弗格森 西方麵臨的四大威脅

曆史學家弗格森認為西方麵臨的四大威脅

2023年10月12日

https://www.marketwatch.com/podcasts/at-barrons/the-4-biggest-threats-to-the-west-according-to-historian-ferguson/5a3f2ca3-f9a2-41bc-9c63-b060d2f4a525

“我不相信‘軟著陸’的故事，”曆史學家兼作家尼爾·弗格森在 2023 年 9 月 12 日的一次談話中說道。
這份文字記錄是由轉錄服務機構準備的。 該版本可能不是最終版本，並且可能會更新。

Andy Serwer：大家好，歡迎來到《巴倫周刊》。 我是安迪·塞爾維爾，歡迎我們的嘉賓尼爾·弗格森，他是曆史學家、作家，有時也是預言家。 很公平？

尼爾·弗格森：是的，這很公平。 安迪有罪。

安迪·塞爾維爾：很高興見到你。 那麽，我們為什麽不直接介入呢，尼爾，我想問你，你認為西方社會目前麵臨的最大風險是什麽，以及這些風險在過去一年左右的時間裏發生了怎樣的變化？

尼爾·弗格森：好問題。 我認為存在對經濟自滿的風險。 我不相信軟著陸的故事，因為我認為我們已經看到實際利率大幅上漲，這將會產生後果。 我想說明年經濟衰退的可能性遠高於市場共識。 所以就是這樣。 其次，我認為一個重大的政治風險即將到來，那就是美國大選。 我認為這種風險仍然被那些還沒有完全消化的人低估了，民主黨正在派出一位非常年長的候選人，而他的競選夥伴卻很弱，來對抗唐納德·特朗普，而在許多其他國家，這位候選人將無法參加選舉 鑒於他在 2021 年 1 月 6 日的行為。因此，考慮到特朗普目前麵臨的所有起訴，這是一場令人驚訝的潛在憲法危機。 第三個風險，我認為美國存在一些看不見、摸不著的重大社會問題。 但無論是精神健康流行病還是阿片類藥物流行病，美國都存在一係列非常深刻的社會問題，我對此非常擔心。 最後，讓我來談談地緣政治問題。 美國和中國正處於第二次冷戰。 我不認為每個人都完全理解了這意味著什麽，但在冷戰初期，存在很大的熱戰風險，這可能是目前被低估的最大風險。

Andy Serwer：那裏有很多風險。 想要深入研究其中的每一個。 也許我們會從政治開始。 如果喬·拜登再次當選會發生什麽？

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，我認為這不是我現在的基本情況。 我的基本情況是，如果出現經濟衰退（我認為經濟衰退的可能性比華爾街認為的更大），那麽如果他是候選人，他就會失敗。 我不確定他最終會成為候選人，因為我認為隨著初選的臨近，許多民主黨人將會非常擔心喬·拜登在民意調查中對可能的共和黨候選人唐納德·特朗普的支持率有多差。 因此，我不排除另一位候選人實際上成為 2024 年民主黨提名人。如果沒有經濟衰退，我就錯了，拜登再次當選，那麽他將繼承他本人或他的政府造成的所有問題。 特別是這個國家正處於非同尋常的財政危機。國會預算辦公室剛剛進行了計算，並決定今年的赤字實際上將比幾個月前預期的要大得多。 所以我們關注的是國內生產總值的 8%。 對於一個充分就業的經濟體來說，這是一個巨大的赤字。 我認為很多人並沒有完全意識到，這種火熱的經濟之所以火熱，是因為大規模的財政擴張仍在繼續。 這種情況不可能無限期地持續下去，因為隨著利率上升——因為美聯儲提高了利率，由於通貨膨脹而不得不提高利率——政府借貸成本遠遠高於幾年前。 所以我們正在考慮一個真正的財政問題。 無論誰擔任 2025 年總統都將麵臨一些非常嚴峻的現實。 讓我舉一個例子。 在其曆史的大部分時間裏，美國的國防支出一直高於償債支出。 但事實已不再如此。 到今年年底，它肯定會支付比國防更多的償債或略多的償債。 對於一個與中國存在重大地緣政治競爭的國家來說，這是一個問題。

安迪·塞爾維爾：好吧，我確實還有一些關於經濟的問題，但我認為我們將轉向唐納德·特朗普獲勝後會發生什麽。

尼爾·弗格森：如果唐納德·特朗普獲勝，情況將與 2017 年大不相同。很多人回首過去，都會記得當時特朗普政府有些混亂的品質。 他們並沒有真正指望會獲勝。 事實上他們還沒有準備好接管政府。 這是即興創作。

如果你回頭看的話，那是相當混亂的。 而且還有相當多的連續性，因為他並沒有在所有不同的部門和機構中真正擁有穩定的人員，這些連續性以我的胡佛同事、吉姆·馬蒂斯和 人力資源麥克馬斯特。 如果特朗普連任，特朗普第二屆政府將會大不相同。 首先，他們正在規劃電力。 我所說的他們，是指美國第一智庫中的特朗普支持者，他們有一個計劃，我認為該計劃將與我們在 2017 年看到的計劃非常非常不同。其次，該計劃不包括建製派人士。 因此，不會出現特朗普第一個任期特有的那些限製性影響。 因此，如果有第二個任期，它就不會像第一個任期那樣。 我預計人員會非常不同。 我認為他們的優先事項會讓很多人感到震驚。 第一，我認為他將回歸保護主義。 我認為他仍然是關稅的堅定支持者。 我們漸漸遠離了這些，但它們並沒有消失。 我最近詢問了他的貿易代表羅伯特·萊特希澤（Robert Lighthizer）。 他剛剛出版了一本傳記。 如果特朗普在 2020 年獲勝，他認為他會做什麽？ 他的回答是：“提高關稅。” 所以我認為保護主義戰略將會回歸。 另一件事，我認為首要任務將是清洗司法部，清洗官僚機構，清除特朗普總統和他的顧問們認為在他的第一任總統期間每一次都阻礙他的所有反特朗普分子的沼澤。 學期。 因此，如果特朗普連任，2025 年與 2017 年將是一個非常非常不同的情況。

安迪·塞爾維爾：如果尼爾·弗格森是一個賭徒，他會賭什麽？

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，我認為關鍵問題是，是否存在經濟衰退？ 我認為如果出現經濟衰退，無論誰是共和黨提名人，都有很大的機會獲勝，因為一百年來沒有人在經濟衰退後連任。 卡爾文·柯立芝 (Calvin Coolidge) 是最後一位做到這一點的人，時間是 1924 年。其他所有在經濟衰退緊隨其後試圖連任的人都失敗了。 如果你看看喬·拜登現在的民意調查，就會發現傑拉爾德·福特在他的總統任期內處於什麽階段。 這是關於喬治·H·W·布什在其總統任期的現階段的情況。 因此，如果出現經濟衰退（我確實認為經濟衰退的可能性比共識更大），那麽我認為喬·拜登很難連任。 事實上，我認為共和黨候選人似乎很可能是唐納德·特朗普，但獲勝的可能性可能接近 60%。 我認為很多人還沒有處理過這些賠率。

安迪·塞爾維爾：你談到了拜登政府政策帶來的一些經濟問題，但這些問題主要不是因為美聯儲在淹沒市場或量化寬鬆方麵的政策，我應該說，A和B，削減 利率，第一。 第二，你說高預算赤字是一個問題。 人們不是總是這麽說嗎，尼爾？

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，我想如果你回到 2021 年初，一小部分人，尤其是拉裏·薩默斯，認為通貨膨脹事故正在發生。 我當時的看法也是如此。 這是我為彭博社寫的。 如果你讀過《華盛頓郵報》上發表的拉裏·薩默斯的原創文章，你會發現它全都是關於財政政策的。 他幾乎沒有提及貨幣政策。 我認為正確的分析是，財政出現了巨大的超調，因為他們一直在實施刺激措施。 即使經濟即將複蘇。 我們有疫苗。 大流行尚未結束，但很明顯，一旦擁有高效疫苗，結束就在眼前。 美聯儲也適應了這一點。 事實上，它容納了財政部在 21 年、22 年發行的新債務中的很大一部分。 它一直持續下去。 請記住，直到 2022 年，貨幣立場才真正發生變化，盡管事實上出現了通脹衝擊的紅燈。 因此，我認為去年年中通脹率達到 9% 是財政和貨幣政策錯誤共同作用的結果。 當然，自那時以來，通脹有所下降，但這隻是因為貨幣政策確實大幅收緊。 如果你隻看一下利率上升的方式並根據通貨膨脹進行調整，就會發現這是自保羅·沃爾克時代以來實際借貸成本的最大增幅。 所以你必須回到 40 年前——事實上，稍微超過 40 年前——才會看到這樣的貨幣緊縮。 這種想法認為，這對杠杆率相當高的經濟根本沒有任何影響，比保羅·沃爾克時代的杠杆率要高得多。 我簡直不敢相信。 所以我認為美國當前經濟實力的氛圍有一定的虛幻性。

安迪·塞爾維爾：不過，情況確實如此，人們一個季度又一個季度地呼籲經濟衰退，而且他們一直在不斷推動。 我不知道你是否也遇到過這種情況，但為什麽還沒有發生呢？

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，我確信我們在經濟學課程中都曾學過的一句老話是，貨幣政策的作用具有長期且可變的滯後性。 這種變化是這裏的關鍵。 如果從緊縮到放緩的平均時間是九個月，那就是平均值。 問題是，它實際上可能比這更長嗎？ 答案是肯定的，在這種情況下確實可以。 因此，我認為，對於臨時團隊來說，宣布勝利並說通貨膨脹隻是暫時的異常現象，與擺脫大流行有關，還為時過早。 我認為，隨著企業和家庭必須再融資，他們可能會受到可怕的衝擊。 如果你看看再融資何時發生，比如說未來 12 個月，你就可以看到這一係列事件是如何發生的。 這是很重要的一點。 針對你剛才所說的話，我想指出的另一個重要觀點是，正如人們幾個月來一直在警告經濟衰退一樣，他們當然也多年來甚至幾十年來一直在警告赤字。 但這裏的問題是數量級很重要。 充分就業時的赤字竟然高達GDP的8%，這令人難以置信、令人震驚。 民主黨人傑森·弗曼（Jason Furman）曾是奧巴馬政府的經濟學家，他指出，國會預算辦公室的這些數字令人深感震驚。 他們確實是這樣，他們告訴我們有些事情出了嚴重的問題。 其中一部分原因是借貸成本的增加也會影響政府。 所以債務存量已經相當高了。 如果你看看國會預算辦公室對未來幾十年而不是幾年的預測，它可能會變得非常非常高、非常快，除非出現某種生產力奇跡，或者除非國會做了它長期以來沒有做過的事情，而這實際上是 改革稅收製度並控製福利，我認為這是極不可能的。

Andy Serwer：Niall，你這幾天回到了英國。 此時世界其他國家對美國有何看法？這種情況發生了怎樣的變化？

尼爾·弗格森：這是一個很好的問題。 我從胡佛回到英國休假一年，這很有趣，因為據我所知，那裏的人們比這裏的人們更擔心美國政治。 一般來說，歐洲也是如此。 上周末我剛剛在基輔，那裏非常擔心如果唐納德·特朗普再次當選，他將終止對烏克蘭的製裁。 這讓所有歐洲人都感到擔憂。 歐洲人確實增加了對烏克蘭針對俄羅斯的戰爭努力的承諾，但他們知道，如果沒有美國，歐洲將很難獨自維持這場戰爭努力。 因此，人們對明年美國大選的情況非常不安。 另一方麵還有一種嫉妒，這種嫉妒是針對美國的經濟增長、美國經濟的活力。 他們都羨慕人工智能，因為歐洲基本上沒有人工智能，英國也幾乎沒有。 所以這是一個奇怪的分歧。 人們真的很擔心美國的政治，也有點羨慕美國的經濟。

安迪·塞爾維爾：全球主義和自由民主是否正在永久衰落，或者這隻是我們正在經曆的一個小問題、一種失常？

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，最近經常有人宣布全球化已經死亡。 事實上，當你觀察國際貿易和資本流動的彈性時，它並沒有那麽死。 自 2007 年全球金融危機爆發前的高點以來，該數字已有所回落。 但我們並沒有看到 1929 年後那種全球化的巨大倒退。當人們談論美國和中國之間的脫鉤時，我會說，這是否意味著蘋果公司 80% 的硬件是在中國生產的，而不是在中國生產的。 隻是百分之一百嗎？ 因為80%仍然是一個相當大的數字。 美國對華貿易逆差依然巨大。 美國與中國的貿易規模仍然巨大。 因此，真正發生的事情是，全球化的形態正在發生變化，而且它的變化是為了應對各種各樣的事情，其中一些是有意識的。 就像美國政府有意識地試圖減少對中國的敞口一樣，供應鏈也在有意識地遠離中國。 但無論如何，還有其他事情會發生。 事實上，中國的勞動力成本不再特別有吸引力，墨西哥現在已經超過了中國及其與美國的貿易； 這是有原因的。 很接近，而且實際上很有競爭力。 因此，這是政策和結構轉變的結合，無論如何都會發生，但我認為人們不應該誇大這種轉變的程度。

但我認為人們不應該誇大這種轉變的程度。 如果美國公司在越南或墨西哥而不是在中國製造，這仍然是全球化。 我們可以以某種方式將其全部帶回國內，我們可以以某種方式將所有製造業帶回美國的想法不太合理，因為在美國製造微芯片的成本要高得多。

Andy Serwer：這是轉向中國的一個很好的選擇。 我們與中國的關係有多糟糕？習近平是一個多麽壞或好的領導人？

尼爾·弗格森：好吧，讓我一一分析。 關係狀態並不好。 盡管拜登總統不久前還談到了全麵的廣島核事故。 他的政府成員對中國的訪問實際上進展得不太順利，並沒有取得多大成就，並沒有改變北京的情緒，即美國正在有意識地奉行一項技術和技術政策。 經濟遏製的目的是讓中國牢牢占據印太地區的第二位。 所以我認為關係不好，而且根據我們從習近平和中共高層人物那裏聽到的情況來判斷，我認為這種關係並沒有因為我們所看到的這些不同的訪問而得到改善。 我認為習近平本人對中國不利有兩個原因。 第一，明確以戰略為目標……嗯，與美國平等或對等，我認為明確地說你要做的事情是一件愚蠢的事情。 這就像發出警告一樣。 這是自鄧小平以來曆屆中國領導人一直避免做的事情。 他們有點把自己的光芒放在鬥式之下。 我認為更具破壞性的第二件事是他對中國經濟所做的事情。 習近平在很多方麵都是馬克思列寧主義的信徒，他重申了中國共產黨對經濟、社會、甚至學術界的權力。 這是一個與我十二年前經常訪問的中國截然不同的中國。 由於大型科技公司受到了控製，言論自由度大大降低，經濟活力也減弱。馬雲基本上被習近平壓垮了。 而占中國經濟 29% 或 30% 的龐大房地產行業正處於危機狀態。 因此，我認為，無論是作為政治領導人還是經濟領導人，習近平都將中國帶入了非常危險的境地。

安迪·塞爾維爾：我們應該對弗拉基米爾·普京有多關心？ 有人說這對美國來說沒什麽大不了的。 也有人說是死敵。

尼爾·弗格森：嗯，從烏克蘭人的角度來看，他是一個不共戴天的敵人，每個月都會殺害大量烏克蘭士兵和平民。 我剛從基輔回來。 我去那裏之前和之後都發生過空襲，從前線那裏服役的士兵那裏收到的報告非常嚴峻。 這是一場非常血腥的戰爭，我認為任何希望俄羅斯軍隊在普裏戈任叛變時崩潰的人都已經失望了。 他們被挖了，他們成功地布下了雷區。 他們在烏克蘭南部的領土上建立了幾乎堅不可摧的防禦。 事實是，烏克蘭今年夏天的攻勢並沒有達到澤連斯基總統所希望的效果。 這對美國重要嗎？ 嗯，在某種程度上，不。 距離很遠，而且戰鬥的不是美國士兵。 問題是我們支持烏克蘭。 不僅在經濟上，不僅在武器方麵，而且我們在公開和道義上支持烏克蘭。 我們說，正如國務卿布林肯大約一周前在基輔所說，我們將在那裏待多久，但這可能會很長一段時間。 周末在基輔的一位德國將軍表示，德國的規劃期限要到 2032 年。這是一場比美國任何人認為他們卷入的戰爭要長得多的戰爭。所以我認為短期問題 我們陷入了一場看不到明顯結束的戰爭，這意味著資源將被吸收，來自軍事庫存的財政資源和硬件購買這場戰爭的時間我認為比喬·拜登預期的要長。 但還有一個更廣泛的問題，那就是普京與習近平關係密切。 對於中國領導人來說，這是極其重要的夥伴關係。 中國不會讓俄羅斯輸掉這場戰爭。 因此，我們不能孤立地看待烏克蘭戰爭。 這是更廣泛的地緣政治鬥爭的一部分，其中美國、歐洲和其他盟友支持烏克蘭，中國和伊朗支持俄羅斯。 這實際上是一個相當令人震驚的情況。 你可以把它想象成，與其說是一場歐洲或東歐戰爭，不如說是第二次冷戰的第一次熱戰。 從這個意義上說，我認為普京是更廣泛威脅的一部分，

中國、俄羅斯和伊朗軸心國的威脅將對美國構成挑戰，不僅在東歐，而且在中東，甚至可能在遠東，就台灣而言。

Andy Serwer：最後一個問題，Niall，鑒於我們正在進行的一些對話，我希望您對這個話題有話要說。 世界上有什麽事情是可以順利進行的呢？

尼爾·弗格森：好吧，如果俄羅斯軍隊突然瓦解、倒下並陣亡，而烏克蘭贏得了戰爭，那就太好了。 那會很棒，但感覺比一年前俄羅斯人從哈爾科夫然後從赫爾鬆逃跑時的可能性要小。 那太好了，但我不會屏住呼吸。 如果中國的經濟困境轉化為某種政治危機，那就太好了。 因為我認為習近平試圖重申一黨專政，黨的獨裁不僅對中國而且對世界都是危險的。 所以你可以期待改變。 我對冷戰持樂觀態度。 我沒有經曆過很多這樣的事情，但如果從最後的事情來看的話，相信自由和民主的社會往往比相信相反的社會更有活力。 所以我認為最終會發生的是，一黨政府的問題和病態將會顯現出來，中國的增長速度將會放緩，其威脅將會減弱，也許它的領導層將會發生變化。 還有什麽可以順利進行呢？ 嗯，目前技術領域發生的所有事情，特別是人工智能的突破，可能會對美國經濟產生真正的好處。 當我們都開始使用 ChatGPT 準備麵試或其他任何事情時，也許會出現巨大的生產力衝擊。 接下來你就會知道，美國經濟的增長速度超出了任何人的預期，而我之前擔心的所有事情都被證明隻是幻影。 因此，存在樂觀的看漲情況。 在紐約這座小鎮上，總會有人持樂觀態度。 但這將是我的看漲情景。

安迪·塞爾沃：好的。 關於這些筆記，尼爾·弗格森，非常感謝您抽出寶貴的時間。

尼爾·弗格森：謝謝安迪。

安迪·塞爾維爾：這是在《巴倫周刊》。 我是安迪·塞爾維爾。 下次我們會抓住你的。 《巴倫周刊》的製作團隊包括 Elia Malidu、Rebecca Bisdale、Kinga Royjack、Joe Lusby 和 Laura Salibury。 執行製片人是克裏斯汀·貝爾斯特羅姆和梅麗莎·哈格蒂。 下周我們將帶著新劇集回來。

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The 4 Biggest Threats to the West, According to Historian Ferguson

10/12/2023

https://www.marketwatch.com/podcasts/at-barrons/the-4-biggest-threats-to-the-west-according-to-historian-ferguson/5a3f2ca3-f9a2-41bc-9c63-b060d2f4a525

"I don't believe in the 'soft landing' story," said historian and author Niall Ferguson in a conversation on Sept. 12, 2023.

This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.

Andy Serwer: Hello everyone and welcome to At Barron's. I'm Andy Serwer and welcome to our guest Niall Ferguson, historian, author, and sometimes prognosticator. Fair enough?

Niall Ferguson: Yeah, that's fair enough. Andy Guilty.

Andy Serwer: Good to see you. So why don't we just jump right in, Niall, and I'd like to ask you what you think the greatest risks are to Western society right now, and how have those risks changed over the past year or so?

Niall Ferguson: Great question. I think there's the risk of complacency about the economy. I don't believe in the soft landing story, because I think we've seen a tremendous hike in real interest rates and that is going to have its consequences. I would say the probability of a recession next year is much higher than market consensus. So there's that. Secondly, I think there's a major political risk coming and that is the US election. That risk is I think still being underestimated by people who haven't fully digested that the Democrats are fielding a very elderly candidate with a weak running mate against Donald Trump, a candidate who in many another country, would not be able to run for election given his conduct on January 6th of 2021. So this is an amazing potential constitutional crisis, given all the indictments that Trump currently faces. Third risk, I think there are major social problems in the United States that are kind of out of sight, out of mind. But whether it's the mental health epidemic or the opioid epidemic, the United States has a whole range of very profound social problems that I worry about a good deal. And then finally, let me give you the geopolitical problem. That the US and China are in Cold War II. I don't think everybody has fully digested what that implies, but in the early Cold War, there is a significant risk of hot war, and that's probably the biggest risk that is underpriced right now.

Andy Serwer: A lot of risks there. Want to drill down into each and every one of them. Maybe we'll start with politics. What happens if Joe Biden is reelected?

Niall Ferguson: Well, I think that's not my base case right now. My base case is that if there's a recession, which I think is more likely than the street thinks, he will lose if he is the candidate. I'm not sure he will ultimately be the candidate because I think as we get closer to the primaries, many Democrats are going to get quite seriously worried about how poorly Joe Biden is polling against the likely Republican nominee Donald Trump. So I would not rule out another candidate actually being the Democratic nominee in 2024. If there's no recession, I'm just wrong and Biden gets reelected, then he inherits all the problems that he himself or his administration created. In particular, the extraordinary fiscal crisis that this country is in. The congressional budget office just did its math and decided that actually the deficit is going to be far larger this year than it previously thought just a few months ago. So we're looking at 8% of gross domestic product. That's kind of a huge deficit for an economy that took full employment barreling along. And I don't think many people fully appreciate that this hot economy is hot because of a massive fiscal expansion that just keeps on going. And that can't be continued indefinitely, because with rates having gone up - because the Fed raised them, had to raise them because of inflation - the cost of government borrowing is far higher than it was just a couple of years ago. And so we're looking at a real fiscal problem. Whoever is president in 2025 is going to be contending with some very harsh realities. Let me give you an example. For most of its history, the United States has comfortably spent more on defense than on debt service. That is no longer true. By the end of this year, it will certainly be paying much more debt service or somewhat more debt service than defense. And that's a problem for a country that is in a major geopolitical rivalry with China.

Andy Serwer: All right, I do have some more questions on the economy, but I think we'll switch over to what happens if Donald Trump wins.

Niall Ferguson: So if Donald Trump wins, it'll be very different from 2017. A lot of people will look back and remember the somewhat chaotic quality of Trump's administration then. They hadn't really expected to win. They were not ready in fact to take over the government. It was improvisation. It was quite chaotic, if you look back. And there was also quite a lot of continuity, because he didn't really have a stable of people tap put in all the different departments and agencies, and those continuities were most obvious in the form of generals like my Hoover colleagues, Jim Mattis and HR McMaster. If Trump is reelected, the second Trump Administration will be very different. Firstly, they are planning for power. By they, I mean the Trump supporters in the America first think tank, they have a plan which I think will be very, very different from what we saw in 2017. And secondly, that plan does not include establishment people. So there won't be those restraining influences that were such a characteristic feature of Trump's first term. So if there is a second term, it won't be at all like the first term. And I would expect the personnel to be really very different. And their priorities will, I think come as a shock to many people. Number one, I think he will be back on protectionism. I think he remains a committed believer in tariffs. We kind of drifted away from those, but they haven't gone away. I recently asked Robert Lighthizer, who was his trade representative. He just published a biography. What did he think Trump would've done if he'd won in 2020? And his answer was, "Raise those tariffs." So I think there'll be a return to a protectionist strategy. And the other thing, which I think will be number one priority will be purge the Department of Justice, purge the bureaucracy, purge the swamp of all the anti-Trump elements that President Trump and his advisors feel thwarted him at every turn during his first term. So it will be a very, very different scenario, 2025 from 2017 if Trump is reelected.

Andy Serwer: And if Niall Ferguson was a betting man, what would he bet?

Niall Ferguson: Well, I think the key question is, is there a recession or not? I think if there's a recession, whoever is the Republican nominee will have a good chance of winning, because nobody has got reelected after a recession in a hundred years. Calvin Coolidge was the last person who did it back in 1924. Everybody else who tried to get reelected with a recession just behind them failed. And if you look at where Joe Biden's polling right now, it's about where Gerald Ford was at the stage in his presidency. It's about where George HW Bush was at this stage in his presidency. So if there's a recession, which I do think is more likely than the consensus, then I think it'd be really hard for Joe Biden to get reelected. I'd actually put the Republican nominee and it seems likely to be Donald Trump, but maybe close to 60% probability of winning. I don't think many people have processed those odds yet.

Andy Serwer: You talked about some of the economic problems stemming from policies of the Biden Administration, but weren't they mostly because of Federal Reserve policies in terms of flooding the markets, or quantitative easing, I should say, A and B, cutting rates, number one. And number two, you're saying that the high budget deficits are a problem. Aren't people always saying that, Niall?

Niall Ferguson: Well, I think if you go back to early 2021, a small number of people, notably Larry Summers, argued that an inflationary accident was happening. That was also my view at the time. I wrote that for Bloomberg. And if you read Larry Summers's original piece, which came out in the Washington Post, it's all about fiscal policy. He barely mentions monetary policy. And I think a correct analysis would be that there was a huge fiscal overshoot, because they kept doing stimulus. Even after the economy was going to heal. We had vaccines. The pandemic was not over, but it was clear that the end was in sight once you had highly efficacious vaccines. And the Fed accommodated this. It in fact accommodated a very large proportion of the new debt issued by the treasury in '21, '22. And it kept going. Remember, there wasn't really a change of monetary stance until into 2022, despite the fact that there were flashing red lights signaling an inflation shock. So I think it was a combination of fiscal and monetary policy error that got us to 9% inflation in the middle of last year. Of course, inflation has come down since then, but only because of a really significant tightening of monetary policy. And if you just look at the way rates have gone up and adjust for inflation, this is the biggest increase in real borrowing costs since the time of Paul Volcker. So you have to go back 40 years to see - in fact, slightly more than 40 years - to see a monetary tightening like this. The idea that this would just have no effect at all on what is a pretty leveraged economy, much more leveraged than it was in Paul Volker's day. I just can't believe. So I think there's a certain illusory quality to the current atmosphere of economic strength in the United States.

Andy Serwer: It is the case, though, that people have been calling for this recession for quarter after quarter after quarter, and they keep pushing and pushing. I don't know if that's been the case with you, but why hasn't it occurred yet?

Niall Ferguson: Well, the old phrase that I'm sure we were all taught at some point in economics classes is that monetary policy acts with long and variable lags. That variation is the key here. If the average is sort of nine months from tightening to the slowdown, that's the average. The question is, could it in fact be quite a bit longer than that? And the answer is yeah, it could actually under the circumstances. So I think it is way too early for the transitory team to declare victory and say that inflation was just this temporary aberration that had to do with coming out of the pandemic. I think it's plausible that as corporations and households have to refinance, they're going to get a terrible shock. And you can see how that sequence of events plays out if you look at when refinancing is going to happen in, let's say the coming 12 months. So that's one important point. The other important point I want to make in response to something you said a moment ago is, just as people have been warning about recession for many months, they have of course been warning about deficits for many years, if not decades. But the thing here is that the orders of magnitude matter. It's incredible, astonishing that the deficit at full employment should be as large as 8% of GDP. Jason Furman, who's a Democrat, who was an economist in the Obama Administration, noted that these CBO numbers are deeply shocking. And they really are, and they tell us that something is going quite badly wrong. And part of that something is the increased borrow costs affect the government, too. So the debt stock is already pretty high. If you look at the CBO forecasts out decades, not just years, it could get really very high, very fast, unless there's some kind of productivity miracle or unless Congress does what it hasn't done for a long time, and that is actually to reform the tax system and bring entitlements under control, which I think is highly unlikely.

Andy Serwer: Niall, you're back in the UK these days. What does the rest of the world think about America at this point and how has that changed?

Niall Ferguson: That's a great question. I'm on leave from Hoover back in the UK for a year, and it's fascinating because people there are more worried about American politics than people here as far, as I can see. And that is true in Europe, generally. I was just in Kyiv last weekend and there's great concern there that if Donald Trump gets reelected, he'll pull the plug on Ukraine. This worries all the Europeans. The Europeans have really increased their commitment to Ukraine's war effort against Russia, but they know that without the United States, it would be extremely hard for Europe alone to sustain that war effort. So there's a good deal of disquiet about what is going to happen next year in the US election. On the other hand, there's a kind of envy, and the envy is directed at US economic growth, the dynamism of the US economy. They all have AI envy because there basically is no AI in Europe and scarcely any in the UK. So it's a strange bifurcation. People are really worried about American politics and kind of envious of the American economy.

Andy Serwer: Is globalism and liberal democracy in permanent decline or is this just a hiccup, an aberration that we're experiencing?

Niall Ferguson: Well, globalization has been pronounced dead rather often recently. It's not that dead, actually, when you look at the resilience of international trade and capital flows. It's dialed back a bit since the high point, which was 2007 before the global financial crisis. But we're not looking at a huge retreat from globalization of the sort that we saw after 1929. When people talk about decoupling between the United States and China, I say, does that mean Apple produces 80% of its hardware in China rather than just a hundred percent? Because 80% is still a rather large number. The US trade deficit with China is still huge. US trade with China is still huge. So what's really going on is that globalization's shape is shifting and it's shifting in response to a variety of things, some of which are conscious. Like the US government is consciously trying to reduce its exposure to China, supply chains are consciously be moved away from China. But there are other things that would be happening anyway. The fact that Chinese labor costs are no longer particularly attractive, Mexico's now overtaken China and its trade with the US; there's a reason for that. It's close and it's actually pretty competitive. So it's a combination of policy and structural shifts that would've happened anyway, but I think one shouldn't exaggerate the extent of the shift. It's still globalization if American companies are manufacturing in Vietnam or in Mexico as opposed to in China. The idea that we can somehow bring it all back home, we can somehow bring all manufacturing back to the United States isn't very plausible, because it's just much more expensive to make microchips in the US.

Andy Serwer: It's a good segue to China. How bad is our relationship with China and how bad a leader or good a leader is Xi Jinping?

Niall Ferguson: Well, let me take those one by one. The relationship is not in a good state. Despite President Biden's talk of a full Hiroshima not so long ago. The visits that have been made by members of his administration to China have really not gone terribly well, haven't really achieved terribly much, haven't changed the sentiment in Beijing, which is that the US is pursuing a conscious policy of technological and economic containment that is designed to keep China firmly in second place in the Indo-Pacific. So I think relations are not good, and I don't think that they've been improved by these various visits that we've seen, to judge by what we hear from Xi Jinping and senior figures in the CCP. Xi himself, I think has not been good for China for two reasons. One, explicitly aiming at strategic... Well, equality or parity with the United States, which I think was a silly thing to explicitly say you're going to do. That was like sending a warning. Something that previous Chinese leaders had avoided doing since Deng Xiaoping. They had sort of kept their light under a bushel. The second thing, which has been more damaging, I think, has been what he's done to the Chinese economy. Xi is in many ways a Marxist-Leninist believer who has reasserted the power of the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, over the economy, over society, even over academia. It's a very different China from the China I used to visit 12 years ago, regularly. Much, much less free in expression and less dynamic economically, because the big tech companies had been reigned in. Jack Ma was essentially brought low by Xi Jinping. And that huge real estate sector, which was really about 29% or 30% of the Chinese economy is in a state of crisis. So I think both as a political leader and as an economic leader, Xi has steered China into very treacherous waters.

Andy Serwer: How concerned should we be over Vladimir Putin? Some people say it's just not that big a deal for the United States. Other people say it's a mortal enemy.

Niall Ferguson: Well, from the points of view of Ukrainians, he is a mortal enemy who is killing significant numbers of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians every month. I just came back from Kyiv. There were air raids before and after my time there, and the reports that one received from the front line by soldiers who had been serving there, pretty grim. This is a very bloody war, and anybody who was hoping that the Russian army would fall apart at the time of the Prigozhin mutiny, I think, has been disappointed. They are dug in, they have managed to lay minefields. They have made an almost impregnable defense of the territory that they hold in southern Ukraine. And the truth is that the Ukrainian offensive of this summer has not achieved anything like what President Zelensky hoped for. Does that matter to the United States? Well, on one level, no. It's a long way away and it's not American soldiers who are doing the fighting. The problem is that we've backed Ukraine. Not only financially, not only in terms of weaponry, but we've publicly, morally backed Ukraine. And we say, as Secretary of State Blinken said in Kyiv just about a week ago, that we'll be there for as long as it takes, but that could be a long time. A German general who was in Kyiv at the weekend said that the German planning horizon was out until 2032. That is a much longer war than anybody in the United States thinks they've got involved in. So I think the problem in the short run is that we are stuck in a war that doesn't have an obvious end in sight, and that means that resources are going to be absorbed, financial resources, hardware from military stocks buy this war for I think longer than Joe Biden expected. But there's a broader problem, and that is that Putin is closely allied with Xi Jinping. This is a partnership of extreme importance to the Chinese leader. China isn't about to let Russia lose this war. So we can't just see the war in Ukraine in isolation. It is part of a broader geopolitical struggle in which the US and the Europeans and other allies support Ukraine, and China and Iran support Russia. That is actually quite an alarming state of affairs. You can think of it, not so much as a European or an East European war, but as the first hot war of Cold War II. And in that sense, I think Putin is part of a broader threat, a threat of a kind of axis of China, Russia, and Iran, that will pose challenges to the United States, not only in Eastern Europe, but in the Middle East and potentially in the Far East, in the case of Taiwan.

Andy Serwer: Final question, Niall, and I hope you've got something to say on this topic, given some of the conversation we've been having. What could go right in the world?

Niall Ferguson: Well, it would be great if the Russian army suddenly unraveled, lay down and died, and Ukraine won the war. That would be terrific, but it feels less likely than a year ago when the Russians were in flight from Kharkiv and then from Kherson. That would be great, but I'm not holding my breath. It'd be great if China's economic troubles translated into some kind of political crisis there. Because I think Xi Jinping's attempt to reassert one party rule, the dictatorship of the party is dangerous not only for China, but for the world. So you could hope for change. And I'm an optimist about Cold Wars. I haven't had a lot of them, but if the last ones anything to go by, the society that believes in freedom and democracy tends to be more dynamic than the society that believes in the opposite. So I think what ultimately will happen is that the problems and pathologies of one party government will manifest themselves and China's growth rate will slow and its threat will diminish and perhaps its leadership will change. And what else could go right? Well, all the things that are currently going on in the realm of technology, particularly the breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, might turn out to be really good for the US economy. Maybe there's a huge productivity shock coming as we all start using ChatGPT to prepare our interviews or whatever it is. And the next thing you know, the US economy achieves higher growth than anybody expected, and all those things that I was worrying about earlier turn out to have been mere phantoms. So there is an optimistic bullish case. There always is, in this town of New York, there'll always be somebody who's bullish. But that would be my bullish scenario.

Andy Serwer: All right. On those notes, Niall Ferguson, thank you so much for your time.

Niall Ferguson: Thanks Andy.

Andy Serwer: This is At Barron's. I'm Andy Serwer. We'll catch you next time. The production team for At Barron's is Elia Malidu, Rebecca Bisdale, Kinga Royjack, Joe Lusby, and Laura Salibury. The executive producers are Kristen Belstrom and Melissa Haggerty. We'll be back with a new episode next week.