應鏈、太陽能組件、風力渦輪機、第四代核電、長距離電力傳輸和 其他尖端技術。與此同時，白宮和國會掌握在石油、天然氣和煤炭遊說團體手中，因此沒有針對新能源技術的戰略。最後，美國總統喬·拜登和國會同意保護美國工業，讓美國有時間收複部分失地。

第三，還有美國維持美國對中國“主導地位”的”大戰略”。對於美國安全機構來說，與中國進行誠實的競爭還不夠。美國政府還對中國經濟設置障礙。美國會不遺餘力地破壞中國經濟，這似乎令人難以置信，但它確實這樣做了。2015年3月，美國高級外交官、前大使羅伯特·布萊克威爾 (Robert Blackwill) 在與合著者阿什利·泰利斯 (Ashley Tellis) 共同發表於外交關係委員會的一篇文章中闡述了這種做法。在我看來，這篇文章是華盛頓對華新政策的公開啟動，奧巴馬、特朗普和拜登總統都遵循了這一政策。

為了理解美國的遊戲計劃，值得詳細引用布萊克威爾和特利斯的觀點：

自成立以來，美國始終奉行一項宏偉戰略，重點是獲取並保持對各種競爭對手的卓越實力，首先是北美大陸，然後是西半球，最後是全球......

由於美國將中國“融入”自由國際秩序的努力現已對美國在亞洲的主導地位產生了新的威脅，並最終可能對美國的全球實力構成相應的挑戰，因此華盛頓需要一項新的以中國為中心的大戰略 平衡中國實力的崛起，而不是繼續協助其崛起。

這些構成替代性平衡戰略核心的變化必須源於這樣一種明確認識：保持美國在全球體係中的主導地位應該仍然是美國二十一世紀大戰略的中心目標。

麵對中國實力的崛起，要維持這一地位，除其他外，還需要振興美國經濟，培育那些賦予美國相對於其他國家不對稱經濟優勢的顛覆性創新；在美國的朋友和盟友之間建立新的優惠貿易安排，通過有意識地排除中國的工具來增加彼此的利益；重建一個涉及美國盟友的技術控製製度，阻止中國獲得軍事和戰略能力，使其能夠對美國及其夥伴造成“高杠杆戰略傷害”；共同增強美國在中國周邊的朋友和盟友的權力政治能力；盡管中國反對，但提高美國軍隊在亞洲邊緣地區有效投射力量的能力—所有這些

同時繼續以符合其對美國國家利益重要性的多種方式與中國合作。

布萊克威爾和泰利斯的這些言論之所以引人注目，有兩個原因。首先，他們毫不含糊地明確闡述了美國的“大戰略”；保持美國在全球體係中的“首要地位”，包括對中國的“首要地位”。其次，他們早在2015年3月就列出了美國在過去十年中奉行的實際政策。

考慮一下布萊克威爾和泰利斯推薦的五項政策。

首先，重振美國經濟。好吧，這很公平。美國需要整頓其經濟秩序。

其次，與亞洲建立新的美國貿易安排，”有意識地將中國排除在外”。這是一個荒謬的想法，因為中國是亞洲最大的經濟體，但奧巴馬試圖（並失敗）建立跨太平洋夥伴關係協定來排除中國，而特朗普和拜登都對中國公然推行保護主義，特別是以單邊關稅的形式 增長違反了世界貿易組織（WTO）的承諾。

第三，重建“技術控製製度”，限製中國獲得高科技。目前這種情況正在進行中，最引人注目的是對向中國出口先進半導體技術的新限製。

第四，在中國邊境建立政治軍事聯盟。 這就是美國與AUKUS（澳大利亞-英國-美國）、四方（澳大利亞-印度-日本-美國）和美國-日本-菲律賓三方的戰略。

第五，“不顧中國的反對”，在亞洲邊緣地區建設美軍。澳大利亞、日本、菲律賓和其他地方也發生了這種情況。

美國的“首要地位”目標被危險地誤導了。由於中國的人口是美國的四倍，美國經濟規模保持超過中國的唯一途徑就是中國的人均國內生產總值繼續低於美國的四分之一。沒有理由發生這種情況。 如果真是這樣，這將意味著中國遭受巨大苦難，全球活力也將遭受巨大損失。

首要地位不應該是美國的目標，也不應該是中國的目標，更不應該是任何國家的目標。 大國唯一明智的目標是共同繁榮、共同安全以及針對環境可持續性與和平等共同挑戰進行全球合作。

美國的策略—利用貿易、技術、金融和軍事政策來阻止另一個國家——對美國來說並不新鮮。 當然，這是美國在20世紀50年代至1980年代“遏製”蘇聯的遊戲計劃。它在20 世紀80年代末再次推出，以阻止美國盟友日本的快速增長，因為日本在工業領域的競爭中勝過美國。 美國迫使日本同意“自願”出口限製和日元估值過高。 由此，日本經濟增速大幅下滑，陷入長期金融危機。

然而，中國不是日本。它更大、更強大，而且不屈服於美國。與20世紀90年代的日本不同，當美國推行貿易和技術政策以減緩中國經濟增長時，中國不需要也不會袖手旁觀。

要理解中國的政策選擇，請回想一下國民收入賬戶恒等式：GDP 等於 C+I+G+X-M。 即中國的GDP可被消費，C； 投資了，我； 由政府消費，G； 出口，X； 或用於替代進口，M； 中國的出口可以銷往美國和歐洲，也可以銷往世界其他地區。

近年來，美國和歐洲市場對中國出口越來越封閉。2023年，美國從中國進口了4270億美元的商品，低於2022年的5360億美元。從中國進口占美國GDP的比例來看，2018年為2.6%，但2023年已降至僅1.6%。這是特朗普和拜登領導下的美國保護主義的結果。

現在，這是中國麵臨的政策選擇。 隨著中國商品和服務生產持續增長，而對美國出口下降，中國麵臨整體商品供應過剩的局麵。 如果不采取政策措施來抵消，供應過剩將降低GDP，甚至可能導致中國經濟衰退。

美國要求中國增加消費以抵消出口下降。例如，中國可以通過減稅來刺激消費。美國建議的問題在於，中國可能會像美國那樣轉向更低的增長和更高的預算赤字。

中國的第二個選擇是增加國內投資，例如加速中國向零碳經濟的轉變。增加國內投資來抵消部分對美國出口的減少是有好處的。

第三個選擇是刺激政府消費。該政策也可能導致經濟增長放緩和預算赤字上升。

第四個選擇是增加對發展中國家的出口。該方法有一個功德無量。 如果美國市場關閉，歐洲市場也關閉（隨著歐洲保護主義變得更加嚴重），那麽中國可以將出口轉移到新興市場。 其中一些會自動發生。由於美國從中國的購買量減少，而從越南的購買量增加，那麽越南將從中國購買更多的中間產品來加工並出口到美國。

然而，一些出口的重新定位將需要中國采取新的政策。新興經濟體的購買力普遍低於美國和歐洲。是的，新興經濟體希望購買中國提供的產品—太陽能組件、風力渦輪機、5G等等—但需要更多貸款才能做到這一點。中國要想大幅增加對新興經濟體的出口，就必須增加對這些經濟體的貸款和外國直接投資，例如通過擴大“一帶一路”倡議以及亞洲基礎設施投資銀行和新開發銀行的貸款。

中國決策者可能會抵製增加對新興經濟體的貸款，因為其中一些經濟體已經陷入債務困境。然而，新興經濟體普遍具有很高的增長潛力。他們的債務並不太高—隻要債務有足夠長的償還期（到期日）。新興經濟體主要需要時間實現增長，從而能夠償還中國的貸款。

這是我自己對中國經濟形勢的總結。 中國經濟供給側持續快速增長。 中國的潛在GDP繼續以每年5%或更快的速度增長。此外，產出的質量很高，而且還在不斷提高。中國是世界其他國家所需的低成本商品生產國：零碳能源係統、5G數字網絡和高質量的基礎設施（如快速城際鐵路）。

中國的問題不是供給側，而是需求側。中國麵臨需求限製，主要是因為美國對中國向美國市場出口設置壁壘，而歐洲似乎也可能效仿美國。盡管中國有可能通過增加國內消費來抵消出口放緩的影響，但最好還是通過擴大“一帶一路”等重要項目來增加對新興經濟體的出口。為了謹慎地這樣做，中國必須增加對新興經濟體的長期貸款。

我不否認中國經濟還麵臨其他挑戰，比如房地產暫時投資過度，或者一些地方政府過度借貸。 但我認為這些問題是短期的、周期性的，而不是長期的、結構性的。當然，還有一些領域需要進一步改革，例如戶口製度。然而，在這方麵，此類改革挑戰仍在持續，而且很可能得到成功解決。

我希望看到中國繼續快速增長，是的，以當前市場價格和匯率計算，中國的國內生產總值超過美國，這符合一個人口比美國多四倍的國家的要求。我注意到，就購買力而言，中國在2017年就已經超過了美國（根據國際貨幣基金組織的數據），而美國並沒有遭遇什麽可怕的事情。

中國經濟的發展不僅惠及中國，也惠及世界。中國提出了從現代瘧疾治療方法（青蒿素）到低成本零碳能源係統和低成本5G係統等有效的新技術。 我們應該為中國持續快速發展加油。 我們應該拋開幼稚的“至上”觀念，采取成人的相互尊重、和平共處、全球合作的理念來保護地球。世界不想要也不需要單一的主導國家。事實上，這在當今世界根本不可行。 對於世界經濟來說，絕對最好的解決方案是中國、美國和歐洲保持開放的貿易和共同商定的產業政策。然而，如果美國和歐洲對中國采取強烈的保護主義態度，那麽中國的最佳應對措施就是加快與新興經濟體的成功且不斷發展的貿易和金融關係。

China's economic success in face of growing U.S., EU protectionism

https://english.news.cn/20240404/3c9664cd50bb47ffb43cabd105056109/c.html
Jeffrey D. Sachs   |   April 4, 2024   |   Xinhua 

The Western press is filled with stories of foreboding about the Chinese economy. We are told regularly that China's fast growth is over, that China's data are manipulated, that a Chinese financial crisis looms, and that China will suffer the same stagnation as Japan during the past quarter century. This is U.S. propaganda, not reality. Yes, the Chinese economy faces headwinds -- mainly created by the United States. Yet China can -- and I believe will -- overcome the U.S.-created headwinds and continue on its path of rapid economic development.

The basic fact is that China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at 5.2 percent in 2023, compared with 2.5 percent in the United States. On a per capita basis, the growth gap is even larger: 5.4 percent in China compared with 2 percent in the United States. In 2024, China will again significantly outpace the United States. There is no great growth crisis despite the fervid rhetoric in the U.S. press. Yes, China is slowing as it gets richer, but it is still growing considerably faster than in the United States and Europe.

There are problems to be sure, but the main ones come from the United States, not from inside China's economy.

First, there is the perception problem. The United States is pushing a negative narrative about China. We actually learned recently that former U.S. President Donald Trump tasked the CIA with spreading malicious propaganda about the Chinese economy on social media starting back in 2019. One specific CIA tactic was to bad-mouth China's important Belt and Road Initiative.

Second, there is the rise of U.S. protectionism. During the 20 years from 2000 to 2020, China was busy building up its new green and digital industries: mastering electric vehicles, 5G, battery supply chains, solar modules, wind turbines, fourth-generation nuclear power, long-distance power transmission, and other cutting-edge technologies. The White House and Congress, in the meantime, were in the hands of the oil, gas, and coal lobbies, and therefore without a strategy for the new energy technologies. Finally, U.S. President Joe Biden and Congress agreed to protect U.S. industries to give America time to recover some lost ground.

Third, there is the U.S. "Grand Strategy" to maintain U.S. "primacy" over China. For the U.S. security establishment, it's not good enough to compete with China on an honest basis. The U.S. government also puts obstacles in the way of China's economy. It seems incredible that the United States would go out of its way to undermine China's economy, and yet it actually does so. Such an approach was spelled out by a senior U.S. diplomat, former Ambassador Robert Blackwill, in March 2015, in an article for the Council on Foreign Relations published with co-author Ashley Tellis. The article, in my view, was the public launch of a new Washington policy towards China, one that has been followed by Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden.

It is worth quoting Blackwill and Tellis at length to understand the U.S. game plan:

Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally...

Because the American effort to "integrate" China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia -- and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American power globally -- Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.

These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of the United States' grand strategy in the twenty-first century.

Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict "high-leverage strategic harm" on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China's periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition -- all the while continuing to work with China in diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.

These statements by Blackwill and Tellis are remarkable for two reasons. First, they explicitly spell out America's "Grand Strategy" in no uncertain terms: to preserve America's "primacy" in the global system, including over China. Second, they listed -- already in March 2015 -- the actual policies pursued by the United States during the past decade.
 

Consider the five policies recommended by Blackwill and Tellis.

First, revitalize the U.S. economy. Okay, that's fair enough. The United States needs to get its economic house in order.

Second, create new U.S. trade arrangements with Asia that "consciously exclude China." That's an absurd idea, since China is the largest economy in Asia, yet Obama tried (and failed) to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership to exclude China, while both Trump and Biden pursued blatant protectionism against China, especially in the form of unilateral tariff increases in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments.

Third, recreate a "technology-control regime" to limit China's access to high-tech. That is currently underway, most notably with the new limits on the export of advanced semiconductor technology to China.

Fourth, build up political-military alliances on China's borders. This is the U.S. strategy with AUKUS (Australia-UK-United States), the Quad (Australia-India-Japan-United States), and the United States-Japan-Philippines Triad.
 

Fifth, build up the U.S. military along the Asian rimlands "despite Chinese opposition." This too is happening with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

America's aim of "primacy" is dangerously misguided. Since China has four times the U.S. population, the only way for the U.S. economy to stay larger than China's would be for China to remain stuck at less than one-fourth of the U.S. GDP per person. There is no reason for that to happen. If it did, it would mean a lot of suffering in China and a great loss of global dynamism.

Primacy should not be the U.S. goal, or China's goal, or indeed the goal of any country. The only sensible goal for the major powers is mutual prosperity, common security, and global cooperation regarding common challenges such as environmental sustainability and peace.

The American playbook -- using trade, technology, financial, and military policies to stop another country -- is not new for the United States. It was, of course, the U.S. game plan to "contain" the Soviet Union during the 1950s-1980s. It was rolled out again in the late 1980s to stop the rapid growth of Japan, an American ally, because Japan was outcompeting the U.S. industry. The United States forced Japan to agree to "voluntary" export restraints and an overvalued Yen. Thus, Japan's economic growth plummeted and Japan entered a prolonged financial crisis.

China, however, is not Japan. It is far larger, more powerful, and not subservient to the United States. Unlike Japan in the 1990s, China need not and will not sit idly by as the United States pursues trade and technology policies to slow China's economic growth.

To understand China's policy choices, recall the national income account identity that GDP equals C+I+G+X-M. That is, China's GDP can be consumed, C; invested, I; consumed by the government, G; exported, X; or used to replace imports, M; China's exports can go to the United States and Europe or to the rest of the world.

In recent years, the U.S. and European markets have become increasingly closed to China's exports. In 2023, the United States imported 427 billion U.S. dollars of goods from China, down from 536 billion dollars in 2022. As a share of U.S. GDP, imports from China were 2.6 percent in 2018, but have declined to only 1.6 percent in 2023, as the result of U.S. protectionism under Trump and Biden.

Now, here then are the policy choices facing China. With the production of goods and services continuing to rise in China, and with exports to the United States falling, China faces an overall excess supply of goods. That excess supply will lower GDP and could even create a recession in China if policy measures are not taken to offset it.

The United States tells China to increase consumption to offset the fall in its exports. For example, China could cut taxes to stimulate consumption. The problem with the U.S. recommendation is that China would likely shift to lower growth and higher budget deficits, as in the United States.

A second option would be for China to increase domestic investments, for example to accelerate China's shift to a zero-carbon economy. There is some merit to boosting domestic investment to offset part of the reduction of exports to the United States.

A third option would be to boost government consumption. That policy too would likely entail slower growth and higher budget deficits.

A fourth option is to increase exports to the developing countries. That approach has a great deal of merit. If the U.S. market is closed, and the European market is closing (as Europe becomes more protectionist), then China can shift exports to the emerging markets. Some of that will happen automatically. As the United States buys less from China and more, say, from Vietnam, then Vietnam will buy more intermediate goods from China to process and export to the United States.

Some of the reorientation of exports, however, will require new Chinese policies. The purchasing power of the emerging economies is generally lower than in the United States and Europe. Yes, the emerging economies would like to buy what China has on offer -- solar modules, wind turbines, 5G, and the rest -- but will need more loans to do so. For China to sell substantially more to the emerging economies, it will have to boost loans and foreign direct investments to those economies, for example by expanding the Belt and Road Initiative and lending by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.

There may be some resistance among China's policy-makers to increasing loans to the emerging economies, since some of those economies are already debt-distressed. Yet, the emerging economies generally have a very high growth potential. Their debt is not too high -- as long as the debt has a long enough pay-back period (maturity). The emerging economies mainly need time to grow and thereby to be able to repay China for the loans.

Here, then, is my own summary of the economic situation in China. The supply side of China's economy continues to grow rapidly. China's potential GDP continues to rise at 5 percent per year or faster. Moreover, the quality of that output is high and rising. China is the world's low-cost producer of goods that the rest of the world needs: zero-carbon energy systems, 5G digital networks, and high-quality infrastructure (such as fast inter-city rail).

China's problem is not on the supply side, but on the demand side. China faces demand constraints mainly because the United States has put up barriers against China's exports to the U.S. market, and Europe seems likely to follow the United States in this. While China could potentially offset that slowdown in exports by increasing domestic consumption, it would be well advised to increase its exports to the emerging economies, in part by expanding important programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative. To do so prudently, China would have to increase its long-term lending to the emerging economies.

I don't deny that there are other challenges facing China's economy, such as some temporary over-investment in real estate, or some over-borrowing by some local governments. Yet, I believe that such problems are short-term and cyclical, not long-term and structural. There are also areas that need further reform, to be sure, such as the hukou (urban residence) system. Yet here too, such reform challenges are ongoing and very likely to be solved successfully.

I would like to see China continue its rapid growth, and yes, overtake the United States in GDP at current market prices and exchange rates, befitting a country that is four times larger than the United States in population. I note that in purchasing-power terms, China already overtook the United States in 2017 (according to IMF data) and nothing awful befell the United States.

China's economic growth benefits not only China but the whole world. China has brought forward new and effective technologies ranging from a modern cure for malaria (artemisinin) to low-cost zero-carbon energy systems and low-cost 5G systems. We should be rooting for China's continued rapid development. We should put aside childish ideas of "primacy" and adopt adult ideas of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and global cooperation to protect the planet. The world does not want or need a single dominant country. Indeed, that's not even feasible in our world today. The absolute best solution for the world economy would be for China, the United States, and Europe to maintain open trade and mutually agreed industrial policies. Yet if the United States and Europe turn strongly protectionist against China, then the best response for China is to hasten its successful and growing trade and financial relations with the emerging economies.