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中國對於美國很危險

(2023-06-05 00:15:50) 下一個

對於美國來說，中國到底有多危險？

SPENCER BOKAT-LINDELL  2023年2月20日
 
本月早些時候，一個中國間諜氣球在美國領空被發現並擊落，美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯隨後決定推遲美國最高外交官自2018年以來的首次中國之行，這成為兩個大國關係惡化的漫長故事中的最新篇章。
這個故事的真正開始是在五年前，當時特朗普政府發起了一場到拜登任內仍然在持續的貿易戰。今年5月，拜登總統承諾，如果中國對台灣發動攻擊，美國將保衛台灣，這是對長期政策的驚人背離（盡管時斷時續），前眾議院議長南希·佩洛西今年夏天對台灣的訪問突顯了這一點。上個月，美國空軍一名高級將領發布了一份備忘錄，預測2025年將爆發戰爭，並呼籲做好準備，“以便威懾中國，並在必要時擊敗中國。”
為什麽華盛頓認為中國是美國國家安全的最大威脅？這些擔憂是有根據的嗎？為了避免兩個擁有核武器的國家之間發生潛在的災難性軍事衝突，應該做些什麽？以下是人們的看法。
中國到底有多危險？
 
中國的威權主義政府給予其公民很少的公民自由，以及更加少的政治權利，並通過無所不及的一黨統治、廣泛的審查製度、對公民社會的壓製、習近平主席領導下日益複雜的監視和宣傳係統，以及被美國定性為種族滅絕的大規模宗教人士和少數民族拘禁來行使其控製。
 
當然，世界上還有其他威權主義政府；美國甚至與其中一些國家結盟。但對美國官員來說，除了其規模之外，中國之所以成為一種獨特的威脅，在於它的軍事現代化，以及用美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀的話來說，中國“為適應其威權偏好而重塑印太地區和國際體係所采取的日益高壓的行動”。
• 近年來，北京對世界上最重要的水道之一南海提出了廣泛的主權要求，這些要求被普遍視為非法。
• 中國還在台灣附近舉行了更激進的軍事演習。台灣是1949年成立的一個繁榮的民主政體，距離中國大陸海岸僅160公裏，北京認為台灣是一個非法分離的省份。
自20世紀70年代以來，美國通過“一個中國”和“戰略模糊”政策達成了微妙的外交平衡，前者不承認台灣是一個主權國家，後者向台灣出售武器但不提供任何安全保證。台灣主導著對電子設備功能至關重要的微芯片生產。美國商務部長吉娜·雷蒙多去年警告稱，如果中國的入侵限製了這些芯片的供應，將導致“嚴重而直接的衰退”以及“我們無法保護自己”。
 
作為世界第二大經濟體，中國還通過貿易、被指稱的知識產權盜竊和對發展中國家的投資施加影響，批評人士稱後者是一種新形式的殖民主義。隨著中國市場力量的增長，“美國的機構和企業越來越沉默，以避免激怒中國政府，”時報的傑曼·洛佩斯寫道。
但是，盡管存在這些擔憂，許多人還是拒絕接受中國對美國構成生存威脅的說法。在最基本的層麵上，“中國既沒有摧毀美國的破壞性能力，也沒有摧毀美國的地緣政治動機，”克萊蒙特·麥肯納學院政府學教授裴敏欣於2021年在彭博社上發表文章稱。他還說，即使最近有所擴張，中國的核武庫仍然比美國小得多，而且中國軍隊在技術先進性和經驗方麵仍然落後。
在昆西國家事務研究所高級研究員史文(Michael Swaine)看來，中國政府對輸出其治理體係也沒有表現出多少興趣。他在2021年的《外交政策》上發表文章指出：“即使有，也幾乎完全是針對發展中國家，而不是像美國這樣的工業民主國家。”此外，中國的經濟發展模式“以其目前的形式，幾乎可以肯定是不可持續的，這是由於中國的人口老齡化、廣泛的腐敗、嚴重的收入不平等、不完善的社會保障網絡，以及推動全球創新需要信息自由流動這一事實”。
在康奈爾大學中國與亞太研究教授白潔曦(Jessica Chen Weiss)看來，與中國展開零和博弈的邏輯在華盛頓的兩黨成員中已經變得如此普遍，以至於有可能損害美國自身的利益。去年，她在《外交事務》雜誌上寫道：“如果個人覺得為了保護自己和職業發展，有必要比別人表現得更強硬，就會產生群體思維。”
對於這種群體思維的批評者來說，對氣球事件的反應是威脅膨脹的又一個例子。“美國人利用各種技術收集中國和其他國家的情報：衛星、電話竊聽、電腦入侵，甚至還有老式的人力資源，”《外交政策》專欄作家艾瑪·阿什福德寫道。“似乎華盛頓把整個事情搞得太過火了。”
美國和中國能在不發生衝突的情況下競爭嗎？
 
即使是那些把對抗中國崛起作為國家首要任務的人，也不是特別熱衷於發動戰爭，因為這幾乎肯定會付出巨大的代價：
• 根據戰略與國際研究中心最近進行的模擬，在入侵台灣引發的衝突中，美國及其盟友將損失數萬名軍人，台灣經濟也將遭受重創。
• 蘭德公司的研究顯示，在一定程度上，由於美國和中國經濟是高度相互依賴的，一場持續一年的戰爭就會導致美國GDP下降5%至10%，中國的GDP下降25%至30%，對全球經濟產生嚴重影響。
• 衝突還可能危及美國和中國這兩個世界上最大的溫室氣體排放國之間在氣候變化方麵的合作，正如佩洛西對台灣的訪問所暫時造成的那樣。
如何才能最好地避免戰爭，人們意見不一。在台灣問題上，台灣的研究教授陳玉潔等人認為，威懾中國需要誌同道合的民主國家展示更多的支持，“包括與台灣簽署雙邊經濟協議，允許台灣加入地區貿易組織，以減少台灣在經濟上對中國大陸的過度依賴，支持台灣參與國際組織，以及更多像佩洛西訪問這樣的姿態。”《紐約時報》專欄作家布雷特·史蒂芬斯認為，拜登也應該發表正式聲明，結束美國的戰略模糊政策。
但也有人認為這是一種挑釁，會適得其反，因為北京已經假設美國會在衝突中支持台灣。“這會暗示我們的政策是確保台灣獨立，這樣一來會削弱互信，”專注於中國的研究公司龍洲經訊的創始合夥人葛藝豪(Arthur Kroeber)去年11月對《外交事務》表示。“可能會煽動台灣為走向獨立而采取更激進的行動，這將增加而不是降低武裝衝突的可能性。”
 
在其他問題上，人們對於如何緩和緊張局勢有更多共識。例如，增加對該地區民主國家的軍事援助得到了相對廣泛的支持。“專注於向美國盟友提供防禦性武器的積極拒止戰略，以及在該地區低調地、更靈活地部署美國的力量，將提高中國軍事行動的成本，同時又不會加劇中國自身的不安全感，”中國曆史學家文哲凱(Jake Werner)和昆西研究所的高級研究員威廉·哈頓寫道。
去年，國會通過了兩黨立法，推出520億美元的補貼和稅收抵免以鼓勵國內芯片生產，這項產業政策可以通過對衝供應鏈薄弱環節來幫助降低台灣爭端對國家安全的影響。正如奧巴馬政府財政部長的顧問史蒂文·拉特納上個月在時報上所寫，“甚至許多自由市場保守派似乎也認識到，不受約束的資本主義會導致不完美的結果。”
拜登還可以通過降低對中國進口商品的關稅來降低美中競爭的溫度，《紐約時報》編委會去年形容關稅是“特朗普政府逼迫中國做出經濟讓步的失敗策略”。編委會認為，美國不應試圖改變中國，而應專注於加強與中國鄰國的關係，因為“最近的曆史告訴我們，美國在不進行單邊行動時能更有效地推進和捍衛自己的利益。”
目前是不安的和平
無論如何平息氣球事件，這都凸顯了美中關係已經變得多麽緊張，下一場爭端有多麽容易演變成衝突。“正如我們在氣球事件上看到的那樣——有人預見到會有這樣一場氣球迷你危機嗎？——有無窮無盡的可能組合，”為時報報道中國的儲百亮(Chris Buckely)本周表示。
它還揭示了兩個大國現在的溝通有多麽欠缺：在氣球被擊落後不久，五角大樓表示，國防部長奧斯汀通過一條特殊的危機熱線聯係了中國國防部長，後者拒絕接聽他的電話。
 
如果這種冷淡的氣氛持續下去，“當關乎世界命運的時刻到來時，一場新的古巴導彈危機並不是不可想象的，”邁克爾·舒曼在《大西洋》上寫道。“然後這兩個對手可能會發現他們避免災難所需的溝通渠道不起作用，他們的敵對態度太根深蒂固，無法找到解決方案。”
Spencer Bokat-Lindell是時報觀點版麵的編輯。歡迎在Twitter上關他：@bokatlindell。翻譯：紐約時報中文網
 
U.S.-China Relations Keep Getting Worse. Do They Have To?
 
 

This article is part of the Debatable newsletter. You can sign up here to receive it on Wednesdays.

The detection and downing of a Chinese spy balloon in American airspace earlier this month, and the attendant decision by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to postpone the first trip to China by America’s top diplomat since 2018, was just the latest episode in a longer story of deteriorating relations between the world’s two great powers.

That story began in earnest five years ago, when the Trump administration ignited a trade war that the Biden administration has continued to wage. It took another turn in May when President Biden pledged to defend Taiwan if China attacked it, a striking (if halting) departure from longstanding policy, which was underscored by the former House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island over the summer. And last month, a top Air Force general issued a memo predicting a war in 2025 and calling for preparations “to deter, and if required, defeat China.”

Why does Washington believe that China is the top threat to U.S. national security? Are those fears founded, and what should be done to avoid a potentially disastrous military conflict between two nuclear-armed countries? Here’s what people are saying.

China’s authoritarian government affords its citizens few civil liberties and even fewer political rights, and exercises its control through sprawling one-party rule, widespread censorship, repression of civil society, systems of surveillance and propaganda that have grown increasingly sophisticated under President Xi Jinping, and the mass detention of religious and ethnic minorities, which the United States has deemed a genocide.

There are, of course, other authoritarian governments in the world; the United States is even allied with some of them. But to U.S. officials, what makes China a unique threat — beyond its size — is the modernization of its military and, in the words of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, its “increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences”:

Since the 1970s, the United States has struck a delicate diplomatic balance through the “one China” policy, under which it does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, and through “strategic ambiguity,” selling arms to Taiwan without making any security guarantees. Taiwan dominates the production of microchips, which are critical to the functioning of electronic devices. A Chinese invasion that constrained the supply of those chips would lead to “a deep and immediate recession” and “an inability to protect ourselves,” Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo warned last year.

As the world’s second-largest economy, China also exerts influence through trade, alleged theft of intellectual property and investment in developing countries that critics have called a new form of colonialism. And as China’s market power has grown, “U.S. institutions and businesses are increasingly silencing themselves to avoid angering the Chinese government,” German Lopez of The Times has written.

But for all these concerns, many reject the notion that China poses an existential threat to the United States. At the most basic level, “China has neither the destructive capability nor the geopolitical motivation to destroy the U.S.,” Minxin Pei, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, argued in Bloomberg in 2021. Even with a recent expansion, China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than America’s, he added, and its military still lags in technological sophistication and experience.

In the view of Michael Swaine, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Beijing also has shown little interest in exporting its governance system. “Where it does, it is almost entirely directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States,” he argued in Foreign Policy in 2021. Moreover, its economic development model “is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free information flows are required to drive global innovation.”

To Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of China and Asia-Pacific studies at Cornell University, the logic of zero-sum competition with China has become so pervasive in Washington among members of both parties that it risks undermining America’s own interests. “When individuals feel the need to out-hawk one another to protect themselves and advance professionally,” she wrote in Foreign Affairs last year, “the result is groupthink.”

And for detractors of such groupthink, the reaction to the balloon incident is yet another instance of threat inflation. “Americans use all kinds of technology to gather intelligence on China and other states: satellites, phone tapping, computer intrusions, and even good old-fashioned human sources,” writes Emma Ashford, a columnist at Foreign Policy. “It just seems as if Washington blew this whole thing way out of proportion.”

Even those who hold countering China’s rise as a top national priority aren’t particularly keen to start a war, as it would almost certainly exact tremendous costs:

  • In a conflict over an invasion of Taiwan, the United States and its allies would lose tens of thousands of service members and Taiwan’s economy would be devastated, according to recent simulations conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

  • In part because the U.S. and Chinese economies are deeply interdependent, a war lasting just one year would cause America’s G.D.P. to fall by 5 percent to 10 percent and China’s by 25 percent to 30 percent, with severe effects for the global economy, according to a RAND Corporation study.

  • Conflict could also imperil cooperation on climate change between the United States and China, the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, as Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan temporarily did.

Opinions differ on how war might be best avoided. Regarding Taiwan, there are some, like Yu-Jie Chen, a research professor in Taiwan, who contend that deterring China requires more demonstrations of support from like-minded democracies, “including signing bilateral economic agreements with Taiwan, allowing it to join regional trade organizations to diminish Taiwan’s economic overreliance on China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and more gestures like Ms. Pelosi’s visit.” The Times columnist Bret Stephens has argued that Biden should also end the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity in a formal statement.

Yet others think that would be a counterproductive provocation, as Beijing already assumes that the United States would support Taiwan in a conflict. “It would erode assurance by implying our policy is to guarantee Taiwan independence,” Arthur Kroeber, a founding partner at the China-focused research firm GaveKal Dragonomics, told Foreign Affairs in November. “And it could incite Taiwan to make more aggressive moves toward independence, which would increase, not lower, the chances of armed conflict.”

On other matters, there is more consensus about how to ease tensions. There is relatively broad support, for example, for increasing military aid to democracies in the region. “An active denial strategy that focuses on supplying defensive weapons to U.S. allies and a lower-profile, more agile deployment of U.S. forces in the region would raise the costs of Chinese military action without exacerbating China’s own sense of insecurity,” write Jake Werner, a China historian, and William Hartung, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute.

Last year, Congress passed bipartisan legislation allocating $52 billion in subsidies and tax credits to encourage domestic chip production, an industrial policy that could help lower the national security stakes of the Taiwan dispute by hedging against supply chain vulnerabilities. As Steven Rattner, a counselor to the Treasury secretary in the Obama administration, wrote in The Times last month, “even many free-market conservatives seem to recognize that unfettered capitalism can lead to imperfect results.”

 

Biden could also turn down the temperature of the U.S.-China rivalry by rolling back tariffs on Chinese imports, which the Times editorial board described last year as “the Trump administration’s failed gambit of bullying China into making economic concessions.” Instead of trying to change China, the board argued, the United States should focus on strengthening ties with China’s neighbors, as “recent history teaches that the United States is more effective in advancing and defending its interests when it does not act unilaterally.”

However the balloon affair blows over, it has highlighted how strained U.S.-China relations have become and how easily another dispute could curdle into conflict. “As we see with balloons — who predicted a balloon mini-crisis? — the possible permutations are endless,” Chris Buckley, who covers China for The Times, said this week.

It has also revealed how little the two powers now communicate: Shortly after the balloon was shot down, the Pentagon said that Secretary Austin reached out through a special crisis line to his Chinese counterpart, who declined to answer his call.

Should this frosty dynamic persist, “a new type of Cuban-missile-crisis moment, when the fate of the world hangs in the balance, is not inconceivable,” Michael Schuman writes in The Atlantic. “Then the two adversaries may find that the channels of communication they’d need to avert disaster aren’t working, and their inimical attitudes are too entrenched to find a solution.”

Do you have a point of view we missed? Email us at debatable@nytimes.com. Please note your name, age and location in your response, which may be included in the next newsletter.

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