《海外校園》充斥左派謊言

本文是針對這篇醜化小布什、重複左派謊言的雜誌文章, 以及這篇相關的回應與對話性質的文章而發。原文的荒謬之處舉不勝舉：例如Valerie Plame 事件還被拿來攻擊布什。事實上, 向Robert Novak提供信息、導致她身分爆光的人早被證實是前副國務卿Richard Armitage(有名的“溫和派”), 這意味著此事根本不可能是布什一派為報複而授意他做的。反而恰恰說明華盛頓圈內有很多人知道威爾遜太太在CIA工作(Armitage更早告訴了Woodward), 隻是想不到她居然在法律上屬於什麽“秘密特工(Covert Agent)” ——身為一個天天去中情局Langley總部(位於弗吉尼亞)上班的工作人員、如何能掩蓋自己跟CIA的關係? 更何況她老公在媒體上鬧得沸沸揚揚(這也是為什麽Armitage等政府人士會自然而然談到他太太在CIA工作的事), 這一切像是保護“秘密特工”的樣子嗎?

華盛頓時報04年這篇報道說她的身分早已泄露給俄國和古巴, 看來多半也是真的, 我沒見過左派對此的反駁。不管怎麽說, 既然造成她身分爆光的不是利比, 也根本沒有理由相信利比是在知道她Covert Agent身分(因為如前所述, 她有這種身分實在令人詫異)的情況下有意透露她的工作單位(否則幹嘛不起訴直接犯案的鮑威爾副手, 卻要舍近求遠? )——因此, 既然司法和常理都沒有指控利比在調查前有違法行為^[1] , 布什又哪裏違背了對公眾的承諾？

以下集中談討其中一個話題, 下麵先引用一段原文：

振風評議∶ 至於布希政府指控伊拉克內有基地組織成員, 這可以從基地組織頭目紮卡維在伊拉克的瘋狂屠殺及被殺, 證實布希總統完全正確。 臨風回應∶ 阿布·紮卡維是因為不滿美國入侵,在2004年加入基地組織,不是伊戰事前！ 美國中情局在戰前告訴布希政府,伊拉克與基地組織無關,被布希、錢尼、倫斯菲爾德共同排斥,在國防部內另外成立了一個小組,希望證實兩者有關。 振風評議∶ 你說∶“阿布·紮卡維是因為不滿美國入侵,是在2004年加入基地組織,不是伊戰事前！美國中情局在戰前告訴布希政府,伊拉克與基地組織無關,被布希 、錢尼、倫斯菲爾德共同駁回,在國防部內另外成立了一個小組,希望證實兩者有關。” 我這裏有2002年《新聞周刊》雜誌, 以封麵文章對鮑威爾的演說進行綜合報導和評論。當年布希政府明確指控∶阿布·紮卡維, 在伊拉克及阿富汗, 與賓拉登的基地組織有關係。而阿布·紮卡維在阿富汗有其獨立性, 以及與賓拉登有矛盾, 以致直到2004年10月, 才在伊拉克公開效忠賓拉登等, 這些事實一點也不能說明, 當年美國對其與基地組織有關係的指控有任何錯誤。 阿布·紮卡維當時在阿富汗的訓練營, 就是接受基地組織的財務資助的（請見《華盛頓郵報》）。他於2001 年在阿富汗與基地組織和塔利班並肩作戰、對抗美軍時受傷。 臨風回應∶ 問題的關鍵在於∶有沒有證據顯示, 在2002年時, 他已經與基地組織掛鉤, 而且作為基地組織的橋梁, 與薩達姆政權陰謀勾結, 準備進攻美國？ 我想沒有這樣的證據。

紮卡維(QI.A.131.03. Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalayleh)在伊戰前就呆在伊拉克, 這一事實對於反戰者是個老大難的問題, 因為他們在辯論中有個大前提, 就是說薩達姆政權是一個“世俗性”政權、跟伊斯蘭極端分子是水火不容的, 極端組織成員在薩達姆治下根本不可能有生存空間; 或者說薩達姆在大是大非的問題上是相當理智的, 決不會攻擊美國或者資助“原教旨”分子, 因為他知道招惹這個國家的後果是什麽。

當民主黨的那些重量級政客(如克裏、戈爾以及Nancy Pelosi)也紛紛加入這一大合唱時, 人們就有理由對他們的前後不一感到震驚了, 因為：

1）他們在戰前都堅決(比布什還堅決)聲稱薩達姆政權對美國安全構成重大威脅。
2）更要命的是, 他們在小布什還沒上台(甚至老布什還沒下台)的時侯就屢屢公開發表這樣的言論, 不是說說而已, 1998年轟炸蘇丹的希法製藥廠, 克林頓對國會解釋說伊政權和基地組織在那裏合夥製“藥”(當時的國防部長William S. Cohen在911委員會的聽證會上聲稱"the owner of the plant had traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX program")。不是說他們在意識形態上水火不容、極不可能合作嗎? 薩達姆不是把伊斯蘭極端組織看作自己的“最大威脅”嗎? 布什和切尼不是必須通過對情報的扭曲和高度選擇性的“使用”(我不知道主導報告的民主黨人用這個詞表達什麽含義)才能得出違背常識的結論嗎? 那麽克林頓政府又是中了什麽邪? 看樣子小布什不僅僅是剛上任就把伊拉克的油田分好了, 他本事大到在1999年以前就能強迫克林頓睜眼說瞎話, 還一直說到2004年接受《時代》專訪的時侯——

On whether Bush was right to invade Iraq You know, I have repeatedly defended President Bush against the left on Iraq, even though I think he should have waited until the U.N. inspections were over. I don't believe he went in there for oil. We didn't go in there for imperialist or financial reasons. We went in there because he bought the Wolfowitz-Cheney analysis that the Iraqis would be better off, we could shake up the authoritarian Arab regimes in the Middle East, and our leverage to make peace between the Palestinians and Israelis would be increased. At the moment the U.N. inspectors were kicked out in '98, this is the proper language: there were substantial quantities of botulinum and aflatoxin, as I recall, some bioagents, I believe there were those, and VX and ricin, chemical agents, unaccounted for. Keep in mind, that's all we ever had to work on. We also thought there were a few missiles, some warheads, and maybe a very limited amount of nuclear laboratory capacity. After 9/11, let's be fair here, if you had been President, you'd think, Well, this fellow bin Laden just turned these three airplanes full of fuel into weapons of mass destruction, right? Arguably they were super-powerful chemical weapons. Think about it that way. So, you're sitting there as President, you're reeling in the aftermath of this, so, yeah, you want to go get bin Laden and do Afghanistan and all that. But you also have to say, Well, my first responsibility now is to try everything possible to make sure that this terrorist network and other terrorist networks cannot reach chemical and biological weapons or small amounts of fissile material. I've got to do that. That's why I supported the Iraq thing. There was a lot of stuff unaccounted for. So I thought the President had an absolute responsibility to go to the U.N. and say, "Look, guys, after 9/11, you have got to demand that Saddam Hussein lets us finish the inspection process." You couldn't responsibly ignore [the possibility that] a tyrant had these stocks. I never really thought he'd [use them]. What I was far more worried about was that he'd sell this stuff or give it away. Same thing I've always been worried about North Korea's nuclear and missile capacity. I don't expect North Korea to bomb South Korea, because they know it would be the end of their country. But if you can't feed yourself, the temptation to sell this stuff is overwhelming. So that's why I thought Bush did the right thing to go back. When you're the President, and your country has just been through what we had, you want everything to be accounted for. On whether the Iraq war was worth the costs It's a judgment that no one can make definitively yet. I would not have done it until after Hans Blix finished his job. Having said that, over 600 of our people have died since the conflict was over. We've got a big stake now in making it work. I want it to have been worth it, even though I didn't agree with the timing of the attack. I think if you have a pluralistic, secure, stable Iraq, the people of Iraq will be better off, and it might help the process of internal reform in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. I think right now, getting rid of Saddam's tyranny, ironically, has made Iraq more vulnerable to terrorism coming in from the outside. But any open society is going to be more vulnerable than any tyranny to that.

當年轉述這一訪談的華語媒體也是別具匠心, 例如北京青年報這篇, 把中間的那三段話(關於伊拉克的違禁武器等相關問題)全部省略, 最後一句(關於文明社會比專製社會更難防範危險)的感情色彩也被扭曲了。但是跟新謊社比起來, 這篇已經夠客觀了。

05年另一件克林頓的新聞又被熱炒, 這裏的題目是“克林頓稱美國入侵伊拉克犯下巨大錯誤”, 不過看了文章內容, 又令人不免懷疑克林頓的本意隻是說伊戰的執行過程、或者說戰後重建過程犯了錯誤。按照華盛頓郵報的敘述：

Clinton cited the lack of planning for what would happen after Saddam Hussein was overthrown. "Saddam is gone. It's a good thing, but I don't agree with what was done," Clinton told students at a forum at the American University of Dubai. "It was a big mistake. The American government made several errors ... one of which is how easy it would be to get rid of Saddam and how hard it would be to unite the country." 。。。 Clinton said the United States had done some good things in Iraq: the removal of Saddam, the ratification of a new constitution and the holding of parliamentary elections. "The mistake that they made is that when they kicked out Saddam, they decided to dismantle the whole authority structure of Iraq. ... We never sent enough troops and didn't have enough troops to control or seal the borders," Clinton said. 。。。 Clinton said it would have been better if the United States had left Iraq's "fundamental military and social and police structure intact."

克林頓是左派的寵兒, 他這些以往的言行讓某些人很難處理。戈爾長期指責薩達姆跟恐怖組織勾結, 卻在伊戰陷入困境之後一舉變成歇斯底裏的反戰狂人, 但如果指控布什說謊, 自己幾乎也沒有可能脫身。然而想象力的作用是無窮的, 例如轟炸蘇丹藥廠一事——

The Sudanese method of producing VX was indeed of Iraqi provenance. But remember, the plant belonged to Sudan. Osama Bin Laden invested in the regime's Military Industrial Company, as he did in many, many other companies, farms, real estate, trading firms, etc. I've never been able to find evidence of contact between Bin Laden and the Iraqis or to demonstrate that Baghdad knew of al-Qaida's involvement in the VX project. BY Daniel Benjamin

也就是說, 薩達姆不知道自己的合夥人是基地組織, 而拉登也不知道對方是伊政權, 雙方都被蒙在鼓裏, 隻有美國間諜知道實情。

類似的, 關於紮卡維, 柿油派也找到一個寶貝, 因而大喜過望
http://thinkprogress.org/2006/09/10/phase-ii-report- conclusion/
據這份06年的報告所言, 薩達姆沒有包庇紮卡維(雖然紮卡維的確在他的地盤上呆著, 而且時間長度不是04年以前所認為的2個月, 是6個月, 見截圖), 而是致力於搜捕這位恐怖活動家, 為世界和平默默奉獻。那為什麽沒抓到呢? 大概是因為那個美國搗亂。。。就好比說, 當年蔣校長他老人家剿匪(Party), 據說因為同時要應對外患, 以致屢次功敗垂成, 後來忍痛簽了個“賣國協定”, 才真正騰出手來, 把Party趕去北上抗日了——可惜美國鐵了心要滅掉老薩, 不跟他簽什麽協議。

總之, 我以前從來沒有想過：對“窩藏紮卡維”這一開戰借口還可以像臨風先生這樣駁——不在薩達姆跟紮卡維的恩怨情仇上糾纏, 直接否認紮卡維在伊戰前是恐怖分子好了。或許他去伊拉克本是為了修橋鋪路、或者還為了關懷那裏的兒童、也有可能是去打醬油的。不過不管怎麽說, 我後麵要貼的兩副截圖(剪自臨風先生眼中最客觀、最中立的那份參院報告)跟“布什說謊”的口號還是有不小的距離。

——（臨風先生稱參院小組的報告“雖然是以民主黨為多數,但也刊登個別參議員提出的異議,筆者文章引用的是該報告的論點,不隻是‘世俗媒體’的宣傳 ”——這給人一種印象, 好像報告裏那些指責布什的部分是雙方意見折衷的產物, 事實上, 你自己讀報告就可以發現：多數派報告和少數派報告在空間、理由和結論上都是高度分隔的, 基本上是各說各話, 多數派部分完全不采納也不談論少數派的任何意見 ——而少數派對多數派有關“布什說謊”的那些結論逐條駁斥、無一認可^[2]。少數派報告自第101頁開始, 為了有效辯論, 本文不會引用少數派的任何結論)。

背景資料已經說了不少, 現在回到直接爭論的那個話題——紮卡維在伊戰前是什麽身分。當看到臨風先生義憤填膺地強調

阿布·紮卡維是因為不滿美國入侵, 在2004年加入基地組織, 不是伊戰事前！ 美國中情局在戰前告訴布希政府, 伊拉克與基地組織無關, 被布希、錢尼、倫斯菲爾德共同排斥, 在國防部內另外成立了一個小組, 希望證實兩者有關。

讀者的第一感覺是：臨風先生是在否認紮卡維此前跟恐怖組織的關係(尤其是那句“因為不滿美國入侵”)。因為倘若紮卡維做的事與“基地”(本身就是個鬆散的網絡)無異, 同樣致力於攻擊美國的盟友(如沙特、埃及和約旦政權), 否認以色列的存在權、並以恐怖主義手段達成目標, 那麽爭論他何時表態加入基地組織有何意義? 例如看我幾年來的言論, 一貫都是蠻不講理、狹隘自義、“石蕊試紙(litmus test)”的, 那麽就算我沒有正式表態加入“ 宗教右翼”又能說明什麽問題？

小布什本來在911後的公共演說(文字記錄)中就已聲明：窩藏恐怖分子的國家就形同向美國宣戰。這也是當時達成的國際共識, 請回去看安理會1368和1373號決議精神：(1)恐怖襲擊被定性為軍事攻擊(而不僅是刑事犯罪), 成員國擁有獨立或集體自衛權("Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter"-後者是針對盟友受攻擊而言)。(2)成員國有義務在本土鎮壓“一切形式的”恐怖主義。(3)窩藏恐怖分子者與之同罪。

順便提一下, 薩達姆對沙特可是一直掂記著。(ISGP-2003-00010366）

當然, 根據上下文而言, 臨風先生並不是否認紮卡維的恐怖分子身分, 但他的本意和邏輯依然很難辯識。

問題的關鍵在於∶有沒有證據顯示, 在2002年時, 他已經與基地組織掛鉤, 而且作為基地組織的橋梁, 與薩達姆政權陰謀勾結, 準備進攻美國？

下麵粗略提出兩種可能

（1）哪怕紮卡維本身已經構成正當的開戰理由, 布什還是說了謊, 因為他說伊拉克跟基地組織有聯係, 而實際上沒有這種聯係。
或者——
（2）紮卡維既然不屬基地組織, 也無法證明他“近期”會攻擊美國(“準備”), 因此該人不構成美國對伊動武的理由。

下麵我將先回應（2）, 再回到（1）。

關於（2）,其實有一個潛台詞,就是說美國必須把恐怖組織跟國家政權同等看待 ——正如你不能因為伊拉克的侵略行為而連帶懲罰敘利亞(盡管兩國都是複興黨執政), 所以美國也不能因為受過基地組織的攻擊、而一並打擊其它的恐怖組織。也就是說, 盡管紮卡維是恐怖組織頭目, 但他的組織沒有攻擊過美國(其實這一點也可疑,因有美國外交人員遇刺一事), 布什政府就沒有向該組織及其庇護國開戰的法理依據。
（關於這一點, 前麵對布什演講及聯合國決議的探討已經足以說清道理了, 不再重複^[3] ）

關於（1）, 我們可以看參議院今年六月出產的那個指責布什“ 說謊”的報告。裏麵的十幾條結論中, 有的說布什在某一問題上的言論不受當時情報支持；有的則是雖有情報依據, 但沒有反映情報群體中的少數派異議；有的是有誤導之嫌：例如情報的確支持伊拉克與基地保持“聯係”的結論, 但小布什轉述這一結論時, 給人造成錯誤印象, 讓公眾以為這種“聯係”已經到了“聯合行動”的程度(真的嗎?), 等等。

但恰恰是有關紮卡維的內容, 布什以及鮑威爾等人的言論跟情報部門的主流觀點完全一致。

Conclusion 11: Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qa'ida-related terrorist members were substantiated by intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraq intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi's presence in the country.

這裏對布什沒有任何異議。自己去讀, 好好想想。

“美國中情局在戰前告訴布希政府,伊拉克與基地組織無關”的說法大概是源於華盛頓郵報的一個類似謊言, 讀者至少應該先看看白宮的辯解再作判斷(空口說白話當然你不信, 但那裏引用的是CIA局長的證詞。場合? 參議員情報委員會)——注意 ！又提到了親愛的紮卡維同誌。：

• In February 2003, CIA Director George Tenet Testified That Iraq Had Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda. ... Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. ... I know that part of this - and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian Islamic jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda - operatives who are aiding the Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in Baghdad since last May. Now, whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in Europe and around the world. So these people have been operating there. And, as you know - I don't want to recount everything that Secretary Powell said, but as you know a foreign service went to the Iraqis twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there is a presence in Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

• Tenet Testified That Iraq Was Providing Safe Haven To Al Qaeda. SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): "Would you say, Mr. Tenet, that the Zarqawi terrorist network is under the control or sponsorship of the Iraqi government?" TENET: "I don't know that, sir, but I know that there's a safe haven that's been provided to this network in Baghdad." LEVIN: "So you're not - well, you're saying that you don't know if they're under the support - that they are under the control or direction?" TENET: "Yes, sir. We have said - what we've said is Zarqawi and this large number of operatives are in Baghdad. They say the environment is good. And it is inconceivable to us that the Iraqi intelligence service doesn't know that they live there or what they're doing." (George Tenet, Select Committee On Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 2/11/03)

• In March 2002, Tenet Testified On Iraq's Links To Al Qaeda. TENET: "We continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorists' activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It has also had contacts with Al Qaeda." (George Tenet, Committee On Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Hearing, 3/19/02)

Tenet另有一次表演(2002-10-07)也值得一提, 他在給國會的回信裏說：

Regarding Senator Bayh's question of Iraqi links to al- Qa'ida, Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions: 。。。 Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al- Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action.

有人說, 情報有誤, 總統也該明察秋毫, 否則仍難逃失職之罪。這是胡扯。總統的義務不是去質疑專業群體的工作成果, 那叫外行指揮內行。發明這種謬論的朋友大概不知道, 布什(以及議員們)收到的“情報”是一份份經過了專業部門層層審核的分析報告, 並不是某個心腹爪牙的幾句耳語。事實上, 甚至布什的講話稿都必須先經過情報部門的檢查, 確定沒有衝突才能照著演講。像這個National Intelligence Estimate, 裏麵列出不同等級的結論, 下麵這幾條屬於High Confidence:

Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.

小布什憑怎麽不接受這些結論? 這不僅是CIA的主流意見, 就連臨風先生津津樂道的國務院(還有能源部)也對這些結論(至少是化學、生物武器的部分)沒有異議(所以就算如臨風先生堅持的那樣,小布什選擇性地公布情報,事實上對開戰與否也並無實質影響)。難不成布什應該親自審查原始數據、拷問犯人？

當然, 如果你硬要堅持, 要精神勝利, 別人也沒辦法。你盡可以把布什想象成一個播音員, 接到紙條(“ 情報”)後不辯真偽就開始“本台剛剛收到的消息。嗨,夥計！你牙上有片卷心菜葉。”

如果還是想多了解一點兒實質性的信息, 推薦下載這個Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism看看(或者看這裏), 尤其是文檔第62頁(原書第43頁)^[4] 。自己判斷薩達姆有沒有支持那些從屬於基地的恐怖組織。你會發現薩達姆在本土為國外恐怖分子設立訓練營(我說的不是那個“劫機場”, 請看ISGZ-2004-032673), 招募人彈, 甚至竭力跟庫爾德區的伊斯蘭極端組織建立聯係。

Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organisations it knew to be part of al- Qa'ida, as long as that organisation's near-term goals supported Saddam's longterm vision.

不承認這個研究報告的權威性? 很好, 那為什麽主流媒體要從中抽出“these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network”這句話大作文章呢？

事實上, 根據Duelfer Report, 伊拉克情報部門的確在Salman Pak開辦訓練營, 招募的誌願者來自蘇丹、埃及甚至也門等國家(你盡可以相信這都是些“世俗化”的家夥)!

M14, Directorate of Special Operations M14, directed by Muhammad Khudayr Sabah Al Dulaymi, was responsible for training and conducting special operations missions. It trained Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations at its facilities at Salman Pak. Additionally, M14 oversaw the “Challenge Project,” a highly secretive project regarding explosives. Sources to date have not been able to provide sufficient details regarding the “Challenge Project.”

大概有的人又要說了, 人家薩達姆隻是在訓練特種部隊嘛("Iraqi special forces training camp"), 隻是為了“反恐”嘛----那就請他們看看這個全球獨一無二的“反恐”訓練科目：

The “Tiger Group” was similar to Special Operations, except that it was primarily comprised of suicide bombers.

繼續引用前述那部由USJFCOM於07年底完成的報告(原官方站點已失效, 請看Internet Archive上的永久存檔, 支國朋友可看這裏), 看看什麽叫斷章取義

Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign "fighters" drawn from these diverse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda's stated goals and objectives.

Some aspects of the indirect cooperation between Saddam's regional terror enterprise and al Qaeda's more global one are somewhat analogous to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national security concerns to the United States. Both cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, neither cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective-expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The wellpublicized and violent rise of the Medellin cartel temporarily obscured and overshadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel. Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, "terror cartel" that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam's regime. Based on captured recordings and documents, this paper illustrates in part how Saddam Hussein ran his "cartel."

In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam's ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam's "coercion" toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power.. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1)his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2)the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and "outreach programs" for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.

要是沒空或者不耐煩讀這麽冗長的東西, 我隻好貼一副圖完事兒(也是出自臨風先生看作至寶的那個“非世俗”的參院小組報告——不是少數派狡辯的部分)：

Conclusion 10: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's support for terrorist groups other than al - Qa'ida were substantiated by intelligence information.
The intelligence community reported regularly on Iraq's safe harbor and financial support for Palestine Rejectionist groups, the Abu Nidal Organization, and others. The February 2002 NIE fully supported the claim that Iraq had, and would continue, to support terrorist groups.

如果你認定了隻有“基地”分支才算恐怖組織,請看這一有關阿布薩耶夫武裝的繳獲文件(ISGP-2003-00014100)：

前述的庫爾德區恐怖組織叫HAMAS(跟我們通常所說的哈瑪斯不是一回事)。

In addition to establishing and maintaining ties to existing Islamist organizations, Saddam's intelligence services were always watchful for emerging movements. In December 1998, the IIS developed a new resource in the form of a small, radical Kurdish-based Islamic movement. In a series of memoranda, the IIS reported being impressed with the new terrorist organization's "readiness to target foreign organizations.. .Iranian border posts, and Kurdish parties ... However, based on the size of the movement (only sixty-two members at the time), the IIS decided it was better to establish individual contacts within the organization and to provide them "financial and moral support." The document goes on to note that "if their will [becomes] linked to their capabilities," then the IIS will establish an organizational relationship.

相關文件號:ISGQ-2005-00118681。

另一與此有關的繳獲文件是:ISGQ-2005-00016212。該文件夾第10頁(Page 10)指出——這個HAMAS是Ansar Al-Islam的前身之一。

提醒一下, IPP作者所引用的這些文件中, 有一個編號為ISGP-2003-00300189的文擋不可不看, 因它對破除神話最有直接效果——裏麵列舉了受薩達姆支持的各路恐怖組織(包括很多“原教旨”團夥)。文檔第14頁提及薩達姆在索馬裏的動作。相關的還有該文檔的第26頁。

順便說一句,臨風先生為了證明布什有罪,寧可相信小道消息,真令人驚訝

2002年9月18日, 美國中央情報局向布希報告, 伊拉克並沒有大規模殺傷性武器

這就讓人摸不著頭腦了。且不說2002年10月的National Intelligence Estimate明確說伊拉克擁有化學武器和生物武器, 今年那個民主黨攻擊布什的報告雖然竭力在雞蛋裏麵挑骨頭, 也講不出這種話來。連德維爾潘在回應鮑威爾的時侯, 也承認

- Right now, our attention has to be focused as a priority on the biological and chemical domains. It is there that our presumptions about Iraq are the most significant: regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of its capacity to produce VX and yperite; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capability; - Today the absence of long-range delivery systems reduces the potential threat of these weapons. But we have disturbing signs of Iraq's continued determination to acquire ballistic missiles beyond the authorized 150-km range.

總之, 看看02年十月的NIE, 就可以發現在伊拉克藏有生物、化學武器的問題上, 任何部門都沒有異議。在Aluminum Tube的問題上, CIA和絕大多數部門都認為那是用於核項目離心機的; 國務院引用能源部的分析, 不同意這一論點; 但是能源部跟其它部門都認為伊拉克的核武重建工作已經展開, 隻有國務院不同意這一點——然而, 國務院絕不認為伊拉克的一切所為跟核武不沾邊：

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities.

讀讀多數派報告的前九條結論(分別在文檔的第16、29、38、39、50、51、58、59和72頁),這不是“2002年918”,而是2008年民主黨搞出來的東西。讀完以後,想想CIA可不可能“在戰前告訴布什伊拉克沒有WMDs”。(有必要回憶一下1998年國務院的白皮書)

友情鏈接：普京同誌有話說

[1]糾纏這個問題實在是太無聊了, 臨風先生既然這麽崇拜維基百科, 何不先看完這個CIA leak scandal timeline, 再來發表宏論? Robert Novak跟Armitage的談話發生在7月8日, Libby同一天向Judith Miller談及此事——結果Armitage就是無心之失(雖然他實際造成了Plame身分的“泄露”), 而Libby就一定是包藏禍心(雖然他約見Miller是按照政府的命令、向媒體公布2002年NIE的Key Judgments)。更不要說Armitage在6月中旬就告知了Woodward(見錄音)。甚至在6月27日跟利比作訪談時、Woodward的提問綱要中就包括Joe Wilson's wife這一條, 然而Libby在如此有利的場合下竟沒有順勢“泄密”。)

指控卡爾·羅夫就更是無理取鬧了。因為諾瓦克在從Armitage那裏得到消息後, 就是向羅夫求證的, 後者因此知道威爾遜太太的CIA身分已經被“泄露”了(而且是政府高官所為), 那麽他在數日後跟Matt Cooper的談話當然跟“報複威爾遜”是一點兒邊都不沾了。(倘若他知道Plame是“Covert Agent”, 而又有意泄密, 那麽既然如今從Novak那裏得知事情已被別人辦好, 並且Plame的身分也將被Novak公開, 為什麽還要在7月11日再向記者泄密、拖自己下水呢？)

[2]舉個很有代表性的例子：請看參院報告文檔的102頁, 在那裏(有關核武器的問題), 少數派反對“布什掩蓋了情報群體中存在的異議”這一結論, 他們指出當布什發表相關言論時、這一“異議”所在的分析報告尚未付印, 多數派的邏輯等於是要求布什施展讀心術。(事實上, 民主黨議員們的發言反而是在讀過這一“包含異議”的報告之後。)

[3]與此類似的一個問題——有些對伊戰背景毫無了解的網友, 他們常常嘲笑布什以“子虛烏有”的WMD作為侵伊理由。這些人多半不知道1441號決議是什麽東西, 更不要說遙遠的安理會687號決議了。極左分子們聲稱薩達姆隻要接受聯合國檢查團入境、就已經算作遵守了安理會1441號決議;隻要這次檢查中沒有發現WMD, 薩達姆就應被視作無罪。

事實上, 這種解讀完全是一派胡言。薩達姆政權作為1991年吞並鄰國的罪犯, 本應遭到審判和清算(正如當初的紐倫堡審判), 隻是它比納粹政權走運, 得到了寬大處理的機會。根據687號決議,它要銷毀全部WMD、呈交流程記錄、服從調查, 使國際社會能夠確信它不再構成威脅, 才可以被免予追究。

因此, 當1441號決議給它“最後機會”、勒令它立即全麵合作, 這是要求它主動交待它曾經擁有的WMD的下落——也就是說,（1）如果尚有藏匿的違禁武器, 當然應該向檢查團坦白（2）如果堅稱WMD已被全部銷毀, 那就必須完整呈報銷毀工作的細節, 說明相應的時間、地點、方法, 拿出相關流程的記錄文件, 以及展示某些化學武器被銷毀後所專有的遺跡, 等等("Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence, for example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that Iraq’s Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete.")——如果這一切信息能夠讓檢查團感到滿意、薩達姆政權才算是沒有違反1441號決議, 並免於安理會多次警告的“嚴重後果”。那麽布裏克斯先生的報告是怎麽說的？一個腦子正常的人會不會相信1441號決議沒有被違反？

再總結一下1441號決議的要點：

[1] 服從687號決議是伊拉克享有和平的前提

[2] 指出伊拉克已經屢次實質性違反(material breach) 其義務, 並且已經多次受到警告(即這種行為將使其麵臨“嚴重後果”)

[3] 目前的決議給予它“最後機會”, 命令其“立即、全麵、無條件合作”

[4] 接受檢查期間若有任何欺瞞或阻撓行為, 將被視為對687號決議條款進一步的“material breach” 。

Holding Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, the Security Council this morning decided to afford it a “final opportunity to comply” with its disarmament obligations, while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) 。。。 The Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days, its intention to comply fully with the resolution. It further decided that, within 30 days, Iraq, in order to begin to comply with its obligations, should provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Council a complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, including chemical, biological and nuclear programmes it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material. Any false statement or omission in the declaration will be considered a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and will be reported to the Council for assessment.

因此, 隻要薩達姆沒有全麵合作——例如漏交相關文件、禁止伊拉克的相關科學家與調查人員單獨會談, 等等(更不要說隱瞞生化實驗室的存在,或者掩蓋運載工具的相關信息), 就構成了對停火協議的實質性違反(不要裝作沒看見這句“all aspects ...including ...programmes it claims are for purposes not related to weapons”)----就失去了“最後機會”, 就必須麵臨被一再警告的“嚴重後果”----何為“嚴重後果”不該有什麽異議吧。(順便提一下：在1998年分別有安理會1154號決議和1205號決議, 前者宣稱“any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq”, 後者則譴責伊方的行為構成“a flagrant violation of resolution 687”)

關於這一切, 鮑威爾同誌的表述簡練精當(該同誌後來聲稱自己被布什騙了。但他所指的隻是關於情報的部分, 至於1441號決議的含義, 聯合國檢查團的報告, 相信Powell不會把這些東西也賴到布什的頭上)。

Last November 8, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it." And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7 "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."

憤青們或許想不到, 以下的發言出自當時的法國代表之口

But Iraq must cooperate actively. The country must comply immediately with the demands of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, in particular by: - permitting meetings with Iraqi scientists without witnesses; - agreeing to the use of U2 observer flights; - adopting legislation to prohibit the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction; - handing over to the inspectors immediately all relevant documents on unresolved disarmament questions, in particular in the biological and chemical domains; those handed over on January 20 do not constitute a step in the right direction. The 3000 pages of documents discovered at the home of a researcher show that Baghdad must do more. Absent documents, Iraq must be able to present credible testimony.

[4]該研究小組在06年發表了另一份報告, 探討薩達姆同誌的領導藝術, 文檔的第72 頁也提及恐怖活動的訓練和招募工作。