Peter Walker 強大不同平等 克服中美之間的誤解和差異

強大、不同、平等：克服中美之間的誤解和差異

強大、不同、平等：克服中美之間的誤解和差異

https://www.amazon.ca/Powerful-Different-Equal-Misconceptions-Differences/dp/1912555336
作者：Peter B Walker (作者) 2019 年 7 月 12 日
Peter B. Walker 是全球領先的管理谘詢公司麥肯錫公司的高級合夥人。 在公司工作的 46 年間，他與世界各地的眾多金融機構合作，重點關注中國。 彼得住在美國紐約。

從美國對華的咄咄逼人言辭，到不斷升級的針鋒相對的貿易戰，再到中國提出威脅美國先進技術全球領導地位的2025倡議，中美兩國（當今世界兩大主導力量）之間的緊張關係從未如此緊張。 更高。

本書對中美關係進行了及時的分析。 每種模式都深深植根於各自的曆史和文化，兩種模式都非常成功地實現了其主要目標，並且隨著時間的推移具有高度的彈性。 它探討了對治理、經濟、社會和軍事問題的核心誤解，以及這些誤解的根源。 作者認為，如果中美兩國能夠通過了解這些差異及其影響來縮小差距，那麽它們就可以共同努力克服全球問題，造福所有人。 更新後的平裝本包含了有關中美關係近期事件的新介紹。

彼得·B·沃克的觀點
美國需要轉變心態，以便與中國合作應對冠狀病毒大流行和其他全球問題
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3081963/shift-mindset-needed-so-us-can-work-china-tackle-coronavirus?
美國和中國需要建設性地接觸，接受棘手的分歧，並在從氣候、饑餓到核擴散等全球問題上共同發揮領導作用，而不是遏製和衝突。

彼得·B·沃克 彼得·B·沃克 2020 年 4 月 30 日
我們與中國的關係已經達到了一個關鍵的轉折點，由於 Covid-19，這一關係變得更加緊迫。 這種病毒和由此引發的大流行是一個正在展開的故事，但也出現了一些教訓。

首先，大多數國家 — — 包括美國 — — 根本沒有做好準備，即使病毒威脅已眾所周知。

我們還知道，對這一流行病反應相對較好的國家有很多值得學習的地方：韓國、台灣、新加坡，當然還有中國。 由於廣泛的檢測、監測、社交距離和隔離的結合，到目前為止，他們所經曆的健康和經濟影響相對較小。
想象一下，如果美國和中國宣布通過一個資金充足、人員充足的世界衛生組織進行協調和持續的領導，世界將如何慶祝。 然後，世界衛生組織可以傳播其對病毒的構成和傳播、最脆弱的情況、最有效的緩解技術、醫療用品、醫院設施和所需人員以及快速開發和分發疫苗所需的工作的研究。
庫存可以迅速建立並通過全球供應鏈獲取。 如果 Covid-19 來襲時采用這種模式，那麽人員和經濟損失可能隻是實際損失的一小部分。

我們沒有與中國合作，而是發現自己在做相反的事情，就像許多美國人一樣，將疫情直接歸咎於中國。 我們是如何到達這個曆史低點的？
1979年美中關係正常化後的幾十年裏，美國認為，隨著中國人民要求更大的自由和選擇領導人的權利，更加富裕的中國將轉向自由民主。

過去十年，美國逐漸認識到自己的假設是錯誤的，中國威脅到了其作為無可爭議的全球經濟領導者的地位。 相反，中國開始被視為戰略威脅。

這導致了美國新的遏製戰略。 經濟上，我們大力加強知識產權保護、減少對華貿易逆差、製造業就業回流等舉措。 我們還發起了貿易戰。
每周六

我們切斷了中國獲得某些先進技術的機會，並在南海提出了挑戰。 我們指責來訪的中國學生和科學家從事間諜活動，並收緊了他們的簽證。

我們攻擊“一帶一路”倡議是一個債務陷阱，旨在將中國的意誌和治理模式強加於發展中國家。 我們敦促其他國家禁止使用 5G 領導者華為，理由是北京會獲取傳輸信息進行間諜活動。
然而，遏製措施除了加劇緊張局勢外，幾乎沒有取得什麽成效（除了早就該實施的知識產權保護之外）。 在許多情況下，它們產生了相反的效果。

中國經濟雖然因貿易戰而放緩，但在城市化、快速增長的中產階級和崛起的服務業的推動下，其增長速度繼續明顯快於美國。

“一帶一路”倡議正在產生巨大的商譽和經濟機會，中國與非洲的貿易額目前幾乎是美國的四倍。 鑒於中國在可再生能源、高鐵、5G、先進計算和人工智能方麵取得的進步，中國有望取得成功。

每年，它增加的畢業生科學家、技術專家、工程師和數學家數量是美國同類畢業生人數的幾倍。 幾乎在所有方麵，遏製都失敗了。

我們需要的是回歸建設性參與，從而形成全球集體領導力。 為此，美國需要再次根本性的思維轉變。 雙方——尤其是美國——都需要接受每個國家的模式都植根於其獨特的曆史和文化。

美國模式源於歐洲早期定居者的經驗。 國父們擺脫了君主製、階級驅動的經濟體係和有限的自由，設計了一個擁有最大自由的極簡主義民主政府。 這個想法是讓美國由自由企業經濟而不是政府來塑造和驅動。

中國的模式是由儒家價值觀塑造的，重點關注家庭和社會。 其曆史上不斷受到北方入侵、洪水、饑荒和其他災難的威脅，也幾乎不可避免地導致了一個全能的中央政府。 模型中隱含的是，就像王朝一樣

隻要有人民的支持，政府就會持續下去。

與美國不同，美國公民在通過選舉選擇領導人時期望有一定的控製感，而中國則通過功績、持續的績效評估和考試來選擇領導人。 皮尤基金會的研究顯示，中國沒有地方政府以上級別的普選，但民眾對政府的支持率是全球最高的。

幾千年來，中國一直專注於國內 — — 與實行幹涉主義的美國傳播民主和保護人權形成鮮明對比。 在參與對外戰爭方麵，中國仍然是所有大國中最和平的記錄之一。

為了人民的最終利益，它在全球範圍內積極改善經濟。 盡管對華鷹派斷言，中國已經證明它沒有興趣輸出其治理模式。

Powerful, Different, Equal: Overcoming the Misconceptions and Differences Between China and the US 

https://www.amazon.ca/Powerful-Different-Equal-Misconceptions-Differences/dp/1912555336

by Peter B Walker (Author) July 12 2019
Peter B. Walker is a Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, the world's leading management consultancy firm. During his 46 years at the firm, he worked with a wide range of financial institutions around the world, with a focus on China. Peter lives in New York, USA.

From the aggressive US rhetoric against China, to the escalating trade war with tit for tat responses, and China's 2025 initiative that threatens the US global leadership in advanced technologies, tensions between the US and China (the two dominant forces of today's world) have never been higher.

This book provides a timely analysis of the US-China relationship. Each model is deeply rooted in their respective histories and cultures, with both models highly successful in achieving their main goals and highly resilient over time. It explores the core misconceptions on governance, economic, social and military issues, and the root causes of these misconceptions. If China and US could close the gap by each understanding those differences and their implications, the author argues, they could work together to overcome global issues to the benefit of all. This updated paperback edition includes a new introduction covering recent events in US-China relations.

Opinion  by Peter B. Walker

Shift in mindset needed so US can work with China to tackle coronavirus pandemic and other global issues

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3081963/shift-mindset-needed-so-us-can-work-china-tackle-coronavirus?

Instead of containment and conflict, the US and China need to engage constructively, accept intractable differences, and move towards co-leadership on global issues from climate and hunger to nuclear proliferation

 

 Peter B. Walker  30 Apr 2020

We have reached a critical inflection point in our relationship with China, made all the more urgent due to Covid-19. The virus and resulting pandemic are an unfolding story, yet several lessons have emerged.

The first is that most countries – including the United States – were simply unprepared, even as the viral threat became well known.

 

We also know there is much to learn from countries that have responded relatively well to the pandemic: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and, yes, China. They have experienced relatively modest health and economic effects so far, thanks to some combination of extensive testing, monitoring, social distancing and quarantining.

Imagine how the world would celebrate if the US and China were to announce a coordinated and continuing leadership through a fully funded and staffed World Health Organisation. The WHO could then disseminate its research on the make-up and spread of the virus, profile of the most vulnerable, most effective mitigation techniques, medical supplies, hospital facilities and staff required, and work necessary to rapidly develop and distribute a vaccine.

Stockpiles could quickly be built up and accessed via global supply chains. If that model were in place when Covid-19 hit, the human and economic losses are likely to have been a fraction of what they will be.

Instead of working with China, we find ourselves doing the opposite, like many in the US, blaming the pandemic squarely on the Chinese. How did we arrive at this historic low point?

For decades after the US and China normalised relations in 1979, the US assumed a wealthier China would shift towards liberal democracy as Chinese people demanded greater freedoms and the right to select their leaders.

Over the past decade, the US has come to understand that its assumption was wrong and that China threatened its role as the undisputed global leader, economically. China began to be perceived as a strategic threat instead.

 

This led to a new US strategy of containment. Economically, we took initiatives to substantially increase intellectual property protection, reduce the trade deficit with China and repatriate manufacturing jobs. We also launched a trade war.

EVERY SATURDAY

 

 

e cut China’s access to some advanced technologies and challenged it in the South China Sea. We accused visiting Chinese students and scientists of spying, and tightened up on their visas.

 

We attacked the Belt and Road Initiative as a debt trap designed to force China’s will and governance model on developing countries. We urged other countries to ban the use of 5G leader Huawei, on the theory that Beijing would access transmissions to spy.

Yet containment has accomplished little other than to increase tensions (with the exception of the long overdue intellectual property protection). In many cases, they had the opposite effect.

China’s economy, though slowed by the trade war, continues to grow significantly faster than America’s, fuelled by urbanisation, a rapidly growing middle class and a rising services industry.

The Belt and Road Initiative is generating substantial goodwill and economic opportunities, with China’s trade with Africa now nearly four times larger than the US’. China is positioned to succeed, given its advances in renewable energy, high-speed rail, 5G, advanced computing and artificial intelligence.

Every year, it adds a population of graduating scientists, technology specialists, engineers and mathematicians several times larger than the comparable US graduate pool. In nearly every way, containment has failed.

What we need is a return to constructive engagement that would lead to collective global leadership. For this, the US needs another fundamental mindset shift. There needs to be acceptance on both sides – particularly the US – that each country’s model is rooted in its unique history and culture.

The US model emerged from early settlers’ experience in Europe. Having escaped monarchies, a class-driven economic system and limited freedoms, the founding fathers designed a minimalist democratic government with maximum freedoms. The idea was to have America shaped and driven by its free enterprise economy, not the government.

China’s model was shaped by Confucian values with a focus on family and society. Its history of constant threats of invasions from the north, floods, famines and other disasters also led, almost inevitably, to an all-powerful central government. Implicit in the model is that, like dynasties, governments would endure as long as they had people’s support.

Unlike the US, where citizens expect some sense of control while selecting leaders through elections, China selects its leaders through merit, ongoing performance reviews and examinations. China has no popular election above local-government level but popular support for the government is among the highest globally, according to Pew Foundation research.

For thousands of years, China focused inward – in contrast to an interventionist US spreading democracy and protecting human rights. China still has among the most peaceful records of any major country in terms of involvement in foreign wars.

 

It is active globally to improve its economy for the ultimate benefit of its people. Despite assertions by China hawks, China has proven it has no interest in exporting its governance model.