1946年3月28日生人，曾擔任投資銀行高盛集團的主席和行政總監。2006年至2009年擔任美國財政部長。2006年5月30日，美國總統布什提名為財政部長以接替約翰·威廉·史諾。[1]6月28日，美國參議院確認他的提名。[2]7月10日，保爾森在儀式中宣誓就任。任期於2009年1月20日屆滿。
導 語
在2月初美國國務卿布林肯訪華之際，美國前財政部長、保爾森基金會主席亨利·保爾森（Henry M. Paulson）1月26日在美國《外交事務》雜誌網站發表題為《美國對華政策並不奏效——廣泛脫鉤危險所在》（America's China Policy Is Not Working-The Dangers of a Broad Decoupling）的文章，呼籲美中兩國決策者更頻繁會麵、更坦誠地溝通。他認為，美國當前對華政策對美國自己的傷害更大，美國聯合盟友製衡中國的策略並不奏效，與中國開展經濟合作符合華盛頓的利益。
他提醒到，“以美國自身利益為代價懲罰中國”的政治意願正在美國國會推波助瀾。拜登政府需要拿出勇氣，“明智且果敢”地應對這些挑戰。以下是保爾森此文主要內容：
盡管人們都在談論我們如何進入了一個新的全球化時代，但剛剛過去的一年卻與2008年驚人的相似。那一年，俄羅斯入侵了它的鄰國格魯吉亞，美國與伊朗、朝鮮關係持續緊張，全球經濟也麵臨嚴峻挑戰。然而，一個顯著的區別是如今的中美關係。2008年，即使中美之間存在政治和意識形態的分歧、有安全利益的衝突以及雙方對全球經濟，包括對人民幣幣值和中國工業補貼政策，存在不同意見，中美還是能夠開展符合自身利益的合作。
作為財政部長，我在2008年金融危機期間與中國領導人合作，防止危機蔓延，減緩危機帶來的最壞影響，恢複宏觀經濟的穩定。如今，這樣的合作變得不可思議。與2008年金融危機時期不同的是，新冠疫情並沒有促進中美間的合作，而是加深了雙方的對立。
▲亨利·保爾森（Henry M. Paulson）， 他曾在小布什總統政府擔任美國第74任財政部長，任期從2006年7月至2009年1月。
世界顯然已經改變。如今的中國領導層更堅定自信。2008年以來，中國的經濟規模增長了兩倍多。盡管中國經濟對外部競爭開放的程度，不及許多西方國家的預期，美國對中國的態度急劇轉向負麵，但一個不變的事實是：如果沒有穩定的美中關係來保證兩國在共同利益上的合作，世界將變得危險和不那麽繁榮。
與2008年不同的是，2023年的中美關係在幾乎所有方麵都將出現變化。雙方都從國家安全的角度看待雙邊關係，甚至對過去被視為積極的雙邊事務也是如此，例如創造就業的投資或突破性技術的協同創新。中方將美國旨在保護美國技術的出口管製視為對中國未來發展的威脅；而美方認為，任何可能提升中國科技能力的舉措，都將使中國作為一個戰略競爭對手得以崛起，並幫助中國強化軍事建設。
中美正在從一種彼此競爭但偶有合作的關係滑至幾乎在所有方麵都互相對抗的關係。結果，美國將自己的企業置於在盟友間的劣勢地位，因為它限製了這些企業開展商業化創新的能力。這可能會讓美國失去在其他國家的市場份額。對於那些擔心美國會在與中國的競爭中失利的人來說，美方這樣的行為可能會進一步確保這種擔憂變成現實。
美國正試圖與和自己擁有相近價值觀的國家結盟，特別是亞洲和歐洲的“民主國家”，以此來製衡中國和向其施壓。但這種策略並不奏效，它傷害了美國和中國，而且從長遠來看，對美國人的傷害可能更甚。與中國在某些領域進行合作，並與世界第二大經濟體保持有利的經濟關係，顯然也符合華盛頓的利益。
目前沒有一個國家效仿美國的劇本來解決它們對中國的各種擔憂。即使是美國最親密的戰略夥伴也不準備像美國那樣，采取大規模性質的對抗、遏製舉措。
事實上，許多國家正在做與華盛頓強硬派所尋求的相反的事情。許多國家並沒有尋求在經濟上和中國脫鉤，而是繼續深化與中國的貿易往來。也許這就是為什麽在2020年中國取代美國成為歐盟最大的貿易夥伴。2022年，歐盟對中國的進出口貿易都有所增長。德國總統朔爾茨（Olaf Scholz）訪華後，亞洲和歐洲領導人，都爭相訪問了中國，比如菲律賓總統小馬科斯（Ferdinand Marcos, Jr）、法國總統馬克龍（Emmanuel Macron）和意大利總理梅洛尼（Giorgia Meloni ），很有可能促成一種更廣泛的態勢。
華盛頓“更少中國”（less of China）的做法在“全球南方”國家的表現更糟。2021年中非貿易額達到曆史新高，比2020年增長35%。美國大力推動華為等中國科技公司退出支柱型電信架構的行動在歐洲和印度收效相對較好，但在其他幾乎所有地方都表現不佳。以沙特阿拉伯為例，它最大貿易夥伴就是中國，其2030年改革計劃嚴重依賴與中國科技企業的合作，包括阿裏巴巴和華為，即使在人工智能和雲服務等美國瞄準的敏感領域也是如此；印尼是一個龐大的亞洲民主國家，華盛頓一直在拉攏印尼以抗衡中國的影響力。實際上，印尼已經將華為作為網絡安全解決方案的首選合作夥伴，甚至是政府係統的首選合作夥伴。
隨著疫情後中國重新開放，美國的這些努力更不可能成功。針對華盛頓的“更少中國”戰略，中國也有自己的“更多的美國以外的所有國家”戰略。中國已經調整其新冠防疫政策，重新開放邊境，吸引外國資本和投資，以重啟經濟。隨著中國開啟新一年的外交布局，圍繞投資、基建和貿易做出新的承諾，美國終究會發現，受挫的原來是自己，而非中國。
貿易規則就是一個很好的例子。2017年，時任美國總統特朗普退出了跨太平洋夥伴關係協定(TPP)，6年後，華盛頓顯然無意重新加入TPP。然而，中國已經申請加入該協議，該協議現在被稱為《全麵與進步跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》(CPTPP)。中國還批準了《亞洲區域全麵經濟夥伴關係協定》（RCEP），申請加入《數字經濟夥伴關係協定》（DEPA），並與厄瓜多爾、新西蘭等國升級或啟動了新的自貿協定。中國現在是世界上最大的貿易國。近三分之二的國家與中國的貿易額超過了與美國的貿易額。
與此同時，美國當前堅持的以“工人利益為中心”的貿易政策，看上去就和貿易保護主義無異。相比之下，華盛頓印太經濟框架（IPEF）的製定也有些畏首畏尾。該框架的推進困難，尤其是因為它拒絕給予加入該框架的國家新的市場準入。
華盛頓麵臨著與經濟引力背道而馳的風險。美國已經成功控製了最敏感的技術，包括先進的半導體。但如果美國的戰略是基於促使與中國在技術領域更廣泛的分離，反而不易成功，因為大多數國家都沒有追隨美國，並且最終可能會找到調整的方法。
▲2022年5月23日，日本東京，日本首相岸田文雄、美國總統拜登、印度總理莫迪在東京都六本木的泉花園畫廊舉行“印太經濟框架”（簡稱IPEF）啟動儀式。
這些將中國拒之門外的努力當然會傷害中國，但也會傷害美國，傷害那些依賴中國供應商的“美國就業創造者”企業，包括普通的美國企業。這些企業幾乎沒有變通辦法，在高通脹和高額能源賬單的重壓之下，很容易被壓垮。美國企業被置於巨大的競爭劣勢，最終買單的還是美國消費者。糾正這一問題的一個明智做法就是取消對中國商品加征的關稅，這些關稅隻會導致消費品價格更高。這種加征關稅的政策在政治上很受歡迎，但在經濟上毫無意義。當然，美國也不應在沒有得到回報的情況下取消這些關稅。例如，華盛頓可以要求中國向更多美國商品開放市場。
歸根結底，美國對華競爭始於國內。美中兩國政治製度迥異。美國要想證明自己更勝一籌，就要堅持那些讓美國經濟成為全球羨慕的對象並且支撐美國國家安全的原則。美國還要在海外展現經濟領導力。
至關重要的一點是，美國要贏得開發技術和吸引人才的競賽，因為未來經濟上的成功在很大程度上將由技術優勢驅動。這就要求美國不僅要開發這些未來的技術，還要將它們商業化，而不是囤積它們。這要求美國製定全球標準，而不是將競技場拱手讓給中國。美國應該在貿易方麵發揮領導作用，而不是退出有中國申請加入的貿易協定，切斷美國企業的出口機會。中國不太可能對很多領域推行的政策很快做出調整。美國需要展現強硬，但要秉持公平，願意對話，並且準備好與中國進行艱難且漫長的協作。
這種合作在過去是有意義的。2008年金融危機最嚴重的時候，中國是美國企業、銀行和房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）最大的債權人。在中美戰略經濟對話期間，美國同中方領導人的密切協調幫助美國說服中國不要拋售美國國債，這對避免另一次大蕭條至關重要。中國在2008年第一屆G20峰會後推出的刺激計劃也幫助抵消了金融危機的影響，並幫助全球經濟複蘇。
金融危機是不可避免的，如果中美這兩個最大的經濟體和經濟增長引擎能夠通過溝通和協調來預測和預防經濟崩潰，並消減其影響，那麽以限製兩國和世界經濟困境的方式來管理金融危機將容易得多。這樣做符合中美兩國的共同利益。但這需要美國財政部長耶倫（Janet Yellen）及其同事與中國同行定期舉行對話，討論並監測全球和國內的宏觀經濟和金融風險。
實體經濟的衝擊會迅速波及金融體係，如果不加以解決，過度金融會對人們的生活造成嚴重破壞。在現代金融中，金錢可以以光速在世界各地流動，這使得世界看起來越來越小。中國經濟規模如此之大，並且融入了全球，若有震蕩必然立即波及全球金融市場。當然，中美之間的一級和二級經濟和金融聯係如此廣泛和深入，它們是不可能消失的，這使得兩國就宏觀經濟風險交換看法變得尤為重要。
中國是美國國債的第二大持有者，也是其他美國證券的主要投資者，因此中國了解美國的經濟政策並對美國政策製定者抱有信心符合兩國的利益，尤其是在美國國會為債務上限爭吵不休的時候。美國政策製定者也要更好地了解中國的經濟政策和挑戰，對這中美兩國都至關重要。
美國需要鞏固拜登政府試圖阻止兩國關係自由落體的努力，這樣做至關重要，因為美國爭取到用來施壓中國的各個盟友和夥伴都希望在可能的情況下和中國開展合作。這也是拜登尋求同中國建立雙邊關係“護欄”的其中一個原因。
為了加強協調，中美兩國的決策者應該更頻繁地會麵，更坦誠地交談。友好關係不是這種合作的先決條件。兩國在政治、安全和意識形態領域的明顯緊張關係並不阻止彼此在宏觀經濟穩定、流行病防範、氣候變化、打擊恐怖主義、核不擴散以及為全球金融體係設置防火牆以抵禦未來金融危機等問題上進行利己的合作。美國國務卿布林肯(Antony Blinken)即將訪華是一個很好的起點。耶倫應該定期與中方接觸。美聯儲主席鮑威爾也應該與中國央行行長進行對話。美國必須控製武器相關技術以及兩用和多用途技術，並更嚴格地審查相關投資和並購，但美國不需要在對國家安全或世界民主國家在技術前沿的競爭力不重要的領域推動和中國的分離。
某種程度的脫鉤是不可避免的。在高科技領域，一些有針對性的脫鉤是絕對有必要的。但全方位脫鉤毫無意義。美國人受益於融入世界，中國仍將是一個巨大的市場，美國人可以參與其中，也可以將其讓給美國的競爭對手。中國是世界第二大經濟體、最大的製造國和最大的貿易國。未來幾十年，中國將是全球金融格局的重要組成部分。美國不該宿命論地接受經濟鐵幕的落下，而應積極與中國談判，為美國人在中國市場上贏得機會。美國官員應該與中國領導層認真討論，如何以一種互惠貿易的方式處理脫鉤問題。目前，兩國主要是相互指控和反訴，而沒有采取任何措施擴大經濟互惠互利的機會。
美中兩國的安全緊張局勢不可能憑空消失。尤其是在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭之後，美國人有理由擔心中國會到處施展影響力。美國加強威懾和改善同盟友的關係都是答案的重要組成部分。但美國的盟友和夥伴毫不掩飾第展現了他們“不孤立或遏製”中國的意願。這是華盛頓應該得到的一個信息，即世界拒絕與中國脫離關係。
美國國內政治風向強勁。“以美國自身利益為代價懲罰中國”的政治意願正在美國國會推波助瀾。拜登政府需要拿出勇氣，“明智且果敢”地應對這些挑戰。
America's China Policy Is Not Working
The Dangers of a Broad Decoupling
By Henry M. Paulson, Jr. January 26, 2023
U.S. President Joe Biden with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, November 2022
For all the talk of how we have entered a new global era, the last year bears a striking resemblance to 2008. That year, Russia invaded its neighbor, Georgia. Tensions with Iran and North Korea were perennially high. And the world faced severe global economic challenges.
One notable difference, however, is the state of Chinese-U.S. relations. At that time, self-interested cooperation was possible even amid political and ideological differences, clashing security interests, and divergent views about the global economy, including China’s currency valuation and its industrial subsidies. As Treasury secretary, I worked with Chinese leaders during the 2008 financial crisis to forestall contagion, mitigate the worst effects of the crisis, and restore macroeconomic stability.
Today, such cooperation is inconceivable. Unlike during the financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic failed to spark Chinese-U.S. cooperation and only intensified deepening antagonism. China and the United States jab accusatory fingers at each other, blame each other for bad policies, and trade barbs about a global economic downturn from which both countries and the world have yet to recover.
The world has clearly changed. China has very different and more assertive leadership. It has more than tripled the size of its economy since 2008 and now has stronger capabilities to pursue adversarial policies. At the same time, it has done far less to open its economy to foreign competition than many in the West have advocated and expected. Meanwhile, U.S. attitudes toward China have turned sharply negative, as have the politics in Washington. What has not changed, however, is the fact that without a stable relationship between the United States and China, where cooperation on shared interests is possible, the world will be a very dangerous and less prosperous place.
In 2023, unlike 2008, nearly every aspect of Chinese-U.S. relations is viewed by both sides through the prism of national security, even matters that were once regarded as positive, such as job-creating investments or co-innovation in breakthrough technologies. Beijing regards U.S. export controls aimed at protecting the United States’ technologies as a threat to China’s future growth; Washington views anything that could advance China’s technological capability as enabling the rise of a strategic competitor and aiding Beijing’s aggressive military buildup.
China and the United States are in a headlong descent from a competitive but sometimes cooperative relationship to one that is confrontational in nearly every respect. As a result, the United States faces the prospect of putting its companies at a disadvantage relative to its allies, limiting its ability to commercialize innovations. It could lose market share in third countries. For those who fear the United States is losing the competitive race with China, U.S. actions threaten to ensure that fear is realized.
COALITION OF THE WILLING
The United States is attempting to organize a coalition of like-minded countries, especially the democracies of Asia and Europe, to counterbalance and pressure China. But this strategy is not working; it hurts the United States as well as China; and over the long term, is likely to hurt Americans more than Chinese people. It is also clearly in Washington’s interest to cooperate or work in complementary ways with China in certain areas and to maintain a beneficial economic relationship with the world’s second-largest economy.
Although many countries share Washington’s antipathy to China’s policies, practices, and conduct, no country is emulating Washington’s playbook for addressing these concerns. It is true that nearly every major U.S. partner is tightening up its export controls on sensitive technologies, scrutinizing and often blocking Chinese investments, and calling out Beijing’s coercive economic policies and military pressure. But even Washington’s closest strategic partners are not prepared to confront, attempt to contain, or economically deintegrate China as broadly as the United States is.
In fact, many countries are doing the opposite of what the hardest-line voices in Washington seek. Instead of decoupling or deintegrating economically, many countries are instead deepening trade with China even as they hedge against potential Chinese pressure by diversifying business operations, building new supply chains in third countries, and reducing exposure in the most sensitive areas. Perhaps that is why, in 2020, despite years of American warnings, China overtook the United States as the European Union’s largest trading partner. Both EU exports to and imports from China grew in 2022. And Asian and European leaders, spurred by the November 2022 visit to Beijing by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, now look set to beat a path to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s door, with trips by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., French President Emmanuel Macron, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni likely to drive a broader trend.
Washington risks pushing against economic gravity.
Washington’s “less of China” approach is faring even worse in the global South. Chinese-African trade reached a historic high in 2021, rising by 35 percent from 2020. An intensive U.S. campaign to push Chinese technology firms like Huawei out of backbone telecommunications architecture has fared comparatively well in Europe and India but poorly nearly everywhere else. Just take Saudi Arabia. Its largest trading partner is China, and its Vision 2030 reform plan leans heavily on hoped-for collaboration with Chinese tech firms, including Alibaba and Huawei, even in the sensitive areas that are squarely in Washington’s crosshairs, such as artificial intelligence and cloud services. Indonesia, a huge Asian democracy that Washington has courted to counterbalance Chinese influence, has actually made Huawei its partner of choice for cybersecurity solutions, and even for government systems.
These U.S. efforts are likely to be even less successful now that China is reopening. Beijing is matching Washington’s “less of China” strategy with its own “more of everyone but America” strategy.
Beijing is reversing its restrictive COVID-19 policies, reopening its borders, courting foreign leaders, and seeking foreign capital and investment to reboot its economy. Last year, Xi made his first foreign trips since the outbreak of the pandemic to Central Asia and the Middle East, underlining his strategy to increase China’s global connectivity. With Xi now traveling the world again after a three-year hiatus, scattering renewed pledges of Chinese investment, infrastructure, and trade at every stop, it is Washington, not Beijing, that may soon find itself frustrated.
Trade rules are a good example. In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and six years later, Washington clearly has no intention of rejoining it. Yet Beijing has applied to join the pact, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). China has also ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia, applied to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, and upgraded or initiated new free trade agreements with countries from Ecuador to New Zealand. China is now the world’s largest trading nation. Nearly two-thirds of all countries trade more with China than with the United States.
Competition with China begins at home.
Meanwhile, the United States is pursuing a “worker-centric” trade policy that looks very much like protectionism. And Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework looks timid by comparison. The framework is struggling, not least because it denies new market access to the very countries that have joined the pacts that Washington has shunned.
Washington risks pushing against economic gravity. The United States has succeeded in controlling the most sensitive technologies, including advanced semiconductors. But it will have less success with a strategy premised on promoting broader technology deintegration with China because most countries are not following its lead and may, eventually, find ways to adjust.
These efforts to shut out China will certainly hurt China, but they hurt the United States, too. American businesses are put at a huge competitive disadvantage, and U.S. consumers pay the price. One sensible step to correct this problem would be to limit tariffs on imports of Chinese consumer goods, which make them more expensive for U.S. consumers. These are politically popular but economically nonsensical. They hurt China but hurt U.S. job creators, as well, including ordinary companies that depend on Chinese suppliers, have few workarounds, and have been crushed under the weight of inflation and high energy bills. But these should not be lifted without getting something in return. For example, Washington should push China to live up to the terms of the 2020 Phase One trade agreement, including by buying more U.S. agricultural products. China also should be required to open its markets to more U.S. goods.
TALK IT OUT
Ultimately, competition with China begins at home. The United States and China have very different political systems. The United States’ is superior, but it must be demonstrated through results. This means sticking to the principles that made the U.S. economy the envy of the world and underpin U.S. national security. It also means demonstrating economic leadership abroad.
It is critically important that Washington win the race to develop technologies and attract talent. Economic success will be driven to a large extent by technological superiority. This requires the United States not just to develop those technologies of the future but to commercialize them and not hoard them. It demands the United States set global standards rather than ceding the playing field to China. And the United States should be leading on trade, not withdrawing from the very pacts China has applied to join and cutting U.S. workers off from export opportunities.
To be sure, security tensions are baked into the relationship, and Xi’s China is a formidable competitor with which the United States must take a very tough-minded approach. Beijing is pursuing policies inimical to U.S. interests in many areas, and it is unlikely to adjust anytime soon. Washington needs to be tough-minded but fair, open to dialogue but not for its own sake, and prepared for a tough, long slog in pursuing self-interested coordination with China.
Such cooperation has been meaningful in the past. At the height of the financial crisis of 2008, China was a huge holder of corporate, banking, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities. The close coordination established with Chinese leaders during the Strategic Economic Dialogue helped Washington convince Beijing not to sell U.S. securities, which was critical to avoiding another Great Depression. The Chinese stimulus package that followed the first G-20 in 2008 also helped to counteract the effects of the crisis and assist the global economic recovery.
Xi's China is a formidable competitor.
Financial crises are inevitable, and they will be much easier to manage in ways that limit the economic hardship in both countries and the world if the two largest economies and drivers of economic growth are able to communicate and coordinate to anticipate and forestall economic disruption, as well as to mitigate its impact. And it is in China and the United States’ shared interests to do just that. But this requires U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and her colleagues to have a regular dialogue with their Chinese counterparts where they discuss and monitor global and domestic macroeconomic and financial risks.
A shock in the real economy can move quickly to the financial system, and financial excesses can wreak havoc on people’s lives if left unaddressed. Modern finance, where money can move around the world with the speed of light, makes the world seem like an increasingly small place. The Chinese economy is so large and integrated globally that disruptions there in 2015 and 2021 immediately rippled through global financial markets. And, of course, the primary and secondary economic and financial linkages between China and the United States are so broad and deep they cannot be wished away, which makes it particularly important that the two states share views on macroeconomic risks. China is the second-largest holder of U.S. Treasury bonds and a large investor in other U.S. securities, so it is in both countries’ interests for China to have an understanding of U.S. economic policy and confidence in U.S. policymakers, particularly when Congress is wrangling over the debt limit. The lack of transparency around China’s lending to some very troubled economies and the large amount of U.S. business investment in the Chinese economy, which can seem like a black box to outside analysts and where abrupt policy changes can take the market by surprise, mean it is critical to both states that U.S. policymakers have a better understanding of China’s economic policies and challenges.
The United States needs to solidify the floor that the Biden administration has tried to put under the freefall. This is essential because the allies and partners Washington hopes to enlist to pressure China expect a good-faith effort to seek cooperation with it, where possible. And that is one reason that U.S. President Joe Biden, in his meeting with Xi in Indonesia last November, sought to establish guardrails around a deteriorating relationship.
To improve coordination, Chinese and U.S. decision-makers should meet more frequently and talk much more candidly. Friendship is no prerequisite for such coordination. And obvious political, security, and ideological tensions do not preclude self-interested cooperation on issues such as macroeconomic stability, pandemic preparedness, climate change, combating terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and firewalling the global financial system against future crisis and contagion. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s upcoming meeting with Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi is a good starting point. Yellen should be talking regularly to China’s new economic czar, He Lifeng. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell should also be speaking with China’s top central banker.
Washington should negotiate aggressively with Beijing to win opportunities for Americans in its market.
And Beijing should not hold hostage cooperation on global issues such as climate change because it is upset about unrelated issues. Linking different foreign policy issues undermines China’s effort to present itself as a constructive global problem solver.
The United States also needs to carefully distinguish what it must have from its allies from what is merely nice to have. Controlling weapons-related technologies and dual- and multiple-use technologies, and more intensively screening Chinese investments and mergers and acquisitions with global tech companies are a must. But Washington does not need to encourage deintegration in areas that are not central to national security or the competitiveness of the world’s democracies at the technological bleeding edge.
Some level of decoupling is inevitable. In the case of high technologies, some targeted decoupling will be absolutely necessary. But wholesale decoupling makes no sense. Americans benefit from access to the world, and China will remain a huge market that Americans can either partake in or abandon to competitors. China is the world’s second-largest economy, its largest manufacturer, and its largest trader. It will be a big part of the global financial picture for decades to come. Instead of fatalistically accepting the descent of an economic iron curtain, Washington should negotiate aggressively with China to win opportunities for Americans in its market. Administration officials should have serious discussions with Chinese leadership about how to manage the decoupling in a way that allows for mutually beneficial trade. Right now, the two countries are mostly trading charges and countercharges while doing nothing to expand mutually beneficial economic opportunities.
Chinese-U.S. security tensions cannot be wished away, and Americans are rightly concerned, especially after the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine, that Beijing will throw its weight around, not least by coercing Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence is a big part of the answer. So are improved relations with allies. But U.S. allies and partners have made no secret of their desire not to isolate or contain Beijing. That is one message Washington should take away from the world’s refusal to disengage with China—and from China’s effort to drive wedges between Washington and everyone else.
The political winds are strong and the desire to punish China even at the United States’ expense is driving many in Congress. Biden will need a lot of courage to be smart and bold in the face of these challenges.
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HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., is Founder and Chair of the Paulson Institute. He was Secretary of the U.S. Treasury from 2006 to 2009.
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