英中對照： Jerome Powell\'s speech on Aug 24， 2025

### Full English Transcript of Jerome Powell's Most Recent Speech

The most recent speech by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, as of August 24, 2025, is titled "Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review," delivered on August 22, 2025, at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Here is the complete transcript:

**Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review**  
Jerome H. Powell  
Chair, Federal Reserve Board  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  
Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium  
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming  
August 22, 2025  

For release on delivery 10:00 a.m. EDT (8:00 a.m. MDT) August 22, 2025  

Over the course of this year, the U.S. economy has shown resilience in a context of sweeping changes in economic policy. In terms of the Fed’s dual-mandate goals, the labor market remains near maximum employment, and inflation, though still somewhat elevated, has come down a great deal from its post-pandemic highs. At the same time, the balance of risks appears to be shifting. In my remarks today, I will first address the current economic situation and the near-term outlook for monetary policy. I will then turn to the results of our second public review of our monetary policy framework, as captured in the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that we released today.  

### Current Economic Conditions and Near-Term Outlook  
When I appeared at this podium one year ago, the economy was at an inflection point. Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year. That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply. Inflation had moved much closer to our objective, and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state. Upside risks to inflation had diminished. But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point, a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions. Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, we recalibrated our policy stance, setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year (figure 1). For example, after the July 2024 employment report, the 3-month average of the unemployment rate had increased more than 0.5 percentage point above its lowest value over the previous 12 months. For more information, see Claudia Sahm (2019), “Direct Stimulus Payments to Individuals,” in Heather Boushey, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, eds., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American Economy (Washington: Hamilton Project and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, May), pp. 67–92, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/AutomaticStabilizers_FullBook_web_20190508.pdf.  

This year, the economy has faced new challenges. Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system. Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth. Over the longer run, changes in tax, spending, and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity. There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be. Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply. In this environment, distinguishing cyclical developments from trend, or structural, developments is difficult. This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes. The labor market is a case in point. The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024 (figure 2). This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago, as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially. But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market—an outcome we want to avoid. The unemployment rate, while edging up in July, stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year. Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly, including quits, layoffs, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and nominal wage growth. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the “breakeven” rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months. Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment. 

At the same time, GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent, roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 (figure 3). The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending. As with the labor market, some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output. Turning to inflation, higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods. Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July. Excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent, above their level a year ago. Within core, prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months, a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024. In contrast, housing services inflation remains on a downward trend, and nonhousing services inflation is still running

- 4 - at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation (figure 4). 4 The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible. We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months, with high uncertainty about timing and amounts. The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem. A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived—a one-time shift in the price level. Of course, “one-time” does not mean “all at once.” It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks. Moreover, tariff rates continue to evolve, potentially prolonging the adjustment process. It is also possible, however, that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed. One possibility is that workers, who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices, demand and get higher wages from employers, setting off adverse wage–price dynamics. Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks, that outcome does not seem likely. Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up, dragging actual inflation with them. Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations, however, as reflected in market- and survey-based measures, 4 Using the consumer price index and other information, an estimate of the contribution of housing services to 12-month core PCE inflation in July was 0.7 percentage point, while core services excluding housing contributed 2.0 percentage points. The contribution from each of these categories remains slightly above its average during the 2002–07 period, during which core PCE inflation averaged about 2 percent. In contrast, the contribution of core goods to 12-month core PCE inflation in July was about 0.25 percentage point, compared with the 2002– 07 average of −0.25 percentage point.

- 5 - appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent. Of course, we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted. Come what may, we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem. Putting the pieces together, what are the implications for monetary policy? In the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside—a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate. Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago, and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance. Nonetheless, with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance. Monetary policy is not on a preset course. 

FOMC members will make these decisions, based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance of risks. We will never deviate from that approach. Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework Turning to my second topic, our monetary policy framework is built on the unchanging foundation of our mandate from Congress to foster maximum employment and stable prices for the American people. We remain fully committed to fulfilling our statutory mandate, and the revisions to our framework will support that mission across a broad range of economic conditions. Our revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as our consensus statement, describes how we pursue our dual-mandate goals. It is designed to give the public a clear sense of how we think about monetary policy, and that understanding is important both for transparency and accountability, and for making monetary policy more effective. The changes we made in this review are a natural progression, grounded in our ever-evolving understanding of our economy. We continue to build upon the initial consensus statement adopted in 2012 under Chair Ben Bernanke’s leadership. Today’s revised statement is the outcome of the second public review of our framework, which we conduct at five- year intervals. This year’s review included three elements: Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, a flagship research conference, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings. 5 In approaching this year’s review, a key objective has been to make sure that our framework is suitable across a broad range of economic conditions. At the same time, the framework needs to evolve with changes in the structure of the economy and our understanding of those changes. The Great Depression presented different challenges from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn are different from the ones we face today. 6 At the time of the last review, we were living in a new normal, characterized by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound (ELB), along with low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve—meaning that inflation was not very responsive to slack in the economy. 7 To me, a statistic that captures that era is that our policy rate was stuck at the ELB for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in late 2008. Many here will recall the sluggish growth and painfully slow recovery of that era. It appeared highly likely that if the economy experienced even a mild downturn, our policy rate would be back at the ELB very quickly, probably for another extended period. Inflation and inflation expectations could then decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned near zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations, triggering an adverse dynamic. The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. 8 The 2020 consensus statement included several features that addressed the ELB-related risks that had become increasingly prominent over the preceding two decades. We emphasized the importance of anchored longer-term inflation expectations to support both our price-stability and maximum-employment goals. Drawing on an extensive literature on strategies to mitigate risks associated with the ELB, we adopted flexible average inflation targeting—a “makeup” strategy to ensure that inflation expectations would remain well anchored even with the ELB constraint. 9 In particular, we said that, following periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time. In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world. Like most other central banks and private-sector analysts, through year-end 2021 we thought that inflation would subside fairly quickly without a sharp tightening in our policy stance (figure 5). 10 When it became clear that this was not the case, we responded forcefully, raising our policy rate by 5.25 percentage points over 16 months. That action, combined with the unwinding of pandemic supply disruptions, contributed to inflation moving much closer to our target without the painful rise in unemployment that has accompanied previous efforts to counter high inflation. 9 See David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66; Michael T. Kiley and John M. Roberts (2017), “Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 317–72, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/kileytextsp17bpea.pdf.

(Note: The transcript appears to end here based on the available content, with no further text provided in the source. Any references to figures are as in the original, but images are not included.)

### Chinese Translation (中文翻譯)

以下是演講稿的完整中文翻譯。我力求翻譯準確、流暢，並保留原意：

**貨幣政策與美聯儲框架審查**  
傑羅姆·H·鮑威爾  
美聯儲主席  
美聯儲理事會  
2025年8月22日  
於堪薩斯城聯儲主辦的傑克遜霍爾經濟政策研討會，懷俄明州傑克遜霍爾  

於東部時間上午10:00（山地時間上午8:00）發布，2025年8月22日  

今年，美國經濟在經濟政策全麵變革的背景下展現出韌性。就美聯儲的雙重使命目標而言，勞動力市場仍接近最大就業，通脹雖然仍略微偏高，但已從疫情後高點大幅回落。同時，風險平衡似乎正在轉變。在今天的講話中，我將首先討論當前經濟形勢以及貨幣政策的近期展望。然後，我將討論我們第二次公開審查貨幣政策框架的結果，該結果體現在我們今天發布的修訂版《長期目標和貨幣政策策略聲明》中。  

### 當前經濟狀況與近期展望  
一年前，當我站在這個講台上時，經濟正處於拐點。我們的政策利率已維持在5-1/4%至5-1/2%超過一年。這種限製性政策立場有助於降低通脹，並促進總需求與供給之間的可持續平衡。通脹已接近我們的目標，勞動力市場從以前過熱的狀態冷卻下來。通脹上行風險已減弱。但失業率上升了近一個百分點，這種發展曆史上僅在衰退之外未曾發生。在隨後的三次聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）會議上，我們重新校準了政策立場，為勞動力市場在過去一年中保持平衡接近最大就業奠定了基礎（圖1）。例如，在2024年7月就業報告後，3個月平均失業率比前12個月的最低值上升了超過0.5個百分點。更多信息，請參閱Claudia Sahm (2019), “Direct Stimulus Payments to Individuals,” in Heather Boushey, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, eds., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American Economy (Washington: Hamilton Project and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, May), pp. 67–92, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/AutomaticStabilizers_FullBook_web_20190508.pdf。  

今年，經濟麵臨新挑戰。對貿易夥伴征收的顯著更高關稅正在重塑全球貿易體係。更嚴格的移民政策導致勞動力增長突然放緩。從更長期來看，稅收、支出和監管政策的變革也可能對經濟增長和生產力產生重要影響。這些政策最終將如何落地以及對經濟產生何種持久影響存在重大不確定性。貿易和移民政策正在影響需求和供給。在這種環境中，區分周期性發展與趨勢或結構性發展很困難。這種區分至關重要，因為貨幣政策可以穩定周期性波動，但對結構性變革幾乎無能為力。勞動力市場就是一個例子。本月早些時候發布的7月就業報告顯示，過去三個月薪資就業增長平均僅為每月35,000人，低於2024年的每月168,000人（圖2）。這一放緩比一個月前評估的要大得多，因為5月和6月的早期數據大幅下修。但就業增長放緩似乎並未在勞動力市場打開大量閑置——這是我們希望避免的結果。失業率在7月小幅上升，但仍處於曆史低水平4.2%，並在過去一年中大致穩定。其他勞動力市場狀況指標也幾乎未變或僅溫和軟化，包括辭職、裁員、空缺與失業比率以及名義工資增長。勞動力供給與需求一致軟化，大幅降低了保持失業率穩定的“盈虧平衡”就業創造率。事實上，今年勞動力增長因移民急劇減少而大幅放緩，勞動力參與率在最近幾個月小幅下降。總體而言，雖然勞動力市場似乎處於平衡，但這是一種奇怪的平衡，由工人供給和需求均顯著放緩所致。這種異常情況表明，就業下行風險正在上升。如果這些風險實現，它們可能以大幅更高裁員和上升失業的形式迅速顯現。 

同時，今年上半年GDP增長顯著放緩至1.2%的速度，大約是2024年2.5%速度的一半（圖3）。增長下降主要反映消費者支出放緩。與勞動力市場一樣，GDP放緩的部分原因可能反映供給或潛在產出增長放緩。轉向通脹，更高關稅已開始推高某些類別商品的價格。根據最新可用數據估計，截至7月的12個月內，總PCE價格上漲2.6%。排除波動性大的食品和能源類別，核心PCE價格上漲2.9%，高於一年前水平。在核心中，商品價格在過去12個月上漲1.1%，這與2024年溫和下降形成顯著轉變。相比之下，住房服務通脹仍處於下降趨勢，非住房服務通脹仍略高於曆史上與2%通脹一致的水平（圖4）。4 關稅對消費者價格的影響現在清晰可見。我們預計這些影響將在未來幾個月積累，時機和金額存在高度不確定性。對於貨幣政策而言重要的問題是，這些價格上漲是否可能實質性提高持續通脹問題的風險。一個合理的基準情況是，這些影響將是相對短暫的——價格水平的單次轉變。當然，“單次”並不意味著“一次性”。關稅上漲仍需時間通過供應鏈和分銷網絡傳導。而且，關稅率繼續演變，可能延長調整過程。然而，也可能關稅的價格上行壓力會引發更持久的通脹動態，這是需要評估和管理風險。一個可能性是，工人看到其實際收入因更高價格而下降，向雇主要求並獲得更高工資，從而引發不利工資-價格動態。鑒於勞動力市場並不特別緊張並麵臨增加的下行風險，這種結果似乎不太可能。另一個可能性是通脹預期可能上升，拖累實際通脹隨之上升。通脹已超過我們的目標四年多，仍是家庭和企業的突出關切。然而，市場和調查基於的長期通脹預期措施4 使用消費者價格指數和其他信息，7月住房服務對12個月核心PCE通脹的貢獻估計為0.7個百分點，而排除住房的核心服務貢獻2.0個百分點。這些類別的貢獻仍略高於2002–07時期的平均水平，當時核心PCE通脹平均約為2%。相比之下，7月核心商品對12個月核心PCE通脹的貢獻約為0.25個百分點，而2002–07平均為−0.25個百分點。

- 5 - 似乎仍保持良好錨定，並與我們2%的長期通脹目標一致。當然，我們不能視通脹預期的穩定性為理所當然。不管發生什麽，我們不會允許價格水平的單次增加成為持續通脹問題。將這些拚圖組合在一起，對貨幣政策有何含義？短期內，通脹風險偏向上行，就業風險偏向下行——這是一個挑戰性情況。當我們的目標像這樣緊張時，我們的框架要求我們平衡雙重使命的兩側。我們的政策利率現在比一年前接近中性100個基點，失業率和其他勞動力市場措施的穩定性允許我們在考慮政策立場變革時謹慎行事。盡管如此，隨著政策處於限製性領域，基準展望和風險平衡轉變可能保證調整我們的政策立場。貨幣政策並非預設路徑。 

FOMC成員將基於他們對數據及其對經濟展望和風險平衡的影響的評估，僅做出這些決定。我們永遠不會偏離這種方法。貨幣政策框架的演變 轉向我的第二個話題，我們的貨幣政策框架建立在國會賦予我們促進美國人民最大就業和穩定價格的不變基礎之上。我們仍完全致力於履行我們的法定使命，本次框架修訂將支持我們在廣泛經濟條件下的這一使命。我們修訂的《長期目標和貨幣政策策略聲明》，我們稱之為共識聲明，描述了我們如何追求雙重使命目標。它旨在向公眾清晰傳達我們對貨幣政策的思考，這種理解對於透明度和問責製以及使貨幣政策更有效都很重要。我們在本次審查中做出的變革是自然進展，基於我們對經濟的不斷演變理解。我們繼續在2012年本·伯南克主席領導下采用的初始共識聲明基礎上構建。今天修訂的聲明是我們每五年進行第二次公開框架審查的結果。本次審查包括三個要素：在全國聯儲銀行的Fed Listens活動、一場旗艦研究會議，以及在FOMC會議係列中支持的政策製定者討論和審議，由工作人員分析支持。5 在接近本次審查時，一個關鍵目標是確保我們的框架適用於廣泛的經濟條件。同時，框架需要隨著經濟結構變革和我們對這些變革的理解而演變。大蕭條呈現的不同挑戰與大通脹和大緩和不同，後者又與我們今天麵臨的挑戰不同。6 在上次審查時，我們生活在一種新常態中，其特征是利率接近有效下限（ELB），伴隨低增長、低通脹和非常平坦的菲利普斯曲線——意味著通脹對經濟閑置不太敏感。7 對我來說，一個捕捉那個時代的數據是我們政策利率在2008年末全球金融危機（GFC）爆發後被困在ELB七年之久。這裏許多人會回憶那個時代的緩慢增長和痛苦緩慢恢複。似乎極有可能，如果經濟經曆即使溫和衰退，我們的政策利率將很快回到ELB，可能又是一個延長時期。在弱經濟中，通脹和通脹預期可能下降，隨著名義利率固定在零附近，提高實際利率。更高實際利率將進一步壓低就業增長，並強化通脹和通脹預期的下行壓力，觸發不利動態。將政策利率帶到ELB並驅動2020框架變革的經濟條件被認為根源於緩慢移動的全球因素，這些因素將持續延長時期——如果不是疫情，本可能如此。8 2020共識聲明包括幾個特征，應對過去二十年日益突出的ELB相關風險。我們強調錨定長期通脹預期的重要性，以支持我們的價格穩定和最大就業目標。借鑒緩解ELB相關風險策略的廣泛文獻，我們采用了靈活平均通脹目標——一種“補償”策略，以確保即使在ELB約束下通脹預期仍保持良好錨定。9 特別是，我們說，在通脹持續低於2%時期後，適當貨幣政策可能旨在一段時間內實現通脹適度高於2%。事實上，而不是低通脹和ELB，後疫情重開為全球經濟帶來了40年來最高通脹。與大多數其他央行和私營部門分析師一樣，到2021年底，我們認為通脹將在不急劇收緊政策立場的情況下相當快速消退（圖5）。10 當清楚這並非如此時，我們有力回應，在16個月內將政策利率提高5.25個百分點。這一行動結合疫情供給中斷的解除，有助於通脹接近我們的目標，而沒有伴隨以往對抗高通脹努力的痛苦失業上升。9 見David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66; Michael T. Kiley and John M. Roberts (2017), “Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 317–72, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/kileytextsp17bpea.pdf。

（注：根據可用內容，演講稿似乎在此結束，沒有來源中提供的進一步文本。任何對圖表的引用均如原稿，但未包括圖像。）