橋水基金瑞·達利歐被Rob Copeland拽下神壇

橋水基金橋水基金瑞·達利歐被Rob Copeland拽下神壇

https://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/72696/202408/24243.html?

橋水基金，被拽下神壇？《紐約時報》記者科普蘭，斷定世界第一對衝基金老板——橋水的瑞·達利歐，被拽下神壇。他寫了這個本基金，用大量的事實來證明自己敘述的故事中，有大量的言論過事實和自相矛盾。

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tARntu41Hw

十裏梧桐

抖音 v.douyin.com/idF122Mq
www.youtube.com/@shiliwutong

2023年10月5日注冊
簡介：家有萬卷藏書，也去過很多國家；讀書，因為想理解世界運行的邏輯；計算機專業，曾任職世界著名軟件公司，及非著名投資公司
"I have a home library with thousands of books and have traveled to many countries. I read because I want to understand the logic behind the workings of the world. With a background in computer science, I have worked for a world-renowned software company and a lesser-known investment firm."

The Fund: Ray Dalio, Bridgewater Associates, and the Unraveling of a Wall Street Legend 

基金：Ray Dalio、Bridgewater Associates 和揭開華爾街傳奇 作者：羅布·科普蘭（Rob Copeland）（作者）2023 年 11 月 7 日 羅布·科普蘭 (Rob Copeland) 是即將出版的紀實驚悚小說《基金：雷·戴利奧 (Ray Dalio)、橋水基金和華爾街傳奇的揭秘》的作者。他於 2022 年底加入《紐約時報》，擔任財經記者，此前他在《華爾街日報》擔任屢獲殊榮的調查記者近十年。

未經授權、未經修飾的著名華爾街對衝基金經理雷·達利奧的故事。紐約時報暢銷書！

雷·達利奧不希望你讀這本書。

當全球最大對衝基金橋水基金的億萬富翁創始人2022 年，達利歐宣布辭去近 50 年前在公寓裏創辦的公司，這則新聞成為世界各地的頭條新聞。達利歐憑借公司令人瞠目的成功，贏得了國際讚譽和名聲，再加上他通過頻繁出現在媒體上、與名人交往以及他的暢銷書《原則》來營造這種神秘感。在《基金》一書中，屢獲殊榮的《紐約時報》記者羅布·科普蘭 (Rob Copeland) 戳穿了這位仁慈商業巨頭精心構建的敘事，揭露了他大肆宣傳的“原則”是現代記憶中偉大的傲慢壯舉之一——實際上，這些原則鼓勵一種充滿偏執和背叛的有毒文化。

《基金》是一場引人入勝、比小說更離奇的旅程，帶你走進一個稀有的財富和權力世界。它毫不畏懼地審視了達利歐所實行的“徹底透明”政策經常造成的痛苦。被描述為他商業成功和有意義的生活秘訣的核心原則。科普蘭通過對公司內部和外部人士的數百次采訪，帶領讀者走進房間，前聯邦調查局局長吉姆·科米親吻達利奧的戒指，最近賓夕法尼亞州參議員候選人大衛麥考密克喝下了酷愛飲料，一群令人難忘的角色輪流扮演，努力克服個人心理和道德上的極限——這一切都在他們魅力十足的領導人的注視下進行。

對於那些相信賺大錢的能力與揭開人性原理有任何關係的人來說，這是一個警示故事。

評論
Rob Copeland 的《基金》

https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/reviews /books/1-250-27694-2.html

我第一次知道 Ray Dalio 是當他或他的出版商在舊金山第四大道和 King Caltrain 車站到處張貼《原則》的廣告時。如果我沒記錯的話，那裏也經常有廣播廣告；2017 年，這成了一樁大事。我的大腦很擅長忽略廣告，所以當時我唯一的想法是“某個商人寫了一本自助書。”我想我隱約以為他是一位首席執行官一些傳統企業的負責人，因為這類書的營銷力度通常都很大。我沒有把他和對衝基金或橋水基金聯係起來，我經常把橋水基金和黑水公司混淆。

事實證明，《原則》更像是一本洗白過的邪教手冊，而不是一本自助書籍。這裏麵有一個故事。

羅布·科普蘭目前在《紐約時報》任職，但多年來他一直是《華爾街日報》的對衝基金記者。他報道了由雷·達利奧創立的大型對衝基金橋水基金等。該基金是雷·達利奧的傳記，也是橋水基金的曆史，從橋水基金成立之初，作為達利奧的谘詢業務載體，直到 2022 年，達利奧在多次錯誤的開始和頭銜的變動，最終退出了公司的管理。（也許吧。根據這裏敘述的曆史，如果你讀到這篇文章時他已經重掌公司，我也不會感到驚訝。）

這是最瘋狂的一次這是我讀過的最恐怖、最惡毒的商業史。

值得一提的是，正如科普蘭明確指出的那樣，雷·達利歐和橋水基金討厭這本書，並聲稱這是一派胡言。科普蘭在腳注中列舉了一些他們的否認（以及許多聽起來像確認一樣的非否認），我發現這越來越有趣。

達利歐的一名律師表示，他“平等對待所有員工，給予各級人員同樣的尊重和給予他們同樣的福利。”

嗯。

無論如何，我個人對橋水基金一無所知，除了我在這裏學到的東西和馬特·萊文的時事通訊中偶爾提到的內容（我就是在那裏得到這本書的推薦的）。我沒有獨立的信息是否科普蘭在這裏描述的任何內容都是真實的，但科普蘭提供了人們在這樣的書中期望的典型的大量注釋和來源清單，萊文的評論表明它與橋水基金的行業聲譽基本一致。我認為這本書是真實的，但由於很明顯，世界上最大的對衝基金主要是一個德蘭

作為一個邪教，其員工大多互相監視和評價，而不是從事任何真正的投資工作，我也有疑問，科普蘭對這些問題的回答並非全部讓我滿意。但稍後會詳細介紹。

本書的核心是原則。這些是不斷變化的規則和格言，規定人們在橋水基金內部應如何行事。根據科普蘭的說法，盡管達利歐後來出版了一本同名的書，但書中的原則版本經過了淨化，並且與公司內部使用的版本相比有顯著的縮減。達利歐不斷添加新的原則，有時還會更改它們，但共同的主題是激進的、對抗性的“誠實”：從不對問題保持沉默，直接麵對人們做錯的任何事情，並告訴人們他們所有的缺點，以便他們“更好地了解自己”。

如果這聽起來像教科書式的虐待行為，那麽你的想法是對的。達利歐公開承認了這一部分，他將橋水基金描述為一家並不適合所有人的公司，但由於這種文化而取得了巨大的成就。但這種令人不安的對抗氛圍隻是功能障礙的冰山一角。根據科普蘭的說法，以下隻是其中幾種表現方式：

達利歐決定，每個人的意見都應該由他們之前決策的準確性來衡量，以創造一種“精英統治”，因此他雇傭了一些人來建立一個社會信用體係，在這個體係中，人們可以使用一個應用程序不斷給所有同事打分。這幾乎立刻演變成了高中級別的群體欺淩，員工們會匆忙降低和排斥任何被達利歐降低評級的同事。

當該係統的早期版本發現橋水基金的兩名員工比達利歐更有信譽時，達利歐操縱了該係統，以確保他總是擁有最高的評級，不受其他人評級的影響。

達利歐對直麵問題的原則如此癡迷，以至於他在橋水基金創建了一個集中的問題日誌，要求員工每周發現並報告 10 到 20 個新問題，否則他們的獎金就會被扣除。然後，他會定期從問題日誌中挑選出一些問題，無論多麽瑣碎，並將其視為對問題責任人價值的全民公投。

達利歐最喜歡的處理問題的方式是審判某人。這需要進行廣泛的調查，然後召開會議，達利歐會嚴厲斥責該人並列出他們的缺點，經常讓他們流淚或驚恐發作，同時自鳴得意地堅持認為對批評做出情緒反應是一種性格缺陷。這些會議隨後被拍攝下來，並添加到橋水所有員工都可以使用的圖書館中，通常會進行編輯以刪除達利歐的人身攻擊並使目標的情緒反應看起來不成比例。達利歐最喜歡的那些會作為他們學習原則的一部分向所有新員工展示。

在橋水獲得機構權力的最佳方法之一是對原則阿諛奉承，並積極參與達利歐的審判。橋水基金的高層經常爭奪權力，他們經常試圖抓住違反原則的對手，以便對他們進行審判。

華爾街金融和美國功能失調的政府之間有一個常見且令人不安的聯係，詹姆斯·科米（沒錯，就是那個詹姆斯·科米）負責橋水基金的內部安全工作三年，這意味著他從監控攝像頭中提取證據，供達利歐在審判期間用來質問員工。

如果這種邪教氛圍還不夠強烈，橋水基金還開發了自己獨特的語言，堪比山達基教。審判被稱為“調查”，解雇某人被稱為“分類”，評級被稱為“點名”，還有許多其他橋水基金特有的術語。不用說，從來沒有人調查過達利歐本人。你也會毫不驚訝地得知，科普蘭記錄了橋水基金的性騷擾和歧視事件，包括達利歐本人的一些行為，盡管這似乎隻是整體功能障礙中相對較小的一部分。達利歐樂於公開羞辱任何人，無論性別如何。

如果你和我一樣，此時你可能想知道橋水基金是如何在這種環境下繼續運營這麽久的。（根據科普蘭的說法，自達利歐於 2022 年退休以來，橋水基金已大幅減少類似邪教的行為，刪除了其調查檔案，並淡化了原則。）它實際上並不是一個宗教邪教；它是一個對衝基金，必須為龐大、成熟的客戶提供投資服務，而且據說它是一個非常成功的基金。為什麽這個奇怪的噩夢般的工作場所沒有幹擾橋水基金的業務？

我認為這是它最薄弱的部分

在他的書中。科普蘭對這個問題做了一些回答，但沒有一個令人滿意。

首先，從科普蘭的敘述中可以清楚地看出，幾乎沒有一名橋水基金的員工能夠控製橋水基金的投資。幾乎每個人都在從事其他業務（銷售、投資者關係）或與邪教相關的癡迷。投資決策（主要納入算法）由一小部分核心人員做出，而且往往由達利歐本人做出。與其他一些對衝基金不同，橋水基金似乎也不頻繁交易，這意味著它們可能避開了勞動力密集型的高頻業務部分。

其次，橋水基金在 20 世紀 90 年代對衝基金繁榮之前作為對衝基金起飛。它於 1990 年從達利歐的個人谘詢業務和投資通訊轉型為對衝基金（1987 年獲得了世界銀行的早期投資），20 世紀 90 年代對衝基金來說是非常好的十年。橋水基金成為世界上最大的對衝基金之一，部分歸功於達利歐的人脈關係和通過時事通訊進行的有效營銷，這給它帶來了某種機構動力。即使在橋水基金表現不如競爭對手的那些年，也沒有人質疑它向橋水基金注資。

第三，達利歐使用了從金融媒體獲得免費宣傳的久經考驗的方法：不斷預測即將到來的經濟衰退，並在預測正確時積極地邀功。從職業生涯開始，達利歐就年複一年地預測經濟衰退。橋水基金在 2000 年至 2003 年的經濟衰退中表現良好，在 2008 年金融危機期間也表現良好。達利歐積極地邀功，因為他預測了這兩次經濟衰退，並在經濟衰退中為橋水基金做好了正確的定位。這是正確的；他避免提及的是，他還預測了每隔一年的經濟衰退，但其中大多數都沒有發生。

這些觀點加在一起構成了一個答案，但它們感覺不像是整個畫麵，而科普蘭也沒有將這些部分聯係起來。達利歐可能隻是擅長投資；他癡迷於閱讀，顯然喜歡思考市場，而當一個虐待狂的邪教領袖並不會占用他所有的時間。在某種程度上，對衝基金確實是半免費的賺錢機器，一旦你擁有足夠數量的資金和政治關係，你就可以接觸到很可能賺錢的投資機會和機製，而普通投資者根本無法接觸到這些機會和機製。達利歐顯然擅長建立人際關係，並投入大量精力與棘手的客戶建立密切聯係，比如中國資金池。

也許最令人信服的解釋並沒有直接出現在這本書中，而是來自馬特·萊文。橋水基金吹捧其算法交易優於人類進行的個人交易，有理由相信，至少在某些投資領域，始終如一地應用算法而不考慮人類的情感是一種可靠的交易策略。萊文在他的新聞通訊中半開玩笑地問道，這種怪異的邪教行為和持續不斷的內鬥是否是一種分散所有人注意力的策略，防止他們幹擾算法，從而做出錯誤的決定。

科普蘭沒有解決這一問題。相反，讀完這本書後，讀者會清楚地看到我所聽說過的最混亂的工作場所，以及一連串比上一個更令人震驚的怪異事件。如果你喜歡看火車失事，這本書適合你。唯一的缺點是，與該類型的其他作品（如《壞血》或《十億美元失敗者》）不同，橋水基金是一家非常成功的公司，因此你不會因為看到紙牌屋倒塌而幸災樂禍。然而，你確實獲得了一個有用的心理模型，可以應用於下一個試圖與你談論“徹底誠實”和“思想精英”的人。

這本書的缺陷在於，像橋水這樣的組織的存在表明了我們社會運作方式的係統性缺陷，而科普蘭對此基本上不感興趣。“這怎麽可能發生？”是一個相當大的問題，不能不回答。當你看到模式並聽到第四種變化時，達利歐行為的純粹離譜也會在書的結尾讓人有點厭倦。但這仍然是一本令人驚歎的書，也是資本主義災難類型中值得一讀的書。

評分：7 分（滿分 10 分）評論：2024-02-24

橋水基金，被拽下神壇？《紐約時報》記者科普蘭，要把世界第一的對衝基金老板——橋水的瑞·達利歐，拽下神壇。他寫了這本The Fund，用大量的事實來證明自己敘述的故事中，有大量的言過其實和自相矛盾。

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tARntu41Hw

十裏梧桐

The Fund: Ray Dalio, Bridgewater Associates, and the Unraveling of a Wall Street Legend 

by Rob Copeland (Author) Nov. 7 2023 

Rob Copeland is the author of the upcoming nonfiction thriller "The Fund: Ray Dalio, Bridgewater Associates, and the Unraveling of a Wall Street Legend." He joined the New York Times as a finance reporter in late 2022, after nearly a decade as an award-winning investigative reporter at the Wall Street Journal. 

The unauthorized, unvarnished story of famed Wall Street hedge-fund manager Ray Dalio. An instant New York Times bestseller!

Ray Dalio does not want you to read this book.

When the billionaire founder of Bridgewater Associates, the largest hedge fund on the planet, announced in 2022 that he was stepping down from the company he started out of his apartment nearly 50 years ago, the news made headlines around the world. Dalio cultivated an aura of international admiration and fame thanks to his company’s eye-popping success, coupled with a mystique he encouraged with frequent media appearances, celebrity hobnobbing, and his bestselling book, Principles. In The Fund, award-winning New York Times journalist Rob Copeland punctures this carefully-constructed narrative of the benevolent business titan, exposing his much-promoted “principles” as one of the great feats of hubris in modern memory—in practice, they encouraged a toxic culture of paranoia and backstabbing.

The Fund is a page-turning, stranger-than-fiction journey into a rarefied world of wealth and power. It offers an unflinching look at the pain so often caused by the “radical transparency” Dalio has described as a core tenet of his recipe for business success and a meaningful life. Drawing on hundreds of interviews with those inside and around the firm, Copeland takes readers into the room as former FBI director Jim Comey kisses Dalio's ring, recent Pennsylvania Senate candidate David McCormick drinks the Kool-Aid, and a rotating cast of memorable characters grapple with their personal psychological and moral limits—all under the watchful eye of their charismatic leader.

This is a cautionary tale for anyone convinced that the ability to make lots of money has anything at all to do with unlocking the principles of human nature.

Reviews 
The Fund by Rob Copeland

https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/reviews/books/1-250-27694-2.html

I first became aware of Ray Dalio when either he or his publisher plastered advertisements for The Principles all over the San Francisco 4th and King Caltrain station. If I recall correctly, there were also constant radio commercials; it was a whole thing in 2017. My brain is very good at tuning out advertisements, so my only thought at the time was "some business guy wrote a self-help book." I think I vaguely assumed he was a CEO of some traditional business, since that's usually who writes heavily marketed books like this. I did not connect him with hedge funds or Bridgewater, which I have a bad habit of confusing with Blackwater.

The Principles turns out to be more of a laundered cult manual than a self-help book. And therein lies a story.

Rob Copeland is currently with The New York Times, but for many years he was the hedge fund reporter for The Wall Street Journal. He covered, among other things, Bridgewater Associates, the enormous hedge fund founded by Ray Dalio. The Fund is a biography of Ray Dalio and a history of Bridgewater from its founding as a vehicle for Dalio's advising business until 2022 when Dalio, after multiple false starts and title shuffles, finally retired from running the company. (Maybe. Based on the history recounted here, it wouldn't surprise me if he was back at the helm by the time you read this.)

It is one of the wildest, creepiest, and most abusive business histories that I have ever read.

It's probably worth mentioning, as Copeland does explicitly, that Ray Dalio and Bridgewater hate this book and claim it's a pack of lies. Copeland includes some of their denials (and many non-denials that sound as good as confirmations to me) in footnotes that I found increasingly amusing.

A lawyer for Dalio said he "treated all employees equally, giving people at all levels the same respect and extending them the same perks."

Uh-huh.

Anyway, I personally know nothing about Bridgewater other than what I learned here and the occasional mention in Matt Levine's newsletter (which is where I got the recommendation for this book). I have no independent information whether anything Copeland describes here is true, but Copeland provides the typical extensive list of notes and sourcing one expects in a book like this, and Levine's comments indicated it's generally consistent with Bridgewater's industry reputation. I think this book is true, but since the clear implication is that the world's largest hedge fund was primarily a deranged cult whose employees mostly spied on and rated each other rather than doing any real investment work, I also have questions, not all of which Copeland answers to my satisfaction. But more on that later.

The center of this book are the Principles. These were an ever-changing list of rules and maxims for how people should conduct themselves within Bridgewater. Per Copeland, although Dalio later published a book by that name, the version of the Principles that made it into the book was sanitized and significantly edited down from the version used inside the company. Dalio was constantly adding new ones and sometimes changing them, but the common theme was radical, confrontational "honesty": never being silent about problems, confronting people directly about anything that they did wrong, and telling people all of their faults so that they could "know themselves better."

If this sounds like textbook abusive behavior, you have the right idea. This part Dalio admits to openly, describing Bridgewater as a firm that isn't for everyone but that achieves great results because of this culture. But the uncomfortably confrontational vibes are only the tip of the iceberg of dysfunction. Here are just a few of the ways this played out according to Copeland:

Dalio decided that everyone's opinions should be weighted by the accuracy of their previous decisions, to create a "meritocracy," and therefore hired people to build a social credit system in which people could use an app to constantly rate all of their co-workers. This almost immediately devolved into out-group bullying worthy of a high school, with employees hurriedly down-rating and ostracizing any co-worker that Dalio down-rated.

When an early version of the system uncovered two employees at Bridgewater with more credibility than Dalio, Dalio had the system rigged to ensure that he always had the highest ratings and was not affected by other people's ratings.

Dalio became so obsessed with the principle of confronting problems that he created a centralized log of problems at Bridgewater and required employees find and report a quota of ten or twenty new issues every week or have their bonus docked. He would then regularly pick some issue out of the issue log, no matter how petty, and treat it like a referendum on the worth of the person responsible for the issue.

Dalio's favorite way of dealing with a problem was to put someone on trial. This involved extensive investigations followed by a meeting where Dalio would berate the person and harshly catalog their flaws, often reducing them to tears or panic attacks, while smugly insisting that having an emotional reaction to criticism was a personality flaw. These meetings were then filmed and added to a library available to all Bridgewater employees, often edited to remove Dalio's personal abuse and to make the emotional reaction of the target look disproportionate. The ones Dalio liked the best were shown to all new employees as part of their training in the Principles.

One of the best ways to gain institutional power in Bridgewater was to become sycophantically obsessed with the Principles and to be an eager participant in Dalio's trials. The highest levels of Bridgewater featured constant jockeying for power, often by trying to catch rivals in violations of the Principles so that they would be put on trial.

In one of the common and all-too-disturbing connections between Wall Street finance and the United States' dysfunctional government, James Comey (yes, that James Comey) ran internal security for Bridgewater for three years, meaning that he was the one who pulled evidence from surveillance cameras for Dalio to use to confront employees during his trials.

In case the cult vibes weren't strong enough already, Bridgewater developed its own idiosyncratic language worthy of Scientology. The trials were called "probings," firing someone was called "sorting" them, and rating them was called "dotting," among many other Bridgewater-specific terms. Needless to say, no one ever probed Dalio himself. You will also be completely unsurprised to learn that Copeland documents instances of sexual harassment and discrimination at Bridgewater, including some by Dalio himself, although that seems to be a relatively small part of the overall dysfunction. Dalio was happy to publicly humiliate anyone regardless of gender.

If you're like me, at this point you're probably wondering how Bridgewater continued operating for so long in this environment. (Per Copeland, since Dalio's retirement in 2022, Bridgewater has drastically reduced the cult-like behaviors, deleted its archive of probings, and de-emphasized the Principles.) It was not actually a religious cult; it was a hedge fund that has to provide investment services to huge, sophisticated clients, and by all accounts it's a very successful one. Why did this bizarre nightmare of a workplace not interfere with Bridgewater's business?

This, I think, is the weakest part of this book. Copeland makes a few gestures at answering this question, but none of them are very satisfying.

First, it's clear from Copeland's account that almost none of the employees of Bridgewater had any control over Bridgewater's investments. Nearly everyone was working on other parts of the business (sales, investor relations) or on cult-related obsessions. Investment decisions (largely incorporated into algorithms) were made by a tiny core of people and often by Dalio himself. Bridgewater also appears to not trade frequently, unlike some other hedge funds, meaning that they probably stay clear of the more labor-intensive high-frequency parts of the business.

Second, Bridgewater took off as a hedge fund just before the hedge fund boom in the 1990s. It transformed from Dalio's personal consulting business and investment newsletter to a hedge fund in 1990 (with an earlier investment from the World Bank in 1987), and the 1990s were a very good decade for hedge funds. Bridgewater, in part due to Dalio's connections and effective marketing via his newsletter, became one of the largest hedge funds in the world, which gave it a sort of institutional momentum. No one was questioned for putting money into Bridgewater even in years when it did poorly compared to its rivals.

Third, Dalio used the tried and true method of getting free publicity from the financial press: constantly predict an upcoming downturn, and aggressively take credit whenever you were right. From nearly the start of his career, Dalio predicted economic downturns year after year. Bridgewater did very well in the 2000 to 2003 downturn, and again during the 2008 financial crisis. Dalio aggressively takes credit for predicting both of those downturns and positioning Bridgewater correctly going into them. This is correct; what he avoids mentioning is that he also predicted downturns in every other year, the majority of which never happened.

These points together create a bit of an answer, but they don't feel like the whole picture and Copeland doesn't connect the pieces. It seems possible that Dalio may simply be good at investing; he reads obsessively and clearly enjoys thinking about markets, and being an abusive cult leader doesn't take up all of his time. It's also true that to some extent hedge funds are semi-free money machines, in that once you have a sufficient quantity of money and political connections you gain access to investment opportunities and mechanisms that are very likely to make money and that the typical investor simply cannot access. Dalio is clearly good at making personal connections, and invested a lot of effort into forming close ties with tricky clients such as pools of Chinese money.

Perhaps the most compelling explanation isn't mentioned directly in this book but instead comes from Matt Levine. Bridgewater touts its algorithmic trading over humans making individual trades, and there is some reason to believe that consistently applying an algorithm without regard to human emotion is a solid trading strategy in at least some investment areas. Levine has asked in his newsletter, tongue firmly in cheek, whether the bizarre cult-like behavior and constant infighting is a strategy to distract all the humans and keep them from messing with the algorithm and thus making bad decisions.

Copeland leaves this question unsettled. Instead, one comes away from this book with a clear vision of the most dysfunctional workplace I have ever heard of, and an endless litany of bizarre events each more astonishing than the last. If you like watching train wrecks, this is the book for you. The only drawback is that, unlike other entries in this genre such as Bad Blood or Billion Dollar Loser, Bridgewater is a wildly successful company, so you don't get the schadenfreude of seeing a house of cards collapse. You do, however, get a helpful mental model to apply to the next person who tries to talk to you about "radical honesty" and "idea meritocracy."

The flaw in this book is that the existence of an organization like Bridgewater is pointing to systematic flaws in how our society works, which Copeland is largely uninterested in interrogating. "How could this have happened?" is a rather large question to leave unanswered. The sheer outrageousness of Dalio's behavior also gets a bit tiring by the end of the book, when you've seen the patterns and are hearing about the fourth variation. But this is still an astonishing book, and a worthy entry in the genre of capitalism disasters.

Rating: 7 out of 10Reviewed: 2024-02-24