風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
華盛頓必須扭轉烏克蘭僵局
https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/02/09/washington-must-pivot-to-break-the-deadlock-in-ukraine/
作者：克裏斯托弗·莫特 2024 年 2 月 9 日
結論
隨著環城公路關於烏克蘭戰爭要麽是一場偉大的文明衝突，要麽是一場民主聖戰的敘事的崩潰，任何關於美國及其盟友等外部勢力是否應該繼續支持在烏克蘭的動態行動的判斷都必須基於衝突如何進行。 將影響全球力量平衡。
由於假設烏克蘭在這一計算中發揮著關鍵作用，許多分析人士無意中應用了一種過時且誤導性的新麥金德參考框架，該框架的重點是歐亞“心髒地帶”對全球海上強國美國的重要性。 因此，他們忽視了全球力量平衡的變化，並完全誤解了對美國真正至關重要的世界地區。
雖然烏克蘭的命運可能對東歐內部和周邊的幾個地區參與者至關重要，但它在這些鄰近地區之外缺乏太大的全球影響。 此外，許多此類國家（即波蘭或德國）都足夠強大，可以在不需要美國額外軍事介入的情況下抗衡俄羅斯在該地區的設計，從而使華盛頓能夠將重點轉向其他優先事項。
考慮到美國在烏克蘭戰爭中付出的高昂代價及其戰略短視，華盛頓必須轉向外交，努力與俄羅斯通過談判找到解決方案。 畢竟，世界上大多數常規衝突最終都是通過外交解決，而不是壓倒性勝利。27
然而，考慮到當前戰場的僵局以及人力和後勤方麵的預期軌跡，談判的任何進一步拖延隻會削弱基輔未來的談判手氣。
烏克蘭國家通過其戰鬥決心，已經從俄羅斯手中榨取了高昂的代價，並從莫斯科手中獲得了戰略自主權。 然而，考慮到目前戰場的僵局以及人力和後勤方麵的預期軌跡，談判的任何進一步拖延隻會削弱基輔未來的談判手氣。
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2023年本來應該是大攻勢之年。 這證明，一支由北約武裝、訓練有素的烏克蘭軍隊可以在 2022 年英雄般的失敗表現的基礎上繼續發揚光大，並將俄羅斯人趕回 2014 年的接觸線。 與之前烏克蘭的攻勢不同，例如非常成功的哈爾科夫行動，這次襲擊的目標和地點被告知全世界，並在俄羅斯常規物質優勢（尤其是火炮方麵）麵前陷入困境。
隨著這次行動的失敗，有關俄羅斯-烏克蘭戰爭的主流敘事再次發生了顯著變化。 戰爭開始時，人們對俄羅斯不可避免地會以征服整個烏克蘭國家的形式取得勝利的悲觀預測，然後鑒於俄羅斯在戰爭開始時多次令人尷尬的失敗，迅速轉向對烏克蘭全麵勝利的樂觀預測。 一種極端讓位於另一種極端。 不可否認，俄羅斯在2022年的表現——尤其是在後勤方麵——極其糟糕。然而，一旦俄羅斯的軍事決心明顯不會立即瓦解，這一事實並沒有改變兩國之間的基本力量平衡。
隻有少數國家支持俄羅斯進攻烏克蘭。 盡管如此，世界上大多數人仍將其視為一場歐洲局部戰爭。 為了反駁這一論點，並通過以軍火和製裁的形式提供前所未有的援助來支持西方對烏克蘭的支持，大西洋主義建製派試圖將這場戰爭描述為一場針對俄羅斯帝國的基於價值觀和生存的鬥爭—— 暗指中國和伊朗——一心想通過“獨裁軸心”統治世界。1 到 2024 年，這種說法幾乎已經站不住腳了。2
重要的是，西方關於烏克蘭戰爭作為我們這個時代關鍵道德鬥爭的全球重要性的言論已經被放棄，北大西洋開始探索外交解決方案的可行性，這表明，甚至許多西方政策製定者也認為， 烏克蘭戰爭是大國競爭的一個實例，而不是民主國家與獨裁國家之間價值觀的重大文明衝突。 3
烏克蘭後，第三方國家的行為集中於其國家利益，這表明世界已經不再采用華盛頓的優先事項——這意味著那些往往“全球化”的優先事項與許多國家麵臨的地緣政治現實不同步。 世界各地。
此外，烏克蘭事件後，第三方國家專注於其國家利益的行為表明，世界已經不再接受華盛頓的優先考慮。暗示那些經常“全球化”的優先事項與世界許多國家麵臨的地緣政治現實不同步。
長期以來，印度一直被華盛頓視為反華一極，但它幾乎沒有采取任何行動來破壞與俄羅斯的關係，甚至自 2022 年以來還擴大了與莫斯科的商業關係。4 與此同時，許多非洲國家感受到了利用衝突重新平衡關係的機會 對俄羅斯有利，尋求比以前從“西方”夥伴關係中獲得的更公平的安全安排。 對於世界上許多國家來說，更加多極化的世界意味著大國之間相互競爭的機會更大，以便為自己爭取最好的結果。 5
許多北約聯盟國家押注烏克蘭可能成為一場全球性的十字軍東征，以激發國際支持，但這一賭注已經失敗。 由於大量資源被花費在一場沒有直接威脅北約聯盟任何成員的衝突上，在多年來“Blob”忽視衝突的基本現實之後，一些現實主義終於開始滲透到討論中。
然而，為了取得成功，外交支持者必須明白，兩年來關於這是我們這個時代最重要的鬥爭的言論不會在一夜之間消失。 目前說服主流反對派相信外交必要性的關鍵在於強調烏克蘭及其最終與俄羅斯邊界的確切性質（基輔是否承認）最終與全球力量平衡無關。
全球均勢與中心地帶理論
烏克蘭的命運很可能對其周邊國家至關重要，但任何關於其與具有全球利益的遙遠大國的相關性的論點都更加值得懷疑。 美國仍然是最重要的全球大國，這就是為什麽它與戰後現狀掛鉤並反對對世界秩序的修正主義設計。
最終，美國的利益歸結為防止競爭對手實現全球霸權。 這可以通過近海平衡戰略來實現，即海軍強國利用其距離和海上力量來增強其他國家阻礙修正主義對手的能力。 6 然而，由於全球反恐戰爭時代繼承的政策 華盛頓發現自己已經過度擴張，在世界各地部署了太多的絆線軍事設施和脆弱的後勤供應鏈。
其中許多戰略糾葛都與美國的核心利益無關，阻礙了美國成為有效的離岸平衡者。
其中許多戰略糾葛都與美國的核心利益無關，阻礙了美國成為有效的離岸平衡者。 他們甚至可能將美國軍隊減少為衝突地區的弱勢旁觀者，而不是阻止其他大國在地區外越權行為的決定性行動者。
在一個對兵力投射進行嚴格限製的多中心世界中，美國及其盟國必須確定地區優先事項並減少隨意幹預。 烏克蘭根本沒有被列入地緣戰略優先事項清單，特別是考慮到中國的崛起。7
盡管如此，美國仍然存在一個至上主義派係，他們依靠聽起來現實主義的主張和基於利益的語言來支持美國繼續參與烏克蘭及其他地區的事務。 多夫·紮克海姆 (Dov Zakheim)8 和安德魯·米奇塔 (Andrew Michta)9 等美國戰略家利用“歐亞同時性”等地緣政治理論，認為烏克蘭對美國的全球戰略態勢至關重要。 因此，我們必須根據這些主張本身的條件來調查其優點和起源。
1904年，英國地理學家、學者哈爾福德·麥金德在《地理雜誌》上發表了一篇題為《曆史的地理樞軸》的文章。 這篇文章最終在英國和美國的地緣政治圈中產生了相當大的影響，它認為海上強國對世界事務毫無疑問的主導地位的時代即將結束。 技術變革，特別是鐵路和電報形式的技術變革，將為大型歐亞大陸帝國（尤其是俄羅斯）帶來巨大收益。
麥金德假設俄羅斯（或者，崛起的德國以犧牲俄羅斯甚至俄德聯盟為代價在東歐獲得領土）將控製內陸資源，並保持足夠的保護距離，使英國皇家無法觸及 海軍，從而創建了一個無懈可擊的歐亞帝國。 麥金德認為，由於世界上大多數人口居住在歐亞大陸，任何能夠主宰超級大陸的力量都將很快主宰世界。 這就是“中心地帶”，世界上更多的沿海地區被稱為“邊緣地帶”。 因此，根據麥金德的說法，保持心髒地帶的分裂以防止這種假設的全球統治的發生符合英國的利益。該理論在文章發表後的第二年就失去了一些吸引力，日本成功遏製了俄羅斯在太平洋的野心，莫斯科和倫敦開始了反德協約。 與此同時，第一次世界大戰導致俄羅斯和德國（暫時）失去了世界事務中決定性力量的地位。
然而，第二次世界大戰結束後，蘇聯崛起，成為僅有的兩個仍然屹立不倒的超級大國之一。 在這樣的環境下，許多人重新審視了麥金德的觀點，修改和更新了它們以適應戰後世界。 從當代政策角度來看，最著名的是卡特政府的國家安全顧問茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基。 從該職位退休後，布熱津斯基重申了麥金德的論點，但從美國的角度來看，他在 1997 年頗具影響力的著作《大棋盤》中指出：單一大國對歐亞大陸的統治現在是美國的首要安全關切，它需要積極的 美國參與世界許多地區的預防工作11
麥金德-布熱津斯基關於潛伏在歐亞“心髒地帶”的全球威脅的舊觀點實際上被用來為繼續支持戰略上不健全的政策提供名義上的、現實主義的信任。
雖然這一新麥金德理論第一部分背後的邏輯總體上是合理的，但歐亞大陸由一個國家霸權的假設不僅在曆史上不可信，而且極其可疑。 也就是說，對美國競爭對手主宰歐亞大陸的理性恐懼，與俄羅斯自然希望在其周邊國家建立勢力範圍的願望混為一談。 12 美國幹預東歐的鼓吹者暗示，通過北約和諸如此類的聯合堡壘進行強有力的軍事反應。 烏克蘭將擊退莫斯科的領土擴張主義，並削弱俄羅斯相對於美國的地位。 13 然而，俄羅斯（甚至與其盟友一起）不僅缺乏通過帝國征服統一歐亞大陸的能力，而且幾乎沒有跡象表明 他們有任何這樣做的願望。 因此，麥金德-布熱津斯基關於潛伏在歐亞“心髒地帶”的全球威脅的舊觀點實際上被用來為繼續支持戰略上不健全的政策提供名義上的、現實主義的信任。
隨後發生的事件，包括美國在中東無休止的戰爭，表明該理論的第二個指令，即呼籲美國在歐亞大陸及其周邊地區進行更積極的幹預，更加值得懷疑。 麥金德關於陸地基礎設施將迅速超過使用貨船的海上貿易量的預測要麽是錯誤的，要麽尚未實現。 布熱津斯基的推論，即中亞對於美國保持歐亞大國分裂的利益至關重要，也未能令人信服，因為那裏的國家缺乏地區團結，被地區大國所掩蓋，因此無法形成一個可行的平衡集團或 甚至成為中國或俄羅斯全球力量投射的關鍵。
歐亞大陸的陸路距離以及居住在其中的國家和文化的高度差異，再加上它們的曆史競爭，自然阻止了中國或俄羅斯等美國主要競爭對手在歐亞大陸建立任何有意義的有凝聚力的霸權秩序。 與此同時，美國力量越深入歐亞大陸內部並遠離其海上力量中心，其後果就越嚴重，正如伊拉克和阿富汗戰爭所表明的那樣。 結果，華盛頓對歐亞大陸以外地區的主導地位的追求浪費了其資源，並驅使不同的行為體結盟反對它——如果美國不介入，這些行為體將是天然的競爭對手。 14
從短期到中期來看，邊緣地區仍然是大國之間爭奪優勢以打破世界力量平衡的中心地帶。 中國的崛起以及力量在東北亞和北美的集中，使太平洋變得更加中心，從而進一步挑戰了麥金德關於歐亞內陸中心地帶的戰略重要性的觀點。 在此背景下，現在是時候從美國的角度重新審視烏克蘭與全球權力博弈無關的問題了。
烏克蘭在北大西洋戰略中的邊緣地位
烏克蘭是歐洲的一個重要國家，這可能在一定程度上解釋了它作為全球安全關鍵的新聲譽。 但從一個擁有全球利益的世界大國的角度來看，這種聲譽就更難維持了。 雖然基輔在戰前擁有 4300 萬人口和令人印象深刻的農業部門，15 但現在幾乎完全依賴外國軍事硬件——無論是繳獲的俄羅斯設備還是工業和軍事進口——並且正在經曆嚴重的人口下降壓力，這損害了其長期發展。 軍事和戰略價值。16 烏克蘭的支持者對戰爭至關重要與地麵主要戰鬥人員相比，他們維持升級主導地位的能力也在動搖。 17
然而，從遙遠的全球大國的角度判斷一個國家的重要性的真正決定因素不是絕對排名，而是相對排名和情境排名。 與摩爾多瓦或奧地利相比，烏克蘭似乎是當地重要的地區大國，但其最大的陸地邊界是與強大得多的俄羅斯接壤。 它還與另一個自信的中等強國土耳其共享黑海地區。 稍微遠一點的是德國，其次是法國、意大利和英國。 鑒於中等強國的最佳定義是其地區實力和在特定鄰國的行動自由，烏克蘭根本不符合資格。18 基輔仍然是其曆史上一直以來的樣子：一個位於不同地區和地區邊界的斷層國家。 文化安全綜合體。
這揭示了一個奇怪但不可避免的事實：沒有一個北約國家與烏克蘭建立正式聯盟。 即使在今天，烏克蘭未來是否會加入聯盟——即使在物質和言辭上都表現出團結一致——充其量也是不確定的。 由於北約本身沒有受到攻擊，並且擁有核威懾和常規威懾，因此有關烏克蘭的損失會給整個北約國家帶來更大風險的說法充其量是毫無根據的。 從美國的角度來看，保護歐洲相對於俄羅斯的力量平衡的關鍵不在烏克蘭，而在德國和土耳其等已經在安全安排上與美國正式掛鉤的國家。 最後但並非最不重要的一點是，歐洲本身可能不再像冷戰期間那樣成為維持全球力量平衡的核心。
烏克蘭是俄羅斯永久的眼中釘？
就目前情況而言，美國和俄羅斯是無可否認的地緣政治競爭對手。 因此，必須根據烏克蘭自身的情況來考慮烏克蘭作為莫斯科周邊國家潛在毒丸的地位。 對俄羅斯造成最大損害，或者利用烏克蘭作為代理人讓俄羅斯“流血”19，其好處是否超過了這種政策的巨大成本？
盡管“戰爭迷霧”籠罩著對任何正在進行的衝突的評估，但仍然可以收集到某些觀察結果。 從北大西洋勢力的角度來看，支持烏克蘭的論點在於其威懾潛力，可以抑製俄羅斯未來針對其周邊國家的軍事冒險主義。 雖然頓巴斯的命運與任何與烏克蘭沒有直接邊界的國家無關，但為俄羅斯奪取新地產的高昂成本最終可能會導致莫斯科未來更加克製。 這種觀點認為，俄羅斯傷亡人數高於預期也可能導致俄羅斯人民更加不願采取未來的冒險主義。
這與北大西洋國家似乎從戰爭中獲得的另一個好處相結合：提高了與俄羅斯接壤的國家的懷疑和不安全程度，特別是那些擁有大量俄羅斯少數民族人口的國家。 哈薩克斯坦也許是繼烏克蘭之後受俄羅斯民族統一主義威脅最大的國家，自烏克蘭戰爭爆發以來，哈薩克斯坦製定了更加獨立的外交政策方針，盡管它仍然與俄羅斯保持著友好關係。20對莫斯科的負麵情緒也激發了芬蘭和瑞典的情緒，這兩個國家此前（ 正式）不結盟國家，申請加入北約聯盟。 也許最引人注目的是，俄羅斯可能已經贏得了絕大多數烏克蘭人的長期敵意，無論邊界的未來到底在哪裏，這種敵意都將在其邊界上醞釀。
西方烏克蘭政策的全球影響
因此，美國對烏克蘭的幹涉主義政策表麵上的好處也伴隨著巨大的負麵影響。 歐洲每一次團結在華盛頓的大西洋主義周圍，世界其他地方就會出現更多背離西方政策的行為。 21
如前所述，印度證明了一個中等規模的大國能夠並且將會如何繞過北大西洋的製裁製度。 土耳其是北約的正式盟友，但比大多數國家擁有更多的自主權，它巧妙地利用其控製馬爾馬拉海峽的戰略位置與俄羅斯和烏克蘭接觸，希望成為兩國之間的外交媒介，同時也樂意為基輔提供物資 武器和莫斯科在製裁方麵存在漏洞。22伊朗和朝鮮都通過間接協助俄羅斯的戰爭努力來提高其全球影響力。
此外，俄羅斯圍繞許多關鍵國防相關產業的軍事再工業化、國內經濟的重振以及隨後將商業轉向中國，表明北約主導的經濟製裁幾乎沒有達到預期的效果。 實際上，它們可能不僅降低了西方的外交影響力23 目前，俄羅斯經濟處於戰時基礎，其彈藥和裝備的生產正在增加。 除非軍事士氣出現某種看似合理但不太可能崩潰的情況，否則隨著衝突持續的時間越長，莫斯科將加強其在烏克蘭問題上的地位。
北大西洋對烏克蘭投資的增加削弱了這種實力，並加劇了美國對世界非關鍵地區太多承諾的後勤擔憂。
當歐洲是美國的主要關注焦點時，支持烏克蘭的代理人戰爭可能是一個明智的策略，但考慮到多極世界中大國競爭的更高成本，這一策略尤其不謹慎。 作為北大西洋聯盟的關鍵成員，美國在不切實際地尋求東歐優勢的過程中，其外交影響力和軍事剩餘庫存已被耗盡。東歐幾個世紀以來一直是俄羅斯實力的支柱，並認為該地區是俄羅斯的天然優勢。 勢力範圍。 但即使在冷戰期間，莫斯科在從烏拉爾山脈到喀爾巴阡山脈的東歐平原的天然優勢也沒有削弱華盛頓的全球實力。 如果說有什麽影響的話，那就是北大西洋對烏克蘭投資的增加削弱了這種實力，並加劇了美國對世界非關鍵地區太多承諾的後勤擔憂。 25
這一切，最近中東發生的事件進一步證實了這一點。 盡管美國在西亞的永久存在與它在東歐的積極參與一樣令人懷疑，但華盛頓的政策製定者（如果不是布魯塞爾或倫敦的政策製定者）如此迅速地將注意力從烏克蘭轉向以色列/巴勒斯坦表明， 即使在 Blob 的幹預主義派係中，當烏克蘭必須與其他優先擁護者競爭時，它也不是一個次要的優先事項。 26
Washington Must Pivot to Break the Deadlock in Ukraine
https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/02/09/washington-must-pivot-to-break-the-deadlock-in-ukraine/
BY: Christopher Mott Feb 9, 2024
Conclusion
With the crumbling of Beltway narratives about the Ukraine War as either a grand civilizational clash or a jihad for democracy, any judgment about whether external powers such as the United States and its allies should still support kinetic operations in Ukraine must be based on how the conflict will impact the global balance of power.
By assuming that Ukraine plays a critical role in that calculation, many analysts inadvertently apply an outdated and misguided neo-Mackinderian frame of reference focused on the supposed import of the Eurasian “heartland” to a global maritime power that is the United States. They thus lose sight of the shifting global balance of power and categorically misunderstand the world regions that truly are of vital importance to the United States.
While the fate of Ukraine may be crucial to several regional players within and around Eastern Europe, it lacks much of a global repercussion beyond those immediate regions. Furthermore, many such countries (i.e. Poland or Germany) are strong enough to counterbalance Russian designs in the region without any additional U.S. military involvement, allowing Washington to pivot to other priorities.
Considering the high costs of the Ukraine war for the United States and its strategic shortsightedness, Washington must pivot to diplomacy and try to find a negotiated solution with Russia. After all, the majority of conventional conflicts around the world are ultimately resolved through diplomacy, not overwhelming victory.27
Through its resolve to fight, the Ukrainian state has already extracted a high price from Russia and secured its strategic autonomy from Moscow. Considering the current stalemate on the battlefield and the expected trajectories in manpower and logistics, however, any further delay in talks will only weaken Kyiv’s negotiating hand down the road.
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2023 was supposed to be the year of the Great Offensive. The proof that a NATO-armed and trained Ukrainian army could continue to build upon the successes of its heroic, underdog performance of 2022 and drive the Russians back to the 2014 lines of contact. Unlike previous Ukrainian offensives, such as the highly successful Kharkiv operation, the objectives and location of this attack were telegraphed to the world and floundered in the face of conventional Russian material superiority, especially in artillery.
With the collapse of this operation, the mainstream narrative about the Russia-Ukraine war has once again shifted remarkably. The war opened with gloomy predictions of inevitable Russian victory in the form of conquering the entire Ukrainian country, then rapidly pivoted towards euphoric forecasts of total Ukrainian victory in light of the multiple embarrassing Russian failures at the beginning of the war. One extreme gave way to another. It is undeniable that Russian performance—especially in regards to logistics—was extremely poor in 2022. Yet, this fact did not change the fundamental balance of power between the two countries once it became apparent that Russian military resolve would not immediately crack.
Only a handful of countries supported Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Still, most of the world viewed it as a local European war. To counter this argument, as well as to bolster support for the West’s backing of Ukraine with unprecedented assistance in the form of munitions and sanctions, the Atlanticist establishment sought to frame the war as a values-based and existential struggle against an imperial Russia—and by implication China and Iran— bent on world domination through an “authoritarian axis”.1 By 2024, this narrative has all but faltered.2
Importantly, the speed at which the Western rhetoric about the global import of the Ukraine War as the pivotal moral struggle of our time has been abandoned and the North Atlantic is beginning to explore the viability of a diplomatic solution shows that even many Western policymakers view the Ukraine war as an instantiation of great-power competition rather than as a grand civilizational clash of values between democracies and autocracies.3
Moreover, the post-Ukraine behavior of third-party states, focused on their national interests, demonstrates how the world has already moved on from adopting Washington’s priorities—implying that those often “globalized’ priorities are out of sync with the geopolitical realities faced by many nations around the world.
Long courted as a counter-China pole by Washington, India has done little to undermine its relations with Russia, even expanding its commercial ties with Moscow since 2022.4 Many countries in Africa, meanwhile, sensed an opportunity to capitalize on the conflict and rebalance their relations in Russia’s favor, seeking more equitable security arrangements than those they formerly got from “Western” partnerships. To many countries around the world, a more multipolar world translates into greater opportunity for bidding the great powers against each other in order to get the best outcome for themselves.5
The bet many NATO-aligned countries made that Ukraine could become a global crusade around which to galvanize international support has failed. With massive amounts of resources being spent on a conflict that has not directly threatened any member of the NATO alliance, some realism has at last begun to penetrate the discussion after years of the Blob overlooking the fundamental realities of the conflict.
To achieve success, however, supporters of diplomacy must understand that two years of rhetoric about this being the most important struggle of our era will not disappear overnight. The key to persuading mainstream opposition about the necessity of diplomacy at this moment lies in emphasizing that neither Ukraine nor the exact nature of its eventual borders with Russia (recognized by Kyiv or not) is ultimately relevant to the global balance of power.
The Global Balance of Power and Heartland Theory
Ukraine’s fate may well be of critical import to the countries bordering it, but any argument for its relevance to more distant powers with global interests is far more suspect. The United States remains the most significant global power, which is why it is tied to the Postwar status quo and opposes revisionist designs on the world order.
In the end, U.S. interest boils down to preventing global hegemony by a rival power. This can be done via the strategy of offshore balancing, where a naval power uses its distance and seapower to enhance the ability of other states that stand in the way of revisionist rivals.6 However, due to policies inherited from the Global War on Terror era, Washington finds itself overextended, with too many tripwire military deployments and vulnerable logistical supply chains across the world.
Many of these strategic entanglements are peripheral to America’s core interests and prevent it from being an effective off-shore balancer. They may even reduce U.S. forces to vulnerable spectators in a conflict zone rather than decisive actors deterring extra-regional overreach by other great powers.
In a polycentric world of hard limits on force projection, the U.S. and its allies must establish regional priorities and reduce haphazard interventions. Ukraine simply does not make the list of geostrategic priorities, especially given the rise of China.7
Nevertheless, there exists a primacist faction in America that relies on realist-sounding claims and an interest-based language to champion continued U.S. involvement in Ukraine and beyond. Using geopolitical rationales such as “Eurasian Simultaneity”, U.S. strategists like Dov Zakheim8 and Andrew Michta,9 among others, posit that Ukraine is critical to America’s global strategic posture. We must therefore investigate the merit and origins of such claims on their own terms.
In 1904, the British geographer and scholar Halford Mackinder released an article in The Geographic Journal titled “The Geographic Pivot of History”. This piece, which would eventually become quite influential in both British and American geopolitical circles, postulated that the age of the maritime power’s unquestioned dominance over world affairs was coming to a close. Technological changes, particularly in the form of railroads and telegraphs, were going to produce massive gains for large, land-based Eurasian empires, particularly Russia.
Mackinder hypothesized that Russia (or, alternatively, an ascendant Germany making territorial gains in Eastern Europe at the expense of Russia or even a Russo-German alliance) would control resources inland with enough protective distance that they would be out of reach for the British Royal Navy, thus creating an unassailable Eurasian empire. Since the majority of the world’s population lived in Eurasia, Mackinder argued, any power that could dominate the supercontinent would soon dominate the world. This was “The Heartland”, with the more coastal parts of the world referred to as “The Rimland”. It therefore served the interests of the British, according to Mackinder, to keep the Heartland divided to prevent this hypothetical global domination from occurring.10
The theory lost some traction early on as the year after the article’s release saw Japan successfully check Russian ambitions in the Pacific, and Moscow and London began an anti-German entente. Meanwhile, The First World War resulted in Russia and Germany being (temporarily) knocked out as decisive powers in world affairs.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, however, the Soviet Union rose as one of only two superpowers to remain standing. In such an environment, many revisited Mackinder’s views, revising and updating them to fit the Postwar world. The most notable from a contemporary policy perspective was Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of the Carter Administration. After retiring from that office, Brzezinski reiterated Mackinder’s arguments but from an American perspective in his influential 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard: The domination of the Eurasian landmass by a single power was now the primary security concern of the United States, and it required active U.S. involvement in many parts of the world to prevent.11
While the logic behind the first part of this neo-Mackinderian theory is generally sound, the very presumption of Eurasian hegemony by one state is not only historically implausible but also extremely dubious. Namely, the rational fear of a U.S. rival dominating Eurasia is confounded with Russia’s natural desire for a sphere of influence in its near abroad.12 It is implied by advocates of U.S. interventionism in Eastern Europe that a robust military response through NATO and aligned bulwarks like Ukraine will repel Moscow’s territorial expansionism and weaken Russia’s position vis-a-vis the United States.13 However, not only does Russia (even together with its allies) lack the ability to unite Eurasia through imperial conquest, but there is also little indication that they have any desire to do so. As such, the old Mackinder-Brzezinski view of a global threat lurking in the Eurasian “heartland” is actually being used to give nominal, realist credence to continued support for a strategically unsound policy.
Subsequent events, including America’s endless wars in the Middle East, have shown that the theory’s second directive, which calls for more active U.S. intervention in and around Eurasia, is even more suspect. Mackinder’s prediction that land infrastructure would rapidly come to surpass the volume of maritime trade using cargo vessels is either incorrect or has not yet materialized. Brzezinski’s corollary that Central Asia would be vital for U.S. interests in keeping the Eurasian powers divided has also failed to convince, as the states there lack regional unity, are overshadowed by the regional powers, and are thus unable to form either a viable balancing bloc or even to serve as the lynchpin for global power projection for either China or Russia.
The overland distances within Eurasia and the high degree of variance of the states and cultures inhabiting it, combined with their historical rivalries, naturally prevent major U.S. rivals like China or Russia from establishing any kind of meaningful cohesive hegemonic order across Eurasia. Meanwhile, the further U.S. power moves into inner Eurasia and away from its maritime center of strength, the more calamitous the results can be, as shown by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, Washington’s pursuit of primacy over areas beyond the Eurasian Rimland has squandered its resources and driven disparate actors to align against it—actors who, absent U.S. involvement there, would be natural rivals.14
Over the short to medium term, the Rimland remains the central zone of contestation between great powers jockeying for advantage to tip the balance of power in the world. The rise of China and the concentration of power in Northeast Asia and North America has made the Pacific even more central, thus further challenging Mackinder’s notions about the strategic import of an inland Eurasian heartland. In this context, it is high time to revisit Ukraine’s irrelevance to the global balance of power game from a U.S.-based perspective.
Ukraine’s Peripheral Position in North Atlantic Strategy
Ukraine is a significant country in Europe, which may partly explain its newfound reputation as a lynchpin for global security. From the perspective of a world power with global interests, however, this reputation is harder to uphold. While home to 43 million people and an impressive agricultural sector before the war,15 Kyiv is now almost entirely dependent on foreign military hardware—whether captured Russian equipment or industrial and military imports—and is experiencing severe downward demographic pressures that undermine its long-term military and strategic value.16 The supporters of Ukraine, who are so critical to the war effort, are also wavering in their ability to maintain any sense of escalation dominance compared to the primary combatants on the ground.17
The true determining factors in judging a country’s importance from the perspective of distant global powers, however, are to be found not in absolute rankings but in relative and situational ones. Ukraine may seem a locally consequential regional power when compared to Moldova or Austria, but its largest land border is with the far stronger Russia. It also shares the Black Sea region with yet another assertive middle power, Turkey. A bit further afield lies Germany, followed by France, Italy, and Britain. Given that a middle power is best defined by its regional strength and freedom of action in a specific neighborhood, Ukraine simply does not qualify.18 Kyiv remains what it has been throughout its history: a fault-line state in the borderlands of different regional and cultural security complexes.
This sheds some light on the strange but unavoidable fact that not a single NATO country has a formal alliance with Ukraine. Even today, the future inclusion of Ukraine into the alliance—even after all this material and rhetorical solidarity—is uncertain at best. Since NATO itself is not under attack, and has both nuclear and conventional deterrence, claims that a loss for Ukraine poses a greater risk for NATO countries in general are unfounded at best. From an American perspective, the key to protecting the balance of power vis-a-vis Russia in Europe is not to be found in Ukraine, but in countries like Germany and Turkey that are already formally tied to the U.S. in security arrangements. Last but not least, Europe itself may no longer be central to maintaining the global balance of power as it once was during the Cold War.
Ukraine as a Permanent Thorn in Russia’s Side?
As things stand, the United States and Russia are undeniable geopolitical rivals. So Ukraine’s position as a potential poison pill in Moscow’s near abroad has to be considered on its own terms. Do the benefits of inflicting maximum damage on Russia, or giving it a “bloody nose”19 by using Ukraine as a proxy, outweigh the extraordinary costs of such a policy?
Despite the “fog of war” that clouds the assessment of any ongoing conflict, certain observations can still be gleaned. From the perspective of the North Atlantic establishment, the argument for supporting Ukraine rests on its deterrence potential for inhibiting Russia from future military adventurism targeting its near abroad. While the fate of the Donbass is irrelevant to any country that lacks immediate borders with Ukraine, the high costs of seizing new real estate for Russia might, in the end, contribute to more restraint by Moscow in the future. Higher than expected Russian casualties might also induce greater reluctance for future adventurism by the Russian people, so the argument goes.
This couples another benefit North Atlantic states seem to have reaped from the war: raising the levels of suspicion and insecurity in countries that border Russia, particularly those with large Russian-minority populations. Perhaps the country most threatened by Russian irredentism after Ukraine, Kazakhstan has charted a more independent foreign policy course since the Ukraine War broke out, although it still maintains friendly relations with Russia.20 Negative emotions towards Moscow also inspired Finland and Sweden, two previously (formally) unaligned nations, to apply to join the NATO alliance. Perhaps most strikingly, Russia has likely gained the long-term enmity of the vast majority of Ukrainians, something that will simmer right on their border no matter where exactly the future of that border lies.
The Global Impact of the West’s Ukraine Policy
The ostensible gains of an interventionist U.S. policy in Ukraine thus come with substantial downsides. For every instance of solidarity in Europe unifying around Washington’s Atlanticism, there have been many more acts of divergence from Western policy elsewhere in the world.21
As mentioned before, India is a testament to how a suitably large middle power can and will get around North Atlantic sanctions regimes. Turkey, an official NATO ally but one with far more autonomy than most, deftly uses its strategic location controlling the Straits of Marmara to engage both with Russia and Ukraine, hoping to serve as a diplomatic vector between the countries even as it happily supplies Kiyv with weapons and Moscow with loopholes around sanctions.22 Iran and North Korea have both managed to increase their global prominence by indirectly assisting the Russian war effort.
Furthermore, Russia’s military reindustrialization around many key defense-related industries, the reinvigoration of its domestic economy, and subsequent redirection of commerce towards China shows that NATO-led economic sanctions have had little of their intended impact. In practice, they might have not only decreased Western diplomatic leverage but also bolstered the targeted regime.23 Currently, the Russian economy is on a wartime footing and its production of munitions and equipment is on the rise. Barring some kind of hypothetically plausible but unlikely collapse in military morale, Moscow is on course to strengthen its position over Ukraine the longer the conflict lasts.24
Backing a proxy war in Ukraine might have been a sound strategy back when Europe was the primary focus of the United States, but given the higher costs of great power competition in a multipolar world, it is especially imprudent. As the pivotal member of the North Atlantic alliance, the U.S. has seen its diplomatic leverage and military surplus stocks depleted in a quixotic quest for advantage in Eastern Europe—a region that has been the backbone of Russia’s power for centuries and that it considers its natural sphere of influence. But even during the Cold War, Moscow’s natural advantages in the East European Plain from the Urals to the Carpathians did nothing to undermine Washington’s global power. If anything, the increase in North Atlantic investment in Ukraine has undermined that power and exacerbated logistical concerns for the United States, which has far too many commitments to non-critical regions of the world.25
All this has been further confirmed by recent events in the Middle East. While permanent U.S. presence in West Asia is every bit as suspect as its active involvement in Eastern Europe, that policymakers in Washington (if not those in Brussels or London) are so quick to pivot their attention away from Ukraine and onto Israel/Palestine reveals that even in the interventionist wings of the Blob, Ukraine is a lesser priority when it has to compete with the other fixations of primacy-advocates.26
