數十億美元給烏克蘭 日本給俄羅斯造成了毀滅性的打擊

日本剛剛給俄羅斯造成了毀滅性的打擊！

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eHRi4fJA6s

軍事秀 2024年9月14日

在本視頻中，我們探討了日本在烏克蘭衝突期間在反對俄羅斯方麵日益增強的作用。日本曾經猶豫不決是否直接參與外國衝突，現在卻是烏克蘭的主要財政支持者，提供了數十億美元的援助。我們將介紹日本通過一項新的投資條約對俄羅斯造成的最新打擊，研究其在北方領土問題上的長期緊張局勢，並質疑日本是否會很快通過提供軍事援助來升級其參與程度。觀看視頻以了解日本對普京不斷變化的立場。
俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京正處於危機模式。經過大約兩年半的戰鬥，他的軍隊仍然無法占領烏克蘭。事實上，每獲得一塊領土，烏克蘭的反應就更加激烈。對普京來說更糟糕的是，這種反應越來越多地得到了世界其他國家的支持。數千億美元的軍事援助已經送往烏克蘭，並承諾將提供更多援助。此外，普京現在必須麵對這樣一個事實：他的行動已導致許多北約成員國采取措施重新武裝自己，為可能與俄羅斯發生的衝突做好準備。這並非吞並烏克蘭的預期結果。俄羅斯預計會在幾周內攻占該國，西方甚至沒有機會做出反應。但這並沒有發生。不過，至少普京需要擔心的隻是西方，對吧？俄羅斯的宿敵為烏克蘭辯護並不奇怪。對普京來說，這隻是西方試圖通過集體幹涉與其無關的事情來對世界其他國家施加地緣政治控製的另一個例子。隻不過，反對俄羅斯的不僅僅是西方。自烏克蘭戰爭爆發以來，日本不僅將自己定位為烏克蘭的合作夥伴，而且越來越成為俄羅斯的敵人。現在，日本又一次對普京的野心造成了毀滅性的打擊，隨著其內部政策的進一步變化，可能會成為俄羅斯總統的更大眼中釘。這讓我們看到了這段視頻。我們將深入探討日本對俄羅斯造成的最新毀滅性打擊，並探索日本為反對普京政權所做的一切。在我們探討關於日本處理烏克蘭衝突的關鍵爭論之前，您還將了解為什麽會發生這一切。但首先是毀滅性的打擊。2024 年 2 月，日本和烏克蘭官員舉行會議，討論一項新的投資條約，該條約本質上可以作為日本向烏克蘭注入資金的一種方式，即使它麵臨俄羅斯的持續轟炸。在這些條約談判中，日本重申了它在衝突開始時做出的繼續為重建烏克蘭提供支持的承諾。這些會談非常富有成效。日本首相岸田文雄宣布了一項雙邊稅收協定，兩國將製定一套防止企業和個人雙重征稅的稅收規則。換句話說，想要向烏克蘭投資的日本投資者不再需要擔心被日本和烏克蘭同時征稅。雖然這看起來微不足道，但它表明日本正越來越致力於幫助烏克蘭，讓其投資者更容易在該國消費。烏克蘭迫切需要這筆錢來重建和資助與俄羅斯的鬥爭。日本將通過放寬簽證管製來支持這些新的稅收規則——再次讓日本投資者更容易進入烏克蘭並在那裏投資——此外還將為烏克蘭的日本風險投資國家提供更多支持。盡管岸田當時沒有提供更多細節，但烏克蘭外長丹尼斯·什米哈爾 (Denys Shmyhal) 後來在社交媒體平台 Telegram 上發帖稱，日本將製定一個由兩部分組成的計劃，通過該計劃，它將為在烏克蘭工作的日本投資者提供 13.5 億美元的支持。隨著時間的推移，這 13.5 億美元可能會變成數十億美元，烏克蘭可以用這些錢來資助其戰爭努力和未來的重建。據什米哈爾稱，新的稅收協定還為豐田和本田等日本主要汽車製造商在烏克蘭開設工廠打開了大門。同樣，這些生產設施麵向未來，為戰後的烏克蘭人提供工作，同時展示了國際公司與烏克蘭做生意的意願遠高於與俄羅斯。這對普京來說是毀滅性的打擊。這並不是日本近幾個月來遭受的唯一打擊。據美國之音報道，截至2024年2月，日本已經向烏克蘭提供了100億美元的援助。值得注意的是，這些援助既是人道主義援助，也是金融援助。

而不是許多其他國家提供的軍事援助。在烏克蘭和日本首相會晤後，還透露日本已承諾再提供 120 億美元的財政援助，其中 47 億美元將於 2024 年 2 月底前抵達烏克蘭。這使得日本成為世界上向烏克蘭提供財政援助最多的五個國家之一，僅落後於美國、德國、英國和各歐盟機構。日本向普京傳達的信息很明確——東京支持烏克蘭。如果普京沒有從這一係列新的財政承諾中得到這一信息，那麽當岸田文雄於 2024 年 4 月 11 日站在美國國會麵前發表演講時，他肯定會得到這一信息。當天，岸田告訴國會，美國在全球舞台上的領導地位是“不可或缺的”，這強化了日本對普京認為的西方全球霸權的承諾。岸田還尖銳地告訴在場的人：“正如我常說的，今天的烏克蘭可能是明天的東亞”，然後進一步稱讚美國不僅為烏克蘭而且為印度太平洋地區提供的支持。他將普京的“特別軍事行動”描述為“來自莫斯科的猛攻”，並詢問如果沒有美國的幹預，印度太平洋國家（包括日本）多久會麵臨同樣嚴峻的現實。岸田在演講的最後對普京說了一句簡單的話：“日本將繼續與烏克蘭站在一起。”如果普京認為他有希望修複與日本的關係，至少在烏克蘭戰爭仍在進行期間，這些話就終結了這種想法。但事實上，兩國關係幾十年來一直緊張，日本宣布向烏克蘭提供更多經濟援助隻是迄今為止一係列分歧中的最新一個。分歧包括圍繞一小片島嶼的爭端，俄羅斯稱之為千島群島，日本稱之為北方領土。二戰後，蘇聯占領了這些島嶼，這些島嶼距離日本最北端的北海道東北僅 810 英裏。自那以後，這一占領一直存在爭議，路透社指出，由於日本和俄羅斯對這些島嶼的立場不同，二戰期間的敵對狀態仍未結束。由於俄羅斯最近的行動，這些立場變得更加堅定。據戰略與國際研究中心 (CSIS) 稱，2010 年代初，俄羅斯似乎即將把北方領土交還給日本。CSIS 稱，這種可能性實際上對日本的外交政策產生了影響，因為前首相安倍晉三在其任期內大部分時間都在努力改善日俄關係，以創造足夠的善意，從而達成協議。外交談判、聯合旅遊項目，甚至日本對俄羅斯當地經濟發展的投資都源於這種方法。但俄羅斯基本上把所有這些善意都拋在一邊。自 2015 年以來，俄羅斯一直在穩步增加其在北方領土的軍事存在，衛星圖像顯示普京一直在建設基礎設施，CSIS 聲稱這些基礎設施距離北海道隻有 14 英裏。這些發展包括在國後島建造可容納 7,000 人居住的兵營，並在島上儲存 Bal 反艦導彈 (ASM)。該島的最南端距離日本領土僅 10 英裏。類似的發展包括在 Etorofu 建造兵營和安裝 Bastion ASM——距離日本領土僅 50 英裏——以及擴建基地和在 Paramushiri 建造俄羅斯機場。該島距離日本僅 380 英裏。Bal 和 Bastion ASM 的射程在 185 至 310 英裏之間，這導致俄羅斯向日本發出了一個信息，即如果日本願意，它可以襲擊北海道附近的任何船隻。整個 2010 年代，緊張局勢不斷加劇。隨後俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，日本向外界表明，它不會被普京的侵略行為嚇倒。盡管俄羅斯的威脅越來越大，日本仍持續向烏克蘭提供經濟援助。此外，日本是首批與美國和七國集團（G7，世界七大經濟強國的集合）其他成員國協調實施懲罰性製裁的國家之一。這些最初的製裁包括資產凍結、限製 Swift 支付訪問以及限製各種受控物品的進出口。隨後又實施了更多製裁。4 月2022 年，日本撤銷了俄羅斯的“最惠國”地位。實施了更多資產凍結和出口禁令，包括禁止俄羅斯進口奢侈品。即使在 2024 年，日本仍在繼續加強製裁。2024 年 2 月，日本與 G7 一起對俄羅斯石油設定了價格上限，3 月、4 月和 6 月還將實施更多資產凍結和出口禁令。日本還以其他方式表達了對烏克蘭的支持。例如，據 CSIS 稱，岸田文雄在 2023 年擔任 G7 主席，他利用這一職位確保全球關注俄羅斯在烏克蘭的行動。他的行動包括 2023 年 3 月訪問基輔——這是日本領導人自二戰以來首次訪問活躍衝突地區。巧合的是，普京訪問基輔的時間恰逢中國國家主席習近平在莫斯科舉行峰會，這兩件事似乎是四國之間劃清界限的標誌。岸田的戰時訪問也標誌著日本傳統的突破，日本過去通常專注於外交，而不是直接支持衝突雙方。日本不再置身於戰爭之外。通過岸田，烏克蘭也有機會與亞洲國家建立關係，否則它可能不會與這些國家合作。例如，2023 年 5 月，日本首相邀請烏克蘭總統澤連斯基參加 G7 峰會，岸田還邀請了印度、非洲聯盟和東南亞國家聯盟的代表參加。這對普京來說是又一次打擊，因為他看到他目前的對手正在與他想討好的國家進行外交對話。因此，我們看到日本對俄羅斯的最新打擊——承諾持續提供數十億美元的財政援助——實際上是日本在幾次外交打擊之後最大的打擊。所有這些都讓我們不禁要問：為什麽日本現在選擇全力支持烏克蘭對抗俄羅斯？部分原因已經得到解釋。日本與俄羅斯的關係一直存在一定程度的緊張，即使在日本試圖伸出外交橄欖枝的時期也是如此。普京通過軍事化北方領土，加劇了這種緊張局勢，將這些島嶼變成了對日本及其主權的真正威脅，即使我們忽略日本對這些島嶼的領土主張。然而，僅憑這些問題還不足以解釋日本從外交嚐試轉向全麵支持烏克蘭的緩慢轉變。還有其他因素在起作用。例如，日本的外交政策與過去幾十年不同。二戰後，日本決定在外交政策中采取和平主義和消極主義。我們看到，在與俄羅斯打交道時——直到最近兩年，兩國從未發生過衝突，即使俄羅斯聲稱擁有日本認為理應屬於它的領土。布魯金斯學會在一篇題為“日本外交政策的曆史參數”的文章中指出，這種方法對日本非常有利可圖。布雷頓森林體係的建立——要求貨幣與美元掛鉤——導致了長期的經濟成功。此外，布魯金斯學會聲稱，通過采取更為消極的角色，日本能夠經受住二戰以來印度太平洋和東亞地區出現的各種危機、革命和戰爭，在所有情況下幾乎都毫發無損。然而，國際形勢正在慢慢地將日本從其消極被動和和平主義政策中推開。自 2000 年以來，中國日益現代化就是其中之一，日本可能認為，隨著中國影響力的增強，日本正在逐漸失去其作為印度太平洋地區主要權力掮客之一的地位。中國影響力的增長也可以解釋日本對俄羅斯的態度——普京和習近平在許多方麵顯然是盟友。從前麵提到的峰會中可以明顯看出這一點。再加上俄羅斯對北方領土的軍事化，日本現在有兩個國家正在微妙地——有時不那麽微妙地——威脅其主權。麵對這些問題，日本需要改變其國家戰略。 CSIS 認為，這一變化實際上是 1991 年海灣戰爭期間開始的演變的結果。當時，日本嚴重依賴中東的石油進口，盡管它也貢獻了 130 億美元來支持在海灣作戰的聯軍。當時，日本的行動被批評為“金錢外交”，許多人想知道為什麽日本拒絕派出任何自己的軍隊來支持聯軍士兵。CSIS 指出，這種批評標誌著日本在國際合作理念上發生了變化。隨後幾年，日本與盟友建立並擴大了夥伴關係，並增加了國防開支。後一項努力最終導致日本內閣批準了該國有史以來最大的國防一攬子計劃。該計劃將使日本在 2024 年向其軍事投資 559 億美元，這一數字每年都在增加，直到 2027 年達到 625 億美元的峰值。再加上日本與美國和韓國簽署了三邊防禦協議——以及加強與北約、印度和澳大利亞的關係——你會發現一個正在改變外交政策的國家。在當前的全球格局下，被動是行不通的。CSIS 指出，這些方法的改變似乎得到了日本人民的普遍支持。例如，2022 年 3 月（即俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭一個月後）進行的一項調查顯示，77% 的日本公民認為國際社會需要團結起來，阻止俄羅斯入侵。受訪者擔心，如果他們不這樣做，俄羅斯強製實施的領土變化可能會為未來的變革嚐試鋪平道路，例如中國入侵台灣。這又回到了日本越來越擔心其他國家的權力鬥爭。俄羅斯占領烏克蘭將使中國更有信心在印度太平洋地區與台灣進行同樣的嚐試。因此，對於日本來說，成為阻止普京“特別軍事行動”的集體努力的一部分至關重要，因為這樣做意味著它可以證明成為未來阻止中國擴張的集體努力的一部分是合理的。這是政策的徹底轉變。這一轉變對普京打擊很大，他可能認為即使入侵烏克蘭，他也可以與日本保持友好關係。如果不是日本發生的另一場變化，這種情況可能就會發生：那些花了很長時間試圖與俄羅斯建立更牢固關係的政客正在逐漸老去。這是根據卡內基基金會 2023 年 10 月的一份報告得出的結論，該報告指出，即使日本表達了對烏克蘭的支持，該國國內的各種親俄遊說團體也成為頭條新聞。這些年長的政客聲稱北約對俄羅斯的反應是“挑釁性的”，烏克蘭的政策是錯誤的。然而，自 2010 年代日本的親俄政策達到頂峰以來，這些遊說團體變得越來越安靜。安倍晉三遇刺是這一轉變的導火索。這位經常稱普京為“親愛的弗拉基米爾”的人，對日本在 2014 年吞並克裏米亞後未能對俄羅斯實施製裁負有責任。他還在 2016 年製定了加強日俄經濟合作的計劃。卡內基基金會表示，即使他在 2020 年辭去首相一職，他在日本自民黨內的影響力也可能導致更多的親俄政策。安倍於 2022 年 7 月遇刺意味著普京失去了他最大的日本盟友。他還不得不眼睜睜地看著其他盟友，如前首相鳩山由紀夫和森喜朗，已經太老了，無法對日本政策產生任何真正的影響。他們現在已經退休了。日本政壇中另一位親普京的人物——鈴木宗夫——是普京出任俄羅斯總統後接待的第一位外國政客。鈴木甚至在安倍領導下擔任俄羅斯政策的非官方顧問，這表明他與俄羅斯的關係變得多麽緊密。但鈴木現在正處於內部懷疑的陰影之下。2000 年代他因腐敗而入獄，這對他沒有幫助，自 2022 年 2 月以來，他為訪問俄羅斯所做的一切努力都被自己的政黨阻止了。日本新一代政客正在嶄露頭角。隨著老派的每一次離去，普京的影響力已經減弱到幾乎不可能與日本保持關係的地步。2024 年 6 月與朝鮮簽署共同防禦協定，本質上就是普京終結了重建這種關係的任何機會。對日本來說，這項協議隻不過是俄羅斯在北方領土的行動和與中國的結盟的又一個侵略跡象。畢竟，朝鮮是日本在印度洋-太平洋地區的另一個重大威脅，也是對日本韓國盟友的威脅。正如外交關係委員會所強調的那樣，與俄羅斯結盟使朝鮮更加危險，這進一步證實了岸田文雄的說法，即俄羅斯對烏克蘭的侵略不能被視為“歐洲獨有”的問題。所有這些都讓我們回到日本決定向烏克蘭提供更多經濟援助的問題。普京對這一強烈打擊的回應表明俄羅斯與日本的關係已經惡化到何種程度。2024 年 6 月，共同社報道了俄羅斯總統的評論，稱兩國之間的當前條件不利於他們回到談判桌上，為二戰後時代締結和平條約。日本可能會同意，盡管原因與普京所表達的不同。據普京稱，責任完全在於日本及其對烏克蘭的支持。“所做的一切都是日本做的，”普京聲稱，似乎無視——很可能是故意的——日本的決定受到他的行動和他的“特殊軍事行動”的影響。這些言論是在 2022 年 3 月與日本的和平協定談判暫停之後發表的。普京甚至走得更遠，聲稱他不會回避訪問北方四島，這實際上是在告訴日本，他很樂意通過加強這些島嶼作為俄羅斯島嶼的地位來煽動日本。從字裏行間我們可以看出，日本對烏克蘭的深化支持給普京帶來了沉重的打擊。他於 3 月結束和平條約談判並非巧合，而此時日本已經支持烏克蘭兩年了。承諾再提供 120 億美元援助似乎是壓垮他的最後一根稻草，這筆錢比以往任何時候都更清楚地表明，日本不再是俄羅斯的盟友。它是敵人。這種敵人身份引出了我們將在本視頻中提出的最後一個問題——日本的經濟援助承諾是否會變成軍事援助承諾？關於日本是否應該采取最後一步鞏固對烏克蘭的支持，爭論愈演愈烈。如果日本真的這麽做，對普京的打擊將比他過去兩年不得不眼睜睜看著的日俄關係惡化和日本的財政援助計劃加起來還要大。不過，日本仍然不願意提供武器……在一定程度上。事實上，日本已經找到了一些外交變通辦法，允許它間接向烏克蘭提供武器，而實際上自己並不提供。例如，它提供的數十億美元的財政援助似乎沒有任何條件，這意味著烏克蘭很可能自由地用這筆錢購買武器，如果它願意的話。至少，這筆援助有助於在烏克蘭經濟麵臨崩潰風險的時期維持其運轉。同樣，這可以幫助烏克蘭購買武器，並使其能夠保持其製造基地的運轉，以便製造自己的武器。更有趣的是，日本在武器部門找到了幾種變通辦法。例如，日經亞洲在 2024 年 7 月報道稱，日本已同意向美國出售價值 1900 萬美元的愛國者導彈，據稱是為了幫助美國補充其數量，此前美國已向烏克蘭提供了數百枚這種導彈。這些導彈係統一旦抵達華盛頓，美國如何使用它們沒有任何條件。日本向美國提供的愛國者係統最終落入烏克蘭手中的可能性很大——甚至很有可能，美國基本上充當中間人，這樣日本就不必直接交付武器。俄羅斯意識到了這一點。其外交部聲稱，日本導彈出現在烏克蘭將對俄羅斯與日本的關係產生“後果”。然而，鑒於這些關係的現狀，日本可能並不太擔心這些“後果”可能是什麽。
值得注意的是，日本已向烏克蘭提供了防護裝備作為其援助計劃的一部分。非致命裝備的交付——包括防彈衣、頭盔和大約 100 輛非軍用車輛——表明日本願意更直接地支持烏克蘭。不過，它對直接運送武器劃清了界限。一些人認為日本需要改變這一政策。
例如，《日本時報》 2023 年 4 月發表的一篇文章指出，日本是七國集團中唯一一個尚未直接向烏克蘭運送武器的國家。然而，同一篇報道指出，日本已經對其指導方針進行了修改，允許其進行前麵提到的頭盔、防彈衣和車輛捐贈。當時，雙方正在安排會談，討論進一步修改這些指導方針的可能性，這將允許日本向烏克蘭提供致命武器。這些談判並沒有帶來改變。然而，同一篇報道表明，日本國內越來越渴望該國采取更積極的立場。日本右翼民粹主義政黨日本維新會就體現了這種渴望。2023 年，該黨的參議院幹事長豬瀨直樹選擇派出 20 名皮卡前往烏克蘭。

一輛裝滿罐頭食品和其他補給品的卡車運往烏克蘭。他用黨員津貼的一部分支付了這筆費用，同時傳達了關於運送的信息：“隻要這些皮卡車不用來運輸機槍，就不會有問題。接收方是否以這種方式使用它們取決於他們。隻要我們自己不帶著這種意圖提供卡車，我們就沒問題。”換句話說，日本可能在一年多後對愛國者導彈係統進行補充時采取同樣的做法。其他人則認為，日本可能不會直接運送武器，因為它國內存在武器短缺。其中一位是築波大學研究烏克蘭戰爭的教授東野敦子。她支持日本向烏克蘭運送愛國者導彈，但她也認為，近期內不太可能實現這種運送，因為日本在國防係統方麵仍存在“嚴重赤字”。最近的軍事預算批準可能會糾正這一赤字。也許，一旦日本認為自己有能力在印度太平洋地區抵禦俄羅斯和中國，未來日本就會向烏克蘭提供更多直接軍事援助。至少，它在 2024 年 2 月承諾的 120 億美元將對普京造成嚴重打擊，無論是增加對烏克蘭的支持，還是進一步破壞俄羅斯與日本的關係。如果日本選擇開始運送武器，那麽這一打擊將隨之而來，表明日本真正反對俄羅斯的意圖。而且不僅在烏克蘭，而且在擴大其在印度太平洋地區的影響力以及軍事化北方領土方麵也同樣如此。但您怎麽看？日本是否越來越接近開始向烏克蘭運送武器的地步，還是仍然固守其消極政策而無法這樣做？如果日本越過這條線，不僅僅是向烏克蘭提供經濟援助，您認為俄羅斯會作何反應？請在評論部分分享您的想法，感謝您觀看此視頻。現在去看看澳大利亞剛剛給俄羅斯帶來了沉重打擊！或者點擊這個其他視頻！

Japan Just Dealt Russia a DEVASTATING Blow!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eHRi4fJA6s
The Military Show  2024年9月14日

In this video, we explore Japan’s growing role in opposing Russia during the Ukraine conflict. Japan, once hesitant to engage directly in foreign conflicts, is now a key financial supporter of Ukraine, providing billions in aid. We’ll cover the latest blow Japan has dealt to Russia with a new investment treaty, examine its long-standing tensions over the Northern Territories, and question whether Japan may soon escalate its involvement by providing military aid. Watch to understand Japan’s evolving stance against Putin.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is in crisis  mode. After approximately two and a half years of fighting, his military still hasn’t been able  to take Ukraine. In fact, for every territorial gain comes an even fiercer Ukrainian response.  Worse yet for Putin, that response is increasingly being backed by the rest of the world. Hundreds of  billions of dollars in military aid have been sent to Ukraine, with commitments being made for many  billions more. Plus, Putin now has to face up to the fact that his actions have resulted in many  NATO members taking steps to rearm themselves so that they’re prepared for a possible conflict with  Russia. This was not how the annexation of Ukraine was supposed to go. Russia anticipated storming  in and taking the country in a matter of weeks,with the West not even having a chance to respond.  That didn’t happen. Still, at least it’s just the West Putin has to worry about, right? It’s no  surprise that Russia’s age-old enemy has come to Ukraine’s defense. To Putin, this is just  another example of the West trying to exert geopolitical control over the rest of the world  by sticking its collective nose into business with which it has nothing to do. Except it’s not just  the West that opposes Russia. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Japan has positioned itself as  not only a partner to Ukraine but an increasingly viable enemy to Russia. Now, the country has dealt  another devastating blow to Putin’s ambitions and, with further changes to its internal policy,  could become an even bigger thorn in the Russian  
president’s side. That brings us to this video.  We’re going to dig into the latest devastating blow Japan has dealt to Russia, along with  exploring everything else Japan is doing to oppose Putin’s regime. You’ll also learn why all  of this is happening in the first place before we explore the key debate that rages about Japan’s  approach to the Ukraine conflict. But first – the devastating blow. In February 2024, officials from  Japan and Ukraine met to discuss a new investment treaty that could essentially act as a way for  Japan to funnel money into Ukraine even as it faces constant bombardment from Russia. During  those treaty negotiations, Japan reaffirmed a vow it made at the beginning of the conflict to  continue providing support to reconstruct Ukraine.  
Those talks were extremely productive. Japan’s  Prime Minister – Fumio Kishida – announced a  
bilateral tax treaty, in which both countries  will codify a set of tax rules that prevent double  
taxation of companies and individuals. In other  words, Japanese investors who want to pour money  
into Ukraine no longer need to worry about being  taxed by both Japan and Ukraine. While this may  
seem small, it’s a sign that Japan is increasingly  committed to helping Ukraine by making it easier  
for its investors to spend money in the country.  Money that Ukraine sorely needs to rebuild and  
fund its fight against Russia. Japan will support  these new tax rules by easing visa controls –  
again, making it easier for Japanese investors  to enter and invest in Ukraine – in addition to  
providing more support to Japanese venture capital  countries in Ukraine. Though Kishida didn’t  
provide further details at the time, his Ukrainian  counterpart – Denys Shmyhal – later posted on the  
social media platform Telegram that Japan would  create a two-part program through which it would  
provide $1.35 billion in support to Japanese  investors working in Ukraine. That’s $1.35 billion  
that could turn into many more billions over time,  all money Ukraine can use to fund both its war  
effort and its future reconstruction. According  to Shmyhal, the new tax treaty also opens the door  
for major Japanese carmakers, such as Toyota  and Honda, to open factories in Ukraine. Again,  
these production facilities are future-focused,  providing work for Ukrainians after the war while  
showcasing how international companies are far  more willing to do business with Ukraine than  
they are with Russia. A devastating blow for  Putin. And it’s not the only blow that Japan  
has landed in recent months. According to Voice of  America, Japan had already provided $10 billion in  
aid to Ukraine as of February 2024. It’s important  to note that this aid has been both humanitarian  
and financial – not the type of military aid that  many other countries have provided. Following the  
conference between Ukraine and Japan’s Prime  Ministers, it was also revealed that Japan  
has pledged to provide a further $12 billion in  financial assistance, of which $4.7 billion would  
arrive in Ukraine by the end of February 2024.  That places Japan among the top five countries  
in the world in terms of providing financial aid  to Ukraine, only falling behind the U.S., Germany,  
the U.K., and various European Union institutions.  The message being delivered to Putin by Japan  
is clear – Tokyo supports Ukraine. And if Putin  hadn’t received that message from this new volley  
of financial commitments, he’d have certainly  gotten it when Fumio Kishida stood in front of  
the U.S. Congress to deliver a speech on April 11,  2024. On that day, Kishida told Congress that U.S.  
leadership on the global stage is “indispensable,”  reinforcing Japan’s commitment to what Putin  
would consider the Western global hegemony.  Pointedly, Kishida also told those assembled:  
“As I often say, Ukraine of today may be East Asia  of tomorrow,” before further lauding the U.S. for  
the support it provides not just to Ukraine but  the Indo-Pacific region. He characterized Putin’s  
“special military operation” as an “onslaught from  Moscow,” and asked how long it would be before  
countries in the Indo-Pacific – Japan included  – would face similarly harsh realities were it  
not for American intervention. Kishida wrapped  the speech up with a simple message to Putin:  
“Japan will continue to stand with Ukraine.”  If Putin believed he had any hope of repairing  
his relationship with Japan, at least while the  Ukraine war is ongoing, those even words put an  
end to that notion. But in truth, the relationship  between the two countries has been tense for  
decades, with Japan’s announcement of more  financial aid to Ukraine being just the latest  
in a series of disagreements that have built up  to this moment. Disagreements such as those over a  
small collection of islands that Russia calls the  Kurils and Japan dubs the Northern Territories. In  
the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union seized  these islands, which are just 810 miles northeast  
of the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido.  That seizure has been disputed ever since, with  
Reuters pointing out that World War II hostilities  between Japan and Russia have still not ended due  
to their differing stances on these islands.  These stances have only grown more resolute due  
to recent Russian actions. According to the Center  for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS,  
Russia appeared to be on the verge of handing  the Northern Territories back to Japan during  
the early 2010s. That possibility actually had an  impact on Japan’s foreign policy, claims CSIS, as  
former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spent much of his  tenure working to improve relations between Japan  
and Russia to create enough goodwill to enable an  agreement to be reached. Diplomatic talks, joint  
tourism projects, and even Japanese investment  in local Russian economic development all stemmed  
from this approach. But Russia essentially took  all of that goodwill and tossed it aside. Since  
2015, Russia has been steadily increasing its  military presence in the Northern Territories,  
with satellite imagery showing Putin has been  building infrastructure that CSIS claims reaches  
as close as 14 miles away from Hokkaido. These  developments include the building of barracks  
large enough to host a population of 7,000 on  Kunashiri, along with the storage of Bal anti-ship  
missiles, or ASMs, on the island. That island’s  southernmost point lies just 10 miles away from  
Japanese territory. Similar developments include  the construction of barracks and installation of  
Bastion ASMs on Etorofu – just 50 miles outside  Japanese territory – along with the expansion of  
a base and development of a Russian airfield on  Paramushiri. That island is just 380 miles from  
Japan. The Bal and Bastion ASMs have ranges  between 185 and 310 miles, leading to Russia  
essentially sending a message to Japan that it  could strike practically any ship near Hokkaido  
if it wished to do so. Tensions were being raised  throughout the 2010s. Then came Russia’s invasion  
of Ukraine, which led to Japan showing that it  wouldn’t be cowed by Putin’s aggression. Even with  
a growing Russian threat looming to its north,  Japan has consistently provided financial aid  
to Ukraine. Furthermore, the country was one of  the first to coordinate with the U.S. and other  
members of the Group of Seven, or G7, nations  – a collective of the world’s seven strongest  
economic powers – to implement punitive sanctions.  These initial sanctions included asset freezes,  
restrictions on Swift payment access, and  restrictions on the import and export of various  
controlled items. More sanctions have followed.  April 2022 saw Japan revoke Russia’s “most-favored  
nation” status. More asset freezes and export  bans were implemented, including bans on luxury  
goods from Russia. Even in 2024, Japan continues  to build on its sanctions. February 2024 saw it  
join with the G7 to place a price cap on Russian  oil, with even more asset freezes and export bans  
coming in March, April, and June. Japan has also  shown its support for Ukraine in other ways. For  
instance, Fumio Kishida was the president of the  G7 in 2023, a position he used to ensure that  
global attention remained on Russia’s actions in  Ukraine, according to CSIS. His actions included  
visiting Kyiv in March 2023 – the first time a  Japanese leader has visited an active conflict  
zone since World War II. Uncoincidentally, that  visit to Kyiv happened around the same time  
that Putin held a summit in Moscow with China’s  President Xi Jinping, with the two events seeming  
to be the drawing of lines in the sand between  the four nations. Kishida’s wartime visit also  
marked a break in Japanese tradition, in which  it generally focused on diplomacy rather than  
directly supporting sides in conflicts. Japan was  no longer keeping out of the war. Through Kishida,  
Ukraine has also been given an opportunity to  build relationships with Asian nations it may not  
have otherwise worked alongside. For instance, May  2023 saw Japan’s Prime Minister invite Ukraine’s  
President Volodymyr Zelensky to a G7 summit to  which Kishida has also invited representatives  
from India, the African Union, and the Association  of Southeast Nations. It was another blow to  
Putin, as he saw his current rival engaging in  diplomatic conversations with countries he would  
like to curry favor with. So, we see the latest  blow Japan has dealt to Russia – the promise of  
billions of dollars in ongoing financial aid –  is actually just the largest following several  
diplomatic jabs Japan has delivered. All of  this leads us to a question: Why has Japan  
chosen now to fully support Ukraine in its efforts  against Russia? Some of the reasons have already  
been explained. Japan’s relationship with Russia  has always featured a certain amount of tension,  
even during the periods when Japan was trying  to extend the diplomatic olive branch. Putin has  
only added to those tensions by militarizing  the Northern Territories, transforming the  
islands into very real threats to Japan and  its sovereignty even if we disregard Japan’s  
territorial claims on the islands. Nevertheless,  these issues alone wouldn’t be enough to explain  
Japan’s slow moving away from attempted diplomacy  to full-blown support for Ukraine. There are other  
factors at play. For instance, Japan is taking a  different approach to its foreign policy than it  
has in many decades. Following World War II,  Japan made the purposeful decision to focus  
on pacifism and passivism in its foreign policy.  We see that in its dealings with Russia – until  
the last two years, the nations never came to  blows even with Russia claiming territory that  
Japan believes rightfully belongs to it. In a  piece titled “Historical Parameters of Japanese  
Foreign Policy,” Brookings points out that this  approach has been extremely lucrative for Japan.  
The institution of the Bretton Woods system –  which required currencies to peg themselves to the  
U.S. dollar – led to extended periods of economic  success. Plus, by taking a more passive role,  
Brookings claims, Japan has been able to  weather the various crises, revolutions,  
and wars seen in the Indo-Pacific and East  Asia since World War II, coming out practically  
undamaged in all cases. However, international  circumstances are slowly pushing Japan away from  
its policies of passiveness and pacifism. The  increasing modernization of China since 2000 is  
one such issue, with Japan likely believing that  it’s slowly losing its position as one of the  
chief powerbrokers in the Indo-Pacific as China’s  influence grows. That growth in Chinese influence  
can also explain Japan’s approach to Russia –  Putin and Xi are clearly allies in many respects.  
That’s evident from the previously mentioned  summits. Couple that with Russia’s militarization  
of the Northern Territories and Japan now has two  countries that are subtly – and sometimes not so  
subtly – threatening its sovereignty. In the face  of these issues, Japan has needed to change its  
national strategy. According to CSIS, this change  is actually the result of an evolution that began  
during the Gulf War in 1991. At that time,  Japan heavily relied upon the Middle East for  
its oil imports, though it also contributed $13  billion to support the coalition forces fighting  
in the Gulf. At the time, Japan’s actions were  criticized as “checkbook diplomacy,” with many  
wondering why the country refused to dedicate  any of its own forces to support the coalition  
soldiers. CSIS notes that this criticism marked  a change in how Japan approached the concept of  
international cooperation. The years that followed  saw it forming and expanding partnerships with its  
allies, in addition to boosting its defense  spending. The latter efforts culminated in  
Japan’s cabinet approving a request for the  country’s largest-ever defense package. That  
package will see Japan invest $55.9 billion  into its military in 2024, with the number  
increasing annually until it reaches a peak of  $62.5 billion in 2027. Add Japan’s inclusion in  
a trilateral defense agreement with the U.S.  and South Korea into the mix – in addition  
to strengthening its ties to NATO, India, and  Australia – and you have a country that’s shifting  
its foreign policy. Passivity couldn’t work in  the current global landscape. CSIS notes that  
these changes in approach appear to be generally  supported by the Japanese people. For instance,  
a survey conducted in March 2022 – a month  after Russia invaded Ukraine – revealed  
that 77% of Japan’s citizens believed that the  international community needed to band together  
to stop the Russian invasion. If they didn’t,  the respondents worried, the territorial changes  
Russia enforced could pave the way for future  attempts at change, such as a Chinese invasion  
of Taiwan. Again, it comes back to Japan becoming  increasingly concerned about power plays by other  
nations. Russia taking Ukraine would make China  more confident in attempting the same in the  
Indo-Pacific with Taiwan. So, it was crucial for  Japan that it became part of the collective effort  
to prevent Putin’s “special military operation”  as doing so means it could justify being part  
of future collective efforts to stop Chinese  expansion. It's a complete turnaround in policy.  
And a turnaround that hit hard with Putin, who  may have believed that he could maintain cordial  
relations with Japan even as he invaded Ukraine.  That could have been a possibility were it not for  
another change happening in Japan: The politicians  who had spent so long trying to build a stronger  
relationship with Russia are gradually aging out.  That’s according to an October 2023 report by  
The Carnegie Endowment, which noted that even as  Japan expressed its support for Ukraine, various  
pro-Russia lobbies inside the country were making  headlines. These older politicians were claiming  
NATO’s responses to Russia were “provocative”  and that Ukraine had misguided policies. However,  
those lobbyists have been growing quieter since  the 2010s, when pro-Russia policies in Japan were  
at their peak. The assassination of Shinzo Abe  was the trigger for this turnaround. The man who  
had often referred to Putin as “dear Vladimir” was  responsible for Japan’s failure to sanction Russia  
following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.  He also created plans to strengthen economic  
cooperation between Japan and Russia in 2016.  Even when he stepped down from his role as Prime  
Minister in 2020, The Carnegie Endowment says, his  influence within Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party  
would likely have led to more pro-Russian policy.  Abe’s July 2022 assassination meant Putin lost his  
biggest Japanese ally. He’s also had to watch as  other allies, such as former Prime Ministers Yukio  
Hatoyama and Yoshiro Mori, have grown too old to  have any true influence on Japanese policy. They  
are now retired. Another pro-Putin influence  in Japanese politics – Muneo Suzuki – was the  
first foreign politician Putin received after he  became Russia’s president. Suzuki even served as  
an unofficial advisor in Russia’s policies under  Abe, showcasing just how strong his ties with  
Russia became. But Suzuki is now working under a  cloud of internal suspicion. His imprisonment for  
corruption in the 2000s hasn’t helped, with  every effort he’s made to visit Russia since  
February 2022 being blocked by his own party.  There’s a new generation of politicians coming  
to the fore in Japan. And with each loss of  the old guard, Putin’s influence has waned to  
the point where it’s almost impossible for him  to maintain a relationship with Japan. Signing  
a mutual defense pact with North Korea in June  2024 was essentially Putin putting an end to any  
chances of rebuilding that relationship. To Japan,  that pact will be little more than another sign of  
aggression to go along with Russia’s actions in  the Northern Territories and its allegiance with  
China. After all, North Korea represents another  major threat to Japan in the Indo-Pacific, as  
well as a threat to Japan’s South Korean allies.  As the Council on Foreign Relations highlights,  
allying with Russia makes North Korea even more  dangerous, adding to Fumio Kishida’s claims that  
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine can’t be seen  as a “Europe-only” problem. All of this brings  
us back to Japan’s decision to send even more  financial aid to Ukraine. Putin’s responses to  
this powerful blow indicate just how far Russia’s  relationship with Japan has fallen. In June 2024,  
Kyodo News reported on the Russian President’s  comments that the current conditions between the  
countries aren’t conducive to them coming back to  the negotiating table to create a peace treaty for  
the post-World War II era. Japan would likely  agree, though not for the same reasons as Putin  
expresses. According to Putin, the blame firmly  rests with Japan and its support of Ukraine.  
“Everything that has been done has been done by  Japan,” Putin claimed, seemingly ignorant – likely  
purposefully – of the fact that Japan’s decisions  are being informed by his actions and his “special  
military operation.” These comments came after the  suspension of peace pact talks with Japan in March  
2022. Putin went even further, claiming that he  will not shy away from visiting the islands that  
make up the Northern Territories, essentially  telling Japan that he is happy to instigate by  
reinforcing their status as Russian islands.  Reading between the lines, we can see that  
Japan’s deepening support for Ukraine dealt a body  blow to Putin. It’s no coincidence that he ended  
the peace treaty talks in March, by which point  Japan had already been supporting Ukraine for two  
years. The pledge of a further $12 billion in aid  seems to be the straw that finally broke his back,  
with that money sending a clearer message than  ever before that Japan is no longer an ally to  
Russia. It is an enemy. That status as an enemy  leads us to the final question we’ll ask in this  
video – will Japan’s pledges of financial aid ever  turn into pledges of military aid? Debates have  
raged over whether Japan should take the final  step in solidifying its support of Ukraine. If  
it does, the blow would be even more devastating  to Putin than the deterioration of relationships  
he’s had to watch over the last two years and  Japan’s financial aid packages combined. Still,  
Japan remains reluctant to provide weapons…to  an extent. In truth, Japan has already found a  
handful of diplomatic workarounds that allow it  to indirectly provide weapons to Ukraine without  
actually providing them itself. For instance,  there appear to be no conditions placed on the  
billions in financial aid it has provided,  meaning Ukraine is likely free to use that  
money to purchase weapons with the money if it so  chooses. If nothing else, that aid is helping to  
keep Ukraine’s economy afloat during a period  when it would be at risk of collapsing. Again,  
that can help Ukraine to purchase weapons, as  well as enable it to keep its manufacturing base  
running so it can build weapons of its own. More  interestingly, Japan has found several workarounds  
in the weapons department. For instance, Nikkei  Asia reported in July 2024 that Japan had agreed  
to sell $19 million worth of Patriot missiles to  the United States, supposedly to help the U.S.  
replenish its numbers after it had provided  hundreds of these missiles to Ukraine. There  
are no conditions on how the U.S. uses these  missile systems once they land in Washington.  
It’s very possible – perhaps even likely – that  the Patriot systems Japan is providing to the U.S.  
will eventually find their way into Ukrainian  hands, with the U.S. essentially acting as an  
intermediary so Japan doesn’t have to deliver  the weapons directly. Russia is aware of this.  
Its Foreign Ministry claimed that the appearance  of any Japanese missiles in Ukraine would lead to  
“consequences” for Russia’s relations with Japan.  However, given the status of those relations,  
it’s likely that Japan isn’t too worried  about what those “consequences” might be.  
It’s also worth noting that Japan has provided  protective gear to Ukraine as part of its aid  
packages. Deliveries of non-lethal equipment  – including body armor, helmets, and about 100  
non-military vehicles – show that Japan is willing  to support Ukraine a little more directly. Still,  
it draws the line at sending weapons directly.  Some argue that Japan needs to change this policy.  
For instance, an April 2023 article published  by The Japan Times pointed out that Japan was  
the only member of the G7 that had yet to  send weapons directly to Ukraine. However,  
the same report noted that Japan had made  changes to its guidelines, allowing it to make  
the previously mentioned donations of helmets,  body armor, and vehicles. At the time, talks  
were being arranged to discuss the possibility  of making further amendments to those guidelines,  
which would allow Japan to provide Ukraine with  lethal weapons. Those talks didn’t lead to a  
change. However, the same report suggests that  there is a growing appetite inside Japan for the  
country to take a more active stance. Nippon  Ishin no Kai – a right-wing populist party in  
Japan – showcases that appetite. In 2023,  the party’s Upper House Secretary-General,  
Naoki Inose, chose to send 20 pickup trucks,  each loaded with canned food and other supplies,  
to Ukraine. He paid for this using a portion of  his party member’s stipends while delivering a  
message about the delivery: “As long as these  pickup trucks aren’t used to transport machine  
guns, there should be no problem. It’s up to the  receiver if they use them in that way. As long  
as we ourselves do not offer the trucks with  that intention, we are fine.” In other words,  
it’s the same approach Japan potentially might  take with the replenishment of Patriot missile  
systems over a year later. Others argue that Japan  may not be delivering weapons directly because it  
has a deficit at home. One of those people is  Atsuko Higashino, who is a professor at the  
University of Tsukuba studying the Ukraine war.  She comes out in favor of Japan delivering Patriot  
missiles to Ukraine, though she also believes  such deliveries are unlikely in the near future  
because Japan still has a “serious deficit” when  it comes to its defense systems. A deficit that  
the recent military budget approvals could see  it rectify. Perhaps the future will see Japan  
lending more direct military aid to Ukraine once  it believes it’s in a position to defend itself  
against Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific.  If nothing else, the $12 billion it pledged in  
February 2024 will be a serious blow to Putin,  both in terms of increased support being lent  
to Ukraine and the further collapse of Russia’s  relationship with Japan. Should Japan choose to  
start sending weapons, that blow will be followed  up with a haymaker signaling Japan’s intent to  
truly oppose Russia. And not just in Ukraine, but  also in its efforts to expand its influence in the  
Indo-Pacific, as well as its work to militarize  the Northern Territories. But what do you  
think? Is Japan edging ever closer to a point  where it’ll start sending weapons to Ukraine,  
or is it still too stuck in its passivism  policies to do so? How do you think Russia  
would react if Japan crossed that line and  went beyond merely providing financial aid  
to Ukraine? Share your thoughts in the comment  section and thank you for watching this video.  
Now go check out Australia Just Dealt Russia a  CRUSHING Blow! or click this other video instead!