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柯林斯看到上帝創造了宇宙──然而生命卻是另一回事
by Jonathan Witt 唐理明譯
譯者按
2006年5月，美國人體基因圖譜計劃負責人柯林斯（Francis Collins）出版了一本暢銷書《上帝的語言（The Language of God）》，副題為「一個科學家呈獻信仰的證據」。他曾和克林頓總統在2000年共同宣布基因譜計劃完成。在以無神思想為主流的媒體大環境中，這位知名的科學家竟寫出一本讚同信仰的書，基督徒豈能不歡欣鼓舞？然而，基督教界對此書的態度卻分歧不一。為什麽呢？柯林斯自己在書中給了答案──是因他在生物的產生論上采取「神導進化論」的緣故。
位於西雅圖的發現學社（Discovery Institute），是提倡智設論的智庫（Think Tank）。雖然柯林斯的書反對智設論，但據筆者所知，此書發行之後，發現學社僅在網上發表三篇短評，且都是淺評其中某一點。經過半年，直到當年11月底，該學社資深研究員威托（Jonathatn Witt）才在《Touchstone》雜誌上發表了一篇全麵性的評論 “Random Acts of Design”。此文說理中肯，邏輯嚴緊，行文謹慎，故筆者譯成中文，以供基督徒平衡的參考。
筆者曾在去年四月《恩福》雜誌上發表「智設論仍在轉動」一文。請參閱該文有關方法論的自然主義（methodological naturalism）、曆史性科學（historical science）和智設論定義等段落，以助了解。又，文中譯者所添之詞以方括弧〔〕為記。
柯林斯是人體基因圖譜計劃的總監，這項重大而成功的計劃將人體三十一億基因碼繪製成譜。眾人總以為世上「卓著的科學家」都是「堅定的無神論者」，但令人驚訝的是，柯林斯卻是位認認真真的基督徒。在他的新暢銷書《上帝的語言：一個科學家呈獻信仰的證據》中，他以遺傳學家和醫師的素養，說服大眾既接受達爾文進化論，也接受一位超越（Transcendent）的造物主。
他所讚同的進化論，是指自宇宙開始直到人類的出現，其間毫無直接理智的介入（intelligent input）。然而他亦言之鑿鑿地指出，基督教的神論是有道理的，不但造物主有憑有據，就連神跡、耶穌的神性、和複活的真實性也都是有可能的。他認為一個科學家可以相信這些基督教的教義，並不需要在入〔教堂〕門前調整（check）頭腦。1
主流媒體側重報導此書的兩方麵：強調達爾文主義並不威脅基督信仰，以及達爾文對一係列物質界的解釋比創造論科學（Creation Science）或智設論（Intelligent Design）更高明。然而這本書有一大特色卻為眾人視而不見，亟待見諸筆墨，即：柯林斯為智設論提出了科學的論據。
智設論所探討的，不僅是物質的起源，更延伸到思想（mind）的起源。其理論為：自然界某些特征最佳的解釋是理智的因素（intelligent cause）。柯林斯在第九章反對在生物界采用智設論，媒體就此大為宣傳。但在第三章「宇宙的起源」中，他卻陳明，「自然界某些特征最佳的解釋是理智的因素」，在此他是指生命起源之前就存在的特征。
柯林斯的論證
他在該書的這部份首先回顧了二十世紀物理學和宇宙學上的各項發現，其中多半肯定了基督教的教導。例如，十九世紀時，科學家一般認為宇宙是永恒的，但到了二十世紀，證據不斷增加，說服他們宇宙約在140億年以前才開始。柯林斯認為，這和聖經「從無到有」的創造教義吻合。
然後，他概述了〔宇宙常數〕精調（fine tuning）的問題。不斷積累的證據顯示，自然界的物理常數（重力、電磁力、宇宙質量等）是極其精密調整的，讓複雜甚至高等的生命可以存活。任何一個倘若有極小的變動，現存的生命就不可能出現。
接下來，柯林斯陳述了現今國際物理學、化學、天文學、宇宙學家所提出的三種解釋：(1) 除了我們的宇宙之外，還有許多個宇宙，數目或許無窮無盡，當中必定至少有一個所具備的常數恰到好處，可以支持高等生命；(2) 我們隻是運氣太好，好得讓人難以置信；(3) 這些物理常數看來像是精調的，因為它們本來就是經過精調的。換言之，它們是出於設計的。
在該章的結尾，柯林斯並沒有說：「我偏好第三種選擇，因為它肯定了我先前的宗教信念。」他反而作了一個以證據為基礎的論證，並且以標準的推理方法為訴求，辯明設計的假說乃是以上物理證據的最佳解釋。
他的結論很明確──盡管用語十分謹慎。論到那兩個非設計的選擇，他說：「根據或然律，第二種選擇最不可能。這樣一來，隻有第一和第三可選。第一種選擇在邏輯上可以站得住，但數目近乎無窮、又觀察不到的宇宙，使它的可信性降至極低；它誠然通不過奧卡姆剃刀（Occam's Razor）原則。」2
上述引文隻能淺略刻劃出柯林斯如何借整章行文引導讀者走向第三種選擇；由於他用語謹慎，實在難以用簡短的篇幅表明。舉個例子，在這段引文之後，他又有效地（雖然力度不強）對付一種反對的說法，即，「引進一個超然設計者也違反了奧卡姆剃刀原則」；而且他提到，「然而可以論證說，大爆炸本身便似乎強力指向有造物主。」
他以大爆炸和宇宙的精調作為他的設計論證兩項主要的論據。（第三項將在下麵談到，是檢視各種不同文化普遍皆有的道德律，和人類利他精神的事實。這些特征達爾文主義無法解釋，而最佳的解釋則為：人是按上帝的形像造的。）
在當前知識界的大環境，倡導智設論的科學家曾經遭到騷擾，甚至被開除；新聞報導和道金斯（Richard Dawkins）、丹那特（Daniel Dennett）等人所寫的暢銷讀物經常攻擊這個主張。如今人體基因圖譜計劃總監竟為智設論提出一個科學的論據，實在應當受眾所矚目。
柯林斯的瑕疵
然而為何這情況沒有出現？這是因為柯林斯接受了反對智設論者的誤導說法，作為他的標準論據。他們認為，智設論是一種反對達爾文主義的純粹負麵論證，再加上「填補空缺的上帝（God-of-the-gaps）」神學。
他們認為，智設論僅僅在達爾文主義戳上了幾個洞，就宣稱這些洞證明了上帝設計了生命。大體而言，他們宣稱，智設論者隻不過是根據我們目前的無知，沒有足夠的唯物機製來解釋某些自然界的現像，就直接辯稱是出於理智設計。
但事實並非如此。誠然，生物學界的智設論者的確對達爾文主義提出大量的批評，但他們也從正麵提出了智設的證據。他們所根據的，是我們對自然界日益增長的知識，包括柯林斯所論及的細胞學界，以及我們對於理智仲介（intelligent agents）──現今所知能產生「資訊」或「不能簡約的複雜機械」（二者都能在細胞中見到）的唯一原因──的了解。
以第三章中的兩個例子來看。首先，他提到脊椎動物眼睛〔視網膜〕的「反向布線（backward wiring）」。表麵看來這樣的結構效果不佳，使得光線必須經過神經和血管3才能達到眼睛的光感細胞。他主張，這乃是新達爾文主義的證據，他不認為有一聰明的設計者直接掌理了這個器官的進化。「在仔細考察之下，眼睛的設計並非完全理想。」他寫道，而這類不完美似乎「令許多解剖學家以為，人體的形成不是出於真正的智慧設計4」。
這種說法是道金斯和廣大達爾文主義者所津津樂道的。然而遺傳學家兼醫生的但頓（Michael Denton）卻已經證明，這種反向布線改善了〔視細胞的〕氧氣流通，這是極重要的優勢，也是達爾文批評者所要求的正向布線所不能達到的。智設論者曾經多次要人注意這一點，但看來柯林斯並不知道。他既沒有討論，也沒有提及。（道金斯和其他達爾文主義者一般則避而不談。）
柯林斯的細菌鞭毛
第二個例子則顯示柯林斯對於智設論學者領銜的工作並不熟悉。他討論了有關一種微小的旋轉發動機──即細菌鞭毛──的科學爭論。這細菌鞭毛是智設論理論家所津津樂道的，因為他們相信，除了設計之外，用其它方法來解釋其起源都顯然徒勞無功，同時，鞭毛的圖像無異將「設計」忽之欲出。
裏海（Leihigh）大學生物化學家貝希（Michael Behe）借著《達爾文的黑盒子》一書，讓這個精良的分子機器出了名。他論證說，它具「不能簡約的複雜性（irreducible complexity）」，因此是設計的證據。他以一個簡單的捕鼠夾來解釋「不能簡約的複雜性」。捕鼠夾如果缺少任何一個部件（木板座、彈簧、打擊杆、固定杆、或扳機），就不能工作；即使五件中有四件，也完全沒用。因此，這個捕鼠夾就是不能簡約地複雜。它要麽部件齊備，要麽就不是一個捕鼠夾。
同樣，細菌鞭毛是由四十多種不同類蛋白質組成的機械，必須要全部都在場才能工作。倘若隻有三十九種蛋白質，也沒有作用。
「不能簡約的複雜性」和達爾文主義有什麽關係呢？一個有知覺〔理智〕的設計者可以集合各個無功能的部件，組成一個完整而有功能的整體。但否認理智指導的達爾文進化論，其進展隻能是一小步的，一次隻可以從一個功能轉進為另一個功能。那麽，按達爾文進化論的機製，一次隻能作一部份，如何能造成一個具不能簡約複雜性的鞭毛發動機？──這個馬達要等全部配件裝好之後才會動。〔因為自然選擇必須有功能優勢才能被選上。〕
柯林斯用了達爾文進化論維護者急先鋒米勒（Kenneth Miller）和其他人的說法，主張自然可以共選（co-opt）較簡單的分子機械來創造細菌鞭毛，並且用「第三類分泌器（type three secretory apparatus [System, or TTSS]）」5 來作這種間接道路的證據。但智設論理論家早已指出，這種解釋有叁個重大問題。
首先，這個微注射器〔（TTSS） 5〕 隻有十種蛋白質，其餘三十種蛋白質還是沒有交代，而這三十種蛋白質從來沒有在其它生物體中找到。其次，從大量文獻來看，這個係統可能是在較複雜的細菌鞭毛之後產生的，而不是在它之前。
最後，即使是自然（nature）一手取得所有構成細菌鞭毛的正確蛋白質零件，要把它們準確地按時間順序組裝起來，則還需要某些東西，就好像汽車在工廠組裝起來一樣。現今這種工作是怎樣完成的？微生物學家密尼克（Scott Minnich）和哲學家邁耶（Stephen Meyer）如此說明：「要統一指揮組裝鞭毛馬達，現今的細菌需要一個詳細的分子生物指令係統，還要有許多其他蛋白質機械為這些組裝指令的表達來有條不紊地計時。」
柯林斯從來不提這類事情。諸如此類的事，再加上其他例子──例如，有關〔智設論〕可試性的問題，認為智設論不能作預見性判斷的說法，還有他對現代智設運動的曆史經常搞錯（他忽視了80年代為智設論奠基的科學家和哲學家的著作，錯誤地以為它始於1991），可見他固然是位第一流的實驗生物學家，但卻從未與智設論第一流的論證交手過。
自然主義者
在同一章中，他援用所謂方法論的物質主義（也稱為方法論的自然主義）之規律，來辯稱，麵對一種生物結構，生物學家不應當隻因為科學家還未發現其成因，就放棄尋求唯物的（即達爾文式的）解釋。
這是他反對智設論理由的一部份。「智設論是一種『填補空缺的上帝』的理論，在倡導者認為科學不能解釋的地方，插進一個需要超自然幹預的假設。」他還寫道，「倡導者犯了一個錯誤，就是把未知誤為不能知、未解決誤為不能解決。」
這說法是認為智設論者被缺乏想像力所困住，無法想像達爾文機製如何能夠產生類似鞭毛馬達般精良的東西。其實，缺乏想像力的是達爾文主義者，他們提不出達爾文式進化之路如何可以產生鞭毛，更不用提實驗室的證明了。
在這種情況之下，隻有兩個可能性：(1) 有一條無指導的進化之路，而科學家最終會發現它；或 (2) 除了由理智的指導之外，並沒有進化之路。柯林斯拒絕考慮後者，無疑犯了「未經證明而將論點假定為真（begging the question）」的謬誤。
假想，一個男孩對一個女孩說，他能夠爬上火星，因為有一道自然階梯，從一個行星伸展到另一個。女孩告訴他，地上沒有一個人找到過這種階梯，而且有理由可以相信它不存在──因為行星之間的距離一直在變，太陽會橫斷其間等等。男孩對女孩搖搖頭，耐心地說：「這是以不知為論證。6科學家在我們太陽係中不斷找到新事物。你看看月亮，那是全程的第一步。等著瞧，所有的事都會順理成章的實現。」
柯林斯認為我們一定可以找到細菌鞭毛的達爾文式進化道路，當然，他的意見不像上述例子那樣離譜，但推理方式是相同的。他把「達爾文式道路一定存在」〔的想法〕，和「懷疑可能找不到的科學家即等於放棄──也就是說，他們不配作科學家」的指控結合起來。
跟隨貝希
但有一件事很希奇，這事令研究《上帝的語言》一書饒有興味。前麵我們看到，柯林斯並不總是犯這個錯誤。例如，當他以宇宙的起源和精調為宇宙有設計辯論時，他用的論證和貝希為設計所用的論證是一樣的，即按照推論，設計是現有證據最佳的解釋。評論者則可以用每一個例證來指出，柯林斯本身違反了方法論的物質主義之規律──而這規律正是他反對智設論的理由。
同樣的批評也可用於他另一個有關設計的論證。他用人心中的道德律作為設計的證明。柯林斯批評另一個對道德律的主要解釋，即，我們以為的道德律，不過是達爾文進化中生存本能或直覺的積累。他爭辯道，更佳的解釋應為：我們不僅僅是物質，也有靈魂。
徹底的方法論物質主義者則可以這樣說：「柯林斯博士，我們暫時還不能用達爾文式的途徑來解釋諸如利他精神之類的事，但這並不表示我們永遠不會找到。你是以『不知』來為設計論證，你不能這麽作。」
柯林斯沒有理會上述的思路，而從宇宙起源、宇宙精調、人心道德律推論出設計，這是正確的。反對者說，他隻是從「我們對充分的唯物原因一無所知」來為設計辯論，但這種反對乃是在還沒有提出證據之前，就假定了該原因實際存在。8真正的科學方法（approach）則應該采用曆史性科學家一貫的作法：比較現有的證據，根據最佳的解釋作出推論，然後再看這推論在新的證據之前能否繼續站立得住。
這位世界級的遺傳學家，在宇宙學和人類經驗的領域中堅持他可以用這份權利，如此，他無形中已將我們推前了一步，更接近眾人普遍接受這方法的日子──無論所討論的是奇點（first singularity）或是第一個細胞。
柯林斯的神學
柯林斯誠然提出了一個神學論證，說明他何以選擇性地應用「方法論的物質主義」，以及他何以相信達爾文主義不會對基督信仰產生威脅。他認為，上帝精調的宇宙初始狀況已臻完美，無需再作進一步的幹預。等到祂預備造出一個種形──初人hominine）──時，祂才賦予它進化所不能注入的不朽靈魂。柯林斯爭辯道：「人類在好些方麵非常獨特，是進化論所不能解釋的，指向我們有屬靈的本質。」
按這個觀點看，宇宙的起源、人類的起源和曆史都是上帝直接的作為。但祂「完全的智慧」卻意味，在兩者之間的140億年中，自然界不需要額外的指導（或設計）。柯林斯認為，那位全智又全能的上帝所造的，必是「恩賜完備的受造界（fully gifted creation）」 （我是借用物理學家範梯爾〔Howard van Till〕的話），凡比它差的，就配不上祂。
柯林斯如此說：
智設論把全能的上帝描繪成一個笨拙的創造者，經常需要插手來調整祂自己原先那產生複雜生命的計劃。對於神無法測度的智慧和創造的奇才隻能瞠目結舌的信徒而言，這種形像很難令人滿意。
因此，他認為，在物質起源和人類起源之間，我們有很好的神學理由，可以前後一致地應用「方法上的物質主義」原則。
但是在作這段論證時，柯林斯處理上帝和時間的關係，與他在第三章對這個題目的處理法前後矛盾。在那裏他提到，基督教的上帝創造並超越了時間──無論過去、現在或將來。這是他用來解釋上帝如何能在大爆炸之前就存在，並如何能知道祂所精調的新宇宙有一日能進化成地球和人類的理由。
但他忽略了這神學理由其實具另一含義。他批評智設論設想的上帝，不能一次（在「恩賜完備的受造界」起源之初）就把設計搞對。但如果這位全能者是在時間之外，如果他淩駕過去、現在和將來，那麽這些幹預乃是出現在這位全能者永恒的麵前──不論是140億年以前一次性的出現，或是在宇宙曆史中不同時間點出現，都是一樣的。
我們也看到，柯林斯未加深慮，就把設計者在創造中不斷的參與，等同於無能。（他推薦米勒〔Kenneth Miller〕所寫《尋找達爾文的上帝（Finding Darwin's God）》，書中米勒向「費城提問者」說，智設論者的上帝「像一個不太懂機械的兒童，他必須不斷揭開車蓋，笨拙地把弄引擎。」）
為什麽要這樣說？說不定創造者願意不斷參與？說不定祂不願意上緊宇宙表的發條，任由它機械式地產生一切東西──從超新星到向日葵？說不定祂和宇宙的關係如同園丁和花園一般？說不定祂願意弄髒自己的手？7
上帝的機會
柯林斯的綜論還有一個重大的缺陷。他既截短了上帝的主權，也截短了達爾文理論的核心──隨機的因素（random element）。該段落是在第十章。他問道：「上帝如何能碰運氣？如果進化是隨機的，祂怎能真正掌控？祂又怎麽能有把握最後會出現有智慧的人呢？」他繼續說：
實際上，隻要不以人的局限性來看上帝，答案就近在咫尺了。如果上帝在自然界之外，祂就是在空間和時間之外。在這樣的狀況下，上帝能夠在創造宇宙的那一刻就知道將來的每一個細節。這包括星體、行星、銀河、所有化學、物理、地質和生物的形成（這些導致地上生命的形成），以及人類的進化，一直到你閱獨本書的這一刻──和未來。
如果這是真的，我們這些在「線性時間（linear time）暴政（tyranny）局限」下的人，會以為進化「是被機會（chance）所驅動的，但從上帝來看，其結果則早已完全定下了。」
如果上帝僅僅大約知道未來的事情，例如人類的起源，同時放手讓隨機運行，來展開宇宙，那麽達爾文式的隨機性還可以保存。但這樣一來，上帝便無法設定如柯林斯所講特定的結果。如果，另一方麵，上帝並沒有讓進化過程隨機運行，那麽我們所講的就不再是達爾文的進化論；而柯林斯既承認，結果早已完全被上帝定下，這就等於說是出於上帝的理智設計──盡管是用次一級的成因。
在前一章中，柯林斯把所謂不良設計歸咎於達爾文式的進化（例如視網膜的反向布線），但如果每項物件的開展，都是依據從宇宙之始就製定的計劃，那麽上帝對眼睛的這種反向布線就當負起全部的責任，正如祂直接設計一樣。曆代基督教神學家所維護神大能的護理（Providence）角色，乃與此類似。但柯林斯卻無法一方麵訴諸神的護理來解釋生命的進化，一方麵又同時說，所謂進化上的問題與錯誤都是隨機的責任，而不是上帝的責任。
優良的傳統
柯林斯在《上帝的語言》中要將達爾文主義和正統基督教綜合在一起，他誠懇的努力卻是失敗的。但是這位在科學界具崇高地位的人，也作成了一件很重要的事。可幸的事，在一些例子中，他違反了方法論的物質主義，讓自己能以設計作為最佳解釋，來說明宇宙的形成、物理常數的精調、和人心中的道德律。
在賦予自己這種自由時，柯林斯乃是回到了科學革命的起點。現代科學是基於兩個雙胞信念所產生的，即，宇宙是一個理性心智所造的可理解產物，而這位造物主不會每一步都受上個世代演繹的三段論（deductive syllogism）9所拘束，這就意味，科學家要斷定造物主究竟是怎麽作的，最好的辦法就是轉向大自然，仔細去作研究。
柯林斯最大的成就，是把自然界放在這個優良的傳統中，拒絕受那「未經證明而將論點假定為真」之方法論規律的束縛，相反的，卻跟隨證據走，不論它引向何處。
譯後記：
威托此文表達了他對柯林斯愛惜交錯的心情。柯林斯的可愛之處，是他不受方法論的自然主義束縛，證明宇宙有一位創造主。可惜之處則是，他沒有始終一貫地運用這個原則。這就說明了他在邏輯上缺乏訓練（他搞的是實驗科學）。因之他的論證也就限於樸素的水平。正因為他有可愛之處，威托才寫此文，頗有苦口婆心的味道。
讀者需謹記，智設論並不討論上帝，隻在科學領域上探討。智設論確實在哲學上對有神論是友好的，但下一步的推論乃是哲學和神學的工作，已超出了科學的範圍。然而柯林斯不理會這個交界，威托為幫助他，也隻好依就了他，但他專設了一段，跨出科學而談柯林斯的神學問題。
譯者現為UCSF醫院腫瘤登記員。本文已由譯者征得作者的同意翻譯。
譯注：
1. 這是康乃爾大學無神論進化論教授William Provine的話，語見Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial, P124, 1991年版。
2. 奧卡姆，14世紀英國邏輯學家。他認為在解釋任何現像時，應當用越少的假設越好。其它需用剃刀削去。對同一個現象，如有兩個同樣滿意的解釋，則以提最少假設者為勝。
3. 視網膜上四對血管對視力無甚妨礙。這是小題大作。
4. 智慧設計：人們對這個名詞有一種誤解，以為既是智慧設計，就應當十全十美，毫無缺陷，倘若不是十全十美，就不是出於設計，必然是進化來的。這種論理本身就違反了邏輯學上禁止用負麵證明作演譯（deductive）結論的規律，它還在實踐上違反了常識。因(1) 批評者並不了解設計者的原意。(2) 設計者在統籌協調中會有所取舍，或委屈求全、妥協。(3) 設計者本身的局限性，原型往往次於改良型。但原型依然是個設計品。為避免不必要的上述論理或解釋，筆者故從現在起采用清華大學翻譯的「理智設計」。理智設計論仍簡稱智設論。
5. TTSS是鼠疫桿菌，用來對宿主注射致死毒素的注射器。現多認為這是一個退化的微器官。
6. 以不知來論證（argument from ignorance）是邏輯錯誤之一。
7. 如果祂願意弄髒自己的手？此段道出了神導進化論的深刻神學錯誤。神導進化論者常規地給上帝戴上好聽的高帽，全智的、睿智的、無限遠見的、全能的等等。但他們卻不許上帝有主權（sovereignty）參與整個創造，特別是生物的創造。
8. 這就是方法論的自然主義所產生的想法。他們下意識中已把它變成哲學的自然主義 （metaphysical naturalism）了。
9. 這是古希臘科學家的思想局限性，他們企圖用邏輯法則來導出必然性（logical necessity），兩個不同重量的鐵球重者下跌得快，就是其中的一個產物
《恩福雜誌》 Vol.7 No.2 04/2007 第七卷 第二期 { 總23 期 }
Random Acts of Design
Francis Collins Sees Evidence That God Made the Cosmos—But Life Is Another Matter
by Jonathan Witt
Francis Collins is the head of the Human Genome Project, the monumental and successful effort to map the 3.1 billion letters of the human genetic code and, surprisingly in a world where “leading scientist” is assumed to mean “hardboiled agnostic,” a serious Christian. In his new bestseller, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief, he draws upon his training as a geneticist and physician to make a case to a popular audience for both Darwinian evolution and a transcendent Creator.
The evolution he argues for involves no direct intelligent input after the origin of the universe until the origin of humans, and yet he also makes a case for a specifically Christian theism, arguing not only for a Creator but also for the possibility of miracles, the deity of Christ, and a literal resurrection. He insists that a scientist can believe these articles of Christian doctrine without checking his brain at the door.
The mainstream media have emphasized two aspects of the book: Its insistence that Darwinism is no threat to Christianity, and its argument that Darwinism better explains a range of physical evidence than either creationism or intelligent design. What has gone begging for ink, how-ever, is a feature of the book hidden in plain sight: Francis Collins makes a scientific case for intelligent design.
According to the theory of intelligent design, which extends from the origin of matter to the origin of mind, an intelligent cause is the best explanation for certain features of the natural world. In chapter nine Collins argues against intelligent design in biology, and this the media have picked up. But in chapter three, “The Origins of the Universe,” he argues that an intelligent cause is the best explanation for certain features of the natural world, in this case, features that existed before the origin of life.
Collins’s Case
He begins this part of the book by reviewing twentieth-century discoveries in physics and cosmology, many of which reinforce Christian teaching. For example, whereas scientists of the nineteenth century generally believed that the universe was eternal, a growing body of evidence in the twentieth century convinced them that the universe began about 14 billion years ago, a theory, Collins notes, nicely in harmony with the biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo, that is, creation out of nothing.
Next, he summarizes the fine-tuning problem, the growing body of evidence suggesting that the physical constants of nature (gravity, electromagnetism, and the mass of the universe, among many others) are exquisitely calibrated to allow for complex and even advanced life. A very tiny difference in any of these and life as we know it would be impossible.
Collins then describes the three live explanations for fine tuning among the international community of physicists, chemists, astronomers, and cosmologists: (1) There are a multitude of universes in addition to our own, perhaps an infinite number, and at least one was bound to have the right physical constants for advanced life; (2) we’re just incredibly lucky; and (3) the physical constants look fine-tuned because they were fine-tuned. That is, they were designed.
He does not wrap up the chapter by saying, “I prefer option 3 because it confirms my prior religious commitments.” Instead, he makes an evidence-based argument, coupled to an appeal to standard methods of reasoning, to argue that the design hypothesis best explains the physical evidence in question.
His conclusion is clear, though his language is guarded. He says of the two non-design options: “On the basis of probability, option 2 is the least plausible. That then leaves us with option 1 and option 3. The first is logically defensible, but this near-infinite number of unobservable universes strains credulity. It certainly fails Occam’s Razor.”
Even this quotation undersells how much he guides the reader toward the third option in the course of the chapter, but his guarded language makes this difficult to demonstrate briefly. For example, after this quotation he deals effectively, if less than forcefully, with the objection that introducing a supernatural designer violates Occam’s razor, too, and notes that “it could be argued, however, that the Big Bang itself seems to point strongly toward a Creator.”
His appeal to the Big Bang and the fine-tuned cosmos form two of his key design arguments. (The third, discussed below, looks at the moral law found across cultures and the fact of human altruism, features that Darwinism fails to explain but which are explained well by the claim that humans were created in the image of God.)
In our present intellectual climate, where scientists have been harassed and even fired for advocating intelligent design, and the idea is routinely attacked in news stories and the popular books of writers like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, the fact that the head of the Human Genome Project makes a scientific case for intelligent design should stand out before all the others.
Collins’s Flaw
Why hasn’t it? Because Collins accepts as a standard talking point the misleading deion of intelligent design employed by its critics. According to them, intelligent design, or ID, is a purely negative argument against Darwinism coupled with a God-of-the-gaps theology.
They claim that design theorists poke holes in Darwinism and then insist that the holes prove that God designed life. More broadly, they claim that ID proponents supposedly argue from our present ignorance of any adequate material cause for certain natural phenomena directly to intelligent design.
But this is not the case. Design theorists in biology do offer an extensive critique of Darwinian theory, but they also offer positive evidence for intelligent design. They argue from our growing knowledge of the natural world, including the cellular realm with which Collins deals, and from our knowledge of the only kind of cause ever shown to produce information or irreducibly complex machines (both found at the cellular level): intelligent agents.
Take two examples from chapter three. First, he refers to the “backward wiring” of the vertebrate eye—an apparently inefficient structure that forces light to pass through the nerves and blood vessels on its way to the eye’s light sensors—and argues that this is evidence for neo-Darwinism and against the idea that a wise designer played a direct role in the evolution of this organism. “The design of the eye does not appear on close inspection to be completely ideal,” he writes, and its imperfection seems “to many anatomists to defy the existence of truly intelligent planning of the human form.”
This is a favorite argument of Dawkins’s, and of Darwinists generally. However, geneticist and physician Michael Denton has demonstrated that the wiring improves oxygen flow, an important advantage not achievable by the tidier approach demanded by Darwinism. Design theorists have called attention to this point repeatedly, but Collins shows no evidence that he is aware of it. He neither addresses it nor mentions it. (Dawkins and other Darwinists generally avoid discussing it.)
Collins’s Flagellum
A second instance where Collins betrays his lack of familiarity with the work of leading design theorists is his handling of the scientific controversy surrounding a micro-scopic rotary engine called the bacterial flagellum. The flagellum is a favorite of design theorists because they are convinced that attempts to explain its origin apart from design are manifestly inadequate, and because images of the flagellum practically scream design.
In his book Darwin’s Black Box, Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe made this sophisticated molecular machine famous by arguing that it was “irreducibly complex” and therefore evidence of design. He used the simple mechanism of a mousetrap as an example of irreducible complexity. If any part of the mousetrap is missing (the base, spring, hammer, holding bar, or catch), the trap cannot work. Even with four of the five parts in place, it is utterly useless. The mousetrap, then, is irreducibly complex. It is either complete, or it is not a mousetrap.
In the same way, the bacterial flagellum, composed of more than 40 distinct kinds of protein machinery, needs every one in place to function. If it has only 39 proteins, it will not work.
What does irreducible complexity have to do with Darwinian evolution? A conscious designer can pull together several dysfunctional parts and assemble them into a functional whole, but Darwinian evolution—which denies the possibility of intelligent guidance—must progress by one slight, functional mutational improvement at a time. So how can the Darwinian mechanism build an irreducibly complex motor one part at a time, if the motor cannot propel at all until all of its parts are in place?
Using the arguments of leading Darwin defender Kenneth Miller and others, Collins argues that nature could have co-opted simpler molecular machines to create the bacterial flagellum, and points to the “type three secretory apparatus” as evidence of such an indirect pathway. But design theorists have noted three crucial problems with this explanation.
One, the micro-syringe at best accounts for only ten proteins, leaving thirty or more unaccounted for, and these other thirty proteins are not found in any other living system. Second, as a wider body of literature suggests, the system probably developed after the more complicated flagellum, not the other way around.
Finally, even if nature had on hand all the right protein parts to make a bacterial flagellum, something would still need to assemble them in precise temporal order, the way cars are assembled in factories. How is such a task presently accomplished? As biologist Scott Minnich and philosopher Stephen Meyer explain, “To choreograph the assembly of the parts of the flagellar motor, present-day bacteria need an elaborate system of genetic instructions as well as many other protein machines to time the expression of those assembly instructions.”
Collins never mentions any of this. In these and other instances—the question of testability, for example, and the claim that intelligent design makes no predictions, and his error-prone history of the modern intelligent design movement (he ignores the work of the scientists and philosophers who founded intelligent design in the 1980s, incorrectly dating its beginning to 1991)—he comes across as a superb experimental biologist who, nevertheless, simply has never engaged the best arguments for intelligent design in biology.
The Naturalist
In the same chapter, he invokes a rule called methodological materialism (also called methodological naturalism) to argue that biologists should not give up looking for a material (meaning Darwinian) cause for particular biological structures just because scientists have yet to discover it.
This forms part of his argument against intelligent design. “ID is a ‘God of the gaps’ theory, inserting a supposition of the need for supernatural intervention in places that its proponents claim science cannot explain,” he writes, and its “proponents have made the mistake of confusing the unknown with the unknowable, or the unsolved with the unsolvable.”
The suggestion here is that design theorists are hobbled by a failure of the imagination, an inability to imagine how the Darwinian mechanism could have achieved anything as sophisticated as the flagellar motor. But it is the Darwinists who have been unable to imagine, much less demonstrate in the laboratory, a credible Darwinian pathway to the flagellum.
The situation suggests two possibilities: Either (1) there is an unguided evolutionary pathway and scientists will eventually discover it; or (2) there is no evolutionary pathway apart from one guided by intelligence. By refusing to consider the second option, Collins commits the fallacy of begging the question.
Imagine a boy who tells a girl he could climb to Mars because a natural ladder stretches from one planet to the other. The girl points out that nobody on earth has ever found such a ladder and there is reason to believe it doesn’t exist—because of the constantly changing distance between the planets, the sun getting between them, etc. The boy shakes his head at her and patiently explains, “That’s an argument from ignorance. Scientists are finding all sorts of new things in our solar system all the time. Look at the moon. It’s one step along the way. You see, everything is falling into place.”
Collins’s suggestion that we are sure to find a Darwinian pathway for the bacterial flagellum isn’t this outlandish, of course, but it employs the same reasoning. He combines the assumption that the Darwinian pathway certainly exists with the charge that any scientist skeptical that we’ll ever find it is simply giving up—is, in other words, failing as a scientist.
Following Behe
But here is the odd thing, the thing that makes The Language of God such an interesting study. As seen earlier, Collins does not always commit this error. For instance, in his arguments for design from the origin and fine-tuning of the universe, Collins makes the same kind of argument for design that Behe makes, inferring design as the best explanation of the current evidence. In each case a critic could note that Collins has himself violated the rule of methodological materialism he has invoked against intelligent design theory.
This same criticism could be leveled against his other design argument, in which he appeals to the moral law in the human heart as evidence of design. Collins critiques the other leading explanation for the moral law—that what we think of as the moral law is only an aggregation of survival instincts instilled by Darwinian evolution—and argues that a better explanation is that we are not just matter but also spirit.
To this, the thoroughly consistent methodological materialist could respond, “But Dr. Collins, just because we’re ignorant of a detailed Darwinian pathway to things like human altruism doesn’t mean we won’t ever find the pathway. You’re arguing from ignorance to design, and you can’t do that.”
Collins was right to ignore this line of thinking in inferring design from the origin of the universe, cosmic fine-tuning, and the moral law within. The objection that he only argued to design from our ignorance of an adequate material cause assumes ahead of the evidence that such a cause actually exists. The truly scientific approach is to do what historical scientists routinely do: compare the available evidence, make an inference to the best explanation, and then see how that inference holds up in light of subsequent discoveries.
By insisting on that right in the realms of cosmology and human experience, one of the world’s leading geneticists has nudged us a step closer to the day when such an approach will be taken for granted, whether the subject be the first singularity or the first cell.
Collins’s Theology
Collins does offer a theological argument for his selective application of methodological materialism and his belief that Darwinism is no threat to Christianity. He suggests that God fine-tuned the initial conditions of the universe so perfectly that no further intervention was needed until he was ready to raise up one form, hominine, by investing it with an immortal soul that evolution could not instill. Collins contends that “humans are also unique in ways that defy evolutionary explanation and point to our spiritual nature.”
On this view, God acted directly in the origin of the universe and in the origin and history of humanity, but his perfect wisdom meant that nature required no additional guidance or direction (or design) during the intervening 14 billion years. Collins suggests that anything less than such a “fully gifted creation” (I am borrowing physicist Howard van Till’s term) is unworthy of a God who is both omnipotent and omniscient.
As Collins puts it:
ID portrays the Almighty as a clumsy Creator, having to intervene at regular intervals to fix the inadequacies of His own initial plan for generating the complexity of life. For a believer who stands in awe of the almost unimaginable intelligence and creative genius of God, this is a very unsatisfactory image.
Thus, between the origin of matter and man, he suggests, we have a good theological reason to consistently apply the principle of methodological materialism.
But in making this argument, Collins treats God’s relationship to time in a manner inconsistent with his treatment of this subject in chapter three. There he notes that the God of Christianity invented and transcends time, both past, present, and future. He makes this point to explain how God could exist before the Big Bang and how he could know that his finely tuned new universe would one day lead to the evolution of planet Earth and human beings.
But this theological point has an implication he overlooks when he criticizes intelligent design theory for positing a God who can’t get the design right the first time (at the origin of a “fully gifted” universe). If the I Am is outside of time, if he stands over past, present, and future, then those interventions occurred in the eternal present of the “I Am” whether they occurred “all at once” 14 billion years ago or at different points throughout the history of the universe.
Also notice how blithely Collins equates the designer’s ongoing involvement in creation with incompetence. (Miller, whose book Finding Darwin’s God he recommends, told the Philadelphia Inquirer that the God of intelligent design theorists “is like a kid who is not a very good mechanic and has to keep lifting the hood and tinkering with the engine.”)
Why? What if the creator likes to stay involved? What if he doesn’t want to wind up the watch of the cosmos and simply leave it to crank out everything from supernovas to sunflowers? What if his relationship to the cosmos is also like a gardener to his garden? What if he wants to get his hands dirty?
God’s Chances
Collins’s synthesis possesses another crucial shortcoming. It undercuts either God’s sovereignty or the random element at the heart of Darwinian theory. The relevant passage is in chapter ten, in which he asks, “How could God take such chances? If evolution is random, how could He really be in charge, and how could He be certain of an outcome that included intelligent beings at all?” The answer, he continues,
is actually readily at hand, once one ceases to apply human limitations to God. If God is outside of nature, then He is outside of space and time. In that context, God could in the moment of creation of the universe also know every detail of the future. That could include the formation of the stars, planets, and galaxies, all of the chemistry, physics, geology, and biology that led to the formation of life on earth, and the evolution of humans, right to the moment of your reading this book—and beyond.
This being the case, we who are “limited . . . by the tyranny of linear time” would think evolution “driven by chance, but from God’s perspective the outcome would be entirely specified.”
If God merely knew about future events like the origin of humans, while granting an element of random play to the unfolding of the universe, Darwinian randomness might be preserved. But then God would not have specified the various outcomes as Collins suggests. If, on the other hand, God did not grant the evolutionary process an element of random play, then we are no longer talking about Darwinian evolution, and Collins’s admission that the outcome was entirely specified by God is as good as saying that it was intelligently designed by God, albeit through the use of secondary causes.
In an earlier chapter Collins blamed Darwinian evolution for supposed bad design (like the backward wiring of the eye), but if every physical event unfolded according to a plan hard-wired into the universe from the beginning, then God is every bit as responsible for the backward wiring of the eye as if he had designed it directly. Christian theologians through the ages have defended a similarly strong role for Providence, but Collins cannot invoke Providence to explain the evolution of life while at the same time suggesting that a random process rather than God was responsible for supposed evolutionary problems and failures.
High Tradition
In The Language of God, Collins has made a sincere but unsuccessful effort to synthesize Darwinism and orthodox Christianity. But he has also done something very important for a man of his stature in the scientific world. In some cases, happily, he violated the rules of methodological materialism by allowing himself to consider design as the best explanation for the origin of the universe, the fine-tuning of the physical constants, and the moral law within the human heart.
In granting himself this freedom, Collins is returning to the origins of the scientific revolution. Modern science was born of the twin convictions that the universe was the rational product of a rational mind, and that this maker was not bound at every turn by the deductive syllogisms of an earlier age, meaning that the best way for a scientist to determine how the Creator had done things was to turn to nature and carefully scrutinize it.
At his best, Francis Collins engages the natural world in this same high tradition, refusing to be bound by a question-begging methodological rule and, instead, following the evidence where it leads.
SOURCES: Denton, “The Inverted Retina” (www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od192/invertedretina192.htm); Minnich and Meyer, “Genetic analysis of coordinate flagellar and type III regulatory circuits in pathogenic bacteria” in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Design and Nature (September 1, 2004), see also William Dembski’s “Still Spinning Just Fine: A Response to Kenneth Miller” (www.designinference.com/documents/2003.02.Miller_Response.htm); Miller, “Evangelicals divided over evolution,” The Philadelphia Inquirer (May 30, 2005).
Who’s Serious?
At one point in The Language of God, Francis Collins echoes a favorite assertion of the most outspoken defenders of Darwinism: “No serious biologist today doubts the theory of evolution to explain the marvelous complexity and diversity of life,” with the context making clear that he means Darwinian evolution. But a recent poll conducted by HCD Research, Inc., in conjunction with the Finkelstein Institute found that a large percentage of Collins’s fellow doctors reject Darwinism.
Additionally, scores of biologists have signed a public list of more than 600 Ph.D. scientists skeptical about Darwinian evolution. Biologists make up the largest group on the list, a group that includes evolutionary biologist and textbook author Stanley Salthe; American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow Lyle Jensen; Richard Sternberg, a Smithsonian Institution evolutionary biologist and a researcher at the National Institutes of Health’s National Center for Biotechnology Information; Giuseppe Sermonti, the editor of Rivista di Biologia, one of the oldest currently published biology journals in the world; and Russian Academy of Natural Sciences embryologist Lev Beloussov.
Are none of these biologists serious? If not, how does one qualify as “serious”? By accepting neo-Darwinism? If so, Collins’s assertion is a mere tautology: No adherent of the theory of evolution doubts the theory of evolution.
— Jonathan Witt
Jonathan Witt is a senior fellow and writer in residence at the Discovery Institute in Seattle. He and his wife Amanda have three children, whom they home school.