Eric Edelman 理解美國備受爭議的主導地位

理解美國備受爭議的主導地位

Understanding America's Contested Primacy

https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2010.10.21-Understanding-Americas-Contested-Supremacy.pdf

Dr. Eric S. Edelman 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Eric S. Edelman 博士 2010 戰略與預算評估中心

執行摘要

2008 年 11 月，美國國家情報委員會發布了《2025 年全球趨勢》，其中指出“由於新興大國的崛起、全球化經濟、相對財富和經濟實力從西方向東方的曆史性轉移以及非國家行為者的影響力不斷增強，到 2025 年，二戰後建立的國際體係將幾乎麵目全非。到 2025 年，國際體係將成為一個全球多極體係，發達國家和發展中國家之間的國家實力差距將繼續縮小”[原文重點]。”

這一結論與四年前國家情報委員會在《2020 年全球未來規劃》中得出的結論大相徑庭，即單極化很可能繼續成為國際體係的長期狀態。

在兩份報告之間，美國的時代精神明顯發生了轉變，原因是伊拉克和阿富汗反叛亂戰爭持續困難，對美國全球領導地位（國內外）的質疑不斷增加，新興經濟體（高盛分析師暗示為金磚四國）似乎勢不可擋地崛起，全球經濟低迷和美國經濟衰退。總體影響是創造了一種新的傳統智慧，即預見美國將繼續衰落，標誌著後冷戰世界的單極世界秩序將結束，以及可能背離冷戰結束後三屆總統政府外交政策中追求美國主導地位的理念。

關於單極化和美國繼續保持主導地位的爭論不僅僅是學術爭論。對美國實力的認知將指導美國決策者和其他國家考慮其政策選擇。自冷戰結束以來，主導地位一直是美國大戰略的基礎，因為沒有其他國家能夠提供集體公共產品，這些產品維護了國際體係的安全，並使全球經濟活動和繁榮急劇增加。美國和全球體係都從這種情況中受益。

關於美國衰落的論點並不新鮮，但在它們成為不容置疑的正統觀點之前，最好仔細研究一下支撐新興傳統觀點的許多關鍵假設。事實上，美國無可否認的相對衰落會導致單極世界的終結嗎？金磚國家真的代表一個集團嗎？多極化會是什麽樣子？無論如何，如何衡量國家實力？如何衡量全球權力分配的變化？全球競爭對手的崛起是不可避免的嗎？

哪些弱點可能會阻礙潛在競爭對手保持目前有利的經濟和政治軌跡？美國是否擁有一些未被充分重視的優勢，這些優勢可能成為其繼續在國際體係中占據主導地位的基礎？如果是，審慎的政府將采取哪些措施來將這種主導地位延續到未來？直線預測經濟增長的曆史和挑戰美國主導地位的崛起，對那些先前預測美國衰落的人來說並不友好。美國不一定會在冷戰後主導地位的“單極時刻”結束和全球多極世界之間陷入困境。新興的國際環境可能與國家情報委員會在 2004 年的《全球未來規劃》和 2008 年的《全球趨勢 2025》中預測的未來有所不同。美國實力的相對衰落似乎更有可能使美國成為國際體係中最強大的參與者。但其他國家的經濟崛起和核武器在某些關鍵地區的擴散可能會使美國麵臨新的嚴峻挑戰。

美國衰落的觀念再度興起，再次引發了有關美國實力的目的和美國國際主導地位的價值的問題。尋求保持美國作為國際體係主要參與者的優勢會給美國預算和納稅人帶來成本。當然，我們應該問一問美國為保持第一而付出的努力能得到什麽。還值得思考的是，如果美國隻是眾多強國之一，世界將會是什麽樣子，以及這種看法將如何影響國家安全決策者在未來二十多年將麵臨的戰略和政策選擇。

主導地位既允許國家推進其自身的特定政策目標，也賦予其更大的行動自由

追求這些目標。在二十世紀的大部分時間裏，美國總統都認為尋求一個“自由世界秩序”符合美國的利益，該秩序由一個以開放、自由貿易和投資自由流動為特征的國際經濟體係和一個以越來越多的自由民主國家為特征的國際政治安排組成。繼續堅持維持主導地位的戰略背後的理論是，隻有強國或強國集團提供的安全才能支撐有利於經濟增長、代議製政府和國際和平與繁榮的自由經濟和政治秩序。自冷戰結束以來，這一觀點一直得到兩黨的一致支持。

盡管這一觀點仍然存在爭議，但似乎很明顯，盡管美國的政策顯然引起了一些不滿，但人們（尤其是政府）仍然認為它在與其他大國的互動中相對溫和。美國對世界的基本看法是，它植根於新自由主義的正統觀念，即自由市場、開放社會和民主製度，這些觀念在共產主義垮台後成為實現和平與繁榮的共識。這種“跨國自由主義”使各國精英傾向於與美國達成廣泛的利益融合，並減少了他們試圖製衡美國權力的傾向。作為國際世界經濟的保障者，以及由於其聯盟體係而提供安全和穩定的提供者，美國提供了其他國家無法提供的全球公共產品。

接受衰落和美國主導地位終結的新傳統智慧很可能導致美國全球政策戰略基礎的改變，並可能成為一個自我實現的預言。

嚴格的評估應該考慮美國在全球舞台上假定競爭對手的優勢和劣勢，以及使美國能夠擴大其主導地位並保持穩定的全球霸權地位的持久優勢和韌性來源，出乎所有人的意料。

需要一個框架來指導美國政策製定者如何思考製定戰略和政策以再次擴大這一角色的問題，因為至少有一條有爭議的命題是，在當前的大衰退過去之後，全球體係將繼續是單極的，而不是多極世界，但對美國領導地位提出了一些額外的挑戰。

2008 年國家情報委員會的報告反映了一股“衰落論”浪潮——人們認為美國的力量正在減弱，其他大國正在崛起，尤其是所謂的金磚四國（巴西、俄羅斯、印度和中國），美國需要調整其國際野心，放棄繼續保持主導地位，轉而迎合崛起中的大國，以促進全球治理。關於美國衰落的想法可以產生兩種結果。它們可以促使政策製定者采取實際上加速衰落的政策，也可以促使領導人采取行動，重振美國經濟活力，從而扭轉衰落。

了解衰落論是一種說服，可以幫助人們評估支持美國衰落論的論據。關於主導地位的爭論不是黨派問題。共和黨和民主黨在是否以及如何保持美國在國際體係中的主導地位的問題上存在分歧。由於美國要應對崛起的中國、其他所謂“金磚四國”日益增強的經濟實力，以及多極世界的前景，這些爭論無疑將繼續下去。影響爭論的一個因素是美國人民是否願意支持這項政策，並願意為繼續保持主導地位付出代價。一些人認為，美國公眾在伊拉克和阿富汗的八年軍事行動中精疲力竭，經濟大衰退又將注意力集中在創造就業機會和醫療保健上，他們可能願意讓美國的政策適應其他崛起的大國，放棄全球主導地位的政策。毫無疑問，這些因素塑造了公眾對美國在世界上的角色的看法。長期以來，民意調查數據一直顯示，當被問及他們的觀點時，美國人會表示更傾向於在國際舞台上與其他國家協調行動。然而，公眾也一直支持美國在全球事務中的領導地位。當麵臨衰落的選擇時，美國人似乎很可能會選擇繼續保持領導地位。這當然是冷戰後時期的教訓。

20 世紀 80 年代末，反衰落論文獻也出現了，如今隨著《2025 年全球趨勢》報告的發布，這種觀點又重新出現。反衰落論者無疑更加堅定了自己的信念，因為衰落論者過去一直是錯誤的。

但僅僅因為衰落論者此前的預測是錯誤的，並不意味著他們這次的預測是錯誤的。

他們的論點需要認真對待。美國的適應能力不容低估，但美國持久的主導地位和單極時刻的持續時間顯然將成為未來幾年激烈爭論的問題。正確的評估將取決於我們如何衡量那些可能成為多極世界中額外極點的國家的力量，以及我們如何評估美國的持久實力和複興能力。

美國的衰落和單極世界秩序的壽命不會僅僅由經濟收益或損失決定。國際體係的未來形態將取決於更廣泛的國家實力衡量標準，而不是某個國家控製的全球生產百分比。然而，衡量國家實力是出了名的困難。在前所未有的單極局勢下，由於幾乎沒有曆史先例可以指導分析人士，衡量相對權力轉移可能更加困難。

主要指標往往包括國內生產總值、人口、國防開支，以及各種其他因素。各種方法在量化或以其他方式衡量許多因素方麵存在差異。但由於所有人都同意這些類型的測量本質上是主觀的，因此略有不同的因素和對不同因素的不同權重會導致不同的結果也就不足為奇了。目前尚不清楚這些模型在多大程度上能夠解釋不連續性和動態變化，而不是直線預測和相對權力轉移。也不清楚這些模型是否真的能夠衡量世界領導人如何看待相對國家實力和權力變化這一至關重要的問題。關鍵因素似乎是了解各國將資源轉化為可用力量的能力，結合硬實力和軟實力。

歸根結底，國際政治家和軍事領導人對國際權力分配的主觀評估至少與國家實力的客觀衡量標準同樣重要。這些判斷不可避免地受到一係列文化、心理、官僚和政治因素的影響。關於美國衰落以及我們是否正在進入一個多極世界而非單極世界的爭論本身將不可避免地對這些主觀判斷產生影響。

然而，我們對假定大國的評估將涵蓋傳統的競爭者歐洲和日本，也包括所謂的金磚四國。

中國

中國的崛起比任何其他所謂的金磚四國都更受關注。根據《2025 年全球趨勢》報告，“如果目前的趨勢持續下去，到 2025 年，中國將成為世界第二大經濟體，並將成為領先的軍事強國。”全球經濟衰退幾乎沒有阻礙中國的崛起。中國官員一直在竭力向所有人保證，他們沒有霸權或統治其他國家的野心。這場“魅力攻勢”始於東南亞，但迅速擴展到非洲和拉丁美洲，展現了中國運用軟實力的能力。但隨著中國實力的增強，其意圖和目標可能會變得更加廣泛。國家對經濟的強大控製以及將黨和國家與主要行業聯係起來的庇護關係，導致經濟出現大量浪費和低效。收入差距的擴大和權力的任意濫用，造成了社會經濟緊張和動蕩的易燃組合。在中國，社會抗議的不斷升級已成為家常便飯。然而，中國的人口結構可能給該國領導人帶來最棘手的問題。在未來十五年裏，中國人口將停止增長並開始下降。老年人與勞動年齡人口的比例也將發生變化，使中國形成所謂的“4-2-1”人口結構，即一個孩子必須贍養兩個父母和四個祖父母。

中國即將發生的人口結構變化也將與其人口年輕群體中日益加劇的性別失衡相交叉。經濟、人口和社會動蕩可能引發一場完美風暴，這導致一些觀察家推測，中國遠非一個崛起的大國，實際上正瀕臨崩潰。然而，目前人們的焦點仍然是強大的中國，特別是因為其經濟進步使其能夠積累大量且不斷增長的軍事能力。即使中國在增長方麵遇到的障礙比《2025 年全球趨勢》中描述的要多，很明顯中國將繼續保持自信，但很難確切知道這種新的自信將以何種形式出現。一些人認為，中國不斷增強的經濟和軍事實力將推動世界各國之間的權力競爭。

該地區與美國的長期戰略競爭。

其他人認為，中國與多邊機構的互動增多將有助於它以負責任的利益相關者的身份和平地融入國際體係。這在很大程度上取決於中國領導層對其全球角色的看法。關於美國和西方“衰落”的討論越來越多，這可能會影響中國領導人的態度以及他們實現中國國際目標的方法。

我們考慮的所有國家都有實力和增強實力的潛力，但它們也肯定會麵臨嚴重的問題。單極時期基於一個事實：美國是現代國際曆史上第一個在所有基本權力要素（經濟、軍事、技術和地緣政治）中都占據決定性優勢的領先國家。除了巴西可能例外，所有其他大國都麵臨著嚴重的內部和外部安全挑戰。日本麵臨著經濟和人口方麵的挑戰，它必須應對附近一個事實上擁有核武器的失敗國家（朝鮮），還必須對正在崛起的中國投以不安的目光。印度國內存在暴力，鄰國（尼泊爾和孟加拉國）也存在叛亂，與中國的關係也一直處於安全困境。人口方麵的挑戰對於歐洲、日本和俄羅斯來說，在軍事人力和經濟增長方麵尤其嚴重。結果要麽會削弱整體軍事實力，要麽會像俄羅斯那樣，加大對核武器的依賴。

新興經濟體麵臨的所有問題和不確定性，以及歐洲和日本等發達國家麵臨的巨大挑戰，隻有一件事似乎是肯定的：事件將推動國際經濟和政治朝著目前無人預料的方向發展，而關於崛起和衰落大國的確定性可能會因變化無常和不可預測的命運而偏離軌道。

隨著全球財富和權力流向亞洲，即使這種流向不像某些支持者所認為的那樣迅速和徹底，美國的優勢也會在一定程度上下降。然而，正如《全球趨勢 2025》所預測的那樣，國際體係是否會走向多極世界，在很大程度上取決於人們如何看待相對權力的轉移，以及如何選擇根據這些看法采取行動。

美國的地理位置是固定的，一直是力量的持久源泉。

正如塞繆爾·亨廷頓所指出的，美國的實力“源於其在世界政治中的結構性地位……地理上遠離世界衝突的主要地區”，也源於“參與曆史上獨一無二的多元化聯盟網絡”。自然資源是美國另一個持久優勢領域。美國的農民和生產者從未像今天這樣高效或多產。農業一直是“美國競爭力的堡壘”。能源資源是另一個優勢。媒體對美國對進口石油的依賴（這是真正的戰略負擔）給予了極大關注，但卻忽視了煤炭和天然氣資源。

事實上，美國（加上加拿大）的能源資源僅次於中東。工業產能是美國製造業衰退的一個領域，美國製造業的衰退被視為美國整體衰退的替代標誌。美國向後工業化、信息技術導向和高度金融化的經濟轉型是避免 20 世紀 90 年代“帝國過度擴張”預測的重要部分。在大衰退之後，後工業化轉型可能被視為美國經濟的致命弱點。這些觀點可能低估了一些因素，這些因素應該有助於美國從第一個單極時代過渡到其後的任何時代。

對創新的開放可以在擴大美國在世界上的領先地位方麵發揮重要作用。一些學者認為，創新是國家在推動長期經濟活動和增長的行業中成為係統領導者的關鍵。未能在這些行業保持係統領導地位是衰退的主要原因。另一個可能推動美國更快複蘇的因素是所謂的“美國信條”，其中包括對國家在經濟中的作用的強烈敵意。更大的私營部門可能會繼續為企業家和創新者提供空間，以延長美國在國際經濟中的領先地位。

另一個極其重要的長期因素是人口結構，它支撐著美國可能繼續保持全球經濟領導地位。美國的生育率在發達國家中名列前茅，幾乎與發達國家持??平替代。

美國人口不斷增長，且比其他發達國家（或中國）更年輕，因此似乎處於有利地位。除了美國眾多優勢外，政治和社會穩定也使其成為全球投資者的避風港。然而，包括美國軍事實力在內的所有這些優勢並不意味著美國注定會繼續保持主導地位，也不意味著單極格局將無限期地繼續成為國際體係的特征。許多領域的錯誤政策決策可能會抵消或浪費美國的優勢。此外，美國還麵臨著許多自身的挑戰。盡管美國人口狀況良好，但隨著嬰兒潮一代的老齡化，美國將不得不承擔無資金支持的養老金債務。伊拉克和阿富汗戰爭的管理不善也損害了美國的地位。如果沒有美國的一致努力，國際體係可能會走向無極或無極化，沒有一個國家在試圖組織國際體係方麵發揮明顯領導作用。其結果將是領導權真空，無法應對當今世界麵臨的大量問題，如恐怖主義、核擴散、種族和宗派戰爭、人道主義災難、犯罪、毒品販運、流行病和全球氣候變化等等。

如果美國接受“衰落”的診斷，並試圖適應崛起的大國，那麽它很可能會加速衰落和美國主導地位的消亡。如果美國領導人選擇繼續前幾代領導人為保持美國主導地位所開辟的道路，他們將不得不利用上述優勢來鞏固和擴大美國的主導地位。

衡量國家相對地位的一個標準是考慮這個問題：“你更願意遇到誰的問題？”經過上述調查，一個理性的人可能會得出這樣的結論：盡管美國麵臨的挑戰很大，但其他潛在大國麵臨的問題更加困難和棘手。盡管《全球趨勢 2025》預測世界正在走向多極化，但美國的優勢地位似乎有可能在單極體係中繼續保持，盡管美國的霸權地位不如 1990 年代那麽明顯。然而，在這一輪循環中，美國的主導地位將更多地受到美國國內和國際經濟限製的限製，並受到地區大國的更多爭奪。中國將在亞洲構成最大挑戰，但伊朗和朝鮮等潛在的新核大國也將對美國??在東北亞和西南亞的延伸威懾提出難題。其他棘手的挑戰者也可能出現，包括西半球的委內瑞拉（特別是如果它與擁有核武器的伊朗結盟的話）。

衰落論文獻對金磚四國的過度關注往往轉移了人們對核武器擴散最有可能對美國繼續保持主導地位構成早期挑戰這一事實的注意力。正如查爾斯·克勞瑟默所寫，“衰落是一種選擇”，如果美國政府采取一些基本措施，衰落是可以避免的。首先，美國要整頓國內秩序。其次，美國需要直麵聲譽挑戰。美國必須做好繼續捍衛公共利益的準備。也許最重要的是，美國主導地位的下降和地區挑戰者的出現，將使美國聯盟和聯盟管理成為美國決策者關注的焦點，這是冷戰結束以來從未有過的。

除了改善我們傳統的基於條約的非正式聯盟的管理外，美國還需要認真考慮其聯盟組合的形態，著眼於與可能比傳統盟友貢獻更大能力和效用的國家發展關係。我們已經看到，印度可能是與美國建立夥伴關係或聯盟的唯一最重要的候選人。在西半球，巴西也可能能夠與美國合作，發揮寶貴的地區穩定作用。

避免多極化或無極化的可能性顯然是存在的。它需要決心保持美國作為“不可或缺的國家”的地位，並製定實現這一目標的戰略。在第一個單極時代來臨之初，五角大樓曾努力明確思考一項擴大美國在國際體係中主導地位的戰略。盡管由此產生的文件《1992 年國防規劃指南》成為許多不合時宜的批評和爭議的主題，但它的主要大綱成為事實上的雙極戰略。

這項藝術戰略支撐了單極“時代”，而出乎大多數人的意料的是，這一時代已經延續了一個時代。如果美國要成功應對爭奪主導地位的挑戰，那麽現在就是開始討論在 21 世紀推動美國力量發展的戰略的時候了。

Understanding America's Contested Primacy

https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2010.10.21-Understanding-Americas-Contested-Supremacy.pdf

Dr. Eric S. Edelman 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Executive Summary

In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued that “the international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries” [emphasis in original].”

This conclusion represented a striking departure from the NIC’s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system.

Between the two reports America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations that followed the end of the Cold War.

The debate over unipolarity and continued US primacy is not merely an academic debate. Perceptions of US power will guide both American policymakers and other nations as they consider their policy options. Primacy has underpinned US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War because no other nation was able to provide the collective public goods that have upheld the security of the international system and enabled a period of dramatically increased global economic activity and prosperity. Both the United States and the global system have benefitted from that circumstance.

The arguments for US decline are not new but before they harden into an unchallenged orthodoxy it would be good to carefully examine many of the key assumptions that undergird the emerging conventional wisdom. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable?

What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors
from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does
the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as
the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps
would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future?
The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of
challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those
who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the
United States will be caught between the end of the “unipolar moment” of postCold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the US with difficult new challenges.

The revived notion of America’s decline has once again brought to the fore a
question about the purposes of United States power and the value of US international primacy. Seeking to maintain America’s advantage as the prime player in the international system imposes costs on the US budget and taxpayer. It is certainly fair to ask what the United States gets from exerting the effort to remain number one. It is also worth considering what the world would look like if the United States was just one power among many, and how such perceptions might affect the strategic and policy choices national security decision-makers will face over the next twenty-odd years.

Primacy both allows the state to advance its own specific policy objectives and
gives it greater freedom of action in the pursuit of those ends. Throughout most
of the twentieth century American presidents have considered it to be in the US
interest to seek a “liberal world order” comprised of an international economic
system characterized by openness, free trade and free flows of investment, and an
international political arrangement characterized by a growing number of liberal
democratic states. The theory behind the continued adherence to a strategy of
maintaining primacy has been that only the security provided by a strong power
or group of powers can underpin the liberal economic and political order that
is conducive to economic growth, representative government and international
peace and prosperity. Since the end of the Cold War this view has had consistent
bipartisan support.

Although the point remains controversial it seems apparent that America,
while clearly creating some resentments with its policies, continues to be seen
(particularly by governments) as relatively benign in its interactions with other
powers. America shares a fundamental view of the world rooted in the neo-liberal orthodoxy of free markets, open societies, and democratic institutions that
emerged as a consensus prescription for peace and prosperity after the collapse
of communism. This “transnational liberalism” inclines national elites to see a
broad confluence of interest with the United States and reduces their tendency
to try and counterbalance American power. As the guarantor of the international
world economy and a provider of security and stability because of its alliance system, the United States provides global public goods which others cannot provide.

Accepting the new conventional wisdom of decline and an end of US primacy
could well lead to an alteration of the strategic underpinnings of American global
policy and could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

A rigorous assessment should consider the strengths and weaknesses of the
United States’ putative competitors on the global scene as well as the enduring
strengths and sources of resilience that have enabled America to extend its primacy and maintain a stabilizing, global hegemonic role against all expectations.

There is a need for a framework to inform how US policymakers might think
about the problem of developing strategies and policies to extend that role yet
again, since it is at least an arguable proposition that rather than a multipolar
world, the global system, after the current Great Recession passes, will continue
to be unipolar but with some additional challenges for US leadership.

The 2008 NIC report reflected a wave of “declinism”—the belief that American
power is on the wane, that other powers are rising, particularly the so-called
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and that the United States needs to adjust
its international ambitions and eschew continued primacy in favor of accommodating the rising powers in the interest of greater global governance. Ideas about American decline can cut two ways. They can predispose policymakers to pursue policies that actually accelerate decline or they can spark leaders to pursue courses of action that renew American economic vitality in order to reverse decline.

Understanding that declinism is a persuasion can help one assess the arguments that are adduced to support the proposition that the United States is in decline. The debate over primacy is not a partisan issue. Both Republicans and Democrats have been divided over the issue of whether and how to maintain America’s primacy in the international system. As the country contends with a rising China, the increased economic clout of the other so-called BRIC countries, and the prospect of a multipolar world these debates will undoubtedly continue. One factor that will shape the debate is the willingness of the American people to support the policy and pay the attendant costs of continued predominance. Some believe that the American public, exhausted by eight years of military exertion in Iraq and Afghanistan, and focused by the Great Recession on job creation and health care, may be willing to accommodate US policy to other rising powers and forego a policy of global primacy. There is no doubt that these factors have shaped the recent public perception of America’s role in the world. Poll data has long shown that, when asked for their view, Americans will express a preference for acting in concert with other nations in the international arena. There has also, however, been consistent public support for US leadership in global affairs. It seems likely that when faced with choices about decline Americans are likely to opt for continued leadership. That certainly is the lesson of the post-Cold War period.

An anti-declinist literature also emerged in the late 1980s and is now reappearing in the wake of the Global Trends 2025 report. The anti-declinists undoubtedly feel strengthened in their convictions because the declinists have been consistently wrong in the past. But simply because the declinists have heretofore been wrong does not mean that they are not correct in their prognosis this time.

Their arguments need to be taken seriously. America’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated, but America’s enduring primacy and the length of the unipolar moment are clearly going to be a matter of intensified debate in the next few years. A proper evaluation will depend on how we attempt to measure the power of those countries that might become additional poles in a multipolar world, and how we evaluate America’s enduring strength and capacity for revival.

American decline and the longevity of a unipolar world order will not be determined purely by economic gains or losses. The future shape of the international system will depend on broader measures of national power than the percentage of global production that a given state controls. Measuring national power, however, is notoriously difficult. In an unprecedented situation of unipolarity, with little historical precedent to guide analysts, the measurement of relative power shifts is perhaps harder still.

The main metrics tend to include GDP, population, defense spending, and then
a variety of other factors. There are differences among the various methods as to
how one might quantify or otherwise measure many of the factors. But since all
agree that these kinds of measurements are inherently subjective it is not surprising that slightly different factors and different weights to different factors
can lead to differing results. It is not clear how much these models can account 
for discontinuities and dynamic changes as opposed to straight-line projections
and relative shifts in power. Nor is it clear that the models can really measure
the all-important question of how world leaders perceive shifts in relative national strength and power. The key factor would seem to be getting at the ability
of countries to convert resources into usable power combining both hard power
and soft power.

At the end of the day, at least as important as the objective measures of national power are the subjective assessments of international statesmen and military
leaders about the international distribution of power. Those judgments are inevitably affected by a range of cultural, psychological, bureaucratic and political
factors. The debate over American decline and whether or not we are entering a
multipolar, as opposed to unipolar, world in and of itself will inevitably have an
impact on those subjective judgments.

Our assessment of putative powers, however, will cover the traditional contenders, Europe and Japan, and include the so-called BRICs as well.

China

The rise of China has attracted more attention than any of the other of the socalled BRICs. According to the Global Trends 2025 report, “if current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second-largest economy and will be a leading military power.” The global recession has barely put a dent in China’s ascent. Chinese officials have been at pains to assure one and all that they have no aspirations of hegemony or dominion over other countries. This “charm offensive,” beginning in Southeast Asia but rapidly expanding to Africa and Latin America, has demonstrated China’s ability to wield soft power. But China’s intentions and aims may become more expansive as its power increases. The strong hold of the state on the economy and the patronage relationships that link the party and state to major industries have generated massive waste and inefficiencies in the economy. Rising income inequality and arbitrary abuses of authority have created a combustible mix of socio-economic tension and unrest. Rising levels of social protest have become an everyday occurrence in China. China’s demography, however, may present the country’s leaders with the most intractable issues of all. In the next decade-and-a-half China’s population will stop growing and begin to decline. The proportion of elderly to working-age individuals will also shift, giving China a so-called “4-2-1” population structure in which one child will have to support two parents and four grandparents.

China's approaching demographic shifts will also intersect with a growing gender imbalance in the younger age cohorts of its population. The potential for a perfect storm of economic, demographic, and social unrest has led some observers to conjecture that China, far from being a rising power, is actually on the verge of collapse. For the moment, however, the focus remains on a strong China, in particular because its economic advance has enabled it to amass significant and growing military capabilities. Even if China experiences more obstacles to growth than described in Global Trends 2025, it is clear that China will continue to be assertive, but it is hard to know exactly what form that new assertiveness will take. Some suggest that China’s increasing economic and military strength will drive a contest for power in the region and a long-term strategic competition with the United States.

Others believe China’s increased interaction with multilateral institutions will help it integrate peacefully into the international system as a responsible stakeholder. Much will depend on the ideas that China’s leadership develops about its global role. The increasing discussion of the “decline” of the United States, and the West more broadly, could have an impact on the attitudes of Chinese leaders and the methods they will employ in accomplishing China’s international objectives.

All the countries we have considered have strengths and the potential to increase
their power, but all of them are also certain to face serious problems. The period
of unipolarity has been based on a singular fact: the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological and geopolitical. With the possible exception of Brazil, all the other powers face serious internal and external security challenges. Japan, with its economic and demographic challenges, must deal with a de facto nuclear-armed, failing state (the DPRK) nearby and must also cast an uneasy glance at a rising China. India has domestic violence, insurgencies in bordering countries (Nepal and Bangladesh) and a persistent security dilemma with respect to China. The demographic challenges will be particularly acute for Europe, Japan, and Russia in the areas of military manpower and economic growth. The results will either diminish overall military strength or, in the case of Russia, impose a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.

With all of the problems and uncertainties that the emerging economies face
and the enormous challenges that bedevil the developed world in Europe and
Japan, only one thing seems certain: events will drive international economics and politics in directions that no one now anticipates and the certainties about rising and falling powers are likely to be knocked askew by a fickle and unpredictable fate.

As global wealth and power flow to Asia, even if it does not occur as quickly
and completely as some boosters maintain, America’s margin of superiority will
decline to some degree. Whether the international system moves toward a multipolar world, as forecast by Global Trends 2025, however, will depend to a large degree on how people perceive the relative shifts in power and how they choose to act on those perceptions.

America’s geographic position is fixed and has been a persistent source of
strength.

As Samuel Huntington has noted, US power “flows from its structural position in world politics ... geographically distant from most major areas of world conflict” as well as from “being involved in a historically uniquely diversified network of alliances.” Natural resources are another area of enduring advantage for the United States. America’s farmers and producers have never been more efficient or productive than they are today. Agriculture has been “a bastion of American competitiveness.” Energy resources are another advantage. The media have lavished a great deal of attention on the United States’ dependency on imported oil, a true strategic liability, but they have neglected coal and gas resources.

In fact, the United States (combined with Canada) trails only the Middle East in
the wealth of its energy resources. Industrial capacity is an area where the decline
of the US manufacturing sector has been seen as a surrogate for broader US decline. The United States’ transition to a post-industrial, information-echnologyoriented and heavily financialized economy was an important part of avoiding the predictions of “imperial overstretch” in the 1990s. In the wake of the Great Recession the post-industrial transition is seen as perhaps an Achilles’ heel of the US economy. These views probably underestimate a few factors that should help the United States navigate the current transition from the first unipolar era to whatever follows it.

Openness to innovation can play an important role in extending the United States’ leading role in the world. Some scholars believe that innovation is the key to countries emerging as system leaders in sectors that power long waves of economic activity and growth. Failure to maintain system leadership in these sectors is a key cause of decline. Another factor that may propel the United States to a more rapid recovery is the so-called “American creed,” which includes a very heavy dose of hostility to the role of the state in the economy. A larger private sector may well continue to provide entrepreneurs and innovators the scope to prolong America’s leading sector primacy in the international economy.

An additional, and extremely important, long-term factor underpinning likely
continued US global economic leadership is demographics. The US fertility rates
are among the highest in the developed world and are virtually at replacement.
With a growing population that will be more youthful than other developed countries (or China) the United States would appear to be in a favorable position. One could also add to the long list of US advantages the political and social stability that has made it the safe haven for global investors. None of these advantages, however, including the United States’ military power, mean that the United States is destined to remain the preponderant power or that unipolarity will continue to characterize the international system indefinitely. Bad policy decisions in a number of areas could negate or squander US advantages. In addition the United States faces many of its own challenges. Despite its demographic health the United States will have to meet the unfunded pension liabilities represented by the aging of the baby boom generation. The nation’s standing has also suffered from the mismanagement of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without a concerted effort by the United States, the international system could move in the direction of nonpolarity or apolarity with no nation clearly playing a leading role in trying to organize the international system. The result would be a vacuum of leadership unable to manage the plethora of contemporary problems besetting the world like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic and sectarians wars, humanitarian disasters, crime, narcotics trafficking, pandemic disease and global climate change to name just a few.

If the United States accepts the diagnosis of “decline” and seeks to accommodate itself to rising powers, it will likely hasten the timing of that decline and the passing of American primacy. If US leaders choose to continue the path that earlier generations of leaders have blazed in seeking to preserve the US position as the preponderant power, they will have to build on the advantages described above to bolster and extend US predominance.

One measure of the relative standing of nations is to consider the question:
“Whose problems would you rather have?” After the survey above, a reasonable person might conclude that, as great as the challenges are for the United States, the other potential powers face even more difficult and intractable problems. Notwithstanding the prediction of Global Trends 2025 that the world is moving toward multipolarity, it seems likely that US predominance could continue in a unipolar system, albeit one where US hegemony is less clear than it was in the 1990s. In this iteration, however, American primacy will be more constrained by US domestic and international economic limitations and more contested by regional powers. China will pose the biggest challenge in Asia, but potential new nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea will also create difficult questions about US extended deterrence in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia. Other troublesome challengers may arise, including Venezuela in the Western Hemisphere (particularly if it aligns with a nuclear-armed Iran).

The overwhelming focus on the BRICs in the declinist literature has tended to
divert attention from the fact that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has the
greatest potential to pose an early challenge to continued US primacy. As Charles
Krauthammer has written, “decline is a choice,” and can be avoided if the United States government takes some basic steps. The first is to get America’s house in order. Second, the United States will need to meet the reputational challenges it faces head on. The United States must be prepared to continue to defend the commons. Perhaps most important, the decline in the margin of US dominance and the emergence of challengers at the regional level will make US alliances and alliance management central concerns for US policymakers in a way that theyhave not been since the end of the Cold War.

Beyond improvements in the management of our traditional treaty-based and
informal alliances, the United States needs to look seriously at the shape of its alliance portfolio with an eye to developing relationships with countries that might contribute greater capability and utility than the traditional allies. We have seen that India is perhaps the single most important candidate for partnership or alliance with the United States. In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil may also be able to play a valuable regional stabilizing role in collaboration with the United States.

The possibility of avoiding multipolarity or non-polarity clearly exists. It requires 
xx Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments resolve to maintain the United States’ role as the “indispensable nation” and a strategy for doing so. At the dawn of the first unipolar era there was an effort at the Pentagon to think explicitly about a strategy for extending US predominance in the international system. Although the document that resulted, the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, became the subject of much misplaced criticism and controversy, its main outline became the de facto bipartisan strategy that underpinned the unipolar “moment” that, against most expectations, stretched into an era. If the United States is going to successfully manage the challenges of contested primacy, the moment to begin the debate on the strategy that will carry US power forward in the twenty-first century is now.