危機時期，民主製度與專製製度孰優孰劣？

MAX FISHER 2022年7月28日

 

5月，在上海進行大流行封鎖期間，騎車經過中國國家主席習近平的海報。 

 

多年來，大學和智庫一直在通過公共外交和官方媒體進行著一場辯論：民主和專製，哪個在危機時期表現得更好？

 

毫無疑問，民主製度在個人權利或法治等問題上占據優勢。盡管如此，關於哪種製度能更有效地應對重大國家挑戰的討論引起了廣泛關注，尤其是考慮到中國震撼世界的崛起，以及西方對政治內鬥的不滿情緒加深。

現在，氣候變化和大流行這兩個同時發生的危機正在考驗各國政府。許多研究仔細審視了這些政府的表現，結果如下：雖然民主國家在處理這些問題方麵的平均表現略好一些，但民主國家和專製國家都沒有表現出明顯和穩定的優勢。

有大量理論研究一種體製或另一種體製的所謂優勢，但幾乎無助於預測這些危機將如何發展。

 

例如，人們曾經普遍認為，像中國這樣的專製國家，因其中央集權和跨越世代的規劃，在應對氣候變化等挑戰時有獨特的能力。

但北京方麵減少溫室氣體排放的承諾卻受到了政治內鬥和短期需要的阻礙，後者正是中國宣傳部門口中民主國家的特點。

與此同時，雖然一些民主國家在處理與氣候相關的問題方麵表現出色，但其他國家卻還在掙紮，尤其是美國，本月早些時候，美國再一次因國會陷入僵局，使得又一項氣候計劃破產。

然後還有大流行。

人們預測，由於民主國家的透明度和對公眾輿論的敏感度，它們將能夠更好地應對病毒，但實際情況並非如此。也有人宣稱，由於專製製度的果斷和主動行動的能力，它們將有出類拔萃的表現，這一預測也落空了。許多專製國家並沒有做得很好。

多項研究發現，根據超額死亡等指標衡量，這兩種製度在管理大流行方麵的平均表現大致相同。

民主國家做得稍好一些。但專家強調，這個小差距可能並不反映民主國家有更好的應對能力，而是表明擁有更強大衛生係統的國家更有可能是民主國家。

正如大流行所表明的那樣，這兩種製度都可以有效地發揮作用，在減緩病毒傳播方麵表現最好的國家中，既有民主政府，也有專製政府。

任何一個係統都可能失敗，比如中國對大流行限製措施的強製執行已經到了壓垮自己的經濟的地步，或者美國的氣候計劃在一名參議員的反對下瓦解，這名議員隻代表1.5%的人口。

 

那些認為某種製度在某些危機中具有先天優勢的理論站不住腳了，但它暗示了另一個教訓：對民主和專製主義的普遍威脅可能不是來自彼此，而是來自內部的弱點。

評估兩種製度

5月，繁華的首爾江南區。

 

“這是一個非常複雜的問題，部分原因是評估表現的方法有很多，”威克森林大學政治學家賈斯汀·埃薩裏在談到有關哪種製度治理更出色的“大量”研究時說。

這個問題在1990年代變得突出，當時幾個亞洲專製國家的經濟騰飛，被視為民主模式的新對手。從那時起，經濟表現就成了係統運行優劣的判斷標準。

兩種思想流派出現了。一個流派說，像中國這樣的專製政府沒有受到選舉強加的短期思維或民主進程的低效率影響，可以強行實施更好的政策。

另一個流派認為，民主國家的透明度和問責製帶來的是更好的運作和更及時響應民意的治理。這一方的支持者指出，在朝鮮經濟崩潰的同時，韓國經濟在民主製度下蓬勃發展。

 

從那以後，這兩種理論都廣泛傳播。但兩者都經不起持續的審視。

例如，一項針對全球專製經濟體的研究發現，平均而言，它們既沒有超過也沒有落後於民主國家。一些專製國家的經濟獲得了增長，這與一些民主國家的原因相同：領導人的明智選擇、更好的運作機構和其他因素。

這兩個係統的運作方式不同，但差異通常會相互抵消。

另一項研究發現，民主國家在抑製衰退方麵表現得更好，而以政黨為基礎的專製體製在促進增長方麵表現得更好，但最終證明這些體製的經濟表現差不多。

而不同基準的比較卻大相徑庭。公民的幸福感、嬰兒死亡率等健康指標以及公共服務的質量在民主製度下都更好——更不用說自由了，畢竟對自由的保護本來就是民主製度的一個根本訴求。

隨著氣候和大流行等全球危機變得越來越重要，關於製度的純粹表現的問題仍然具有現實意義。

 

經受危機考驗

2021年9月，超過65萬麵白旗插在華盛頓國家廣場上，以紀念死於新冠的美國人。 

 

這場大流行已經影響了地球上的每個國家，而且它的損失可被量化，這似乎提供了一個絕佳的機會來考驗哪種製度的治理更有效。

但卡內基國際和平基金會的雷切爾·克萊因菲爾德的研究，得出了與那些經濟研究大致相同的結論。民主國家和專製製度的表現大致相同，一個製度的表現不會持續優於另一個。

 

雖然一些評論員指出，例如，伊朗早期的失敗證明專製政府的不透明和腐敗將致其毀滅，但另一些人則指出，有很多這樣的政府表現出色，例如越南。

有多少麵臨困境的民主政體，比如美國，就有多少表現良好的民主政體，比如新西蘭或台灣，這駁斥了從廣義上講民主製度過於混亂或反應遲鈍的理論。

克萊因菲爾德發現，重要的是社會信任或機構能力等因素。並且在培養這些能力時，一種製度並不一定能夠持續比另一種做得更好。

另一項研究承認專製統治者也許更有可能對大流行的死亡人數撒謊，該研究檢驗了超額死亡率——一個難以偽造的指標。他們發現，平均而言，民主國家在遏製大流行病死亡方麵比專製政府做得更好——但同樣，差距不大，而且可能出於政治製度以外的因素。

政治學家埃薩裏還發現，在疫苗接種率方麵，民主國家有少許優勢，但即使如此，許多民主國家的表現不如專製政府，反之亦然。

 

氣候考驗

2021年11月，中國大同一個煤礦附近的工人在分揀煤炭。 

 

氣候這個長期的、可以說是更大的危機能否帶來不同的啟示？對美國的許多人來說，專製主義似乎占據了優勢，因為北京的領導人已經宣布了一項又一項重大氣候政策。

 

但事實證明，一些民主國家在氣候問題上同樣積極，這表明美國遇到的困難與其說是因為民主本身，不如說是因為美國製度特有的怪異之處。

專製政府可能和任何民主國家一樣混亂。以中國廣受吹捧的五年計劃為例，該計劃聲稱製定長期政策，無需經過立法中討價還價或內訌的麻煩。

實際上，這些文件讀起來不像是立法，更像是一份願望清單，有時措辭模糊，由中央規劃者發送給省級和機構領導，由他們來決定如何實現——如果他們打算實現的話。

中國的習近平主席可以高聲宣告溫室氣體減排目標，但他就算喊破嗓子，也沒法保證自己的政府會照辦——事實上看起來的確沒有。中國各省的領導人和國有企業建造了更多的煤電廠，比世界其他地方加起來還多。

這其中有一部分可能是政策造成了困惑。北京同時要求經濟增長和減碳，地方官們隻能自己去琢磨該側重哪一個。但有一些的確是在抗命。

北京一直苦於難以讓地方官服務於國家利益。習近平多年來屢次宣稱中國要削減鋼鐵產能，結果第二年個別省份的產出不降反升，導致市場供過於求，對全國產業構成傷害。

有一個著名的例子，北京曾命令各省遏製危及國民健康的水汙染。官員們沒有關閉汙染工廠，隻是把他們搬遷到自己的邊界地帶，於是汙染流向了毗鄰省份，而全國汙染總量卻增加了。

在新冠疫情之初，地方領導人向中央隱瞞疫情暴發相關的信息。現在官員們麵臨著感染清零的壓力，於是他們對地方經濟進行壓製，在全國層麵上產生了災難性的效果。

這些起起落落無疑跟中國的專製模式有關。但有類似體製的國家經常在中國成功的地方遇阻，或在中國遇阻的地方卻成功了。

同樣，美國的成敗得失跟其它民主政體的表現也談不上一一對應，無論這算是好事還是壞事。

“生活在一個體製下的人自然會去羨慕另一個體製的優勢，”埃薩裏說，尤其是當世界各地的民主和專製政體都在麵對越來越多的內部挑戰時。

但他又說，從數據得出的結論支持了一句經常算在前英國領導人溫斯頓·丘吉爾頭上——這一點可能不足為信——的一句話：“民主是最壞的製度，但其他人類已嚐試的製度更壞。”

相關報道

這個世界變得越來越壞了嗎？    2022年7月13日

中國欲組反美聯盟，領導新國際秩序  2021年3月30日

麵對疫情，專製比民主更有優勢？  2020年4月3日

 

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Max Fisher是一名駐紐約的國際新聞記者和專欄作家，曾在世界各地報道衝突、外交、社會變革和其他主題。他撰寫的“解析”專欄探討重大世界事件背後的想法和背景。歡迎在Twitter和Facebook上關注他。

With Crisis Everywhere, Do Democracies Have an Edge?

https://cn.nytimes.com/usa/20220728/democracies-authoritarian-governments/

The challenges of pandemic and climate change are being closely studied, but have done little so far to settle the eternal debate over whether authoritarian governments or democracies fare better in hard times.

 By Max Fisher  July 26, 2022

Riding past a poster of President Xi Jinping of China during a pandemic lockdown in Shanghai in May.

 

A debate has long raged at universities and think tanks, through public diplomacy and state media outlets: Does democracy or an authoritarian system perform better in times of crisis?

There is no doubt as to democracy’s advantage on matters like individual rights or rule of law. Still, discussions about which system is more effective in addressing major national challenges draw heavy attention, especially given China’s world-shaking rise and deepening frustration in the West over political infighting.

Now, two simultaneous crises — climate change and the pandemic — are putting governments to the test. Their performances are being scrutinized in a number of studies, with this result: While democracies do perform slightly better on average in dealing with these problems, neither democracy nor an authoritarian system has shown a clear and consistent edge.

Sweeping theories for the supposed advantages of one system or the other have been of little help in predicting how these crises would play out.

 

 

It was once widely held, for instance, that authoritarian nations like China would, because of their centralized authority and generational timelines for plans, be uniquely equipped to tackle challenges like climate change.

But Beijing’s pledges for reducing greenhouse gasses have been thwarted by political infighting and short-term imperatives of just the sort that China’s propagandists say are characteristic of democracies.

At the same time, while some democracies have excelled in dealing with climate-related matters, others have struggled, particularly the United States, which earlier this month saw yet another climate plan collapse amid congressional gridlock.

And then there is the pandemic.

Predictions that democracies’ transparency and sensitivity to public opinion would make them better equipped to handle the virus have fared poorly. So have declarations that authoritarian systems would excel because of their ability to move decisively and proactively; many did not.

Multiple studies have found that both systems have, on average, performed roughly the same in managing the pandemic, as measured by metrics like excess deaths.

 

 

Democracies have done slightly better. But experts stress that this small gap may not reflect that democracies are better equipped, but rather that countries with, for example, stronger health systems may be likelier to be democratic.

Either system can function effectively, as the pandemic has shown, with individual democracies and authoritarian governments alike among the world’s best performers on slowing the virus’s spread.

And either system can falter, as with China’s pushing pandemic restrictions to the point of cratering its own economy, or the United States’ climate plans collapsing under the opposition of a senator who represents one half of one percent of the population.

This undermines theories that either system wields an innate advantage in certain crises, but it hints at another lesson: The prevailing threats to democracy and authoritarianism alike might not come from one another, but from weaknesses within.

 

 

Assessing the Systems

 

 

 

 

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The prosperous Gangnam district in Seoul in May.Credit...Anthony Wallace/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“This is an incredibly complicated question, in part because there are so many different ways to assess performance,” Justin Esarey, a Wake Forest University political scientist, said of the “vast” number of studies into which political system governs better.

That question gained prominence in the 1990s as several Asian autocracies, their economies booming, presented what was taken as a new rival to the democratic model. Ever since, economic performance has been seen as the benchmark for which system runs better.

Two schools of thought emerged. One said that authoritarian governments like China, freed of the short-term thinking imposed by elections or the petty inefficiencies of the democratic process, could force through better policy.

The other said democracies’ transparency and accountability produce better-run and more responsive governance. Proponents pointed to South Korea’s economy booming under democracy just as North Korea’s collapsed.

Both theories have circulated ever since. But neither consistently holds up to scrutiny.

One study of authoritarian economies worldwide, for instance, found that they, on average, neither exceeded nor lagged democracies. Those that grew did so for the same reason that some democracies did: smart choices by leaders, better-run institutions and other factors.

 

 

The two systems operate differently, but the differences often cancel one another out.

Another study found democracies somewhat better at curbing recessions, and party-based authoritarian systems a bit better at boosting growth, but ultimately the systems’ economic performance proved comparable.

This is hardly true of every benchmark. Citizens’ happiness, health measures like infant mortality, and the quality of public services are all better under democracy — not to mention the liberties whose protection is, after all, part of the point of democracy.

And questions of sheer performance have remained relevant as global crises like climate and the pandemic have taken on growing importance.

Tested by Crisis

 

 

 

 

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More than 650,000 white flags were planted on the National Mall in Washington, in September 2021, to commemorate the Americans who had died from Covid-19.Credit...Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

The pandemic would seem to provide the perfect opportunity to test which system can govern more effectively because it has affected every country on earth and its toll is quantifiable.

 

 

But research by Rachel Kleinfeld of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reached much the same conclusion as those economic studies. Democracies and authoritarian systems are roughly as likely to do well or poorly, with neither consistently outperforming the other.

While some commentators pointed to, say, Iran’s early failures as proof that authoritarian governments’ secrecy and corruption would doom them, others pointed to how many other such governments, like Vietnam, excelled.

And for every democracy that struggled, like the United States, another, like New Zealand or Taiwan, performed well, undercutting theories that democracy, taken broadly, was too messy or slow to respond.

What mattered, Dr. Kleinfeld found, were factors like social trust or institutional competency. And neither system is necessarily and consistently better at cultivating those.

Another study, acknowledging that authoritarian rulers might be more likely to lie about the pandemic’s toll, examined a hard-to-falsify metric called excess mortality. They found that on average, democracies fared better at curbing pandemic deaths than did authoritarian governments — but, again, the gap was slight, and possibly explained by factors other than political system.

Dr. Esarey, the political scientist, also found a slight advantage for democracies when it came to vaccination rates, but given that, many democracies underperformed authoritarian governments and vice versa.

The Climate Test

Could climate, a longer-term and arguably larger crisis, shed a different light?

To many in the United States, authoritarianism might seem to hold the advantage, as Beijing’s leaders have announced one dramatic climate policy after another.

But some democracies have proved similarly aggressive on climate, suggesting that American struggles are less because of democracy itself than quirks specific to the U.S. system.

And authoritarian governments can be just as messy as any democracy. Take China’s much-touted five-year-plans, which claim to set long-term policy without the fuss of legislative horse-trading or infighting.

In reality, the documents can read less like legislation than a wish list, and sometimes a vague one, sent from central planners to provincial and agency leaders who decide on their own how to pursue those decrees, if they do so at all.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, can announce greenhouse gas reductions until he is blue in the face, but he might not be able to count on his own government’s complying — which it seemingly has not. China’s provincial leaders and its state-run enterprises built more new coal plants than have the rest of the countries of the world combined.

Some of this may be policy confusion. Beijing has demanded economic growth as well as carbon reductions, leaving local officials to figure out which to emphasize. But some may also be defiance.

Beijing has long struggled to compel local officials to serve the national good. For many years, Mr. Xi announced China’s intention to reduce its steel production, only for output to rise the next year as individual provinces increased production, glutting the market and hurting the industry nationally.

In one infamous example, Beijing ordered provincial leaders to curb the water pollution that was then imperiling the nation’s health. Rather than cutting down on polluting factories, officials instead moved them to their borders, so that pollution, which increased nationwide, flowed into the next province.

Early in the pandemic, local leaders withheld information about the outbreak from central planners. And now that officials face pressure to keep infection numbers near zero, they are suppressing local economies to devastating nationwide effect.

These ups and downs are certainly linked to China’s autocratic model. But countries with similar systems have often struggled where China succeeded, or succeeded where it struggled.

Likewise, American successes and setbacks have hardly paralleled the performance of other democracies, for better or worse.

“It’s natural for the people living under one system to envy the advantages of the other,” Dr. Esarey said, particularly when both democracies and authoritarian systems face growing internal challenges worldwide.

The data, he added, instead supports a conclusion sometimes attributed, perhaps apocryphally, to Winston Churchill, the former British leader: “Democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”