Daniel Bell - A Vertical Model Political System
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30OGjUCbiDY
Daniel A. Bell 貝淡寧 dabell@hku.hk, facdev@hku.hk
https://www.facebook.com/HKULawFac/
Born 22 May 1964 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada;educated at McGill University, University of Oxford,is a Canadian political theorist. He is currently Chair of Political Theory at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. He was previously Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University and professor at Tsinghua University.
丹尼爾·貝爾 - 垂直模式政治體係
2015年8月26日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30OGjUCbiDY
丹尼爾·貝爾,倫理學與政治哲學教授,在北京教授政治理論。在這場妙趣橫生的演講中,他挑戰了我們的政治直覺,並探討了理想的政治模式,其基礎是民主和賢能政治是好的。他探討了將政治決策權完全交給選民所固有的問題,因為選民可能受過教育,也可能不了解公共利益,或者無法將短期利益放在一邊。他描述了一種垂直模式,即由賢能官員在上層,由民選政客在下層,這種模式靈活,“中間有很大的實驗空間”。他表示,這“或多或少”是自20世紀90年代以來激發中國政治變革的模式。但是,它也存在一些缺陷。請觀看視頻,了解它們究竟是什麽。
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引言
今天早些時候,我們瞥見了中國崛起的力量。它令人震驚的經濟崛起不僅得益於其龐大的人口,更得益於其企業家精神的崛起。企業家精神,以及我所學到的政治理論是:隨著人口財富通過獨立於國家的成功企業增長,任何個人或政黨所行使的國家壟斷權都無法被挑戰。因此,中國如今因其由一黨主導而受到批評,而我們西方模式的民主被認為是一個合適的答案。所以,問題是,西方最了解情況,還是東方最了解情況?我們將與丹尼爾·貝爾一起開啟“創意之城”的最後一場會議。
丹尼爾·貝爾
非常感謝摩西和凱特的邀請。正如摩西剛才所說,我不是極客,這在某種程度上是一個問題,因為我對我想學習的新技術不太適應,但我發現……我同意第一位發言者的觀點,我們應該向孩子、向學生學習,但他們對學習遲緩的學生並不總是很有耐心。關鍵是我沒有PPT或視頻,我唯一有的東西就是兩樣東西,一是,我想我不需要這些來為ABBA或演唱會加油助威,二是,我當然有
紙,上麵有講義。想象一下,這是公元前二世紀,當時中國才剛剛發明紙,人們會說,哇,太酷了,比竹篾好多了。所以,這就是我今天提供的技術援助。不過,我想我應該先介紹一下自己。我出生在蒙特利爾,長大,過去九年一直在北京教授政治理論。人們經常問我,為什麽你這麽……我的意思是,你如何處理文化衝突?我的意思是,蒙特利爾和中國很不一樣,但實際上它們並沒有那麽不同,因為我來自一個非常腐敗的城市,我在一個非常腐敗的國家工作,所以很明顯,好吧。所以我有多少15分鍾的時間來試圖說服你接受一個論點?
坦白說,如果我25年前聽到這個論點,我會感到震驚,我會非常反感,你知道,我會非常討厭那個即將提出這個論點的人。因為這確實意味著我們必須挑戰我們兒時習得的政治直覺。我認為,隨著中國實力的不斷增強,這個論點可能比20年前更容易提出。我要得出的基本結論聽起來有點違反直覺,因為人們常說,關於中國,有一個標準的說法,過去二三十年有很多經濟改革,但沒有政治改革。我的意思是,你讀任何報紙,都會看到這樣的標準說法,但我認為這個標準說法是錯誤的。自20世紀90年代初以來,中國一直在進行政治改革。不僅如此,我認為這是建立在理想政治模式基礎上的政治改革,國旗改革應該繼續以這種模式為基礎。那麽,這個模型是什麽呢?嗯,這就是我要在這裏嚐試解釋的。我不僅要解釋,還要在一定程度上論證它的合理性。最後,我會討論一下這個模型仍需克服的幾個問題。現在,讓我先從幾個我認為不應該引起爭議的假設開始。第一個假設是最不具爭議性的,那就是民主是一件好事。對吧?我的意思是,我們都認為我們應該在政府中擁有發言權。我們不希望被統治。沒有人相信像朝鮮那樣的神明般的政治人物,我們應該盲目地追隨他們。我的意思是,這是一個瘋狂的想法。當然,我們應該在政治社群中擁有發言權。好吧,沒有人會不同意這一點。第二個假設是,它不應該那麽有爭議,但它……
這聽起來有點爭議,因為我們不太熟悉。這種觀點認為,賢能政治或政治賢能政治是好的,這種觀點認為
政治體製應該以基於卓越能力和美德來選拔和提拔領導人的方式構建。賢能政治 vs. 民主,這是中國政治文化的標準,或多或少是主流觀點,聽起來
有點奇怪,但其實也不奇怪。我的意思是,我們當然希望由能力超群的政治領導人來治理,對吧?我的意思是,政治領導人從定義上來說就擁有淩駕於我們之上的權力,我們希望他們以理性的方式行使這種權力。我的意思是,如果政治領導人愚蠢、消息不靈通,做出錯誤的決定,那麽就會對我們的利益產生負麵影響。所以我們當然希望領導人能夠處理複雜的信息,對世界持開放態度,對基本事實有很好的理解等等。但我們也希望領導人有美德,至少在最低限度上,他們不腐敗,對吧?領導人
應該服務於政治共同體,而不是服務於他們的如果他們貪汙腐敗,顯然就不道德,所以我認為從這個意義上來說,我們不僅僅是民主黨人,而且都是精英政治家,既要有才能,又要有美德。問題是,我們如何才能調和這兩種假設,你知道,這兩種觀點,民主是好東西,精英政治也是好東西,我們如何才能調和它們?基本上,有三種模式被討論過,第一種模式是一種更民主的模式,第二種模式是我捍衛了大約15年,但現在我改變了主意,我認為第三種模式更好,我會在最後嚐試捍衛它。這聽起來像是在為中國現行體製辯護,但我要解釋的是,這並非完全是辯護,實際上,它指出了需要根據該模式進行進一步改革。那麽,調和民主與精英政治的第一個方法是什麽?第一種是,讓我們交給選民決定,選民會選擇他們認為最好的人。最理性、最有德行的統治者,對吧?當然沒問題,問題是……而且有很多經驗證據表明,現在的選民並不總是……理性的。我的意思是,有一本很棒的書,叫做《理性選民的神話》,這本書去年由普林斯頓大學出版社出版,幾年前由一位經濟學家撰寫。他詳細地展示了……選民是如何係統性地誤解……他們的基本經濟利益的,他……主張在擁有投票權之前,你至少應該通過經濟學考試。選民,當然,這在民主國家是行不通的,因為一旦你製度化了“一人一票”製度,你就無法改變一個製度,我稍後會回到這個問題。我們應該選擇,應該把投票權留給選民,這個想法的另一個問題是,選民經常以不道德的方式投票,如果我投票,……這不僅影響我自己的利益,還影響他人的利益,對吧?因此,我應該……應該投票給那些根據……做決定的人。為了公共利益,承諾大多數選民會根據他們的短期經濟利益投票。
他們再次誤解了這些利益,但這就是他們試圖做的。唯一這樣做的人是,順便說一句,有些人更理性,
往往是更富有的資本家。你知道,這就是為什麽你知道,作為一種對美國製度的描述,它並不完全不公平。它是一美元一票,而不是一人一票。但無論如何,選民應該根據公共利益投票,但他們經常根據短期經濟利益投票,
這不道德。好吧,這並不總是發生。有時選民確實會根據公共利益投票,他們根據
投票群體的利益投票。這聽起來不錯,而這正是民主最有效的時候。選民根據投票群體的利益投票。現在的問題尤其在於像中國或美國這樣的大國。這些政策不僅影響選民群體,也影響非選民,影響子孫後代,影響居住在國外的人們,影響我們的祖先,影響自然界的動物等等,而且沒有人代表他們的利益。這是一個嚴重的問題,或許也是民主製度最深層次的問題,就是當選民的利益與非選民的利益發生衝突時,選民的利益往往會占主導地位。如果政府的政策影響到子孫後代,那麽選民的利益往往會占主導地位。這就是為什麽應對氣候變化或全球變暖會成為一個如此重大的問題,因為你需要有20年或50年展望的政治家,而在民主國家,幾乎不可能指望政治家有正確的長遠眼光,因為他們擔心的是未來。選舉等等,那麽我們如何才能解決這個問題呢?西方有一些巧妙的方案。你知道,在十九世紀,偉大的英國自由主義理論家約翰·斯圖爾特·密爾提出過一些巧妙的方案。他說,讓我們給受過教育的人額外的選票。現在你知道,在某種程度上,這不是一個糟糕的想法。問題是,在實踐中很難實施。我們如何區分受過教育的人和沒有受過教育的人?如果你有碩士學位,你就有兩票;如果你有博士學位,你就有三票。不可能以非任意的方式劃定界限。換句話說,一旦你提出這個問題,就不可能避免爭議。另一方麵,一旦你實施了一人一票製,就不可能改變,無論這個論點多麽合理,沒有人會說“好吧,我同意,我不像其他人那麽理性,我也同意其他人應該有額外的選票”,這完全行不通。所以我認為解決這個問題的想法投票的問題在於,給受過教育的人或任何群體額外的選票,例如在經濟學考試中,這根本行不通,那麽我們還能有哪些其他模式呢?
其他模式是指溫斯頓·丘吉爾有句名言:民主製度是最糟糕的製度,除了其他所有製度之外。這是其他模式,而且這種說法非常常用,你經常聽到。
我知道這句話肯定是支持民主的最常用論據之一,但實際上還有其他模式,這就是我要講的。我不知道他為什麽會提出這個模式,因為溫斯頓·丘吉爾在二戰中的主要敵人當然是納粹黨,你知道他們是如何被選出來的。我的意思是,好吧,那麽其他兩種模式是什麽呢?
第一個是橫向模式,意思是在中央政府層麵,有一個民主製度,一人一票來選擇領導人,還有一個精英管理製度。領導人的選拔基於功績、卓越能力和美德,像弗裏德裏希·哈耶克這樣的偉大人物就曾提出過兩院製立法模式。他說,我們應該像英國上議院那樣實行兩院製立法。這些議員年齡在45歲以上,但眼界隻有15歲,他們必須考慮與民選議會不同的長期問題。這完全行不通,因為一旦有了民主選舉產生的議會,它往往是社會合法性的唯一來源。無論是英國的上議院還是參議院,更不用說哈耶克所設想的那些權力更大的上議院,它們相對於民主黨議會來說,必然會失去權力。那麽,在中國,由於中國更具精英管理的傳統,20世紀初偉大的中國思想家索尼婭·森提出了一個想法:我們應該對政治家進行考試,而不是對選民進行考試。如果我們可以投票給他們,但如果他們考試不及格,他們就無法為公眾服務。這聽起來不錯。他被譽為台灣和中國大陸的開國元勳。問題是,如果有人
獲得80%的選票卻未能通過考試,那麽這個體製必然會不穩定,缺乏合法性,所以這又是一個行不通的方案。另一位偉大的中國當代思想家楊廷,以及童童、陳國強等人也提出了類似的方案。這是一個普遍的觀點,實際上我在過去15年左右一直捍衛這個方案。一個是民主體製,政客會服務於選民的利益;另一個是賢能體製,政客是通過考試和
基層政府的政績選拔出來的,他們會服務於受政府政策影響的非選民的利益,比如子孫後代。這種觀點的問題在於,民主體製一旦建立,就必然會擁有更高的
合法性,而賢能體製必然會失去某種權力。所以,這是一個問題,其他問題在中國是不現實的。我的意思是,我們繼續……我希望過去15年能朝著這個模式發展,但目前還沒有。那麽,還有什麽其他模式呢?我們稱之為垂直模式。中央政府或頂層由李克強選拔的政治家,底層由民選政治家組成,中間有很多實驗空間。這種模式或多或少是對19世紀90年代以來中國政治變革模式的描述。我必須承認,現在回想起來,這似乎很明顯。
我第一次了解到這一點,是在我遇到現任副總統時。聯合國應該與其他幾位學者達成一致。他說,你知道為什麽,為什麽西方人會這樣做?好吧,我的意思是,讓我不要把……歸咎於……這就是我要對他說的,但為什麽西方人認為,一個小村莊應該有一個放之四海而皆準的解決方案,一個擁有13億人口的國家也應該有一個統一的領導人選拔方法,當然,沒有放之四海而皆準的方案,我們需要在地方政府的不同層級采用不同的領導人選拔方式。地方政府了解他們的領導人的性格,他們知道他們是否腐敗,我知道他們在哪裏腐敗,他們對法律的理解更透徹。地方問題並不複雜,無論是建學校還是建醫院,如果他們犯了錯誤,這不是世界末日,你知道,但在中央,地方政府更注重社區精神,但在中央,問題要複雜得多,如果他們犯了錯誤,這可能是世界末日,你知道是否應該就氣候變化發動戰爭,這些都是重大問題,而專業知識或經驗並不重要。一點兒也不,想想就覺得很瘋狂,但你知道,這差不多就是這個想法,而且它有點像一刀切的模式。所以,基本思路是,政治指揮鏈越往上走,中央和基層之間的精英管理就越重要,實驗的空間就越大,這差不多就是中國模式。你知道,今天我們聽說了長沙,這些城市正在進行一些令人著迷的建築實驗。我又見到了長沙市長,他非常有魅力,擁有伯克利的博士學位,曾在世界銀行工作過。所以,我的意思是,把他和加拿大的市長比較一下,我就不點名了。是的,所以,你有很多實驗的空間。香港當然是言論自由的典範,基本思路是,中央政府不應該幹預太多,讓所有這些實驗都進行下去,如果某種方法有效的話。那麽你可以將其推廣到全國其他地區,所以或多或少,你知道,你認為中國是高度集權的國家,實際上它是高度分散的,你在不同的城市和地區進行了所有這些實驗,比非常僵化的聯邦製靈活得多,領導人要經過二三十年的培訓才能晉升到特倫特的指揮鏈上,所以他們不會犯初學者的錯誤,我的意思是奧巴馬,他非常聰明,但他第一次當選總統時,經驗不足,犯了很多初學者的錯誤,而這種情況在中國不會發生。請注意,這種模式與最高層的競爭性選舉不相容,因為一旦你有了競爭性選舉,你就沒有動力花20到30年的時間去培訓人們,所以這是一個相當不錯的模式。現在有兩個缺陷是什麽?我還有1分40秒的時間來解釋。第一個缺陷當然是腐敗,對吧,這個體製非常腐敗,大家都知道,事實上,與經濟主導地位相似的國家相比,這個體製並沒有那麽腐敗,但腐敗程度更高。在中國,治理腐敗的動機在於,領導人被視為賢能政治家,被視為民主黨人,從而獲得合法性。所以,我認為政府現在或多或少正在朝著治理腐敗的方向發展。我預計中國在未來十年左右會比蒙特利爾更好地處理腐敗問題。但無論如何,第二個問題或許是更深層次的問題,即社會現代化過程中的合法性問題。我認為中國也存在同樣的問題。在開放社會中,人們更渴望參與政治。合法性來源多種多樣,有民族主義,也有政績合法性。你知道,如果你擺脫貧困,但在某些時候,人民需要認可一個製度。在中國,競爭性選舉是不可能的,那麽,情況會怎樣呢?為什麽預測10年、15年,甚至20年後,會舉行某種形式的全民公投,詢問人民是否認可中國模式?如果認可,我們將在更穩定的憲法基礎上繼續推行。 50年左右,如果讚成票占多數,我認為它在中國會更加合法,也會在國外獲得更大的尊重。所以我再說一遍,我不是在為這個體製辯護,我確實認為這個體製或多或少走在正確的軌道上,但它需要大量的改進。謝謝。我還有14秒。我是丹尼爾。是什麽讓你首先來到這裏的?她坐在那裏。我的妻子是中國人。我們在1989年認識的。完美的解釋。我們拍張照吧。吉恩在這裏。吉恩,沒錯,我們有一個五年計劃要實現。
Daniel Bell - A Vertical Model Political System
2015年8月26日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30OGjUCbiDY
Daniel Bell, Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy, teaches political theory in Beijing. In this slyly witty talk he challenges our political intuitions and debates what would be a desirable political model, based on the assumptions that democracy and political meritocracy are good things. He discusses the problems inherent with just leaving things with voters, who may or not be educated, understand the common good, or be able to put aside their short-term interests. He describes the Vertical Model with meritocratically-chosen officials at the top and democratically-elected politicians underneath, which is flexible and has “lots of room for experimentation in between.” He says this is “more or less” the model that has inspired political change in China since the 1990s. But, there are some flaws. Watch and find out what they are.
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Introduction
earlier today we had a glimpse of the rising power of China it's stunning economic rise not just by force of its
awesome population but by force of the rise of its entrepreneurial spirit entrepreneurial spirit and the theory as I learned it the political theory as I learned it is that with the growth of wealth in a population through successful businesses independent of the state there masu nor later come challenges to the monopoly of the state as it is exercised by any one individual or party for that reason China is criticised today for its domination by apparently a single party and democracy in our western style is proposed as an appropriate answer so the question is does the West know best or does the East and we're going to kick off this last session of idea city with Daniel Bell
Daniel Bell
well thank you so much for inviting me Moses and and Kate and as Moses just said I am NOT a geek which is in a way a bit of a problem because I don't feel very comfortable with new technologies I want to learn but I find and I agree with the first speaker that we should learn from the children and from our students and so on but they're not always very patient with slow learners so the point is that I don't have any PPT or or videos the only thing that I have while two things that I have one I
guess I don't need this to facilitate the cheering for the ABBA or concert but the other thing I have of course is
paper with with lecture notes and in you have to imagine that this would be the second century BC when paper had just been invented in China and then people would say wow so cool much better than bamboo strips you know so so this is my kind of thing technical aid today but I guess I should say a little bit about myself now I was born and bred in Montreal and I've spent the past nine years teaching political theory in Beijing and people often ask me why you're such a I mean how could you deal with a cultural clash I mean Montreal is so different than China but actually they're not that different because I'm from a very corrupt City and I work in a very corrupt country so so there are clear okay so how much I have 15 minutes to try to persuade you of an argument that
had I heard it myself 25 years ago to be frank I would have been appalled I would have and I would have strongly you know I would have disliked and whoever is
about to present this argument because really it does mean that we have to challenge the political intuitions that we learn as children and I think with China's growing power perhaps the argument is easier to make than it would have been about 20 years ago and the basic conclusion that I'm gonna try to arrive at it sounds a little bit counterintuitive because people often say well there's the standard trope is this about China right the past 20 or 30 years there's been a lot of economic reform but no political reform right I mean you read any newspaper that's the standard story but I think the standard story is wrong there has been political reform since the early 1990s not only that but I think it's political reform on the basis of a desirable political model and that flag reform should continue to be based on that model now what is that model well that's what I'm going to try to explain here not just explain it but try to justify it certain extent and I'll end up with some with a discussion of a couple of problems that the model still needs to overcome now let me begin with a couple of
assumptions that I think should not be controversial the first is the least controversial that democracy is a good
thing right I mean we all think that we should have some say in our government that we don't want to be governed nobody believes in in these kind of god-like political figures maybe like in North Korea that we should blindly adhere to I mean that's a crazy idea of course we should have some say in our political community okay nobody will disagree with that the second assumption is not it shouldn't be that controversial but it s
ounds a bit controversial because it's not so familiar to us and this is the idea that meritocracy or political meritocracy is a good thing and this is the idea that
the political system should be structured in a way that selects and promotes leaders based on superior ability and virtue now Meritocracy vs Democracy that's that's the standard you know in Chinese political culture that's more or less the mainstream view and it sounds a
bit strange but it's not that strange I mean of course we want to be governed by political leaders with superior ability right I mean political leaders by definition have power over us and we want them to exercise that power in a rational way I mean if the political leader is stupid and ill-informed and makes wrong decisions you know then it negatively affects our interests so of course we want leaders with ability to process complex information and be open to the world and have good understanding of the basic facts and so on but we also
want leaders who are virtuous in the sense that least in the minimal sense that they're not corrupt right leaders
should serve the political community they shouldn't serve their own interests and if they're corrupt and obviously they're not virtuous so I think in this sense we're all not just Democrats but all meritocratic ear ability and virtue the question is how can we reconcile
these two assumptions you know these two views that democracy is a good thing and meritocracy is a good thing how can we reconcile them and basically there are
three models that have been discussed and the first model is a kind of more democratic model the second one is one that I've been defending for 15 years or
so but I've now changed my mind and the
third model I think is the better model
that I'll try to defend at the end and
it sounds like a defense of the current
system in China but I'll explain that
it's not quite a defense actually points
to the need for further reform according
to that model
so what's the first way of reconciling
democracy and meritocracy the first is
well let's just leave it according to
the voters the voters will choose
whoever they think is the best most
rational and most virtuous ruler right
no problem there of course a problem is
that and there's a lot of empirical
evidence now the voters are not always
rational I mean there's this excellent
book called the myth of the rational
voter came out last year by a couple
years ago by Princeton University Press
by an economist he shows in great detail
how voters systematically misunderstand
their basic economic interests and he
argues for that before you have the right to vote you should you should at least pass economic exams Voters of course it's a non-starter in a democracy because once you institutionalize one person one vote you
can't change a system and I'll get back to that in a minute another problem with with the idea that we should select that we should just leave it to voters is that voters often vote in an immoral manner if I vote it's
not just for it doesn't just affect my own interest it affects the interest of others right so therefore I should I
should vote for people who vote who who decide things according to the common good the promise that most voters vote according to their short-term economic
interest again they misunderstand those interests but that's what they try to do the only people who do is by the way as a sideline there are people who are more
rational tend to be the richer capitalists you know which is why you have you know as a kind of it's not
completely unfair description of the American system it's one dollar one vote rather than one person one vote but anyway so so voters should vote according to the common good but they vote according to the short-term
economic interests often and that's immoral now okay that doesn't always happen sometimes voters do vote according to the common good they vote according to
the good of the voting community now that sounds good and that's when democracy works best the voters vote according to the interests of the voting community the problem now especially in a big country like China or the u.s. is that the policies don't just affect the voting community they affect non voters as well they affect future generations they affect people living outside the
country they affect our ancestors they affect animals in the natural world and so on and nobody represents their
interests this is a serious perhaps at deepest problem with democracy is that when there's a clash between the
interests of voters and the interests of non voters were affected by the policies of government like future generations the interests of voters tends to dominate and if and that's why dealing with climate change or global warming is going to be such a big issue because you need politicians who have 20 or 50 year outlooks and it's almost impossible in a democracy to expect politicians to have that long term outlook right becausethey're worried about the next election and so on so how could we correct this Solutions problem well we have had some ingenious
proposals in Western three you know in the nineteenth century the great liberal British theorist John Stuart Mill he says let's give extra votes to educated people now that you know the a certain extent you know that's is not a terrible idea the problem is that it's very hard to implement in practice how do we draw the line between you know who who who's educated and who's not and if you have a masters you get two votes if you have a
PhD you get three votes it's impossible to draw the line in a non arbitrary way in other words it's impossible to avoid controversy as soon as you bring up this issue and the other thing is once you implement one-person one-vote it's impossible to change no matter how rational the argument nobody's going to say fine I agree I'm not as rational as other people and I agree that other
people should have extra votes it's just a complete non-starter so I think the idea of addressing the problems of
voting by giving extra votes to educated
people or to any sort of group in for example giving exams in economics is a non-starter so what are the other models that we can have you know are there
other models I mean you know Winston Churchill famously said that you know democracy is the worst possible system except for all the others and and that's Other models and that's so commonly used you hear it
all the time you know I know that quote must be one of the most commonly used arguments in favor of democracy but in fact there are other models that's what I'm gonna talk about and I don't know why he would even come up with that because you know Winston Churchill's you know main you know enemy in affair with in in world war two of course was was the Nazi Party you know and and you know how were they chosen I mean you know anyway so the okay so what are the two
other models okay the first one is a horizontal model meaning at the central level of government you have you have a democratic institution one person one vote to choose leaders and you have meritocratic institution where leaders are chosen on the basis of merit superior ability and virtue and you've had great singers like Friedrich Hayek who proposed this bicameral legislature
model he says let's have a bicameral legislative kenner of the House of Lords in the UK these would be over people over 45 that have 15 horizon and they have to think of the long-term issues different than the elected house come again a complete non-starter because once you have a democratic elected house that tends to
be the only source of legitimacy in society and whether it's the House of Lords in the UK or the Senate not to
mention these stronger upper houses that that Hayek had in mind they inevitably are bound to lose power relative to the Democratic house what about in the
Chinese context where there is more of a tradition of meritocracy well the great Chinese thinker in the early 20th century Sonya Sen he proposed an idea let's give exams to politicians not to voters if the we can vote for them but if they fail the exams then they can't
serve the public now that sounds like a good idea and and he's regarded as a founding father in both Taiwan and China again the problem is that if somebody
gets 80% of the vote and they fail the exam you know the system is bound to be unstable and to lack legitimacy so that's another non-starter another great Chinese thinker contemporary finger called yang ting he
proposes and several others by Tong Tong
and and Josef Chen and others this is a common view and actually one that I've defended in the past you know 15 years or so a democratic house where the politicians would serve the interests of voters and a meritocratic house where the politicians are chosen by exams and
performance at lower levels of government and they would serve the interest of non voters affected by the
policies of government like future generations the problem with that view Vertical model is that again the Democratic House once is there it's bound to have more
legitimacy and the meritocratic house is bound to lose some sort of power so and that's one problem you know the other problems are just unrealistic in China I mean we keep on hoping the past 15 years is moving towards that model but it's not happening so what's another model let's call this the vertical model where we have meritocratic Li chosen politicians at the central level
government or at the top and democratically elected politicians at the bottom with lots of room for
experimentation in between and that model is more or less a description of the model that has inspired political change since the 1890s in China and I must confess it seems so obvious in retrospect you know
and I first learned about it when I met the current vice president the UN shall accord with a few other academics you know and he and he says you know why is why do Westerners you know well okay I mean let me not attribute this what I'm about to say to him you know but why is
it that people west people in the West think that there's one size fits all solution at a little village there's one
way of choosing leaders it should be the same way of choosing leaders and a country 1.3 billion people of course there's no one-size-fits-all we need
different ways of choosing leaders at
different levels of government at the
local level people know the character of
their leaders they know whether the
corrupt I know where they're able they have a better sense of the law at the local issues are not so complex whether you build a school or Hospital and if
they make a mistake it's not the end of
the world you know but at the center and
there's more of a community spirit at
the local level but at the central level
the issues are much more complex if they
make a mistake it could be the end of
the world you know whether to go to war
on climate change and these are huge
issues and the idea that expertise or
experience doesn't matter at all it's
it's crazy when you think about it you
know but this is more or less the idea
and it kind of one size fits all model
so so the basic idea is the further up
you'd move the chain of political command the more meritocracy should matter in between the central level and the lower level tons of room for experimentation and that's more or less the Chinese model you have cities you know today we heard about Changsha you
know which are doing the fascinating
experiments with architecture you know
again I met the mayor of Cheung sha he's
again very fascinating and has a PhD
from from Berkeley it was worked in the
World Bank and so I mean compare that to
mayors in Canada and I won't name any
any yes so so you have lots of room for
experimentation in between you know and
you have not you know Hong Kong of
course is a model of free speech and the
basic idea is the central government
should intervene too much let all these
experimentations happen and if something
works then you can generalize it to the
rest of the country so and more or less
you know you think of China's highly centralized state in fact it's highly decentralized and you have all these
experiments in all different cities and regions in much more flexibility than a very rigid federal system and the leaders are trained for twenty or thirty years before they can move up the Trent the chain of command you know so they don't make beginners mistakes I mean Obama he's very brilliant but when he was first made you know president he didn't have as much experience lots of beginners mistakes it doesn't happen in China and note that this model is incompatible with competitive elections at the highest levels because once you have competitive elections you know you won't have this incentive to train people for 20 or 30 years so it's a
pretty good model now what are the two flaws and I have a minute and 40 seconds left to explain the first flaw of course is corruption right that the system is very corrupt everybody knows that in fact compared to countries that similar levels of economic dominance not that corrupt but there's more of an incentive to deal with corruption in China because of the fact that the leaders get legitimacy from being viewed as meritocratic from being viewed as Democrats so in fact the government now I think is moving more or less towards dealing with corruption I expect China to deal better with corruption than Montreal over the next decade or so but anyway the second problem is perhaps even deeper problem which is a legitimacy problem that a society modernizes and here I do think that it's also the case in China there's more of a desire for political participation in open society there are different sources of legitimacy there's nationalism there's performance legitimacy you know
if you if you leave a poverty but at some point there's going to be a need for the people to endorse a system in
China and competitive election is a non-starter so what could it be why predict that in 10 or 15 years maybe
20 there's going to be some sort of referendum to ask the people do you endorse the Chinese model and if so
we're gonna let keep it in place in a more stable constitutional foundation for 50 years or so if there's a strong yes vote I think it'll be much more legitimate in China and it'll have also greater respect abroad so so again I'm not defending the system I do think the system is is is more or less on the right track but that it needs a tremendous amount of improvement thank you I have 14 seconds I'm Daniel what took you out there in the first place well she's sitting up there my wife is Chinese we met in 1989 the perfect explanation let's take up pictures Jean here Jean that's right we have a five-year plan to fulfill