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中國死敵印度 特立獨行 不會成為美國盟友

(2024-04-24 15:23:31) 下一個

為什麽中國的死敵印度不會成為美國的盟友

https://www.newsweek.com/why-india-chinas-bitter-foe-wont-become-us-ally-1792564#:~:text=

作者:Tom O'Connor,《外交政策》資深作家兼《國家安全與外交政策》副主編 2023 年 4 月 11 日

印度陸軍司令警告說,印度已做好應對針對中國的“任何意外情況”的準備

在擁有世界上人口最多的兩個亞洲鄰國之間的緊張關係加劇之際,印度與美國和其他西方結盟國家的關係日益密切,同時對崛起的中國也越來越警惕。

但即使新德裏采取了前所未有的措施來加強與華盛頓的關係,這個傳統的不結盟國家似乎也不太可能與美國建立任何正式的防務聯盟。

印度前駐華大使阿肖克·坎塔(Ashok Kantha)對《新聞周刊》表示:“事實上,我們確實將印度和美國視為天然盟友,但這並不是軍事聯盟意義上的盟友。”

這樣的聯盟將違背印度超過 75 年的後殖民曆史,印度從英國贏得獨立,並遭受與巴基斯坦的暴力分裂,引發了與鄰國伊斯蘭共和國和印度之間圍繞有爭議領土的幾場戰爭中的第一場。 六十年前與中國的關係。 然而,即使在該國最嚴重的一些危機期間,印度也選擇不在世界強國中選邊站。

坎塔說:“我們經曆了長達兩個世紀的殖民統治,然後我們成為世界上人口最多的國家之一,這在民主、多元文化和開放社會方麵也具有創新性。” “我們在冷戰時期得出的結論是,印度不能成為當時美國和蘇聯這兩個大國的陣營追隨者,我們將與這兩個國家合作。”

如今,盡管新德裏將華盛頓視為更好的合作夥伴,但在中美摩擦不斷加劇的情況下,印度稱之為“戰略自主”的政策仍在繼續。
“我們不會保持同等距離,我們會在問題上采取立場,”他補充道。 “在某些問題上我們可能會與美國走得更近,但我們不會加入軍事同盟。這一基本共識沒有改變。”

為什麽印度是美國的合作夥伴

在這張新聞周刊照片插圖中,美國總統喬·拜登和印度總理納倫德拉·莫迪於 2022 年 11 月 15 日在印度尼西亞努沙杜瓦舉行的 G20 峰會上握手。

這樣的立場從來不意味著中立。 在整個冷戰期間,新德裏與莫斯科建立了緊密的戰略夥伴關係,這種關係至今仍然以外交互動的形式存在,並且俄羅斯在印度武裝部隊中擁有大量武器。

因此,盡管坎塔聲稱印度對俄羅斯去年二月在烏克蘭發動戰爭的決定抱有“嚴重疑慮”,但他表示,“我們不會譴責俄羅斯,因為這種關係在曆史上對我們很重要,甚至在今天也是如此。” 由於各種原因。”

然而,甚至在烏克蘭衝突之前,坎塔就表示,新德裏正在尋求軍事夥伴關係多元化,這一趨勢為美印關係提供了重大機遇,他在其中表示,“國防正在成為一個非常重要的領域” 區域。” 除了不斷擴大的情報共享協議外,兩國還進行了越來越多的聯合演習,包括去年 11 月在印度與中國有爭議的邊界附近舉行的 Yudh Abhyas 訓練。

中印之間長達 2,100 英裏的有爭議邊界,即實際控製線,是兩國幾十年來最嚴重緊張局勢的根源,始於 2020 年發生的一係列致命衝突。 試圖緩和局勢,但手持棍棒和石塊的部隊之間的緊張遭遇和小衝突仍在繼續。

在去年 12 月發生的最新一次公開承認的衝突之後,《美國新聞與世界報道》援引未透露姓名的消息來源稱,美國在整個事件過程中向印度提供了實時情報支持。

坎塔在擔任大使期間親自參與了中印外交,他表示,北京近年來的行為“在印度和美國造成了深深的痛苦、焦慮和疑慮”。

坎塔說:“因此,雖然印度絕對不傾向於采取任何形式遏製中國,但我們認為像中國這樣的國家是無法被遏製的,或者說我們對與中國經濟脫鉤也不感興趣。” 我們更傾向於對中國采取某種去風險策略,我們傾向於建立威懾來防範中國的魯莽行為,以避免重蹈2020年4月和5月在西部地區邊境發生的事情。”

坎塔表示,印度麵臨的任務“主要是建立

發展我們自己的能力,但也需要對中國進行外部製衡,然後與美國和其他誌同道合的國家合作將成為而且事實上已經是我們政策的重要組成部分。”

盡管他對在邊界爭端上沒有取得重大進展的情況下中印關係的任何重大改善持懷疑態度,但他表示,避免更嚴重的衝突對於印度在其他方麵實現其國家目標至關重要。

坎塔說:“這非常重要,因為我們的國防預算仍然相對有限,我們希望在可預見的未來專注於發展。” “因邊界沿線的任何衝突或緊張局勢長期升級而分散注意力絕對不符合我們的利益。”

印度,士兵,斯利那加,列城,高速公路,

1 月 6 日,在印控克什米爾斯利那加以東 67 英裏的佐吉拉,印度陸軍士兵在斯利那加-列城高速公路上的掩體外站崗。 這個戰略關口連接克什米爾和位於的拉達克。

不列顛哥倫比亞大學客座教授斯瓦蘭·辛格(Swaran Singh)擁有數十年在印度主要外交和軍事機構授課的經驗,他也認為,管理好這種關係對於實現兩國的長期目標至關重要。

辛格對《新聞周刊》表示:“降級是唯一的出路,因為中國和印度都不能偏離其發展軌跡,也不能錯過他們想象中的曆史性複興,成為世界事務的中心舞台。” “但隨著兩個快速增長的經濟體和同等文明國家重新奪回自己在陽光下的地位,它們的競爭仍然不可避免。”

中國和印度之間的動態並不總是那麽嚴峻。 雖然 1960 年代的邊境戰爭、中國與巴基斯坦的密切關係以及印度在 1950 年代吞並西藏後主辦西藏分離主義流亡政府的做法,助長了兩個大國之間根深蒂固的怨恨,但這些努力始於 20 世紀 80 年代末, 2018 年和 2019 年,中國國家主席習近平和印度總理納倫德拉·莫迪在各自國家舉行了峰會。

然而,三年前,當新冠病毒 (COVID-19) 開始席卷全球時,兩國發生了致命的邊境口角,這標誌著一個黑暗的轉折。 印度外交部上周拒絕了中國重新命名印度聲稱擁有主權的領土內11個地點的決定,而中國外交部則批評印度內政部長阿米特·沙阿周一訪問有爭議的邊境地區,這場爭執繼續成為頭條新聞。

然而,由於邊境緊張局勢仍在發酵,辛格斷言“雙方都同意需要開始建立信任的新篇章,以適應他們作為快速發展的大國的新形象。”

與此同時,他表示,“雙方都在繼續進行大規模的前沿部署,同時也在致力於軍事脫離接觸,即使麵對定期的核心指揮官級別和部際會議,這也是不完整和不平衡的。”

辛格說:“當他們學會處理雙邊和曆史問題時,他們現在需要學習如何在新的大國形象中相互接觸,特別是在地區和全球論壇上的互動。”

兩國在某些關鍵領域至少取得了一些共同點,在日益多極化的國際秩序中獲得了更多的相關性。 其中包括九個國家的上海合作組織集團和被稱為金磚國家的非正式聯盟,其中包括中國、印度、巴西、俄羅斯和南非。

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這次選舉可能會以台灣為代價給中國帶來一個新的拉美朋友

兩次台灣之行對最危險的中美問題的命運意味著什麽

距戰爭邊緣四年,陷入危機的巴基斯坦能否避免新的印度衝突?

其他一些國家已申請或表示有興趣加入這兩個組織,這兩個組織承諾為了加強安全和經濟協調而擱置雙邊爭端。

盡管如此,中國在經濟、軍事和外交領域日益增長的影響力給新德裏帶來了風險和機遇。

辛格說:“雖然中國展現出前所未有的經濟增長,鞏固了其政治影響力和軍事現代化,但中國的崛起使印度成為美國領導的自由世界秩序中現狀大國的首選合作夥伴。” “這為印度打開了技術轉讓和國防合作的大門,使印度成為唯一展現出對抗中國能力的鄰國。”

印度還加大了與美國、澳大利亞和日本一起參與另一個多邊組織“四邊安全對話”(俗稱“四方”)的力度。 四方加強了成員之間的合作,中國經常指責四方試圖組建一個以遏製中華人民共和國為基礎的集團。

然而,與坎塔一樣,辛格也指出,這些融入印度作為一個國家核心原則的聯係是有限度的。

辛格說:“即使在獨立和分治最脆弱的時刻,印度也選擇了不結盟,這定義了其文明基因。” “今天,作為世界上人口最多的國家、第三大國防支出國、第五大經濟體和擁有核武器的國家,這種情緒得到了加強,並反映在其多邊結盟的公理中。”

他還認為,世界秩序的不穩定為中國和印度的角色發揮了更大的空間,這也有助於阻止雙方有效地解決兩國陷入困境的雙邊關係。

辛格說:“疫情和烏克蘭戰爭肯定分散了中國和印度對雙邊問題的注意力,甚至使中印關係進一步複雜化。” “因此,雖然一個更加和平的世界可能會給他們提供糾正一些刺激的機會,但一定程度的邊緣政策將繼續定義中印關係。”

上海, 合作, 組織, 領導人, 峰會, 2022, 烏茲別克斯坦

(從左到右)印度總理莫迪、哈薩克斯坦總統托卡耶夫、吉爾吉斯斯坦總統賈帕羅夫、中國國家主席習近平、烏茲別克斯坦總統米爾濟約耶夫、俄羅斯總統普京、塔吉克斯坦總統拉赫蒙和巴基斯坦總理沙赫巴茲。

尼赫魯大學副教授、新德裏戰略與國防研究委員會創始人哈皮蒙·雅各布指出了中印關係複雜動態的另一個重要因素。

盡管美國去年超過中國成為印度最大的貿易夥伴,但中華人民共和國仍然是一個有影響力的經濟參與者。 因此,雅各布告訴《新聞周刊》,“印度在公開譴責中國侵略方麵缺乏共識,這主要是印度與中國經濟關係的結果”。

但從根本上來說,他也認為持續不斷的領土爭端是導致中印關係下滑的主要原因。

雅各布說:“中印關係惡化的原因是中國在與印度邊境的掠奪戰略。” “中國也對印度與美國不斷發展的夥伴關係感到不滿,這(至少部分)首先是中國侵略的結果。”

他補充道:“如果中國恢複 2020 年夏季對峙之前的領土現狀,不再對印度領土提出主權要求,雙邊緊張局勢就有可能緩和。” “但我認為中國並不熱衷於這樣做。”

鑒於雙方之間日益加深的不信任程度,曾在印度擔任國家安全顧問的新德裏觀察家研究基金會研究員馬諾吉·喬希(Manoj Joshi)也對《新聞周刊》表示,“兩國和解的可能性很小”。 低的。”

喬希說:“兩國一直非常謹慎地確保事情不會變得更糟,但似乎沒有可以建立新的臨時解決辦法的共識。” “緩和局勢是可以解決的,事實上,也正在解決中。但和解的可能性不大。懷疑不會輕易消失。”

他補充說:“局勢仍將令人擔憂,特別是因為雙方繼續在邊界實際控製線兩側集結兵力。” “早期的進程是以尋求削弱此類力量的協議為基礎的。”

但印度與美國日益接近也存在障礙。 盡管來自北京的威脅推動了新德裏向華盛頓的轉變,但印度和美國在許多其他地緣政治問題上存在分歧。

喬希說:“印度和中國之間的實力差距無疑是推動當前美印關係趨同的一個主要因素。” “但印度的立場主要是由其規模和利益驅動的。它認為來自巴基斯坦的重大安全威脅,而美國在不同時期一直是巴基斯坦的主要軍事盟友。它認為伊朗是波斯半島上相對溫和的參與者。” 海灣和朋友,美國將德黑蘭視為敵對參與者。”

喬希說:“這排除了與美國建立正式軍事聯盟的可能性,而這需要更加一致的觀點。

Why India, China's Bitter Foe, Won't Become a U.S. Ally

https://www.newsweek.com/why-india-chinas-bitter-foe-wont-become-us-ally-1792564#:~:text= 

By Tom O'Connor, Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy  Apr 11, 2023 

 

 

India Ready For 'Any Contingency' Against China, Warns Head Of Army

Amid heightened tensions between neighboring Asian powers that are home to the world's two largest populations, India has grown closer to the United States and other Western-aligned nations, while becoming increasingly wary of a rising China.

But even as New Delhi takes unprecedented steps toward shoring up relations with the Washington, there appears to be little chance the traditionally non-aligned nation will establish any formal defense alliance with the U.S.

"In fact, we do refer to India and the USA as natural allies," former Indian ambassador to China Ashok Kantha told Newsweek, "but this is not in the sense of a military alliance."

Such an alliance would run contrary to more than 75 years of India's post-colonial history after winning its independence from the United Kingdom and suffering a violent partition with Pakistan, sparking the first of several wars over disputed territory with the neighboring Islamic Republic as well as one with China six decades ago. Even during some of the nation's most dire crises, however, India has opted to not choose sides among world powers.

"We had to suffer a period of colonial subjugation lasting two centuries, and then we emerged as one of the most populous countries in the world, which was also innovative in democracy, in multiculturalism and in an open society," Kantha said. "We came to the conclusion during the Cold War period that India cannot be a camp follower of either great power, at that time the USA and the Soviet Union, that we will work with both countries."

Today, this policy referred to by India as "strategic autonomy" continues amid growing frictions between the U.S. and China, even if New Delhi saw Washington as the better partner.

"We will not be equidistant, we will take positions on issues," he added. "On some issues we might be closer to the USA, but we will not join a military alliance. And this basic consensus has remained unchanged."

Why India Is U.S. Partner

In this Newsweek photo illustration, U.S. President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands during the G20 Summit on November 15, 2022 in Nusa Dua, Indonesia. 

Such a position has never implied neutrality. Throughout the Cold War, New Delhi forged a tight strategic partnership with Moscow, a relationship still very much alive today in the form of diplomatic interactions and the outsized presence of Russian weaponry comprising the arsenal of the Indian Armed Forces.

So, while Kantha asserted that India had "serious misgivings" regarding Russia's decision to launch a war in Ukraine in February of last year, he said "we abstain from condemning Russia because it's a relationship that has been historically important to us, and even today for a variety of reasons."

Even before the conflict in Ukraine, however, Kantha said that New Delhi was looking to diversify its military partnerships, a trend that has served as a major opportunity for U.S.-India relations, in which he said that "defense is emerging as a very major area." In addition to a broadening array of intelligence-sharing pacts, the two countries have pursued a growing number of joint exercises, including the Yudh Abhyas training that took place in November near India's disputed border with China.

The contested 2,100-mile boundary separating China and India, known as the Line of Actual Control, has been the source of the most serious tensions between the two powers in decades, beginning with a deadly series of clashes in 2020. The two sides have repeatedly attempted to de-escalate the situation, but tense encounters and skirmishes have continued among troops armed with clubs and stones.

After the latest publicly acknowledged clash that occurred in December, U.S. News & World Report cited unnamed sources claiming that the U.S. offered India real-time intelligence support throughout the incident.

Kantha, who was personally involved in navigating China-India diplomacy during his tenure as ambassador, said Beijing's actions in recent years "caused deep pain or anxieties and misgivings in India, as also in the USA."

"So while India is definitely not inclined to move towards any kind of containment of China, we believe that a country like China cannot be contained, or nor are we interested in the economic decoupling from China," Kantha said, "I think we are more inclined towards some kind of de-risking strategy vis-à-vis China, we are inclined to build deterrence to guard against China's reckless behavior to avoid a repetition of what happened along the borders in the western sector in April and May 2020."

The task at hand for India, according to Kantha, "will largely be building our own capabilities, but also requires an aspect of external balancing of China and then working together with USA and other likeminded countries will become, and is already in fact, an important component of our policy."

And while he was skeptical of any major improvement in China-India relations without serious progress made on the border dispute, he said avoiding a more serious conflict was crucial for India to achieve its national goals on other fronts.

"It's extremely important, because our defense budget remains relatively modest and we would like to focus on development for the foreseeable future," Kantha said. "Getting distracted by any conflict or protracted escalation of tensions along the borders is definitely not in our interest."

India, soldiers, on, Srinagar, Leh, highway,

Indian army soldiers stand guard outside their bunker on the Srinagar-Leh highway on January 6 in Zojila, 67 miles east of Srinagar in Indian-administered Kashmir. The strategic pass connects Kashmir with Ladakh, which is located. 

Swaran Singh, a visiting professor at the University of British Columbia with decades of experience lecturing at India's major diplomatic and military institutions, also argued that managing this relationship was essential for achieving the long-term objectives of both powers.

"De-escalation is the only way as both China and India cannot afford to derail their development trajectories and miss their imagined historic resurgence to the center stage of world affairs," Singh told Newsweek. "But as two rapidly growing economies and peer civilizational states reclaiming their place under the sun, their competition remains inevitable."

The dynamic between China and India was not always so grim. While their 1960s border war, China's close ties with Pakistan and India's hosting of the separatist government-in-exile of Tibet following the region's annexation by China in the 1950s fostered deep-rooted bitterness between the two powers, efforts began in the late 1980s and early 1990s to rehabilitate their relations and, as recently as 2018 and 2019 Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held summits in their respective countries.

Their fatal border spat three years ago, just as COVID-19 began to grip the world, signaled a dark turn, however. The feud has continued to make headlines as the Indian Foreign Ministry rejected China's decision last week to rename 11 places within territory claimed by India and the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Indian Home Minister Amit Shah's visit to the contested frontier region on Monday.

And yet, with border tensions still simmering, Singh asserted that "both sides agree on the need to begin a new chapter of confidence building to suit their new avatar as rapidly developing major powers."

At the same time, he said "both also continue with heavy forward deployments while also working on military disengagement which has been, even in face of regular core commander level and inter-ministerial meetings, patchy and uneven."

"As they learnt to deal with their bilateral and historic problems," Singh said, "they now need to learn ropes of engaging each other in their new avatars as major powers and especially in their interface in regional and global fora."

The two countries have managed to share at least some common ground in certain key venues gaining more relevance in an increasingly multipolar international order. These include the nine-state Shanghai Cooperation Organization bloc and the informal coalition known as BRICS, in which China and India are joined by Brazil, Russia and South Africa.

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A number of other countries have applied to or expressed interest in joining these two groups that promise to put bilateral quarrels aside in the interest of greater security and economic coordination.

Still, China's growing clout in the economic, military and diplomatic spheres have presented both risk and opportunity for New Delhi.

"While China has demonstrated an unprecedented economic growth that undergirds its political influence and military modernization, China's rise has made India the preferred partner for status quo powers in the U.S.-led liberal world order," Singh said. "This has opened doors for technology transfers and defense cooperation for India, making India the only neighbor that has showcased capacity to stand up to China."

India has also doubled down on its participation in another multilateral group, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, alongside the U.S., Australia and Japan. The quartet has intensified cooperation among members and it is regularly accused by China of representing an attempt to form a bloc built on containing the People's Republic.

But, like Kantha, Singh pointed out that there were limits to these ties built into India's core tenets as a nation.

"Even at its weakest moment of independence with partition, India chose nonalignment that defines its civilizational DNA," Singh said. "Today, as the world's largest population country, third-largest defense spender, fifth-largest economy and a state with nuclear weapons, this sentiment stands reinforced and reflected in its axiom of multialignment."

He also argued that the same instability in the world order that has made room for growing roles for both China and India has also helped to prevent the two sides from effectively catering to their ailing bilateral relations.

"Pandemic and the Ukraine war have surely distracted both China and India from attending to their bilateral problems, if not further complicated China-India equations," Singh said. "So, while a more peaceful world may avail them opportunities to redress some of their irritants, some amount of brinkmanship will continue to define China-India relations."

Shanghai, Cooperation, Organization, Leaders, Summit, 2022, Uzbekistan

(L-R) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz.

Happymon Jacob, an associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University and founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research in New Delhi, pointed to another important factor in the complex dynamic of China-India relations.

While the U.S. surpassed China as India's top trading partner last year, the People's Republic remains an influential economic player. As such, Jacob told Newsweek that there is "an absence of a consensus in India on openly calling out Chinese aggression, which is primarily a result of India's economic relationship with China."

Fundamentally, however, he too saw the ongoing dispute over territory as primarily driving the downturn in China-India relations.

"The reason behind the deterioration in Sino-Indian relationship is China's land grab strategy on the border with India," Jacob said. "China is also unhappy about India's growing partnership with the U.S., which (at least partly) is a result of China's aggression in the first place."

"If China were to reinstate the territorial status quo as it existed prior to the summer standoff of 2020 and stake no more claims to Indian territories, it is possible to deescalate bilateral tensions," he added. "But I don't think China is keen to do that."

Given the level of mistrust that has been fostered among the two sides, Manoj Joshi, a fellow at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation who has served in national security advisory roles in India, also told Newsweek that "the chances of a rapprochement are low."

"The two countries have been very careful in ensuring that things don't go from bad to worse, but there seems to be no meeting ground on which a new modus vivendi can rest," Joshi said. "De-escalation can be worked out and is, in fact, being worked out. But rapprochement is unlikely. Suspicions will not go away easily."

"The situation will remain fraught, especially since both sides continue to build up their forces on either side of the Line of Actual Control that marks their border," he added. "The earlier process had rested on agreements that had sought to build down such forces."

But obstacles exist to India's growing proximity to the U.S. as well. While the perceived threat from Beijing has helped fuel New Delhi's shift toward Washington, there are a host of other geopolitical issues on which India and the U.S. are at odds.

"The power gap between India and China, is certainly a major factor driving the current convergence of U.S.-India ties," Joshi said. "But India's positions are mainly driven by its size and interests. It perceives a significant security threat from Pakistan, whereas the U.S. has been at various times a major military ally of Pakistan. And where it sees Iran as a relatively benign actor in the Persian Gulf and a friend, the U.S. has seen Tehran as a hostile player."

"This rules out the possibility of a formal military alliance with the U.S.," Joshi said, "something that would require a much closer identity of views."

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