Jeffrey Sachs 在新的多極時代實現和平

Jeffrey Sachs 在新的多極時代實現和平

Jeffrey Sachs: Achieving peace in the new multipolar age

傑弗裏·薩克斯 | 2024 年 8 月 9 日 | 新世界經濟
https://www.manilatimes.net/2024/08/09/opinion/columns/achieving-peace-in-the-new-multipolar-age/1962778

隨著 1991 年蘇聯的解體，美國認為自己將以無與倫比的霸主地位主宰世界。然而，事實證明，美國的“單極”時刻是短暫的。隨著中國的崛起、俄羅斯從蘇聯解體時期的複蘇以及印度的快速發展，美國的地緣政治主導地位結束了。我們已經進入了一個新的多極時代。

美國仍在為保持世界霸權而戰，但這是妄想，注定會失敗。即使世界其他國家想要領導世界，美國也沒有能力領導世界，但事實並非如此。美國占世界??產出的份額（按國際價格計算）為 16%，且呈下降趨勢，低於 1950 年的 27% 和 1980 年的 21%。中國占 19%。中國製造業產出大約是美國的兩倍，中國在尖端技術領域與美國不相上下。

美國在軍事上也過度擴張，在 80 個國家設有約 750 個海外軍事基地。美國在也門、以巴、烏克蘭、敘利亞、利比亞等地卷入了曠日持久的戰爭。美國的戰爭和霸權追求是通過債務來融資的，包括欠中國等競爭對手的債務。

此外，美國的預算政治陷入癱瘓。為政治運動提供資金的富人希望降低稅收，而窮人則希望增加社會支出。結果是僵局，預算赤字長期存在（目前已超過 GDP 的 5%）。公共債務從 2000 年占 GDP 的 35% 左右飆升至今天的 100%。

美國在人工智能和微芯片設計等領域保持著技術活力，但中國通過傳播其開創的技術和進步，迅速趕上了美國的突破。世界上大多數綠色和數字硬件——包括先進的太陽能電池組件、風力渦輪機、核電站、電池、芯片、電動汽車、5G 係統和長距離輸電——都是在亞洲製造的，其中很大一部分來自中國或中國主導的供應鏈。

鑒於預算赤字，美國逃避了全球領導地位的財政負擔。美國要求北約盟國自掏腰包支付軍事防禦費用，而美國對聯合國氣候和發展融資係統的貢獻卻越來越吝嗇。

簡而言之，雖然美國自欺欺人地認為它仍然是世界霸主，但我們已經處在一個多極世界。這就提出了一個問題：新的多極化意味著什麽。有三種可能性。

第一種可能性是我們當前的軌跡，即大國之間繼續爭奪主導地位，美國與中國、俄羅斯和其他國家對立。美國著名外交政策學者約翰·米爾斯海默教授提出了“進攻性現實主義”理論，根據該理論，大國不可避免地會爭奪主導地位，但其後果可能是悲劇性的，以毀滅性的戰爭形式出現。我們的任務當然是避免這種悲劇性的結果，而不是接受它作為命運的安排。

第二種可能性是通過大國之間的力量平衡實現不穩定的和平，有時被稱為“防禦性現實主義”。由於美國無法打敗中國或俄羅斯，反之亦然，大國應該通過避免直接衝突來維持和平。美國不應不顧俄羅斯的強烈反對，試圖將北約強行推進烏克蘭，也不應不顧中國的強烈反對，向台灣提供武器。

簡而言之，大國應該謹慎行事，避免觸及彼此的紅線。這無疑是個好建議，但還不夠。權力平衡會變成不平衡，威脅和平。歐洲協調，即 19 世紀歐洲主要大國之間的權力平衡，最終在 19 世紀末屈服於權力平衡的轉變，從而引發了第一次世界大戰。

第三種可能性是大國之間實現真正的和平，過去 30 年來，美國領導人一直對此嗤之以鼻，但我們最大的希望就是實現真正的和平。這種和平將建立在共同認識到全球霸權是不存在的，共同利益需要大國之間的積極合作的基礎上。這種方法有幾個基礎，包括理想主義（基於道德的世界）和製度主義（基於國際法和多邊機構的世界）。

持久的和平是可能的。我們可以從 19 世紀西方列強到來之前東亞長期的和平中學到很多東西。哲學家項樹臣在她的著作《中國世界主義》中引用了曆史學家康大衛的話，康大衛指出：“從明朝建立到鴉片戰爭——即從 1368 年到 1841 年——中國、朝鮮、越南和日本之間隻發生過兩次戰爭。這是中國入侵越南（1407-1428 年）和日本入侵越南（1428 年）。

朝鮮統治時期（1592-1598 年）。”東亞的長期和平被英國在第一次鴉片戰爭（1839-1842 年）中對中國的攻擊以及隨後的東西方（以及後來的中日）衝突所打破。

項教授將東亞長達半個世紀的和平歸功於儒家和諧規範，這種規範支撐了中國、朝鮮、日本和越南之間的治國之道，與歐洲治國之道的爭霸形成鮮明對比。在這一漫長時期，中國是該地區無可爭議的霸權，但並沒有利用其主導力量威脅或傷害朝鮮、越南或日本。

中國外交政策製定專家董建玲博士在其著作《變化世界中的中國治國之道：揭開持久傳統和動態約束的神秘麵紗》中對中國和歐洲治國之道的差異提出了類似的觀點。

我最近提出了“21 世紀永久和平十項原則”，以中國和平共處五項原則為基礎，加上五項切實可行的進一步措施，因此，這是儒家倫理與製度主義的結合。我的想法是利用合作的倫理和國際法及聯合國憲章的實際利益。

9 月，世界各國將齊聚聯合國未來峰會，關鍵信息如下。我們不需要也不想要霸權。我們不需要權力平衡，因為權力平衡很容易變成武力不平衡。我們需要建立在倫理、共同利益以及國際法和製度基礎上的持久和平。

Achieving peace in the new multipolar age

Jeffrey D. Sachs   |   August 9, 2024   |   New World Economy
https://www.manilatimes.net/2024/08/09/opinion/columns/achieving-peace-in-the-new-multipolar-age/1962778
 
With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US assumed that it would dominate the world as the unrivaled hegemon.  Yet the US “unipolar” moment proved to be short-lived.  US geopolitical dominance ended with the rise of China, the recovery of Russia from the period of Soviet collapse, and the rapid development of India.  We have arrived at a new multipolar age. 

The US still fights to remain world hegemon, but this is delusional and doomed to fail. The US is in no position to lead the world, even if the rest of the world were to want it, which is not the case. The US share of world output (at international prices) is 16% and declining, down from around 27% in 1950, and 21% in 1980.  China’s share is 19%.  China’s manufacturing output is roughly twice that of the US, and China rivals the US in cutting-edge technologies. 
 
The US is also militarily overextended, with some 750 overseas military bases in 80 countries. The US is engaged in protracted wars in Yemen, Israel-Palestine, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.  The US wars and quest for hegemony are financed through debt, including debt owed to rival powers such as China.
 
Moreover, America’s budget politics is paralyzed. The rich, who fund the political campaigns, want lower taxes, while the poor want more social outlays.  The result is a standoff, with chronic budget deficits (now above 5% of GDP).  The public debt has swelled from around 35% of GDP in 2000 to 100% of GDP today.   

The US sustains technological dynamism in areas such as artificial intelligence and microchip design, yet US breakthroughs are quickly matched in China through the spread of knowhow and advances pioneered by China.  Most of the world’s green and digital hardware -- including advanced solar modules, wind turbines, nuclear power plants, batteries, chips, electric vehicles, 5G systems, and long-distance power transmission – is manufactured in Asia, with a large share in China or Chinese-dominated supply chains. 
 
In view of its budget deficits, the US shirks the financial burdens of global leadership. The US demands that NATO allies pay their own way for military defense, while the US is increasingly stingy in its contributions to UN system for climate and development finance.
 
In short, while US deludes itself that it remains the world’s hegemon, we are already in a multipolar world.  This raises the question of what the new multipolarity should mean.  There are three possibilities. 
 
The first, our current trajectory, is a continued struggle for dominance among the major powers, pitting the US against China, Russia, and others.  The leading US foreign policy scholar, Professor John Mearsheimer, has put forward the theory of “offensive realism,” according to which the great powers inevitably struggle for dominance, yet the consequences can be tragic, in the form of devastating wars.  Surely our task is to avoid such tragic outcomes, not accept them as a matter of fate. 
 
The second possibility is a precarious peace through a balance of power among the great powers, sometimes called “defensive realism.”  Since the US cannot defeat China or Russia, and vice versa, the great powers should keep the peace by avoiding direct conflicts amongst themselves.  The US should not try to push NATO into Ukraine, against Russia’s strenuous objections, nor should the US arm Taiwan over China’s vociferous opposition.    
 
In short, the great powers should act with prudence, avoiding each other's red lines.  This is surely good advice, but not enough.  Balances of power turn into imbalances, threatening the peace.  The Concert of Europe, the balance of power among the major European powers in the 19th century, eventually succumbed to shifts in the power balance at the end of the 19th century, which led onward to World War I.
 
The third possibility, scorned in the past 30 years by US leaders, but our greatest hope, is true peace among the major powers.  This peace would be based on the shared recognition that there can be no global hegemon and that the common good requires active cooperation among the major powers.  There are several bases of this approach, including idealism (a world based on ethics), and institutionalism (a world based on international law and multilateral institutions).
 
Sustained peace is possible.  We can learn much from the long peace that prevailed in East Asia before the arrival of Western powers in the 19th century.  In her book Chinese Cosmopolitanism, philosopher Shuchen Xiang cites historian David Kang, who noted that “from the founding of the Ming dynasty to the opium wars – that is, from 1368 to 1841 – there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. These were the China’s invasion of Vietnam (1407-1428) and Japan’s invasion of Korea (1592-1598).” East Asia’s long peace was shattered by Britain’s attack on China in the First Opium War, 1839-1842, and the East-West (and later Sino-Japanese) conflicts that followed.
 
Prof. Xiang attributes the half-millennium of East Asian peace to Confucian norms of harmony that underpinned the statecraft among China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, in contrast to the struggle for hegemony that characterized Europe’s statecraft. China, during this long period, was the region’s uncontested hegemon, but did not use its predominant power to threaten or harm Korea, Vietnam, or Japan. 
 
Dr. Jean Dong, an expert in China’s foreign policymaking, makes similar points about the differences between Chinese and European statecraft in her book Chinese Statecraft in a Changing World: Demystifying Enduring Traditions and Dynamic Constraints. 
 
I have recently proposed 10 Principles for Perpetual Peace in the 21st Century, building on China’s five principles for peaceful co-existence, plus five practical further steps, hence, a mixture of Confucian ethics and institutionalism.  My idea is to harness the ethics of cooperation and the practical benefits of international law and the UN Charter.
 
As the world assembles in September at the UN Summit of the Future, the key message is this.  We don’t want or need a hegemon.  We don’t need a balance of power, which can too easily become an imbalance of force.  We need a lasting peace built on ethics, common interests, and international law and institutions.