黑社會監獄幫派管理美國的刑罰製度

地下世界的社會秩序， 監獄幫派如何管理美國的刑罰係統

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System    by David Skarbek (Author) June 18 2014

大衛·斯卡貝克，2014

門派各立 影響力外溢 揭秘美國監獄黑幫

 

佩利肯灣監獄內部一景。　

　

　在監獄內放風的囚犯猶如生活在外麵的自由世界。

美國監獄防範嚴密。

監獄本該是罪犯接受懲罰和教育的地方，而在美國加利福尼亞州的一些監獄，犯人們私下裏拉幫結派，繼續違法勾當，其影響力甚至外溢到街頭黑幫，對監獄管理構成新的挑戰。

　　放風期間暗潮湧動

　　今年二月份的一天清晨，美國加州的佩利肯灣監獄，Ｂ區的囚犯們正等待走出牢房，開始早間時段的操場放風。獄警克裏斯托弗·阿科斯塔對前來采訪的《大西洋》月刊記者格雷姆·伍德低聲提示道：“注意觀察他們的行為。”

　　阿科斯塔當了１５年一線獄警，對囚犯們的“習性”了如指掌。按照他的提醒，記者伍德開始留心觀察。囚犯們陸續走出牢房，逐一接受獄警搜身檢查，然後步入操場呼吸新鮮空氣。漸漸地，伍德開始有所察覺：隊伍中第一個具拉美裔特征的犯人進入操場後，徑直走向約４５米外的一張水泥台坐下來，似乎在等待；第一個黑人囚犯走到健身區，緊盯著場外；一個白人囚犯則選擇了靠近籃球場的第三個地點……“顯然，他們的行動是有目的性的：每個人為各自的團夥及同伴標出一個集合點，”伍德寫道。

　　當“集合點”聚集了一定人數，比如５個人，他們會派出兩名“偵察員”，在操場上先逛一圈，偷聽其他團夥的談話，摸清楚“局勢”。“然後，他們回到自己的‘基地’匯報情況，比如誰打算揍誰，誰要倒賣什麽貨，等等。”

　　伍德得知，這所監獄中關押的幾乎全是參與謀殺、盜竊、販毒等犯罪的重罪犯，其中絕大多數人分別加入加州六大監獄黑幫：“我們的家族”、“墨西哥黑手黨”、“亞利安兄弟會”、“黑色遊擊隊”、“北方組織”、“納粹飆車手”。囚犯們劃分放風地盤的行為，正是監獄黑幫之間相互較量、製約的體現。

　　監獄黑幫機製成熟

　　加州監獄黑幫的存在由來已久，其勢力不僅局限於監獄內部，還蔓延到社會上，與獄外犯罪分子勾結呼應。一些監獄黑幫的影響力甚至反超街頭黑幫。

　　不過，外界對監獄黑幫的了解十分有限。他們如何在監獄管控下組織運作，是黑幫成員須嚴格保守的秘密。據稱，透露細節的“告密者”會遭到監獄內外黑幫的追殺。

　　加州學者戴維·斯卡爾貝克研究監獄黑幫多年，今年夏天出版《地下世界的社會秩序》一書，試圖揭開黑幫內幕。他的研究主要針對加州監獄係統，這是全美第二大監獄係統，目前共收押大約１３．５萬囚犯。

　　斯卡爾貝克發現，加州監獄黑幫出現於上世紀５０年代，正值入獄人數激增、監獄係統亟待擴張之時。不同族裔的囚犯被混雜關押，年輕氣盛的“初進宮”者和有犯罪前科的“老油條”們關在一起，擁擠的監獄內暴力事件不斷，監獄管理者一時也無能為力。一些囚犯不得不聯手合作，形成小團體，起初目的是為尋求自保，後來發展為爭奪獄中有限資源和利益。監獄黑幫由此興起。

　　“監獄黑幫是高度成熟的組織，有詳盡的發展規劃，有一套等級製度，甚至還有‘人力資源部門’，”斯卡爾貝克說，他們會用盡一切手段尋找空隙、瞞天過海，讓手機、刀具、香煙、毒品等違禁品流入監獄，並實施地下交易。

　　防範嚴密仍有罪惡漏洞

　　根據斯卡爾貝克的研究，加州六大監獄黑幫中，“我們的家族”、“墨西哥黑手黨”和“北方組織”主要吸納拉美裔囚犯；“亞利安兄弟會”是宣揚極端種族主義的白人囚犯團夥，曾在獄中製造多起駭人聽聞的暴力謀殺，“納粹飆車手”是其分支；“黑色遊擊隊”的成員則是與白人勢不兩立的黑人囚犯。

　　獄警們深知，把屬於不同黑幫的囚犯混在一起，就好比讓不同化學元素接觸，可能會導致災難性“爆炸”。因此，在積累多年經驗基礎上，監獄方麵如今也學會巧妙利用幫派之間的關係管理囚犯。

　　為了控製監獄黑幫，加州當局嚐試過兩種方式。第一種是拆散黑幫成員，把他們送到不同監獄關押，希望以此瓦解黑幫對某個監獄的影響力，結果卻適得其反。黑幫成員轉移到其他監獄後不但沒有安分守己，反而繼續招兵買馬擴大勢力，幾乎“汙染”加州所有監獄，甚至影響到其他州的部分監獄。

　　２０世紀９０年代起，當局新建佩利肯灣監獄，開始嚐試現行做法：確認監獄黑幫的高級頭目，全部送到佩利肯灣監獄關押。

　　監獄裏有一棟六角形建築，是專門關押黑幫頭目等重犯的地方。他們通常被判終身監禁。不同於其他囚犯，這些重犯沒有每天到操場放風的機會，隻能被押往樓內一間玻璃頂空屋，單獨曬曬太陽。

　　這間空屋四麵都是水泥牆，空空蕩蕩，地上有一個小小的排汙孔。即便如此，黑幫頭目們依然能設法通過這個小孔，與其他牢房的幫派成員們傳遞信息。

　　記者伍德在獄警陪同下進入這一重犯牢區，打算就黑幫話題采訪幾個犯人，結果未能如願。多數囚犯對他的提問置若罔聞，理都不理。一個身上文有刺青的拉美裔男囚隔著牢門，像趕蒼蠅似的衝伍德揮手。隻有一個犯人回答他：“監獄黑幫？這兒沒什麽黑幫。”

　　新華社供本報特稿

地下世界的社會秩序， 監獄幫派如何管理美國的刑罰係統

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System    by David Skarbek (Author) June 18 2014

大衛·斯卡貝克，2014
審閱者：Daniel J. D’Amico； 布朗大學,  發表在《獨立評論》2015 年春季刊上。

大衛·斯卡貝克的新書《地下世界的社會秩序：監獄幫派如何治理美國刑罰係統》經過精心研究，推理合理，文筆優美，適合專業學者和普通讀者閱讀。 對於任何對經濟學或犯罪與懲罰應用領域有認真研究興趣的人來說，即使不是立即閱讀，也應該被認為是必讀的。

首先，斯卡貝克的著作重申了經濟思維方式的解釋力。 他對理性選擇分析的致力於，以及他對自我調節和自發進化的社會製度潛力的理解，為理解近年來相對未通過類似技術進行研究的重要主題提供了新的見解。 此前的研究人員將監獄幫派的崛起和穩定歸因於潛在的種族敵對情緒，但這種分析有很多無法解釋的地方，也未能完全符合這一趨勢的特定時間和程度。 相比之下，斯卡貝克認為看似精神病的幫派成員是理性且有目的的代理人。 他們的偏好是由他們的犯罪身份主觀決定的，就像他們所追求的行動方針受到監禁的獨特限製一樣。 基於這種觀點，他能夠認識到監獄社會的獨特條件因素——例如資源極度匱乏、潛在的暴力和敵對人員以及公共當局不可靠的安全保障——如何影響囚犯的動機和行為。 有利於監獄幫派組織形式中所激發的規則和習俗的出現。

斯卡貝克為整個美國監獄係統中犯罪團夥組織最近興起的令人費解的現象提供了獨特而令人信服且我認為準確的解釋。 簡而言之，囚犯們之所以形成監獄幫派的組織形式，是因為在二十世紀末監獄人口急劇增長的情況下，戒備森嚴的治安和以前的社會習俗已經不再有效，囚犯們從幫派組織中獲得了類似於合同執行、個人利益等治理機製。 安全和爭議解決。

在監獄社會中，從基本設施到麻醉品的物質資源都受到管理當局的嚴格監管和/或禁止，但對它們的需求仍然強勁，因此它們的利潤潛力很高。 就其本質而言，囚犯中充滿了邪惡的成員，但以前監獄生活的限製足以讓囚犯認識到長期合作而非衝突的好處。 因此，非正式的、自我強製執行的囚犯行為守則的曆史可以追溯到監獄本身。

在過去的幾十年裏，囚犯人口規模較小且更加同質，走私、生產和衝突裁決的協調成本相對較低。 然而，隨著近幾十年來監獄人口激增，非正式法規的效力開始減弱並最終瓦解。 規模更大、異質性更強的犯罪群體使得合作與協調的發展和維持變得更加困難。 反過來，由種族、族裔身份和生產性比較優勢組成的信任網絡隨著不斷發展的組織結構而出現，這些組織結構附有內部強製製衡，以填補安全和衝突裁決所需的角色。 斯卡貝克表明，從囚犯的角度來看——他在全文中通過原始資料、二次學術研究和新聞報道對囚犯的角度進行了徹底調查——監獄幫派在維持監獄內的社會秩序方麵發揮著至關重要的作用。

斯卡貝克的工作還為目前占主導地位且可以說不完整的犯罪和懲罰模型提供了急需的方法和理論更新。 在某種程度上，監獄建築象征並肯定了一個標準框架。 刀片刺網和炮塔傳達出這樣的信息：這些裝甲箱內潛伏著危險的東西，而這些籠子可能可以保證社會的安全。 監獄空間不僅向囚犯傳達這種隱含的社會秩序和治理模式，還巧妙地向整個社會的所有公民傳達這種隱含的社會秩序和治理模式。 人類擁有極其危險的邪惡和暴力能力。 犯罪是非法的，對社會有害。 監獄本質上是同時用來懲罰惡人、保護無辜、震懾邪惡的工具。

正如早期刑罰理論家和監獄設計者傑裏米·邊沁 (Jeremy Bentham) 所總結的那樣，“道德改革——健康保護——工業活躍，教育普及——公共負擔減輕——經濟如同磐石一般——濟貧法的棘手結沒有被割斷” ，但又不受束縛——這一切都源於建築中的一個簡單想法！” （“全景敞視監獄”，《全景敞視監獄著作》，Miran Bozovic 編輯 [倫敦：Verso]，第 30 頁）。

然而，衡量和肯定刑事處罰監禁模式的實證效果的嚐試卻產生了相對模糊的結果。 累犯依然存在； 刑事增長的財務成本似乎不可持續； 跨國犯罪率似乎與監獄趨勢並不直接相符。 天生好奇的人理所當然地想知道這些設施內發生了什麽。 然而近年來，監獄人種學研究越來越少。 我們可以慶幸的是，斯卡貝克就是這樣一個充滿好奇心的人，他的理性選擇和新的製度方法超越了他的主題的經驗挑戰。

他的研究結果中最令人不安的是那些顯示監獄幫派對監獄圍牆之外和整個傳統社會的影響的結果。 監獄是解決犯罪和社會混亂的默認手段。 大多數人自然地認為，如果有人違法，他或她就應該入獄，但斯卡貝克的研究發現，在監禁範圍內形成的社會組織的影響力要複雜得多，甚至可能存在問題。 一旦進入監獄圍牆，個體罪犯必須使自己的行為適應由極端暴力、獨裁等級製度和不信任所強製執行的規則和權力關係體係。 鑒於獲釋囚犯的數量龐大且不斷增加，以及他們重新融入自由社會的困難，人們必須想知道，放棄與在監獄社區生存相關的文化學習是多麽困難，甚至可能是不可能的。 城市街頭幫派的突出地位及其協調非法移民和毒品生產和分銷的能力，即使不是直接受到監獄幫派組織結構的鼓勵，也間接受到監獄空間條件因素的影響，似乎也受到影響。 在某種程度上，閱讀《地下世界的社會秩序》會讓人們以一種新的眼光看待監獄建築。 裝甲箱孕育著這樣的社會體係：暴力權力和殘酷報複得到回報，善意被剝削，信任永遠不確定。 然後，那些不得不生活在這些係統中的個體會定期返回傳統社會，從而帶來毫不奇怪的危險後果。

許多活動人士和分析人士長期以來一直主張監獄改革，但這種努力在很大程度上受到阻礙，因為社會對與此類製度形式相關的全麵而準確的成本和收益相對無知。 毫無疑問，由於這篇開創性的文本，世界更加了解了情況。 老實說，《地下世界的社會秩序》是一本我希望自己有洞察力、時間、耐心和奉獻精神來寫的書。 我隻希望類似的作品能夠隨之而來。

丹尼爾·J·達米科
布朗大學

The Social Order of the Underworld, How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System

https://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?id=1057

David Skarbek,   2014 

Reviewed by: Daniel J. D'Amico; Brown University

This book review appeared in the Spring 2015 issue of The Independent Review.

 

David Skarbek’s new book The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System is meticulously researched, soundly reasoned, well written, and accessible to specialist scholars and casual readers alike. It should be considered required if not immediate reading for anyone with serious research interests in either economics or the applied fields of crime and punishment.

 

First and foremost, Skarbek’s work reaffirms the explanatory power of the economic way of thinking. His commitment to rational-choice analysis and his understanding surrounding the potentials for self-regulating and spontaneously evolved social institutions offer fresh insights to comprehend an important topic relatively uninvestigated in recent years through similar techniques. Previous researchers attributed prison gangs’ rise and stability to latent racial hostilities, but such analysis leaves much unexplained and fails to fully accord with the particular timing and magnitudes of the trend. In contrast, Skarbek considers seemingly psychotic gang members as rational and purposeful agents. Their preferences are subjectively shaped by their criminal identities, just as their pursued courses of action are uniquely constrained by their imprisonment. As a result of this view, he is able to recognize how the distinctive conditional factors of prison society—such as extreme resource scarcity, a population of potentially violent and hostile agents, and unreliable security from public authorities—shape inmates’ incentives and behaviors in favor of the emergence of rules and customs galvanized within the organizational form of prison gangs.

 

Skarbek provides a uniquely compelling and I think accurate explanation for the puzzling and recent rise of criminal gang organizations throughout the American prison system. In short, inmates coalesced on the organizational form of prison gangs because guarded security and previously common social customs were less effective amid extreme prison population growth during the late twentieth century, and so the inmates received from gang organizations governance mechanisms akin to contract enforcement, personal security, and dispute resolution.

 

In prison societies, material resources from basic amenities to narcotics are heavily regulated and/or prohibited by managing authorities, yet demand for them remains intense and thus their profit potential high. By their very nature, inmate populations are filled with nefarious members, but the confines of prison life in previous eras sufficiently attuned inmates to the benefits of long-run cooperation over conflict. Hence, informal and self-enforced inmate codes of conduct date back historically as long as prisons themselves.

 

In earlier decades, smaller and more homogeneous inmate populations represented relatively low coordination costs for smuggling, production, and conflict adjudication. However, as prison populations exploded in recent decades, the efficacy of informal codes began to fray and ultimately to unravel. Larger and more heterogeneous groups of confined criminals made cooperation and coordination more difficult to develop and maintain. In turn, networks of trust aligned by race, ethnic identity, and productive comparative advantage emerged with evolved organizational structures that were affixed with internally enforced checks and balances to fill the needed roles of security and conflict adjudication. Skarbek shows that from the inmates’ perspective—which he has thoroughly surveyed with original source materials, secondary academic research, and journalistic reports throughout the text—prison gangs serve a crucial function in the maintenance of social order behind bars.

 

Skarbek’s work also serves as a much needed methodological and theoretical update to the currently dominant and arguably incomplete models of crime and punishment. In a way, prison architectures symbolize and affirm a standard framework. Razor wire and gun turrets communicate that something dangerous lurks within these armored boxes and that such cages presumably keep society safe. Prison spaces communicate this implicit model of social order and governance not only to their inhabitants but also subtly to all citizens living throughout society. Human beings possess an incredibly dangerous capacity for evil and violence. Crimes are illegitimate and harmful to society. Prisons are essentially tools used simultaneously to punish evildoers, to protect the innocent, and to deter evil henceforth. 

As early penal theorist and prison designer Jeremy Bentham summarized, “Morals reformed—health preserved— industry invigorated, instruction diffused—public burthens lightened— Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock—the Gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied—all by a simple idea in Architecture!” (“Panopticon,” in The Panopticon Writings, edited by Miran Bozovic [London: Verso], p. 30).

Yet attempts to measure and affirm the empirical effects of the incarceral model of criminal punishment have born relatively ambiguous results. Recidivism persists; the financial costs of penal growth appear unsustainable; and cross-national crime rates do not seem to accord directly with prison trends. The naturally inquisitive mind rightly wonders simply what occurs inside these facilities. Yet prison ethnographic research has been increasingly rare in recent years. We can be thankful that Skarbek is one such inquisitive mind and that his rational-choice and new institutional approach transcends the empirical challenges of his subject matter.

Most disconcerting in his findings are those that show the effects of prison gangs beyond penitentiary walls and throughout traditional society. Prisons are the default resolution to crime and social disorder. Most people think naturally that if someone breaks the law, he or she should go to jail, yet Skarbek’s research uncovers that the influence of social organizations forged within the confines of incarceration is far more complicated and perhaps problematic. Once inside prison walls, the individual criminal must acclimate his behaviors to a system of rules and power relationships enforced by extreme violence, authoritarian hierarchies, and distrust. Given the high and growing numbers of released inmates and their difficulties reassimilating into free society, one must wonder how difficult or perhaps even impossible it may be to leave behind the cultural learning associated with surviving the prison community. The prominence of urban street gangs and their abilities to coordinate illegal immigration and the production and distribution of narcotics seem influenced if not encouraged directly by the organizational structures of prison gangs and indirectly by the conditional factors of prison space. In a way, reading The Social Order of the Underworld causes one to see prison architectures in a new light. Armored boxes incubate social systems where violent power and cut-throat retaliation are rewarded, kindness exploited, and trust is never certain. The individuals who have had to live in these systems are then periodically cycled back into traditional society with unsurprisingly hazardous consequences.

Many activists and analysts have long argued for prison reform, but such efforts are largely stunted by society’s relative ignorance regarding the full and accurate costs and benefits associated with such institutional forms. In no uncertain terms, the world is better informed thanks to this groundbreaking text. In full honesty, The Social Order of the Underworld is a book I wish I had had the insight, time, patience, and dedication to write. I only hope that similar works will follow in its wake.

Daniel J. D’Amico
Brown University

黑社會的社會秩序：監獄幫派如何管理美國的刑罰製度

https://www.amazon.ca/Social-Order-Underworld-Prison-American/dp/0199328501

作者：David Skarbek（作者）2014 年 6 月 18 日

摘要
本書研究監獄黑社會的社會秩序，以了解法外機構如何形成、運作和演變。 它利用經濟學來探索囚犯文化、囚犯等級製度和監獄幫派政治的秘密世界。 與國家薄弱國家的企業家一樣，從事非法活動的囚犯不能依賴國家治理機構，例如法院和警察。 懲教人員不會解決海洛因交易出錯的糾紛，也不會幫助殺死掠奪性強奸犯。 囚犯必須製定規則來管理俘虜社會。 在當今的監獄中，幫派在保護囚犯和在違禁品市場進行非法交易方麵發揮著關鍵作用。 它們具有複雜的內部結構，並且常常依賴於詳盡的成文章程。 為了維持社會秩序，幫派裁決衝突並策劃戰略性暴力行為，以協商囚犯、幫派成員和懲教人員的相互競爭的要求。 本書利用經濟學來解釋監獄幫派為何形成、他們如何與正式機構互動以及他們如何影響監獄圍牆外的犯罪。 經濟學解釋了監獄生活中看似非理性、真正令人震驚且往往是悲劇性的世界。

當大多數人想到監獄幫派時，他們會想到由暴力、種族主義暴徒組成的混亂群體。 很少有人認為幫派是複雜的組織（通常有詳盡的成文章程），負責監管監獄黑市、裁決衝突並從戰略上平衡囚犯、幫派成員和獄警的相互競爭的需求。

然而，正如大衛·斯卡貝克（David Skarbek）所說，幫派的形成是為了在不法之徒之間建立秩序，產生替代性的治理機構來促進非法活動。 他用經濟學來探索罪犯文化、囚犯等級製度和監獄幫派政治的秘密世界，並解釋監獄幫派為何形成、正式製度如何影響他們，以及為什麽他們對監獄之外的犯罪行為具有強大的影響力。 他的發現的影響遠遠超出了看似非理性且常常是悲劇性的俘虜社會。 它們還闡明了在傳統治理機構不存在的情況下社會和政治秩序如何出現。

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System

 https://www.amazon.ca/Social-Order-Underworld-Prison-American/dp/0199328501

by David Skarbek (Author)June 18 2014

Abstract
This book studies the social order of the prison underworld to understand how extralegal institutions form, operate, and evolve. It uses economics to explore the secret world of the convict culture, inmate hierarchy, and prison gang politics. Like entrepreneurs in countries with weak states, inmates engaged in illegal activity cannot rely on state-based governance institutions, such as courts of law and the police. Correctional officers will not resolve a dispute over a heroin deal gone wrong or help kill a predatory rapist. Inmates must create rules to govern the society of captives. In today’s prisons, gangs play a pivotal role in protecting inmates and enforcing illicit deals in contraband markets. They have sophisticated internal structures and often rely on elaborate written constitutions. To maintain social order, gangs adjudicate conflicts and orchestrate strategic acts of violence to negotiate the competing demands of inmates, gang members, and correctional officers. This book uses economics to explain why prison gangs form, how they interact with formal institutions, and how they influence crime beyond prison walls. Economics explains the seemingly irrational, truly astonishing, and often tragic world of prison life.

When most people think of prison gangs, they think of chaotic bands of violent, racist thugs. Few people think of gangs as sophisticated organizations (often with elaborate written constitutions) that regulate the prison black market, adjudicate conflicts, and strategically balance the competing demands of inmates, gang members, and correctional officers. 

Yet as David Skarbek argues, gangs form to create order among outlaws, producing alternative governance institutions to facilitate illegal activity. He uses economics to explore the secret world of the convict culture, inmate hierarchy, and prison gang politics, and to explain why prison gangs form, how formal institutions affect them, and why they have a powerful influence over crime even beyond prison walls. The ramifications of his findings extend far beyond the seemingly irrational and often tragic society of captives. They also illuminate how social and political order can emerge in conditions where the traditional institutions of governance do not exist.

大衛·斯卡貝克 (David Skarbek) 是布朗大學政治學和政治理論項目係副教授。 他的新書《監獄秩序之謎》解釋了為什麽世界各地的監獄生活各不相同。 該書榮獲刑事司法科學院國際部頒發的“傑出圖書獎”。 在他的第一本書《地下世界的社會秩序》中，他用經濟學來解釋為什麽幫派已經主宰了許多美國監獄。

他的學術文章發表在《美國政治科學評論》、《法律、經濟學和組織雜誌》、《經濟行為與組織雜誌》、《刑事司法雜誌》和《公共選擇》等領先期刊上。

他就美國和世界各地的政治和經濟問題發表演講，包括最近在威爾士、比利時、意大利、英格蘭和美國加州大學伯克利分校、哈佛大學、麻省理工學院、斯坦福大學舉辦的學術研討會和公開演講 ，以及國家經濟研究局。 他還曾在杜克大學、倫敦國王學院和加州大學伯克利分校擔任過專業職務。

David Skarbek is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Political Theory Project at Brown University. His new book, The Puzzle of Prison Order, explains why life behind bars varies around the world. It recieved the "Outstanding Book Award" from the International Section of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. In his first book, The Social Order of the Underworld, he uses economics to explain why gangs have come to dominate many American prisons.

His academic articles have been published in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Criminal Justice, and Public Choice.

He gives talks about political and economic issues across the United States and around the world, including recent academic seminars and public talks in Wales, Belgium, Italy, England, and in the United States, including at UC Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, Stanford University, and the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has also held professional appointments at Duke University, King's College London, and University of California, Berkeley.

His personal webpage is www.davidskarbek.com, and he tweets at @davidskarbek.