實現中國夢 北京的新世界秩序

實現“中國夢”北京的新世界秩序

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/6/living-the-chinese-dream-beijings-new-world-order

隨著北京增強外交影響力，分析人士表示，北京希望“重塑”甚至取代現有的全球機構。

習近平和夫人彭麗媛在人民大會堂外台階底部的紅地毯上。他們身後有三名身著禮服的士兵在台階中間。

自去年取消 COVID-19 限製以來，中國國家主席習近平加強了外交力度 [文件：Thomas Peter/Pool via Reuters]

作者：Frederik Kelter 2023 年 6 月 6 日

自去年年底中國放棄零 COVID 政策以來，北京一直參與從東到西的一係列活動。

印度果阿峰會、新加坡和南非軍事演習、德國總理和法國總統的訪問以及中國國家主席習近平訪問俄羅斯和沙特阿拉伯隻是北京最近旋風外交的幾個例子。

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盡管西方領導人談到與中國脫鉤或降低經濟關係的風險，但中國仍然與世界經濟緊密相連，是120多個國家的最大貿易夥伴。

中國孤軍奮戰的日子已經一去不複返了，中國政府似乎滿足於默默旁觀世界事務。現在，北京正在努力爭取與其世界第二大經濟體地位相匹配的外交地位。

在聯合國紀念中華人民共和國加入聯合國 50 周年會議上，習近平發表講話，談到中國的外交崛起，並談到北京致力於建立以追求和平、民主和人權以及拒絕單邊主義、外國幹涉和強權政治為特征的世界秩序。

3 月中旬，在北京舉行的全球政黨對話會上，習近平重申了他對同一原則的承諾。

習近平在主旨演講中介紹了全球文明倡議 (GCI)，作為將這些原則正式化的一種方式，其附加目的是鼓勵各國“充分利用其曆史和文化的相關性”和“欣賞不同文明的價值觀，避免將自己的價值觀或模式強加於他人”。

連同此前提出的全球發展倡議（GDI）和全球安全倡議（GSI），全球倡議似乎囊括了中國國家主席對新國際秩序的總體願景——盡管內容不明確。

姚元葉在美國聖托馬斯大學教授中國研究。他認為，這樣的秩序將部分取代國際體係，部分重塑國際體係，使其成為一套更符合中國共產黨世界觀的新結構。

“這將是一個不會限製共產主義中國，反而會促進其崛起的世界秩序，”他說。

另一種說法
3 月份對話會的目的在某種程度上是充當中國對美國民主峰會的回應，美國在當月第二次舉行民主峰會，旨在團結世界民主國家。

雖然蒙古、塞爾維亞和南非的領導人都受邀參加這兩次活動，但美國峰會主要邀請了華盛頓的傳統盟友，而北京的峰會則邀請了哈薩克斯坦、俄羅斯、蘇丹和委內瑞拉的領導人。

中國領導人和官方媒體將中共的對話會議描繪成中國擁抱世界各國願景的一部分，其中包括與俄羅斯和緬甸等國家保持甚至深化外交聯係。

近幾個月來，中國政府確實表現出了與各種世界參與者接觸的意願。

題為“中國現代化與世界”的論壇大廳。兩塊大屏幕上播放著習近平的正式肖像

中國外交部長秦剛於 4 月在上海舉行的中國現代化與世界論壇上宣讀習近平的一封信 [檔案：Ng Han Guan/美聯社照片]

中國外交在 3 月伊朗與沙特阿拉伯關係緩和中發揮了作用。同樣在 3 月，中國外交部長訪問了緬甸政變領導人敏昂萊，而習近平則前往莫斯科會見了俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京。

4 月，習近平與烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基通了電話，上個月，他的特使試圖為北京主導的結束俄羅斯在烏克蘭戰爭的計劃爭取支持。北京也被認為是潛在的

衝突肆虐的蘇丹的和平斡旋人。

位於北京的全球化研究中心高級研究員安迪·莫克表示，中國處理國際關係的方式是“和而不同”的心態。

“它更多地由共同的未來定義，而不是共同的價值觀定義，”他告訴半島電視台。

這意味著，盡管西方國家有時會以遵守一套價值觀為條件進行互動和合作，但中國希望將其參與建立在發展潛力和未來利益的基礎上，莫克說。

這項政策在很大程度上遵循了中共的信念，即發展和繁榮不一定會導致采納這些所謂的西方價值觀。中國領導層經常批評“某些國家”將自己的原則強加於其他國家，不尊重具有不同文化和傳統的非西方國家的管理方式。

莫克認為，北京的世界秩序將由多極化定義，他說中國沒有成為主導大國的計劃。

“我不認為世界秩序的改變是新老板簡單地取代舊老板的情況。”

重新配置現有的世界秩序

中國政府表示，盡管中國領導層經常反對強加西方價值觀，但這並不意味著北京希望在全球舞台上拋棄民主、人權和法治。

習近平今年 3 月訪問莫斯科時，與俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京一起為兩國關係日益密切幹杯 [資料圖：Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik via AP Photo]

習近平以中國為例，聲稱中國是“民主的”，因為中共和國家代表人民，代表人民管理國家，促進人民的意願。中國官方媒體堅稱，自由民主國家“僅僅”根據選舉周期來衡量民主，忽視了人民的需求。

北京還指出，其扶貧和抗擊 COVID-19 戰略是政府致力於人權的例子。

“他們認為這些價值觀是相對的，並在他們自己的觀點中提供了更具包容性的定義，免於饑餓和免於生命恐懼的自由被視為更基本的人權的例子，”莫說。

現代對人權的理解可以追溯到《世界人權宣言》（UDHR），其中詳細列出了一係列基本權利和自由，這些權利和自由被視為固有的、不可剝奪的和適用於所有人的。

這些權利在聯合國成立初期通過，被載入國際體係的基礎。從那時起，《世界人權宣言》催生了 70 多項人權條約，其中許多條約已由中國簽署和批準。

因此，人權組織人權觀察（HRW）亞洲部主任伊萊恩·皮爾森表示，試圖重新解釋人權和民主的語言並非一件可以掉以輕心的事情。

皮爾森告訴半島電視台：“各國不能隨心所欲地重新定義人權。”
“極權主義的朝鮮也自稱朝鮮民主主義人民共和國——光說不做是不行的。”

人權觀察在 2020 年警告說，北京試圖在聯合國內部推動變革，不僅試圖重新定義既定原則，還阻礙調查和淡化對世界各地侵犯人權行為的譴責。

中國政府的努力正值國際非政府組織和聯合國機構對中國侵犯基本自由和權利表示深切關注之際。

北京對這種擔憂進行了反擊。

去年，聯合國發布了一份報告，詳述了中國政府可能對西部新疆地區以穆斯林為主的維吾爾族人犯下的“反人類罪”，北京對此作出了回應。它指責美國和其他西方國家的所謂反華勢力假裝關心人權，並聲稱他們想利用維吾爾問題“破壞新疆穩定並壓製中國”。
然而，聯合國人權理事會 10 月份就該問題進行辯論的投票以微弱優勢被否決。

投票結束後，人權組織大赦國際指責理事會未能堅持其核心使命：保護世界各地人權侵犯的受害者。

挪威國防研究所中國關係教授利塞洛特·奧德加德告訴半島電視台：“近年來，中國政府的全球影響力不斷增強，並能夠將這種影響力轉化為對既定國際機構的更大影響力。”

此外，北京還利用其在聯合國安理會的否決權，阻止譴責緬甸軍事政變的決議和聲明，並阻止對朝鮮實施新的製裁，同時棄權譴責俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭。

此外

在傳統全球機構中擁有更大發言權的同時，北京還建立了新機構，以提升其作為國際參與者的信譽。
上海合作組織、金磚國家新開發銀行（NDB）、亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB）和絲路基金均由中國牽頭，總部設在中國，被稱為聯合國、世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織等現有全球機構的替代品。

但聖托馬斯大學的葉教授表示，這些機構不應被視為北京試圖取代現有的國際機構。

正如聯合國的案例所顯示的那樣，北京也投入了相當大的精力來重塑既有的機構。與此同時，中國是聯合國第二大資金捐助國，也是安理會僅有的五個擁有永久否決權的成員之一。

“我們看到北京在既有結構內部和外部開展工作，這取決於哪種方式最有利於實現他們的目標，”葉教授說。

追求中國夢
最終目標是實現中華民族的複興，即中國夢——這是習近平主席執政初期就與他密切相關的願景。

中國夢代表著北京尋求恢複其威望——19 世紀末和 20 世紀初帝國主義列強在“百年屈辱”中造成的損害——並在 2049 年前將中國變成一個先進的、世界領先的國家。

這包括發展中國國內事務，同時也將中華人民共和國的領土擴展到目前不受其直接控製但仍被視為中華民族不可分割的部分的地區。

這包括與印度和不丹陸地邊界沿線的有爭議領土、日本在東海管理的尖閣諸島（中國稱為釣魚島）以及文萊、馬來西亞、菲律賓和越南有競爭主張的南海大部分地區。

然而，最重要的是，中國的複興意味著與台灣統一，北京不排除使用武力實現這一目標。
當中國軍隊在台灣周圍進行大規模演習或中國船隻在南海攔截其他國家船隻時，北京辯稱，這些行為並沒有違反中國的國際承諾，而是中國維護對理應屬於中華民族的領土主權的例子。

在世界舞台上，中國政府一再譴責侵犯國家主權、外國幹涉別國內政和單方麵使用經濟製裁的行為。

但與此同時，它保留無視與其相悖的國際裁決的權利——例如 2016 年國際法庭裁定其對南海的曆史性主張“沒有法律依據”——並對那些被認為阻礙北京實現民族複興的人采取行動。

2021 年，立陶宛允許在維爾紐斯開設“台灣代表處”，而不是通常的“台北經濟文化辦事處”，這讓北京大為惱火。立陶宛認為這種命名慣例是在鼓勵台灣獨立，因此對這個波羅的海國家實施了嚴厲的經濟製裁。

這是一個模式窗口。

但即使北京宣稱自己和其他國家“不幹涉”，它自己也被指控幹涉國外事務。

在加拿大，一份泄露的情報報告於 5 月初披露，據稱中國當局在一名加拿大議員及其家人在香港發起一項成功的議案後，參與了一場恐嚇活動，該議案宣布中國對維吾爾族人的待遇是種族滅絕。

此前，加拿大情報泄露事件導致有人指控北京試圖幹涉 2019 年和 2021 年的加拿大大選，以確保反北京候選人落敗。

中國外交人員還被指控幹涉丹麥選舉，而英國第二大城市曼徹斯特的領事人員被指控使用暴力擾亂中國領事館外的示威活動。

在所有這些案件中，中國官員都否認參與任何形式的幹預，而是聲稱有“隱藏議程”的勢力在“編造謊言”來“抹黑”中國。與此同時，中國政府表示，它保留捍衛主權和打擊那些試圖幹涉中國內政的人的權利。

據稱，習近平去年在與美國總統拜登的電話中談到美國與台灣的接觸時說：“玩火者自焚。”

Living the 'Chinese Dream'  Beijing's new world order

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/6/living-the-chinese-dream-beijings-new-world-order

As Beijing boosts its diplomatic clout, analysts say it wants to “remould” and even supplant existing global institutions.

XI Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, on the red carpet at the bottom of the steps outside the Great Hall of the People. There are three soldiers in ceremonial dress half way up the steps behind them.

China's President Xi Jinping has stepped up diplomacy since the removal of COVID-19 curbs last year [File: Thomas Peter/Pool via Reuters]

By Frederik Kelter  6 Jun 2023 

Ever since China abandoned its zero-COVID policy at the end of last year, Beijing has been involved in a flurry of engagements from East to West.

A summit in India’s Goa, military drills in Singapore and South Africa, visits by the German chancellor and the French president as well as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own visits to Russia and Saudi Arabia are just a few examples of Beijing’s recent whirlwind diplomacy.

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And while Western leaders have talked about decoupling or de-risking economic ties with China, the nation remains deeply integrated with the world economy and is the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.

Long gone are the days when China was an isolated loner or the Chinese government seemed satisfied with observing world affairs quietly from the sidelines. Now, Beijing is reaching for the diplomatic status that matches its position as the world’s second-biggest economy.

In a speech at a United Nations conference held to mark the 50-year anniversary of the People’s Republic of China’s joining the UN, Xi addressed China’s diplomatic rise and spoke of Beijing’s commitment to a world order defined by the pursuit of peace, democracy and human rights as well as the rejection of unilateralism, foreign interference and power politics.

In mid-March, at a so-called dialogue meeting between global political parties in Beijing, Xi reinforced his commitment to the same principles.

In his keynote speech, Xi introduced the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) as a way of formalising these principles with the added purpose of encouraging countries to “fully harness the relevance of their histories and cultures” and “appreciate the perceptions of values by different civilizations and refrain from imposing their own values or models on others”.

With the previously proposed Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI), the GCI appears to encapsulate – although in amorphous terms – much of the Chinese president’s overall vision for a new international order.

Yao Yuan Yeh teaches Chinese Studies at the University of St Thomas in the United States. According to him, such an order would partly supplant and partly remould the international system into a new set of structures that better align with the worldview of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

“It would be a world order that does not constrain communist China but contributes to its rise,” he said.

An alternative narrative

The purpose of the dialogue meeting in March was, to some extent, to act as a Chinese counterpart to the Summit for Democracy that the United States held for a second time that month as part of an effort to rally the world’s democracies.

While leaders from Mongolia, Serbia and South Africa were invited to both events, the US summit mostly included traditional Washington allies, while the gathering in Beijing included leaders from Kazakhstan, Russia, Sudan and Venezuela.

The Chinese leadership and state media portrayed the CCP’s dialogue meeting as part of China’s vision of embracing countries across the world, which includes maintaining or even deepening diplomatic contact with nations like Russia and Myanmar.

The Chinese government’s willingness to engage with a variety of world actors has indeed been on display in recent months.

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang reads a letter from Xi Jinping at the Chinese Modernization and the World Forum in Shanghai in April [File: Ng Han Guan/AP Photo]

Chinese diplomacy played a role in the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March. Also in March, the Chinese foreign minister visited Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, while Xi travelled to Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In April, Xi held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and, last month, his envoy attempted to build support for a Beijing-led plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing has also been mentioned as a potential peace broker in conflict-ravaged Sudan.

Andy Mok, a senior research fellow at the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, says the Chinese approach to international relations is defined by a live-and-let-live mindset.

“It is less defined by shared values and more defined by a shared future,” he told Al Jazeera.

That means that while Western countries sometimes condition interactions and cooperation on adherence to a set of values, China wants to base its engagements on the potential for development and future benefits, Mok said.

The policy largely follows a CCP conviction that development and prosperity do not have to lead to adopting these – so-called Western – values. The Chinese leadership has frequently criticised “certain countries” for supposedly imposing their principles onto others and lacking respect for the ways non-Western nations with different cultures and traditions run their affairs.

Beijing’s world order would be defined by multipolarity, according to Mok, who says China has no plan to be a dominant power.

“I don’t see a change in the world order being a case of a new boss simply replacing the old boss.”

Reconfiguring the existing world order

Although the Chinese leadership regularly opposes the imposition of Western values, this does not mean Beijing wants to discard democracy, human rights and the rule of law on the global stage, according to the Chinese government.

Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin toasted an ever-closer relationship between their two countries when Xi travelled to Moscow in March [File: Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik via AP Photo]

Using China as an example, Xi has claimed that China is “democratic” because the CCP and the state represent the people and run the country on behalf of the people to promote the will of the people. Chinese state media have insisted that liberal democracies neglect the needs of the people by measuring democracy “only” on the basis of electoral cycles.

Beijing also points to its poverty alleviation and strategy against COVID-19 as examples of the government’s commitment to human rights.

“They see these values as more relative terms and have in their own view provided a more inclusive definition of them with freedom from hunger and freedom from fear for your life being seen as examples of more basic human rights,” Mok said.

The modern understanding of human rights can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which details a set of basic rights and freedoms seen as inherent, inalienable and applicable to all people.

Adopted in the early years of the UN, the rights were enshrined into the foundation of the international system. Since then, more than 70 human rights treaties have sprouted from the UDHR, many of which have been signed and ratified by China.

Trying to reinterpret the language on human rights and democracy is therefore not something to be taken lightly, according to Elaine Pearson, the director of the Asia division of the rights organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW).

“It is not up to individual states to redefine human rights as they like,” Pearson told Al Jazeera.

“Totalitarian North Korea also calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea – simply saying something doesn’t make it true.”

HRW warned in 2020 that Beijing was trying to bring about change within the UN, not only by trying to redefine established principles but also by hampering investigations and diluting condemnations of human rights abuses around the world.

Its efforts come at a time when international NGOs and UN bodies have expressed deep concern about the violation of basic freedoms and rights in China.

Beijing has fired back at such concerns.

When a UN report was released last year detailing possible “crimes against humanity” by the Chinese state against the mostly Muslim Uighurs in the far western Xinjiang region, Beijing responded with a report of its own. It accused alleged anti-China forces in the US and other Western countries of feigning concern for human rights and claimed they wanted to use the Uighur issue to “destabilise Xinjiang and suppress China”.

A vote in October at the UN’s Human Rights Council to debate the issue, however, was narrowly defeated.

Following the vote, human rights group Amnesty International accused the council of failing to uphold its core mission: protecting the victims of human rights violations everywhere.

“The Chinese government has gained more global influence in recent years and has been able to turn that influence into a greater sway at established international institutions,” Liselotte Odgaard, a professor of China Relations at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, told Al Jazeera.

Additionally, Beijing has used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block resolutions and statements condemning the military coup in Myanmar and hinder new sanctions on North Korea, while abstaining from condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Besides developing a greater say in traditional global institutions, Beijing has also founded new institutions to further its credibility as an international player.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund have all been spearheaded by China, have headquarters in China and have been called alternatives to established global institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

But they should not necessarily be seen as an attempt by Beijing to replace existing international institutions, according to St Thomas’s Yeh.

As UN cases show, Beijing has channelled considerable effort into reshaping established institutions as well. At the same time, China is the second-biggest donor of funds to the UN and one of only five members of the security council with permanent veto powers.

“We are seeing Beijing working both inside and outside established structures, depending on what is most conducive to their goals,” said Yeh.

Pursuing the Chinese Dream

The ultimate goal is achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation also known as the Chinese Dream – a vision closely associated with President Xi since his early days in office.

The Chinese Dream represents Beijing’s quest to regain its prestige – damaged in the ‘Century of Humiliation’ by the imperial powers in the late 19th and early 20th century – and turn China into an advanced, world-leading nation by 2049.

This includes developing China internally but also expanding the territory under the PRC into areas currently beyond its direct control that are nonetheless considered inalienable parts of the Chinese nation.

This includes disputed territory along the land border with India and Bhutan, the Senkaku islands (that China calls Diaoyudao) administered by Japan in the East China Sea as well as most of the South China Sea where Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have rival claims.

Above all else, however, China’s rejuvenation means unification with Taiwan and Beijing has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this goal.

When the Chinese military conducts large-scale exercises around Taiwan or when Chinese vessels intercept ships from other countries in the South China Sea, Beijing argues these are not breaches of China’s international pledges but examples of China upholding sovereignty over territory that rightfully belongs to the Chinese nation.

On the world stage, the Chinese government has repeatedly condemned violations of national sovereignty, foreign interference in other nations’ affairs and the unilateral use of economic sanctions.

But at the same time, it reserves the right to look past international rulings that go against it – such as the 2016 international court ruling that its historic claim to the South China Sea had “no legal basis” – and take action against those perceived to stand between Beijing and its path towards national rejuvenation.

When Lithuania in 2021 allowed the opening of a “Taiwan Representative Office” rather than the usual “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office” in Vilnius, Beijing was furious. Seeing such a naming convention as encouraging Taiwanese independence, it imposed severe economic sanctions on the Baltic state.

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But even as Beijing touts “non-interference” for itself and others, it has itself been accused of engaging in interference abroad.

 

In Canada, a leaked intelligence report revealed in early May that Chinese authorities had allegedly been involved in an intimidation campaign against a Canadian MP and his family in Hong Kong after he sponsored a successful motion declaring the Chinese treatment of the Uighurs a genocide.

Previous Canadian intelligence leaks have led to allegations that Beijing attempted to interfere in the Canadian general elections of 2019 and 2021 to secure the defeat of anti-Beijing candidates.

Chinese diplomatic staff have also been accused of election interference in Denmark, while consular staff in Manchester, England’s second-biggest city, were accused of employing physical violence to disrupt a demonstration outside the Chinese consulate.

In all these cases, Chinese officials have denied engaging in any sort of tampering, claiming instead that forces with “hidden agendas” were “fabricating lies” to “smear” China. At the same time, the Chinese government says it reserves the right to defend its sovereignty and act against those that attempt to interfere in China’s domestic matters.

As Xi allegedly told US President Biden regarding US engagement with Taiwan during a phone call last year: “Those that play with fire get burned.”