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澳外長黃英賢 用大國競爭來看待印太的未來不妥

(2023-05-11 14:20:59) 下一個

澳外長黃英賢:僅從大國競爭的角度來看待印太地區的未來不妥

 

澳大利亞外交部長、工黨人黃英賢(Penny Wong)自上任以來多次出訪太平洋地區諸島國,繼續推動與英國和美國在上屆聯盟黨政府期間達成的澳英美三邊安全夥伴關係(AUKUS,又稱奧庫斯協議),並於去年首次訪問中國。4月17日,黃英賢受邀在澳大利亞國家新聞俱樂部以澳洲在區域力量平衡中的利益為題,發表了主旨演說。我們也將在本期的節目中為您介紹黃英賢對澳大利亞在太平洋地區和更廣泛的印太地區對外政策的闡述。

澳大利亞外交部長黃英賢資料圖片

澳大利亞外交部長黃英賢資料圖片 © 網絡圖片

 

活動當天,黃英賢在講話一開始時談到:“我想特別感謝我今天的一位客人,(澳洲國家評估辦公室前總幹事)艾倫·金格爾(Allan Gyngell)。幾十年來,艾倫一直是各屆政府的官方和非官方顧問,始終在為澳大利亞的國家利益提供獨特的服務。他是澳大利亞外交政策的權威曆史學家。他是關於澳大利亞外交政策的最好的作家。坦率地說,他是澳大利亞外交政策屆最優秀的大腦。也可能是澳大利亞外交政策屆最謙卑的人。我感謝我們所處這片土地的傳統主人,恩古納瓦人(Ngunnawal)和恩甘布利人(Ngambri),並向過去、現在和新出現的長老們表示敬意。”

黃英賢說:“澳大利亞原住民是這片土地上的第一批外交官和商人。但就在這個月,賈斯汀·穆罕默德(Justin Mohamed)先生開始被任命為澳大利亞首任原住民大使。提升原住民的視角將加強我們在全世界和我們地區的聯係,特別是在藍色太平洋地區。這些聯係的潛在力量長期以來一直被忽視,這對我們自己是不利的,而我們應該把我們擁有的一切都擺到桌麵上。不言而喻,我們帶到桌上的第一件事就是我們自己。當我旅行時,我傾向於通過解釋我們是誰來開始接觸:這片土地擁有地球上最古老的連續文化,以及來自 300 多個祖先的人們。一個其人民與世界上如此多的人民有共同點的國家。”

黃英賢說:“當澳大利亞人放眼世界時,我們看到自己在世界中的反映——正如世界可以看到自己在我們身上的映像一樣。這意味著我們有能力與世界各地的人們建立共同的基礎。這是一個強大的天然資產,可以建立一致,可以表達我們的決心,看到世界上所有人民的利益與我們自己的利益一起得到維護。這很重要,因為我們的外交政策必須準確和真實地反映我們的價值觀和利益,即我們是誰和我們想要什麽。這很重要,因為我們的國家力量,比其他任何東西都更多地來自於我們的人民。我們需要利用我們國家力量的所有要素來促進我們的利益,因為在我們地區不受控製的戰略競爭的影響是嚴重的。”

黃英賢說:“因此,今天我想和你們談談我們如何避免戰爭和維護和平——更重要的是,我們如何塑造一個反映我們國家利益和我們共同區域利益的地區。這些利益在於一個按規則、標準和規範運作的地區——在那裏,一個大國不會決定一個小國的命運;在那裏,每個國家都可以追求自己的願望,自己的繁榮。而我想談的是,我們如何通過塑造我們所希望的地區,為維持和平的地區力量平衡作出貢獻。戰略競爭是在幾個層麵上運作的。我們可能更願意分開的領域——經濟、外交、戰略、軍事都交織在一起,並且都被激烈的敘述競賽所左右。但是,除了了解競爭是如何運作的,我們還需要了解競爭的內容——它不僅僅是大國之間的競爭,實際上不亞於對我們地區和我們世界運作方式的爭奪。”

黃英賢說:“許多評論家和戰略家喜歡簡單地從大國爭奪首要地位的角度來看待本地區正在發生的事情。他們喜歡二元論。二元論的吸引力是顯而易見的。簡單、明確的選擇。非黑即白。但是,僅僅從大國爭奪首要地位的角度來看待本地區的未來,意味著各國自己的國家利益可能會被忽略。它削弱了每個國家通過大國的棱鏡以外的其他方式參與的力量。將討論範圍縮小到我們海岸上的潛在動能衝突也是無益的,因為地區利益受到的挑戰遠不止於此。脅迫性貿易措施;不可持續的貸款;政治幹預;虛假信息;以及重塑從貿易到人權等有利於小國的國際規則、標準和規範——這些都侵犯了各國行使其機構、促進區域平衡和決定自己命運的能力。”

黃英賢說:“因此,在這個存在爭奪的地區,像我們這樣的國家需要加強關注,關注我們的利益是什麽,以及如何維護這些利益。我們的重點必須是我們需要做什麽,以便我們能夠按照我們自己的法律和價值觀生活,由我們自己的公民決定,追求我們自己的繁榮,作出我們自己的選擇,尊重但不屈從於他人。我們的重點需要放在如何確保我們的命運不由他人決定,如何確保我們的決定是自己的。如果有任何疑問,俄羅斯對烏克蘭的非法且不道德的入侵使我們對生活在一個沒有國家占主導地位,也沒有國家被支配(no country dominates, and no country is dominated)的地區的利益變得非常明顯。誠然,澳大利亞一直需要以這種方式關注自己。但現在尤其如此,因為我們的地區麵臨著在某些方麵前所未有的情況。而這些情況需要我們在國家政策方麵表現出空前的協調和雄心。”

黃英賢說:“在南中國海有重疊主張的國家之間的緊張局勢已經上升。有爭議地物的軍事化以及空中和海上的危險遭遇使情況變得更加複雜。中國繼續以近一個世紀以來世界上從未見過的速度和規模實現軍事現代化,但對其戰略意圖幾乎沒有透明度或保證。去年8月,據報道有5枚中國彈道導彈落入日本的專屬經濟區。而就在上周,我們看到中國在台灣周圍進行打擊和封鎖的演習。除此之外,朝鮮繼續破壞穩定,其持續的核武器計劃和彈道導彈發射,威脅著我們在日本、韓國和更廣泛地區的友邦。總的來說,這些因素的組合和誤判的風險構成了幾十年來最棘手的情況。”

黃英賢說:“這就是為什麽我如此堅定地拒絕參與對地區熱點的猜測,無論是喜馬拉雅山、台灣、韓半島還是其他地方。特別是,在政治和媒體界,當涉及到台灣問題時,有很多關於時間表和情景的狂熱討論。任何像我這樣(身居要職)的人,如果覺得有衝動要加入這種討論,應該抵製這種誘惑。這是最危險的猜謎遊戲。我在這方麵的做法不是簡單的政治家尋求避免假設性的問題。它是對利益的坦率和清晰的評估。我們不希望看到任何單邊改變現狀的行為。我們呼籲通過對話和平解決兩岸問題,不威脅或使用武力或脅迫。因為讓我絕對明確地表明。一場關於台灣的戰爭對所有人來說都會是災難性的。”

黃英賢說:“我們知道不會有真正的贏家,而且我們知道維持現狀比任何替代方案都要全麵優越。這將是具有挑戰性的,既需要保證也需要威懾,但這是最能避免衝突並使本地區生活在和平與繁榮中的主張。因此,我現在要對澳大利亞國家新聞俱樂部說——以避免任何可能的誤解:我們的工作是降低任何潛在衝突的熱度,同時增加對其他國家的壓力,讓他們也這樣做。阿爾巴尼斯(Anthony Albanese)政府在國內這樣做,我們在外交上也這樣做。這可能不會像今天那樣賣出很多報紙,但它會幫助你們在更長時間內賣出報紙。”

黃英賢說:“具體到我們的對華關係,阿爾巴尼斯政府將保持冷靜和連貫,並繼續做我們上任以來的工作:在我們能合作的地方合作,在我們必須不同意的地方不同意,明智地處理我們的分歧,最重要的是接觸並大力追求我們自己的國家利益。我們從中國要繼續做中國的現實出發。其中一部分是世界第二大經濟體的現實,它占世界GDP的18%。中國的增長故事在減輕其本國人民、本地區和世界的貧困方麵發揮了關鍵作用。中國經濟的急劇增長一直是澳大利亞繁榮的推動力。即便是在多元化發展的情況下,在可預見的未來,中國仍將是澳大利亞最大的貿易夥伴,也是符合我們國家利益的寶貴的外國投資來源。”

黃英賢說:“除此之外,習主席已明確表示,中國的目標是‘到本世紀中葉,把我國建設成為綜合國力和國際影響力領先的社會主義現代化強國’。像任何國家一樣,中國將部署這一力量,並利用這種影響力來推進其國家利益。我們知道,這些利益有時會與我們的利益以及本地區其他國家的利益不同。重要的是,中國將國家利益理解為通過有利的結果,通過減少不利結果的可能性,以及通過減少分歧或異議的空間來推進。這種理解通過其持續的國家政策得到了協調。像中國這樣的大國利用其掌握的一切工具來最大限度地提高自己的韌性和影響力——其國內產業政策;其在基礎設施、外交和軍事能力方麵的大規模國際投資;進入其市場的機會。這種國家政策說明了中等國家,如我們和我們在東南亞和太平洋地區的合作夥伴所麵臨的挑戰。”

黃英賢說:“然而,我們不需要對中國尋求最大限度地發揮其優勢而浪費精力,感到震驚或憤怒。相反,我們要把精力用於爭取我們自己的優勢。我們部署我們自己的國家政策,以塑造一個開放、穩定和繁榮的地區。一個可預測的地區,按照商定的規則、標準和法律運作。在這裏,沒有國家占主導地位,也沒有國家被支配(Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated)。一個主權受到尊重,所有國家都從戰略平衡中受益的地區。一個保障我們提出異議的能力的地區。一個維護我們的能動性的地區。一個保護我們決定自己命運的能力的地區。當我們談及我們的利益時,這就是我們的意思。這樣的地區並不是簡單地有機存在的。它需要我們的國家努力,特別是在一些人試圖改寫規則的時候。這種努力不能由澳大利亞政府的單獨一個部門來承擔。”

黃英賢說:“我們的外交官不能單獨做這件事,我們的軍隊也不能。我們在世界範圍內所做的事情需要通過我們的身份和我們在國內所做的事情來加強和強化。這需要對我們國家力量的所有要素進行投資。經濟更加多元化,在本土製造更多的東西,應對氣候變化並使澳大利亞成為一個可再生能源超級大國,通過國家反腐敗委員會(NACC)加強對我們機構的信任,麵對我們的網絡安全需求,投資於教育和培訓,加強人們所依賴的服務,增長工資——所有這些都是使澳大利亞更加強大和抵抗外部衝擊的一部分。我們的經濟安全、我們作為一個多文化民主國家的國內韌性和我們的國際參與結合起來就是我們的國家政策。阿爾巴尼斯政府正在部署所有這些國家力量的要素,以使澳大利亞在國內更加穩定、自信和安全,並在世界範圍內更具影響力。”

黃英賢說:“國家政策的核心是我們的外交政策,在本地區和世界範圍內推進澳大利亞的利益和價值觀——保證澳大利亞人的安全,確保我們的經濟實力。這是我們為塑造本地區而部署的戰略,以使其特點更符合我們的利益;避免衝突並維持和平。這也是本地區國家所希望的。東盟對‘可能會破壞該地區的穩定,並最終導致大國之間的誤判、嚴重對抗、公開衝突和不可預測的後果’的行動表示關切,並呼籲堅持多邊主義、夥伴關係和合作。正如我一開始所說的,戰略競爭不僅僅是關於誰是奪魁者,誰在比賽中領先,或者誰在印度-太平洋擁有戰略首要地位。它實際上是關於該地區的特點。它關係到支撐我們安全和繁榮的規則和規範,確保我們在一個開放和包容的區域內的準入,並負責任地管理競爭。”

黃英賢說:“從我在整個地區的旅行中可以清楚地看到,各國不希望生活在一個封閉的、等級森嚴的地區,那裏的規則是由一個大國為滿足其自身利益而製定的。相反,我們希望有一個開放和包容的區域,以商定的規則為基礎,大小國家都能選擇自己的命運。各國希望有一個繁榮的、相互聯係的地區,通過一個透明的體係,在全球經濟增長的中心共同進行貿易,經濟的相互依存不被濫用於政治和戰略目的。各國都希望有一個和平和穩定的地區。這意味著要有足夠的平衡來阻止侵略和脅迫——如果要實現持久的平衡,包括澳大利亞在內的更多參與者必須為此作出貢獻。在這種平衡中,通過外交的戰略保證得到了軍事威懾的支持。這就是為什麽澳大利亞對管理大國競爭的護欄(guardrails)的想法如此投入,從而使其不會陷入衝突。大國在各個層麵都有可靠和開放的溝通渠道,以盡量減少誤解和誤判的風險。在這裏,對每個國家的安全政策都有限製。”

黃英賢說:“(美蘇兩國)在古巴導彈危機後製定的護欄可充當向導。拜登(Joe Biden)總統已經向中國提出了同意護欄的建議。他的建議得到滿足符合全世界的利益。我已經對我的中國同行,以及他的前任說過這一點。我將繼續這樣說。在我不斷的旅行中,我將不斷提醒我的同事們,推動對大國競爭進行負責任的管理,符合我們所有在地區和平與穩定中具有生存利益的國家的利益。事實上,這是一種超越印度-太平洋的利益。所有國家都需要行使我們的能動性來避免戰爭,並維護和平。而倡導這一目標是澳大利亞外交的最關鍵方麵。這要從我們外交部門的能力開始——我們在當地將我們的外交政策付諸行動的人。我每天都為澳大利亞外交與貿易部感到自豪,該部由安思捷(Jan Adams)秘書長幹練地領導,她今天與我們在一起。他們提供重要的戰略洞察力和警告,他們捍衛我們的利益,他們影響和說服,他們在房間裏和桌子旁,他們與合作夥伴一起提供澳大利亞的援助,他們為需要的澳大利亞人提供關鍵的領事支持。”

黃英賢說:“由於上屆政府未能確保為我們的外交能力提供長期資源,澳大利亞的外交足跡實際上已經縮減。盡管莫裏森政府一直在談論太平洋地區的發展,但實際上在太平洋地區工作的外交官比自由黨上台時還要少。這是在上屆政府對我們的發展計劃削減118億澳元的基礎上,留下的真空讓別人來填補。我們的第一個預算提供了自2011至12年以來最大的一次官方發展援助增長,以建立一個更強大的地區。阿爾巴尼斯政府不久將發布我們的新發展政策。發展援助是國家政策的核心。它幫助我們的區域夥伴在經濟上變得更具韌性,發展關鍵的基礎設施,並提供自己的安全,這樣他們就不太需要求助於他人。而所有這些都是在總理和政府其他成員的參與下進行的。在我被任命(為外長)後的11個月裏,我已經訪問了30個國家,其中5個國家的訪問次數超過了一次。本周我將訪問新喀裏多尼亞和圖瓦盧,這意味著我作為外交部長將訪問所有太平洋島國論壇成員國。”

黃英賢說:“我們的工作必須從太平洋地區開始,因為太平洋地區是個大家庭,因為上屆政府的短處我們需要彌補,也因為這是工黨的DNA。我提醒你們,在巴布亞新幾內亞從澳大利亞獨立的過程中,(澳洲工黨籍前總理)惠特拉姆(Gough Whitlam)與(巴布亞新幾內亞前總理)大酋長索馬雷爵士(Sir Michael Somare)曾是合作夥伴。盡管惠特拉姆並不缺乏出色的改革,但他說:‘如果曆史要抹去我的整個公共生涯,除了我對民主的巴布亞新幾內亞的獨立所做的貢獻,我應該感到滿足’。太平洋地區的許多國家都經曆過大國競爭演變成災難和衝突的現實——當時他們自己的能動性被擱置,他們的聲音被忽視。任何質疑太平洋島國對澳大利亞安全的戰略重要性的人,隻需要對曆史有一個最簡單的了解。雖然我們的戰略環境在過去50年裏發生了變化,但我們的地理環境沒有變化,太平洋對我們自身安全的中心地位也沒有變化。”

黃英賢說:“隨著戰略較量重新回到本地區,當我們共同努力,當我們對太平洋的優先事項作出反應,當我們尊重太平洋能動性時,這種安全就會得到加強。作為太平洋大家庭的一員,我們的優先事項是確保藍色太平洋保持和平、繁榮並有能力應對我們時代的挑戰。這就是為什麽我們與我們的區域同行密切合作,幫助太平洋大家庭保持團結,以及為什麽我們將繼續提升太平洋地區在對我們地區最重要的問題上的聲音。我們和太平洋島國論壇的觀點是,太平洋大家庭對太平洋安全負責。我們對太平洋地區正在發生的事情很現實——我們知道事情不會再回到以前的樣子了。當國家不尊重太平洋的能動性,當他們強加不可持續的債務負擔,或者當宣布後沒有兌現惠及社區的承諾時,我們會明確表達我們的關切。我們希望澳大利亞能成為本地區國家的首選合作夥伴。是夥伴,而不是家長。”

黃英賢說:“在上屆政府九年的不尊重之後,我們對氣候變化采取了真正的行動。我們已經在四年內將我們對太平洋地區的官方發展援助增加了近10億澳元。我們增加了基礎設施投資,並建立了專門的氣候和基礎設施夥伴關係,為太平洋地區的需求提供具有氣候適應性的投資。我們擴大並改善了太平洋地區的勞動力流動計劃,並與夥伴政府合作,確保所獲得的技能為所有人帶來紅利。我們加強了海上安全合作,與瓦努阿圖簽署了雙邊安全條約,並正在與巴布亞新幾內亞簽署條約方麵取得進展,與斐濟簽署了部隊地位協定,幫助合作夥伴在大規模網絡攻擊後恢複關鍵服務,並應對自然災害——最近在瓦努阿圖發生的‘朱迪’和‘凱文’颶風。我們正在幫助區域夥伴提高經濟複原力,發展關鍵的基礎設施,並提供自己的安全,這樣他們就不太需要求助於他人。如果沒有這些投資,其他國家將繼續填補真空,澳大利亞將繼續失去地位,就像我們在自由黨和國家黨執政期間那樣。”

黃英賢說:“我們對待太平洋地區的原則——小國以加強影響力、杠杆作用和主權的方式進行合作——是澳大利亞外交政策的基本原則,其基礎是澳大利亞最偉大的外交部長伊瓦特博士(H. V. Evatt)的工作。澳大利亞的外交政策,在其最佳狀態下,從來都是‘你與大國的關係’。像我們這樣的國家需要一個用規則來約束權力的國際體係。這正是伊瓦特在(1945年)舊金山會議上努力實現的目標,他明白,僅僅通過贏得當時大國的青睞,永遠無法滿足我們的利益。然而,無論是孟席斯(Robert Menzies)前總理還是霍華德(John Howard)前總理,澳大利亞曆史上一直有人認為我們的外交政策應該僅僅是依附於一個大國。現在有些人暗示我們應該依附於他們預期的霸權中國。但是,阿爾巴尼斯政府將始終對澳大利亞抱有更大的期望。我們將始終追求更大的自力更生和更積極的外交政策。現如今,我們將伊瓦特的遺產現代化,與本地區的夥伴和朋友合作,在維持對我們所有人都有利的平衡方麵發揮能動性作用。”

黃英賢說:“這就是我們通過與整個地區的夥伴進行有價值的雙邊戰略合作所尋求實現的目標。這也是我們通過與東盟和太平洋島國論壇的區域夥伴關係所尋求的。當(阿爾巴尼斯)總理歡迎莫迪和岸田首相以及拜登總統下個月訪問澳大利亞時,我們將致意四方安全對話(Quad)的重要貢獻,也致意日本和印度的力量、分量和影響力,它們本身就在為戰略平衡作出貢獻。而奧庫斯協議代表了我們與美國和英國關係的演變,有助於使澳大利亞本身成為本地區更強大的合作夥伴。我們的做法在太平洋地區很重要,在東南亞也很重要。回到之前的話題——有些人認為東南亞隻是一個大國競爭的舞台。我們不讚同這種觀點。因為它剝奪了東南亞國家以及東盟這個持久的核心機構的影響力、活力和作用。剝奪了他們為追求國家和集體利益而做出主權選擇的能力。它掩蓋了東南亞國家內部和之間存在的複雜動態——我們地區的國家在麵對戰略競爭時尋求最大化其影響力的方式。”

黃英賢說:“以及他們如何決定自己對其主權所麵臨的真實和直接挑戰的反應,包括在南中國海。它淡化了澳大利亞和我們的夥伴可以與本地區合作以加強我們的集體安全和繁榮的方式。更重要的是,它把消極怠工作為一種可行的選擇:在別人代表我們作出選擇的時候,我們可以袖手旁觀,希望得到最好的結果。這削弱了我們——澳大利亞和我們在東南亞的鄰國塑造我們希望生活的地區的能力。這就是為什麽阿爾巴尼斯政府將與東盟及其成員國的接觸作為核心優先事項。到我們政府上台一周年時,我將作為外交部長訪問東南亞的每一個國家,除了緬甸。”

黃英賢說:“這種外交努力必須輔之以更多的經濟接觸。本屆政府將於今年晚些時候發布的《2040年東南亞經濟戰略》,以及我們與區域夥伴的自由貿易協定網絡,都是這方麵的核心。這不僅是互惠互利的,而且創造了共享價值,這是和平的重要激勵因素。在一個擁有超過6.75億人口的多元化地區,我們必須有針對性地了解如何最大限度地發揮我們的影響力。並與合作夥伴合作,加強和擴大這種影響力。共同創造機會,並向本地區表明,除了安全利益之外,還有其他利益可以培養。要建立一種確信,即知道他們的成功就是我們的成功。這就是為什麽我們鼓勵美國和來自印度-太平洋及其他地區的其他夥伴在東南亞進行更大的經濟參與,包括通過‘印太經濟框架’(IPEF)。”

黃英賢說:“如果不清楚美國對這種平衡的重要性,我們就無法談論我們想要的平衡地區。我認為現在是時候進行一些現實檢查了。在澳大利亞曆史上,沒有比科廷(John Curtin、澳洲前總理)在二戰時轉向美國更重要的轉折點。美國是我們最親密的盟友和主要的戰略夥伴。如果沒有美國及其對本地區的安全保障,印度-太平洋就不會享有長期的、不間斷的穩定和繁榮。整個地區都受益於美國的參與,受益於他們對本地區戰略平衡的貢獻。美國經常被談論為不可缺少的大國。它仍然如此。但這種不可或缺性的性質已經改變。在我們尋求戰略平衡的過程中,所有國家都在行使其能動性以實現和平與繁榮,美國是平衡多極地區的核心。許多對美國的不完美自鳴得意的人會發現,如果美國停止發揮其作用,世界就會變得不那麽令人滿意。”

黃英賢說:“話雖如此,我們不能隻把它交給美國。本地區的所有國家都必須通過外交、經濟和其他方麵的接觸來行使其權力,以維持本地區的平衡——並維護支撐了幾十年和平與繁榮的規範和規則。而這種平衡必須得到軍事能力的支持。上個月,澳大利亞和我們的奧庫斯協議合作夥伴宣布了我們獲得核動力潛艇的途徑——這是我們曆史上對國防能力最大的一次投資,代表了我們國家、我們的國防軍和我們的經濟的一個轉型時刻。正如我們每個人都有責任通過我們的外交幫助維持和平的條件一樣,我們也有責任在集體威懾侵略方麵發揮我們的作用。如果任何國家能夠計算出他們可以成功地支配另一個國家,那麽這個地區就會變得不穩定,衝突的風險就會增加。正如《2020年國防戰略更新》所強調的,澳大利亞必須對我們自己的安全負責,這意味著我們必須增強我們自己的能力,以發揮威懾作用。”

黃英賢說:“在一個軍事現代化的時代,由於其他國家的軍隊可以在更大的範圍內,以更快的速度和更高的精度和殺傷力進行作戰,對我們的安全負責意味著能夠從更遠的距離將潛在對手的部隊和基礎設施置於危險之中。通過我們自己擁有強大的防禦能力,並與投資於自身能力的夥伴合作,我們改變了任何潛在侵略者的計算方式。我們必須確保任何國家都不會得出結論,認為衝突的好處超過了風險。這對於確保我們國家和人民的安全和保障至關重要。我們的外交和國防政策是我們如何使澳大利亞在世界範圍內更強大、更有影響力的兩個基本和相互依賴的部分。它們共同使各國更難通過武力或威脅使用武力來脅迫其他國家損害其利益。它們共同促進了維持我們地區和平的戰略力量平衡。正如我的同事(國防部長)馬爾斯(Richard Marles)所說:‘威懾並不是合作的替代品——它們一起是相互加強的’。”

黃英賢說:“在我們這樣的民主國家,像奧庫斯協議這樣大的工程應該引起審查。有些人擔心價格太高。對此有兩個回應。首先,從我們地區軍事擴軍的規模和速度來看,需要進行嚴肅的財政投資,以使我們自己擁有可靠的防禦能力,並為區域平衡作出貢獻。第二,大部分的金融投資是在我們自己身上。在我們自己的工作、工業和主權能力方麵。讓我們不要忘記,奧庫斯協議不僅僅是關於潛艇。它也是關於聯合開發能力,包括人工智能、量子技術和網絡。有些人擔心時間框架。的確,在九年的能力公告中,我們失去了很多時間,但沒有交付。但我們不能回到過去;我們隻能開始工作,以現實的速度和最低的過渡風險提供必要的能力。這就是為什麽該最佳途徑不僅僅涉及獲取弗吉尼亞級潛艇或建造我們自己的潛艇,而且還涉及延長柯林斯級潛艇的壽命。”

黃英賢說:“還有人對核不擴散問題提出了關切。工黨在倡導切實可行的國際防擴散與裁軍努力方麵有著自豪的曆史,我們已經批準了《不擴散核武器條約》,並將確保我們繼續以最高和最嚴格的標準履行其義務。我們的奧庫斯協議合作夥伴理解並認可澳大利亞在國際法下的承諾,包括《拉羅通加條約》(即《南太平洋無核區條約》)。海軍核推進符合我們在《拉羅通加條約》下的義務。美國已經確認,輪流訪問澳大利亞的核動力潛艇將采用常規武器。雖然我們不是該條約的締約國,但澳大利亞將繼續以符合《曼穀條約》(即《東南亞無核武器區條約》)基本原則的方式行事。我們已經並將繼續定期和透明地與國際原子能機構和我們的區域夥伴進行接觸。我感謝我們的合作夥伴願意參與,並感謝他們公開表示讚賞我們為使他們了解情況而作出的努力。我特別注意到印度尼西亞的評論,即:‘維護本地區的和平與穩定是所有國家的責任。至關重要的是,所有國家都要成為這一努力的一部分’。這正是我們正在做的事情。”

黃英賢說:“澳大利亞在許多方麵是幸運的——尤其是我們受益於我們最偉大的政治家的遠見卓識:科廷、伊瓦特和惠特拉姆。他們為我們指明了在世界範圍內促進我們國家利益的道路。這條道路今天仍在繼續,使他們的遺產、聯盟、夥伴關係、規則和區域現代化。在我們麵對今天的情況時,這條道路一如既往地指導著我們,使我們的後代受益的遠見卓識。我想用我對世界各地的許多聽眾提出的一個觀點來結束,因為它確實觸及了問題的核心。當今的情況已經促使人們將其與1914年、1930年代和1962年進行比較。這些比較應該作為警告,但僅此而已。因為我們不是曆史的人質。我們決定如何對待當下。”

黃英賢補充說:“我們正在對我們的國家力量進行投資,不僅僅是為了防止區域競賽,而是為了塑造和影響它,以促進我們的國家和共同利益。我們正在通過對未來軍事力量的重大軍事投資,包括通過奧庫斯夥伴關係,創造威懾力。我們正在通過創造國內經濟的韌性,解決氣候變化和能源安全問題,通過更強大的供應鏈,在澳大利亞製造更多的東西,以及培訓我們的人民來實現這一目標。而我們正在通過投資我們的外交力量,更新澳大利亞最緊密的夥伴關係,以及推進我們的利益和價值觀來實現這一目標。我們的決定是利用我們國家力量的所有要素來塑造符合我們利益的世界,並使之變得更好。非常感謝大家的關注!”

National Press Club Address, Australian interests in a regional balance of power

https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power 

Speech,  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong 

17 April 2023

Thank you to the National Press Club for having me today, and to Jane for your introduction and moderating today’s discussion.

Thank you all for being here. I acknowledge members of the diplomatic corps, and my ministerial colleague Pat Conroy.

I want to particularly acknowledge one of my guests today, Allan Gyngell.

Allan has been an official and unofficial adviser to governments for decades, always in singular service of Australia’s national interest.

He is the definitive historian of Australian foreign policy. He is the finest writer about Australian foreign policy. He is, frankly, the finest mind in Australian foreign policy. And possibly also the smallest ego in Australian foreign policy.

I acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet, the Ngunnawal and Ngambri peoples, and pay my respect to elders past, present and emerging.

First Nations peoples were this land’s first diplomats and traders.

But it was just this month that Mr Justin Mohamed commenced his appointment as Australia’s inaugural Ambassador for First Nations People.

Elevating First Nations perspectives will strengthen our connections across the world and in our region, especially across the Blue Pacific.

The potential power of those connections has been neglected for too long, and it has been to our own detriment, when we ought to bring everything we have to the table.

Self-evidently, the first thing we bring to the table is ourselves. As I travel I tend to begin engagement by explaining who we are: a land that is home to the oldest continuous culture on the planet, and to people from more than 300 ancestries.

A nation whose people share common ground with so many of the world’s peoples.

When Australians look out to the world, we see ourselves reflected in it – just as the world can see itself reflected in us.

What that means is we have the ability to build on common ground with people around the world. This is a powerful natural asset for building alignment, for articulating our determination to see the interests of all the world’s peoples upheld, alongside our own.

This matters because our foreign policy must be an accurate and authentic reflection of our values and interests – of who we are and what we want.

And it matters because our national power, more than anything else, comes from our people.

We need to harness all elements of our national power to advance our interests, when the implications of unchecked strategic competition in our region are grave.

So today I want to talk to you about how we avert war and maintain peace – and more than that, how we shape a region that reflects our national interests and our shared regional interests.

Those interests lie in a region that operates by rules, standards and norms – where a larger country does not determine the fate of a smaller country; where each country can pursue its own aspirations, its own prosperity.

And I want to talk about how we contribute to the regional balance of power that keeps the peace by shaping the region we want.

Strategic competition is operating on several levels. Domains that we might prefer to separate – economic, diplomatic, strategic, military – all interwoven, and all framed by an intense contest of narratives.

But as well as understanding how competition is operating, we need to understand what is being competed for – that it is more than great power rivalry and is in fact nothing less than a contest over the way our region and our world work.

Many commentators and strategists prefer to look at what is happening in the region simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy. They love a binary. And the appeal of a binary is obvious. Simple, clear choices. Black and white.

But viewing the future of the region simply in terms of great powers competing for primacy means countries’ own national interests can fall out of focus.

It diminishes the power of each country to engage other than through the prism of a great power.

It is also unhelpful to narrow this discussion to the potential of kinetic conflict on our shores, when regional interests are challenged by actions that fall far short of that.

Coercive trade measures; unsustainable lending; political interference; disinformation; and reshaping international rules, standards and norms that have benefited smaller countries, from trade to human rights – these all encroach on the ability of countries to exercise their agency, contribute to regional balance and decide their own destinies.

So countries like ours in this contested region need to sharpen our focus, on what our interests are, and how to uphold them.

Our focus must be on what we need to do so we can live according to our own laws and values, determined by our own citizens, pursuing our own prosperity, making our own choices, respecting but not deferring to others.

Our focus needs to be on how we ensure our fate is not determined by others, how we ensure our decisions are our own. And if there were any doubt, Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine renders stark our interest in living in a region where no country dominates, and no country is dominated.

It’s true that Australia has always needed to apply ourselves with this focus. But it is especially true right now because our region faces circumstances in some ways unprecedented.

And these circumstances require a response of unprecedented coordination and ambition in our statecraft.

Tensions have risen between states with overlapping claims in the South China Sea.

Compounding that have been the militarisation of disputed features and dangerous encounters in the air and at sea.

China continues to modernise its military at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century with little transparency or assurance about its strategic intent.

In August last year, five Chinese ballistic missiles were reported to have fallen in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. And just last week, we saw China practice strikes and blockades around Taiwan.

On top of that, North Korea continues to destabilise, with its ongoing nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile launches, threatening our friends in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the broader region.

Altogether, this combination of factors and the risk of miscalculation comprise the most confronting circumstances in decades.

This is why I am so steadfast in refusing to engage in speculation about regional flashpoints, whether the Himalayas, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula or anywhere else.

In particular, there is much frenzied discussion in political and media circles over timelines and scenarios when it comes to Taiwan. Anyone in positions like mine who feels an urge to add to that discussion should resist the temptation.

It is the most dangerous of parlour games.

My approach to this is not simply a politician seeking to avoid hypothetical questions. It is a frank and clear-eyed assessment of interests.

We do not want to see any unilateral change to the status quo. We call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue without the threat or use of force or coercion.

Because let me be absolutely clear. A war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for all.

We know that there would be no real winners, and we know maintaining the status quo is comprehensively superior to any alternative. It will be challenging, requiring both reassurance and deterrence, but it is the proposition most capable of averting conflict and enabling the region to live in peace and prosperity.

So I will say it now to the National Press Club – to avoid any possible misunderstanding: our job is to lower the heat on any potential conflict, while increasing pressure on others to do the same. The Albanese Government does that here at home, and we do that in our diplomacy.

That may not sell as many newspapers today, but it will help you to sell them for a lot longer.

In our China relationship specifically, the Albanese Government will be calm and consistent, and continue to do as we have since coming to office: cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest.

We start with the reality that China is going to keep being China.

Part of that is the reality of the world’s second largest economy, representing 18% of the world’s GDP. China’s growth story has played a crucial role in alleviating poverty for its own people, the region and the world.

Its dramatic economic growth has been a driver of Australian prosperity.

Even with increased diversification, China will remain Australia’s largest trading partner for the foreseeable future, and a valued source of foreign investment, where it meets our national interests.

Beyond that, President Xi has made clear China’s goal of being “a great modern socialist country that leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence by the middle of the century.”

Like any country, China will deploy this strength and utilise this influence to advance its national interests.

We know at times these interests will differ from our interests, and from others in the region.

Importantly, China understands national interest as being advanced by favourable outcomes, by reducing the possibility of unfavourable outcomes – and by reducing the space for disagreement or dissent.

This understanding is coordinated through its persistent statecraft.

A great power like China uses every tool at its disposal to maximise its own resilience and influence - its domestic industry policy; its massive international investment in infrastructure, diplomacy and military capability; access to its markets.

This statecraft illustrates the challenge for middle powers, like us and our partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Yet we need not waste energy with shock or outrage at China seeking to maximise its advantage.

Instead, we channel our energy in pressing for our own advantage.

We deploy our own statecraft toward shaping a region that is open, stable and prosperous. A predictable region, operating by agreed rules, standards and laws. Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated. A region where sovereignty is respected, and all countries benefit from a strategic equilibrium.

A region that safeguards our capacity to disagree.

A region that preserves our agency.

A region that protects our ability to decide our own destiny.

When we talk about our interests, this is what we mean.

That kind of region doesn’t simply exist organically. It demands our national effort, especially as some seek to rewrite the rules.

That effort cannot be left to one or another arm of Australian Government.

Our diplomats cannot do it alone, nor can our military. And what we do in the world needs to reinforce and be reinforced by who we are and what we do at home.

It takes investment in all elements of our national power.

A more diversified economy, making more things here, responding to climate change and making Australia a renewable energy superpower, strengthening trust in our institutions through the National Anti-Corruption Commission, facing our cyber security needs, investments in education and training, strengthening the services people rely on, growth in wages - all part of making Australia more robust and resistant to external shocks.

Our economic security, our domestic resilience as a multicultural democracy and our international engagement combine as our statecraft.

The Albanese Government is deploying all of these elements of national power to make Australia more stable, confident and secure at home, and more influential in the world.

Central to statecraft is our foreign policy, advancing Australian interests and values in our region and the world – to keep Australians safe, to ensure our economic strength.

It’s the strategy we deploy to shape the region so that its character is closer to our interests; to avert conflict and maintain peace.

That is what the countries of the region want too. ASEAN has expressed concern over actions that “could destabilise the region and eventually lead to miscalculation, serious confrontation, open conflicts and unpredictable consequences among major powers” and called for upholding multilateralism, partnership and cooperation.

As I said at the outset, strategic competition is not merely about who is top dog, who is ahead in the race, or who holds strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific.

It’s actually about the character of the region. It’s about the rules and norms that underpin our security and prosperity, that ensure our access within an open and inclusive region, and that manage competition responsibly.

It’s clear to me from my travels throughout the region that countries don’t want to live in a closed, hierarchical region where the rules are dictated by a single major power to suit its own interests.

Instead, we want an open and inclusive region, based on agreed rules, where countries of all sizes can choose their own destiny.

Countries want a prosperous, connected region, trading together at the epicentre of global economic growth, through a transparent system, where economic interdependence is not misused for political and strategic ends.

And countries want a region that is peaceful and stable. That means sufficient balance to deter aggression and coercion – balance to which more players, including Australia, must contribute if it is to be durable.

A balance where strategic reassurance through diplomacy is supported by military deterrence.

It is why Australia is so invested in the idea of guardrails to manage great power competition, so it does not career into conflict.

Guardrails where the major powers have reliable and open channels of communication at all levels to minimise the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Where limits are established on each country’s security policies.

The guardrails that were developed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis serve as a guide.

President Biden has made overtures to China toward agreeing guardrails. It is in all the world’s interests that his overtures are met. I have said this to my Chinese counterpart, and to his predecessor. And I will keep saying it.

And in my continuing travels, I will keep reminding my colleagues that it is in the interests of all of us with an existential interest in regional peace and stability to press for the responsible management of great power competition.

Indeed, this is an interest that extends beyond the Indo-Pacific.

All countries need to exercise our agency to avert war, and maintain peace.

And advocating this objective is the most critical aspect of Australia’s diplomacy.

This starts with the capability of our foreign service – our people on the ground that put our foreign policy into action.

I am proud every day of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, so ably led by Jan Adams – here with us today.

They provide vital strategic insights and warning, they champion our interests, they influence and persuade, they are in the room and at the table, they work with partners to deliver Australian assistance, they provide critical consular support for Australians in need.

As a result of the previous Government’s failure to ensure long-term resourcing for our diplomatic capability, Australia’s diplomatic footprint has actually shrunk.

For all their talk of a Pacific step up, the Morrison Government actually had fewer diplomats working in the Pacific than when the Liberals took office.

This is on top of the former government’s $11.8 billion of cuts to our development program, which left vacuums for others to fill.

Our first budget delivered the single biggest ODA increase since 2011-12 to build a stronger region.

The Albanese Government will soon release our new development policy. Development assistance is central to statecraft. It helps our regional partners become more economically resilient, develop critical infrastructure and provide their own security so they have less need to call on others.

And all of this led by the engagement of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.

In the eleven months since my appointment, I have visited 30 countries, five of them more than once.

This week I will visit New Caledonia and Tuvalu, meaning I will have travelled to all Pacific Island Forum members as foreign minister.

Our work had to start in the Pacific because the Pacific is family, because of the shortcomings of the previous government we needed to remedy, and because it is in Labor’s DNA.

I remind you of Gough Whitlam’s partnership with Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare in Papua New Guinea’s independence from Australia. Though Whitlam was not short of remarkable reforms, he said:

If history were to obliterate the whole of my public career, save my contribution to the independence of a democratic PNG, I should rest content.

Many countries in the Pacific have lived the reality of great power competition spiralling into catastrophe and conflict – when their own agency was sidelined and their voices ignored.

Anyone who questions the strategic importance of Pacific islands to Australia’s security needs only acquire the briefest familiarity with history.

While our strategic circumstances have changed in the last 50 years, our geography has not, and nor has the centrality of the Pacific to our own security.

With the return of strategic contest to the region, this security is enhanced when we work together, when we respond to Pacific priorities, and when we respect Pacific institutions.

As a member of the Pacific family, our priority is to ensure the Blue Pacific remains peaceful, prosperous and equipped to respond to the challenges of our time.

That’s why we have worked closely with our regional counterparts to help the Pacific family stay united, and why we will continue to elevate Pacific voices on the issues that matter most to our region.

Our view and the view of the Pacific Islands Forum is that the Pacific family is responsible for Pacific security.

We’re realistic about what is happening in the Pacific – we know that things won’t go back to how they were before.

We make our concerns clear when countries don’t respect Pacific institutions, when they impose unsustainable debt burdens, or when announcements aren’t followed by delivery that benefits communities.

We want Australia to be a partner of choice for the countries of our region. Partners, not patriarchs.

We have delivered real action on climate change, after nine years of disrespect from the previous government.

We have increased our ODA to the Pacific by nearly a billion dollars over four years.

We’ve boosted our infrastructure investments and established a dedicated climate and infrastructure partnership to deliver climate-resilient investments for Pacific needs.

We’ve expanded and improved Pacific labour mobility programs and are working with partner governments to ensure the skills gained pay dividends for all.

We’ve enhanced our maritime security cooperation, signed a bilateral security treaty with Vanuatu and are making progress on a treaty with PNG, signed a status of forces agreement with Fiji, helped partners restore critical services in the wake of massive cyber attacks and responded to natural disasters – most recently cyclones Judy and Kevin in Vanuatu.

We are helping regional partners become more economically resilient, develop critical infrastructure and provide their own security so they have less need to call on others.

Without these investments, others will continue to fill the vacuum and Australia will continue to lose ground as we did under the Liberals and Nationals.

The principle of our approach to the Pacific - smaller countries working together in a way that strengthens influence, leverage and sovereignty - is a fundamental principle of Australian foreign policy, grounded in the work of Australia’s greatest foreign minister, Dr Herbert Evatt.

Australia’s foreign policy, at its best, has never simply been “what you do with the great powers.”

Countries like us need an international system that constrains power with rules.

That was what Evatt worked so hard to achieve at the San Francisco Conference, understanding that our interests could never be served just by winning favour with the great powers of the day.

Yet whether Menzies or Howard, there have been those throughout Australia’s history who have thought our foreign policy should simply be to attach ourselves to a great power.

Now some imply we should attach ourselves to what they anticipate will be a hegemonic China.

But the Albanese Government will always be more ambitious for Australia. We will always pursue greater self-reliance and a more active foreign policy.

Today we modernise the Evatt legacy, working with partners and friends in the region to exercise agency in maintaining an equilibrium that benefits us all.

That is what we seek to achieve through our valued bilateral strategic cooperation with partners throughout the region.

That is what we seek to do through our regional partnerships with ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum.

When the Prime Minister welcomes Prime Ministers Modi and Kishida and President Biden to Australia next month, we will acknowledge the critical contribution of the Quad and also the power, weight and influence of Japan and India, which in their own right are contributing to strategic balance.

And AUKUS represents an evolution of our relationships with the US and the UK, helping make Australia itself a stronger partner for the region.

Our approach matters in the Pacific and it matters in Southeast Asia.

To return to an earlier point—some would see Southeast Asia as a mere theatre for great power competition.

That is not a view we share.

Because it strips Southeast Asian nations—and the enduring, central institution of ASEAN—of their influence, dynamism and agency.

Of their ability to make sovereign choices in pursuit of their national and collective interests.

It glosses over the complex dynamics that exist within and between Southeast Asian nations—the ways in which the countries of our region seek to maximise their influence in the face of strategic competition.

And how they determine their own responses to the real and direct challenges to their sovereignty, including in the South China Sea.

It downplays the ways in which Australia and our partners can work with the region to enhance our collective security and prosperity.

And importantly, it presents passivity as a feasible option: that it’s possible to stand by and hope for the best, while others make choices on our behalf.

That diminishes our ability—both Australia and our neighbours in Southeast Asia—to shape the kind of region we want to live in.

That’s why the Albanese Government has made engagement with ASEAN and its members a core priority. By the first anniversary of our Government, I will have visited every country in Southeast Asia as foreign minister, except Myanmar.

This diplomatic effort must be complemented by increased economic engagement.

The Government’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, due for release later this year, is central to that, as is our web of free trade agreements with regional partners.

Not only is this mutually beneficial, but it creates the shared value that is a critical incentive for peace.

In a diverse region of more than 675 million people, we have to be targeted about how we can maximise our impact.

And work with partners to reinforce and multiply that effect.

To create opportunity together, and to demonstrate to the region that there are interests to nurture beyond security interests.

To build the assurance that comes with knowing that their success is our success.

That’s why we encourage greater economic engagement in Southeast Asia by the United States and other partners from the Indo-Pacific and beyond, including through IPEF.

We can’t talk about the balanced region we want without being clear about America’s importance to that balance.

And I think it’s time for some reality checks here.

There is no greater turning point in Australian history than Curtin’s wartime turn to America.

The United States is our closest ally and principal strategic partner.

The Indo-Pacific would not have enjoyed its long, uninterrupted period of stability and prosperity without the US and its security guarantee to the region.

The whole region benefits from US engagement, from their contribution to the region’s strategic balance.

America has often been talked of as the indispensable power. It remains so. But the nature of that indispensability has changed.

As we seek a strategic equilibrium, with all countries exercising their agency to achieve peace and prosperity, America is central to balancing a multipolar region.

Many who take self-satisfied potshots at America’s imperfections would find the world a lot less satisfactory if America ceased to play its role.

Having said that, we cannot just leave it to the US.

All countries of the region must exercise their agency through diplomatic, economic and other engagement to maintain the region’s balance – and to uphold the norms and rules that have underpinned decades of peace and prosperity.

And this balance must be underwritten by military capability.

Last month, Australia and our AUKUS partners announced our pathway for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines – the single biggest investment in our defence capability in our history, representing a transformational moment for our nation, our Defence Force and our economy.

Just as we each have a responsibility to help maintain the conditions for peace through our diplomacy, we also have a responsibility to play our part in collective deterrence of aggression.

If any country can make the calculation that they can successfully dominate another, the region becomes unstable and the risk of conflict increases.

As the Defence Strategic Update in 2020 emphasised, Australia must take responsibility for our own security, meaning we must grow our own ability to deliver deterrent effects.

In an age of military modernisation, as other militaries can operate from increased range, with faster speed, and greater precision and lethality, taking responsibility for our security means being able to hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance.

By having strong defence capabilities of our own, and by working with partners investing in their own capabilities, we change the calculus for any potential aggressor.

We must ensure that no state will ever conclude that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks. This is fundamental to assuring the safety and security of our nation and our people.

Our foreign and defence policies are two essential and interdependent parts of how we make Australia stronger and more influential in the world.

Together, they make it harder for states to coerce other states against their interests through force or the threatened use of force.

Together, they contribute to the strategic balance of power that keeps the peace in our region.

As my colleague Richard Marles has said, “deterrence isn’t an alternative to cooperation – together, they are mutually reinforcing.”

Now, an undertaking as big as AUKUS in a democracy like ours should attract scrutiny.

Some are concerned the price is too high. There are two responses to that.

First, in the context of the scale and speed of the military build-up in our region, a serious financial investment is required to have credible defence capabilities of our own, and making our contribution to regional balance.

Second, much of the financial investment is in ourselves. In our own jobs, industry and sovereign capability. Let’s not forget AUKUS is about more than submarines. It’s also about joint development of capabilities including artificial intelligence, quantum technology and cyber.

Some are concerned about timeframes. It’s true that we lost a lot of time over nine years of capability announcements with no delivery. But we can’t go back in time; we can only get to work on the best way forward to deliver the necessary capability, at a realistic pace, with the lowest transition risk.

It is why the pathway doesn’t just involve acquiring Virginia class submarines or building our own, but also extending the life of the Collins class.

And some have raised concerns about nuclear non-proliferation.

Labor has a proud history of championing practical international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, having ratified the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – and will ensure we continue to meet its obligations to the highest and most rigorous standards.

Our AUKUS partners understand and recognise Australia’s commitments under international law, including the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Naval nuclear-propulsion is consistent with our obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

The US has confirmed that the nuclear-powered submarines visiting Australia on rotation will be conventionally-armed.

And while we are not a party to it, Australia will continue to act in a manner that is consistent with the basic principles of the Bangkok Treaty.

We have and will continue to engage, regularly and transparently, with the IAEA and with our regional partners.

I thank our partners for their willingness to engage – and for their public messages of appreciation of our efforts to keep them informed.

I particularly note the comment from Indonesia, that: “maintaining peace and stability in the region is the responsibility of all countries. It is critical for all countries to be a part of this effort.” That is precisely what we are doing.

Australia is fortunate in so many ways – not least in the way we benefit from the foresight of our greatest statespeople: Curtin, Evatt and Whitlam.

They showed us the path to advance our national interests in the world. That path continues today, in modernising their legacies, of alliance, partnerships, rules and region.

That path guides us as well as ever as we face today’s circumstances with the foresight to benefit the generations that follow us.

I want to conclude with a point I make with many audiences around the world, because it really gets to the heart of it.

Today’s circumstances have prompted comparisons with 1914, the 1930s, and 1962.

Those comparisons should serve as warnings, but nothing more.

Because we are not hostages to history. We decide what to do with the present.

We are investing in our national power, not just to guard against regional contest, but to shape and influence it to advance our national and shared interests.

We are doing this by creating deterrence, with major military investments in future capability, including through the AUKUS partnership.

We are doing this by creating domestic economic resilience, addressing climate change and energy security, through more robust supply chains, making more things in Australia, and skilling our people.

And we are doing this by investing in our diplomatic power, renewing Australia’s closest partnerships, and advancing our interests and values.

Our decision is to use all elements of our national power to shape the world in our interests, and to shape it for the better.

Media enquiries

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