風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
美學者提6大原因 籲美軍方放棄"拒止性嚇阻"戰略
2023-9-19 03:33| 來源：世界新聞網
在討論台灣防衛手段時，「拒止性嚇阻」（deterrence by denial）常被視為最佳戰略之一。然而，美國軍事新聞網站「防務一號」（Defense One）17日刊出學者專文，提出6大原因呼籲五角大廈放棄此一戰略，指這個在美蘇冷戰後受到青睞、至今仍受到國防官員、智庫研究和政府戰略大力支持的想法，實際上並未發揮作用，俄國並未因此在入侵烏克蘭行動上卻步，中國仍繼續透過「灰色地帶」行動重塑南海和東海的安全環境，而五角大廈自身兵棋推演也顯示，要完全嚇阻中國入侵台灣是行不通的。
華府智庫「哈德遜研究所」的兩名資深研究員克拉克（Bryan Clark）及派特（Dan Patt）共同撰文指出，隨著美國即將開始新一輪總統大選，以及中國、俄羅斯和伊朗局勢惡化，現在是時候重新思考某些支撐美國國防政策的傳統智慧了，其中瑕疵最多、最未被充分檢視的正是「拒止性嚇阻」戰略。據報導，該戰略意指防守方發揮對抗武力，藉由「拒止行動」阻絕敵軍，讓入侵者意識到自己可能在攻擊行動中遭遇奮力抵抗，進而挫敗、付出代價，因而不敢輕易發動攻勢。兩位學者舉出「拒止性嚇阻」無法繼續支撐美國戰略架構的6個原因。
一、「拒止性嚇阻」概念模糊。
「拒止」表麵上看似美國和盟軍將阻止或扭轉侵略者的行動，但要是人口多達14億，且擁有世界上最大規模海軍、海岸警衛隊、船隊和火箭軍的中國準備入侵台灣，該戰略或許就不可行。認為可行的人經常主張，「拒止」意味替侵略者製造不確定性，但這與此一戰略應傳達的確定性正好相反。如果要製造「不確定性」，提高美軍的創造力和靈活性反而更有機會做到。
二、「拒止性嚇阻」針對的目標有誤。
若戰略本身實際上是想動搖潛在侵略者的信心，並重塑其風險衡量，那麽美國國防部就應該依據美國情報界對敵方的隱憂，來追求自身能力、戰術和姿態，從而最大限度地創造「不確定性」。然而，五角大廈的預算安排，都是為了說服美國國防官員和國會相信美國和盟軍有能力拒絕侵略，因為這樣更容易對外解釋。
三、「拒止性嚇阻」扭曲美國的部隊規劃。
運用戰略進行作戰分析，探討部隊如何阻止侵略是很好，也有助於證明防禦計畫的合理性。然而，即使是一支有能力在72小時內擊沉350艘船艦的部隊，像中國這樣的對手可能早就擬好對抗計畫，由此提高不了多少「不確定性」。此外，建立能夠滿足「拒止」的能力，可能也會排擠應對其他侵略手段的能力，例如長期封鎖、網路和資訊戰或準武裝部隊擴大攻勢等。
四、「拒止性嚇阻」在對抗新形式侵略上或許行不通。
拒止戰略取決於要拒止的對象，隨著「灰色地帶」行動、網路和資訊戰的效率不斷提高，我方將需要採取不同的方法，來嚇阻刻意放緩或採取迂迴行動以達成目標的敵方。以中國為例，美軍可能得參與「灰色地帶」的對抗，並採取行動影響北京領導層，避免局勢升級。
五、「拒止性嚇阻」損害美國信譽。
此一戰略會造成快速、大規模的損失，導致在麵對擁有核武的對手時，局勢出現災難性升級。鑑於美國在烏俄戰爭以來，一直避免對烏方提供更強有力的支持，不能排除美國領袖迴避採取「拒止性嚇阻」戰略的可能性。
六、「拒止性嚇阻」為美軍帶來不成比例的成本。
要在海外維持一定的軍力，以便臨時對數百艘軍艦或數千輛戰車做出打擊，對於已處在崩潰邊緣的軍隊來說既昂貴又深具挑戰性。更糟的是，像中國那樣隻需對目標進行有效打擊的對手，所負擔的成本要比美軍低得多。
文中指出，當美國佔據主導地位時，「拒止性嚇阻」很有效，但現在反倒讓美國的國防計畫和投資走向更大的「可預測性」，不再是替對手帶來「不確定性」，該是放棄的時候了。
<<<<<<>>>>>>
美國對華威懾不起作用
U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working
Foreign Policy
由於美國在亞洲的軍事優勢不再是既定的，國防規劃者需要采取不同的戰略。
2023 年 9 月 5 日《外交政策》，作者：哈德遜研究所國防概念與技術中心主任布萊恩·克拉克 (Bryan Clark) 和哈德遜研究所高級研究員丹·帕特 (Dan Patt)。
三十多年來，美國軍事的全球領先地位一直是美國戰略和安全政策的基石。 但技術擴散、日益嚴峻的全球挑戰以及過時的部隊設計已經削弱了美國對中國的軍事優勢，而中國可以利用其地理位置的鄰近性和先進的能力來贏得針對台灣的地區戰爭。 如果華盛頓沒有確定持續的軍事主導地位（迄今為止，華盛頓有能力簡單地否認和鎮壓東亞的侵略），尋求常規威懾的美國領導人將需要製定不同的戰略。
盡管華盛頓部分地區發表了言論，但與中國的戰爭並未迫在眉睫，入侵台灣給中國共產黨帶來許多風險，因為它麵臨著日益嚴峻的經濟、人口和外交挑戰。 為了讓入侵對北京失去吸引力，美國軍方可能隻需要讓中國認為任何衝突都會曠日持久且代價高昂。 因此，華盛頓不應優化美國軍隊以應對可能永遠不會到來的入侵，而應開展一場長期行動，削弱北京對通過一係列暴力途徑實現其在台灣和該地區野心的信心。 這場運動應該包括軍事和非軍事手段，力圖引導中國走上更負責任、更和平的道路，實現其外交政策目標。
支持通過否認進行威懾戰略不變的人認為，威懾北京的最佳方式是通過在該地區集結足夠的打擊能力來使入侵台灣變得不可行，從而讓中國國家主席習近平相信攻擊會失敗。 由於中國現在擁有世界上最大的海軍、陸軍、火箭軍、民用艦隊和工業基地（其建造新艦艇和導彈的速度是美國的兩倍以上），從長遠來看，這一計劃根本不切實際。 此外，某些情況——例如中國的封鎖、隔離或針對台灣較小島嶼的行動——可能無法完全否認。
那麽，在這些新條件下，否認的真正含義是讓中國領導人產生不確定性，懷疑他們的計劃能否按照北京可接受的條件取得成功。 像俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰爭那樣陷入困境並耗盡資源的入侵或使中國搖搖欲墜的經濟陷入困境的入侵可能很快就會失去支持，任何勝利都將付出慘重的代價。 然而，美國的國防規劃和決策仍然關注東亞戰場上的行動是否成功或係統是否有效，而不是結果是否足以讓習近平和其他中國領導人在考慮發動侵略時三思而後行。
為了獲得這種理解並恢複戰略在國防規劃中的作用，美國國防部應該首先遵循自己的指示。 2022年國防戰略的主要組成部分之一是戰役概念，在軍事學說中，它描述了旨在實現特定目標的一係列精心策劃的軍事和非軍事行動。 但在五角大樓的實踐中，美國戰略的競選元素隻不過是與軍事戰備相關的各種預算項目的一個桶，這些項目不容易落入國防戰略的其他標題之下。
國防部不應將競選活動作為雜七雜八的訓練計劃、維護、部署和演習的預算理由，而應認真對待自己對競選活動的定義，並製定一項戰略來揭示並最終塑造中國領導人的看法。
中國已經開始了自己的行動，例如對台灣領空和水域的持續空中和海上入侵，以及微信上的入侵演習。 涉及的部隊、船隻、飛機、導彈和車輛的數量遠遠低於征服一個擁有 2300 萬人口的島嶼所需的數量，但這些行動的目的並不是為了考驗中國人民解放軍 (PLA) 或台灣軍隊。 軍隊。 相反，這些活動是塑造國內外觀念運動的一部分。
這並不是說國防部在影響中國決策的更廣泛努力上無所事事。 近兩年來，澳大利亞-英國-美國（AUKUS）安全條約的建立，與菲律賓和日本擴大軍事合作，以及對烏克蘭的持續支持，無疑削弱了中國領導人的信心。
正如我們最近在哈德遜研究所的報告中概述的那樣，適當的競選策略將建立在這些舉措的基礎上。 像 AUKUS 這樣的大動作不能隨意重複，也不能在時機上達到最佳效果，這降低了它們作為信號的效用。 但小型軍事行動，例如新的部隊組成、能力、戰術、態勢和盟軍行動，可以從中國的反應方式中引發多樣化和頻繁的信號； 測試有關中國關注或信任領域的假設； 並提供改變北京信念的機會。
冷戰期間，美國國家安全領導人也采取了類似的做法來揭露和利用蘇聯在國土導彈防禦和潛艇脆弱性等問題上的神經痛。 如今，從開源衛星圖像到算法分析的新信息技術可以增強並加速這一過程。 它將用於製定和編排戰役計劃，而不是傳統地使用技術來服務於作戰計劃。
美國的行動需要出其不意，才能獲得有關解放軍和其他中國安全部隊的有用信息。 航行自由行動等可預測的行動將引起正式的反應，而這些反應完全無法反映出中國領導人的真正擔憂或信心程度。 然而，一場意想不到的多國演習或在東亞出現的一種新的、先前實驗性的軍事能力可能會通過中國安全機構的言行產生洞察力。
美國軍方已經可以在戰場上以及五角大樓實驗室、戰爭中心和機構的架子上獲得一本令人驚訝的深度雜誌。 現有和新興的美國及盟國單位或係統的新組合，以及相應的作戰概念，為引發中國意想不到的新信號和反應提供了幾乎無窮無盡的選擇。 五角大樓的聯合全域指揮與控製計劃旨在實現這種可互換性，但努力還不夠。 美國國會最近為幫助美國軍事指揮官自下而上地將傳感器、操作員和武器結合起來所做的努力帶來了更多希望。
為了最大限度地影響中國領導人的信念，競選意外應該有兩種主要形式：一是破壞解放軍攻擊美國通信和後勤薄弱環節的戰略，二是通過展示美國及其盟國的力量來破壞中國快速或廉價取得勝利的希望。 為持久衝突做好準備。 通過擊敗解放軍的戰略並表明中國的對手已經做好了長期的準備，美國的行動可以增加北京的認知，即對台灣或美國盟友的攻擊可能會變得像俄羅斯在烏克蘭的不幸遭遇一樣混亂、代價高昂和糾纏不清。
華盛頓當前的軍事戰略旨在向習近平證明，入侵將在戰鬥中被擊敗——這一概念的前提是美國在該地區繼續保持軍事主導地位。 相反，競選活動首先會集中於降低他對侵略的偏好，使其他道路更具吸引力。 這種勸阻策略將要求美國領導人接受這樣的事實：中國不會消失，習近平不會放棄他的目標，美國的軍事優勢不再得到保證。 但在一個不再由美國主導的世界裏，集中精力開展勸阻運動可能是實現和平共處的唯一途徑。
U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working
With U.S. military superiority in Asia no longer a given, defense planners need a different strategy.
Foreign Policy， By Bryan Clark, the director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute, and Dan Patt, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
A U.S. Navy sailor walks past an F/A-18F fighter jet on the flight deck of the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier in the port of Busan, South Korea, on March 28.
For more than three decades, the U.S. military's global preeminence has been the rock on which U.S. strategy and security policy are built. But technology diffusion, growing global challenges, and antiquated force design have eroded the United States’ military edge against China, which could exploit its geographical proximity and advancing capabilities to win a regional war against Taiwan. Without the certainty of continued military dominance that, until now, gave Washington the ability to simply deny and suppress aggression in East Asia, U.S. leaders seeking conventional deterrence will need to devise a different strategy.
Despite the rhetoric in parts of Washington, war with China is not imminent, and an invasion of Taiwan carries many risks for the Chinese Communist Party as it faces mounting economic, demographic, and diplomatic challenges. To make an invasion unattractive for Beijing, the U.S. military may merely need to raise China’s perception that any conflict would be drawn out and exceedingly costly. Instead of optimizing the U.S. military for an invasion that may never come, Washington should therefore mount a long-term campaign that undermines Beijing’s confidence in a range of violent paths to realizing its ambitions in Taiwan and the region. This campaign should involve military and nonmilitary means that seek to steer China toward more responsible and peaceful paths to its foreign-policy goals.
Proponents of an unchanged strategy of deterrence through denial argue the best way to deter Beijing is to make an invasion of Taiwan infeasible by massing sufficient strike capability in the region to convince Chinese President Xi Jinping that an attack would fail. With China now operating the world’s largest navy, army, rocket force, civilian fleet, and industrial base (which builds new ships and missiles at more than twice the U.S. pace), this plan has become simply unrealistic over the long term. Furthermore, some scenarios—such as a Chinese blockade, quarantine, or operation against Taiwan’s smaller islands—may prove impossible to completely deny.
What denial really means under these new conditions, then, is to create uncertainty in the minds of Chinese leaders that their plans could succeed on terms acceptable to Beijing. An invasion that bogs down and drains resources like Russia’s war in Ukraine or sinks China’s faltering economy could quickly lose support, and any victory would be pyrrhic. However, U.S. defense planning and decision-making still focus on whether an operation succeeds or a system works on an East Asian battlefield—not whether the result is sufficient to make Xi and other Chinese leaders think twice about aggression as they consider launching it.
To gain that understanding and restore the role of strategy in defense planning, the U.S. Defense Department should begin by following its own directives. One of the 2022 National Defense Strategy’s main components is the notion of campaigning, which in military doctrine describes an orchestrated series of military and nonmilitary actions designed to achieve specific objectives. But in Pentagon practice, the campaigning element of U.S. strategy has become little more than a bucket for various budget items related to military readiness that don’t easily fall under the defense strategy’s other headings.
Rather than using campaigning as a budget justification for a motley collection of training programs, maintenance, deployments, and exercises, the Defense Department should take its own definition of campaigning seriously—and build a strategy to reveal and eventually shape the perceptions of Chinese leaders.
China is already engaged in its own campaign, exemplified by sustained air and maritime intrusions into Taiwan’s airspace and waters, as well as invasion rehearsals featured on WeChat. The numbers of troops, ships, aircraft, missiles, and vehicles involved fall far short of what would be needed to subdue an island of 23 million people, but the operations are not intended to test either the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or Taiwanese forces. Instead, these events are part of a campaign to shape perceptions at home and abroad.
This is not to say the Defense Department has been idle in its broader effort to shape Chinese decision-making. In the last two years, the establishment of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact, expanded military cooperation with the Philippines and Japan, and continued support for Ukraine have all undoubtedly eroded Chinese leaders’ confidence.
As we recently outlined in a Hudson Institute report, a proper strategy of campaigning would build on these initiatives. Big moves like AUKUS cannot be repeated at will or be timed to best effect, which reduces their utility as a signal. But small military actions, such as new force compositions, capabilities, tactics, postures, and allied operations, can elicit diverse and frequent signals from the way China responds; test hypotheses regarding areas of Chinese concern or confidence; and provide opportunities to shift Beijing’s beliefs.
During the Cold War, U.S. national security leaders practiced a similar approach to expose and exploit Soviet neuralgia regarding issues such as homeland missile defense and submarine vulnerability. Today, new information technologies, from open-source satellite imagery to algorithmic analysis, can empower and accelerate the process. Instead of the traditional use of technology to serve an operational plan, it would be used to build and orchestrate the campaign plan.
U.S. campaigns will need surprise to elicit useful revelations about the PLA and other Chinese security forces. Predictable actions such as freedom of navigation operations will draw formalized responses that show nothing about Chinese leaders’ real concerns or levels of confidence. However, an unexpected multinational exercise or a new, previously experimental military capability showing up in East Asia could yield insights via the words and actions of China’s security establishment.
A deep magazine of surprise is already available to the U.S. military, both in the field and on the shelves of the Pentagon’s laboratories, warfare centers, and agencies. New combinations of existing and emerging U.S. and allied units or systems, as well as the accompanying operational concepts, offer almost endless options for eliciting unanticipated new signals and reactions from China. The Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control initiative was intended to enable this kind of interchangeability, but the effort has fallen short. Recent efforts by the U.S. Congress to help U.S. military commanders combine sensors, operators, and weapons from the bottom up hold more promise.
To maximize their impact on Chinese leaders’ beliefs, campaign surprises should come in two main flavors: those that undermine the PLA’s strategy of attacking perceived U.S. communications and logistics vulnerabilities and those that undermine Chinese hopes for a quick or cheap victory by demonstrating U.S. and allied readiness for a protracted conflict. By defeating the PLA’s strategy and showing that China’s opponents are prepared for the long haul, U.S. campaigns can increase the perception in Beijing that an attack on Taiwan or a U.S. ally could become as messy, costly, and entangling as Russia’s misadventure in Ukraine.
Washington’s current military strategy aims to prove to Xi that an invasion would be defeated in battle—a notion that presupposes continued U.S. military dominance in the region. Instead, campaigning would focus on lowering his preference for aggression in the first place, making other paths more attractive. This strategy of dissuasion would require U.S. leaders to accept that China will not fade away, Xi will not give up on his goals, and U.S. military preeminence is no longer guaranteed. But focusing on a campaign of dissuasion may the only path to peaceful coexistence in a world no longer dominated by the United States.
