古典時代的希臘人不僅發明了西方政治的中心思想——國家權力應該由大多數公民來指導——而且還發明了西方戰爭的核心行為，即決定性的步兵戰鬥。 公元前五世紀的希臘人不再采取伏擊、小規模衝突、機動或個人英雄之間的戰鬥。 在各個年齡段的武裝人員之間設計了一場凶猛、短暫且具有破壞性的正麵衝突。 在這項大膽、原創的研究中，維克多·戴維斯·漢森展示了這個殘酷的企業如何致力於實現與共識政府相同的結果——明確、立即解決爭端。
《西方戰爭方式》借鑒了一係列非凡的資源——希臘詩歌、戲劇、花瓶繪畫以及曆史記錄——來描述戰場上實際發生的事情。 這是第一個從步兵的角度來探索古典希臘戰爭的實際機製的研究——殘酷的長矛刺擊，穿著沉重的青銅盔甲進行戰鬥的困難，這使得他們很難看到、聽到和移動，以及 害怕。 漢森還討論了士兵的身體狀況和年齡、武器裝備、傷口和士氣。
對古希臘人殺戮場上發生的事情的令人信服的描述最終表明，他們的武器和戰鬥風格是經過精心設計的，通過使戰鬥經曆盡可能具有決定性和可怕性，最大限度地減少時間和生命損失。 漢森將這種新的戰鬥方式與憲政政府的興起聯係起來，提出了新的問題並對關於戰爭曆史的舊假設提出了質疑。
西方戰爭方式中有哪些希臘人？
https://defenceindepth.co/2021/10/21/which-greeks-in-the-western-way-of-war/
凱文·布拉克福德博士，國防研究部。 倫敦國王學院
“西方戰爭方式”(TWOW) 是曆史學家維克多·戴維斯·漢森 (Victor Davis Hanson) 定義的一個概念，他將古希臘人和他們決定性的步兵戰鬥形式視為獨特的西方傳統的源泉。 這是訓練有素的公民士兵的理想，能夠在決定性的戰鬥中擊敗敵人，在自由社會中明確區分戰爭與和平。 西方戰爭傳統的核心理念是，雙方同意的政府能夠利用直接武力以明確、有力的方式戰勝對手。 TWOW 的“震撼與敬畏”和殺傷力，依賴於更好的技術和決定性的壓倒性力量，與伏擊、小衝突或個人戰鬥形成鮮明對比，這些被認為是自由西方國家所不具備的特征。
如今，這種向西方發動戰爭的理想繼續引發關於美國是否已經失去“殺戮藝術”，或者美國如何受到西方理想束縛的爭論，甚至有一個 RUSI 播客專門致力於理解“西方”這個詞。 戰爭方式”。 至關重要的是，人們越來越擔心非西方大國的“龍與蛇”已經學會克服西方的優勢和戰爭方式。 英國國防部甚至擔心“對手已經研究了西方的戰爭方式”並學會了適應新的能力。 將這些對西方戰爭方式衰落的擔憂結合起來，是擔心西方的軍事主導地位受到威脅，以及敵對大國在尋求直接對抗時不會遵守規則。
TWOW 及其可追溯到古希臘的西方例外論框架對於理解當代挑戰來說是一個糟糕的指南。 當前戰略文獻的趨勢常常陷入本質主義論點，這些論點側重於文化差異來解釋廣泛的結果。 這在家庭手工業中尤為明顯，家庭手工業的興起將混合戰爭和“小綠人”解釋為一種獨特的俄羅斯現象，其基礎是俄羅斯民族性格的缺陷和俄羅斯人之間的差異性文化。 創造這樣的原始理由來解釋戰略行為會簡化曆史並誇大差異。 將理性的西方與集中壓倒性的力量與依賴狡猾和欺騙的非理性的東方進行對比，會產生基於可疑假設的非曆史論點。 西方以獨特方式作戰的觀念也引發了令人不安的刻板印象和陳詞濫調，並且容易受到對東方主義的批評，如下所述。
TWOW 建立在自由城邦的神話化觀點之上，公民士兵捍衛自由國家，這種觀點可以追溯到古代古典時代。 因此，它發展了一種關於西方戰爭的道德敘述和意識形態觀點，而這種觀點並沒有得到古希臘戰爭曆史的支持。 這種保衛自由城邦的公民士兵的理想主義忽視了希臘城邦及其東部波斯對手經常使用希臘雇傭軍。 但這隻是西方擁有獨特戰爭方式這一概念背後的眾多曆史上有問題的信念之一。
西方尋求以壓倒性的武力展示進行直接對抗的想法可能會讓古希臘人自己感到驚訝，他們讚揚奧德修斯等傳奇英雄，因為他狡猾、狡猾和操縱性的行為讓對手感到困惑和驚訝。 認為西方不會采取這種形式的詭計的信念表明，隻有東方大國才有能力利用間接武力和詭計來獲得優勢。 TWOW聲稱西方尋求直接決戰，但卻悄悄地忽視了單極時代已經看到西方技術在無人機和隱形轟炸機方麵占據主導地位，這些技術明確用於突襲對手和欺騙對手。 因此，尚不清楚西方或東方的戰爭方式之間是否存在明顯的文化差異。
東方主義者對東方戰爭的描繪可能集中於孫子高超的欺騙策略，或武士的光榮風格。 第二次世界大戰中日本帝國的神風特攻隊飛行員是東方戰爭方式的一個明顯例子。 神風特攻隊飛行員以犧牲自己的生命為代價，以冷靜、有節製的自我犧牲精神瞄準薄弱環節，這被視為與西方戰爭方式背道而馳。 然而，西方軍隊在第一次世界大戰戰場上緩慢前進的過程表明，在麵對更強大的防禦形式時，犧牲、荒謬的勇敢行為以及生命損失之間存在著有趣的相似之處。
這些曆史例子挑戰了西方和東方戰爭方式作為不同和穩定類別的概念。
TWOW 方法建立在理想化的古典古代曆史之上，作為獨特的西方傳統的源泉，但古代晚期的不那麽迷人的時代和“黑暗時代”呈現出更為複雜的景象。 為了理解實力的衰落、新競爭對手的崛起和技術適應，也許我們不應該關注古希臘人，而應該關注講希臘語的拜占庭人。
拜占庭帝國的曆史表明，不同的文化和戰爭方式可以采用相似的戰術和戰略來麵對相似的物質和行動限製。 拜占庭帝國和中國唐朝對遊牧草原武士到來的反應就是一個例子。 拜占庭是以君士坦丁堡為中心的東羅馬帝國，距離中國唐朝有3000多英裏，但在公元6-7世紀左右，兩國都麵臨著草原遊牧民族的大規模入侵。
在古代晚期的這個時期，突厥騎兵的大規模入侵威脅著拜占庭和中國的定居社會。 盡管這兩個帝國相距甚遠，但遊牧戰士非常擅長利用騎馬射箭、快速突襲、伏擊和佯裝飛行戰術進行戰爭，這給防禦帶來了一係列類似的問題。 中國將軍李靖和被稱為戰略的拜占庭戰爭手冊針對遊牧戰爭方式製定了共同的主題。 雙方都試圖利用談判來攻擊土耳其人的營地，並且都看到了在敵對領土上保衛輜重列車的重要性。
同樣，拜占庭人和李靖主張以防禦部隊控製戰場陣地，分兵進攻和前進。 然而最值得注意的是，中國人和拜占庭人都對隊形的秩序和控製表示擔憂，以免落入遊牧民族假裝逃跑的陷阱。 遊牧草原武士的出現創造了一種新的戰爭形式，對中國和拜占庭的定居帝國提出了挑戰。 為了應對草原遊牧民族的戰術，每個帝國都製定了類似的解決方案，重點是集中力量、保護後勤和控製紀律嚴明的隊形。 這個簡短的例子表明，由於物質和戰略限製，而不是基於文化差異的解釋，類似的過程可以發展。
今天，中國和俄羅斯修正主義的崛起反映了美國及其盟國已經失去了冷戰後的主導地位。 然而，為了理解中國的崛起，戰略辯論仍然把目光投向古希臘人和修昔底德。 這是修昔底德關於伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的起因是雅典實力的增強和斯巴達的恐懼的著名言論，被概括為“修昔底德陷阱”。 因此，古希臘曆史被用來形容美中關係正走向戰爭。 但講希臘語的拜占庭人麵臨著與薩珊波斯人的強大競爭。 拜占庭-薩珊王朝的帝國衝突並不是一個大國崛起和衰落導致大國戰爭的故事，而是一個更複雜的故事，講述了一場長達400年的對抗，雙方在美索不達米亞兩岸建立了緩衝區。 。
這兩個帝國之間的競爭形成了兩個利益分割的體係，波斯國王將其稱為地球的“兩隻眼睛”。 今天，將世界劃分為兩種相互競爭的國際秩序願景是一種現實的可能性。 修昔底德陷阱給人一種不可避免的感覺，但美國和中國也有可能同樣尋求創造利益範圍。 古希臘曆史和修昔底德可以成為戰略辯論的有用指南，但認識到後來講希臘語的拜占庭人提醒我們，我們應該避免基於對文化身份的有限解讀而提出宏大的主張和本質主義的論點。
TWOW 是一個關於西方戰爭方式的神話框架，它通常始於古希臘人，並將“西方”的理想視為古典世界的產物。 羅馬的衰落在很大程度上被西方視為一場災難性事件，它開啟了一段黑暗時代，東方帝國的延續，而講希臘語的拜占庭人因此被悄悄遺忘。 拜占庭帝國並不完全符合“西方”的經典，其曆史教訓也被忽視。 但正如本文試圖簡要表明的那樣，TWOW 建立在本質主義文化差異的簡單化方法之上。 拜占庭戰爭的曆史呈現出一幅更加複雜的圖景，這動搖了西方獨特的戰爭方式的想法。 TWOW 是一個傲慢且有曆史缺陷的概念，需要被拋棄。
希臘重裝步兵與“西方戰爭方式”
這篇短文是 2012 年春季為 CAMS 180：古代戰爭而寫的，作為我對一個小組項目的貢獻，該項目定義了維克多·戴維斯·漢森 (Victor Davis Hanson) 稱為“西方戰爭方式”的模型，並分析了我們目前對希臘重裝步兵的了解如何反駁或支持 這個假設。
西方戰爭方式：
它是什麽？
“西方戰爭方式”是由維克多·戴維斯·漢森（Victor Davis Hanson）開發的流行模型，描述了現代歐洲（或西方）戰爭和戰鬥禮儀的起源。
漢森認為，西方戰爭方式是傳統的意識形態，即戰爭應該在軍隊之間預先安排好的、決定性的短期軍事衝突中進行，而不是使用欺騙性的戰爭戰術。 遊擊戰和撤退被認為是懦弱的行為，而隻有與敵人直接對抗才能獲得榮譽和榮耀。 此外，西方對戰爭成功或不成功的定義完全取決於其決定性，這意味著戰爭隻能通過在結束時有明顯的贏家和明顯的輸家來決定。
典型的“西方”軍隊進行決鬥式的“人對人的戰鬥”，通常是由類似的武裝人員以嚴格的隊形進行戰鬥。 就像18世紀的英國軍團一樣，他們的聲譽建立在戰場英勇的基礎上，冒著死亡的危險，按照戰鬥規則堅守陣地擊敗敵人，這就是西方標準中勇敢的定義。 偏離規則是為那些必須“作弊”才能獲勝的低等懦夫和失敗者保留的。
西方戰爭方式的起源：
漢森指出，這些決鬥觀念和對戰爭的態度是西方獨有的，可以追溯到古典希臘重裝步兵。 根據漢森的模型，重裝步兵從事高度儀式化的痛苦戰爭係統，這在方陣中得到體現。 漢森堅持認為，重裝步兵方陣的功能、布局和裝備的演變是為了強調這種儀式化的意識形態，這種意識形態厭惡撤退，強調聯合行動、凝聚力和前進。
支持西方戰爭方式的論點：
通過將方陣解釋為極其緊密的陣型，並通過字麵解釋重裝步兵奧提莫斯的“推”，漢森的方陣戰爭模型似乎解釋了重裝步兵裝備的某些不尋常的方麵，包括背板、槍托尖刺和盾牌的凹度1。
更重要的是，漢森的儀式化重裝步兵戰爭模型可以解釋方陣所缺乏的東西，即射彈的整體使用。 “這種對近距離麵對麵殺戮的故意依賴解釋了希臘文學中另一個普遍蔑視的對象：那些從遠處作戰的人，輕裝的散兵或輕盾兵，標槍投擲者，投石手，尤其是弓箭手 ”2 在《伊利亞特》和希臘人看來，射箭本身幾乎被認為是“作弊”。 這是一種違反一對一有序戰鬥榮譽準則的戰爭策略。 任何膽怯的農民都可以在安全距離內用弓箭殺人，但這需要一個真正的男人來近距離和個人戰鬥。
根據漢森的說法，重裝步兵戰爭的另一個決鬥屬性仍然是“西方戰爭方式”，那就是它習慣在預先確定的地點舉行預先安排的戰鬥。 希羅底德在他的著作中講述了馬爾多尼奧斯（薛西斯的表弟）寫給薛西斯的一封關於重裝步兵戰爭程序的信，“這些希臘人習慣於以最毫無意義的方式在彼此之間發動戰爭......因為一旦他們宣布 互相爭鬥時，他們會尋找最公平、最平坦的地方，然後下去戰鬥。 結果，即使是勝利者也會帶著巨大的損失離開； 我不必提及被征服者，因為他們已經被消滅了。” 3
此外，數百年後，波利比烏斯將當前的羅馬戰爭與古希臘人的戰爭進行了對比，“古人選擇不通過欺騙來征服敵人，他們認為除非在公開的戰鬥中粉碎對手的精神，否則任何成功都是輝煌或安全的。 因此，他們彼此同意不使用隱藏的導彈或遠距離發射的導彈，他們認為隻有肉搏戰才是真正決定性的。 因此他們提前宣戰、宣戰，宣布部署的時間和地點。 但現在他們說隻有可憐的將軍才會在戰爭中公開做任何事情（13.3.2-6）”4
當然，這些段落暗示希臘人並不關心牽製或遊擊戰術，而是更喜歡東方鄰國所不具備的更快、更具決定性的戰鬥形式。
反對“西方戰爭方式”的論點
現代戰爭方法起源於古典重裝步兵的觀點可能既不完全正確，也不完全錯誤。 事實是，仍然沒有證據表明遠古時代有“純粹的”重裝步兵戰爭，這意味著我們仍然隻能感染
從我們後來掌握的證據來看。 此外，波利比烏斯和希羅底德的著作也不能完全準確，因為一篇是為了娛樂，另一篇是幾百年後寫的，是對“美好時光”的懷念。
此外，漢森的西方戰爭方式模型將對決斷性的渴望稱為西方的，同時暗示東方或非歐洲的戰爭是直接相反的。 “正是西方渴望步兵之間發生一次壯觀的碰撞，渴望在自由人之間的戰場上用鋒利的武器進行殘酷的殺戮，這讓我們來自非西方世界的對手困惑和恐懼了 2500 多年。” 5 然而，將非西方人描繪成隻參與非決定性和欺騙性的遊擊戰，這是一個本質上的缺陷。 近東軍隊並沒有避免預先安排的決定性戰鬥，米吉多戰役（約公元前 1479 年）、卡爾卡爾戰役（公元前 853 年）和蒂爾圖巴戰役（約公元前 653 年）的記載就證明了這一點。 。 如果漢森相信這一點，“公元前七世紀初的希臘就首次表達了對一場可怕的武力衝突的渴望……這在歐洲曆史上是第一次……在短短幾個小時內找到決定性的勝利或徹底的失敗， ”比古典重裝步兵早近 800 年前，東方人就開始實行決定性的預先安排的戰爭。 6 認為重裝步兵具有發起決定性的預先安排的戰爭的原始且獨特的願望的假設是完全不準確的。
此外，認為希臘人沒有利用欺騙手段的觀點本質上也是錯誤的。 從軍事演習到反情報和秘密行動，希臘人毫不猶豫地對敵人使用欺騙手段。 似乎隻有當欺騙被用來對付希臘人時，才會被認為是懦弱的行為。 例如，在溫泉關戰役中，希臘人在不同地點佯裝撤退，結果卻轉身屠殺追擊的波斯人；在薩拉米斯戰役中，地米斯托克利欺騙薛西斯相信他們已經投降，以阻止自己的軍隊撤退。 公元前 396 年，“斯巴達海軍上將法拉基達斯在前往迦太基封鎖下的錫拉丘茲的途中，俘獲了九到十艘迦太基三層戰艦，將自己的人放進去，然後拖著自己的船隻駛過迦太基人。” 7
在另一個例子中，“得知色雷斯人打算在夜間攻擊他的營地，伊菲克拉特斯留下了許多火堆（給人留下營地仍然被占領的印象）並隱藏了他的部下，他們攻擊並擊敗了進攻的色雷斯人。” 8 即使在《伊利亞特》中，特洛伊人也被希臘人通過欺騙擊敗。
因此，雖然預先安排的決戰既不是西方軍隊的原創，也不是獨一無二的，而且重裝步兵當然也沒有放棄使用欺騙手段，但很難說古希臘人在塑造我們現代西方關於戰爭如何進行的觀念中發揮了什麽作用。 應該發工資。 在過去 200 年間，人們對什麽是標準戰爭或不被認為是光榮戰爭的態度已經發生了顯著的變化，更不用說在過去 2,600 年裏了。
1 Victor Davis Hanson，《西方戰爭方式》，（紐約：Alfred A. Knopf，1989 年），第 1 章。 6.
我對西方戰爭方式有疑問
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/2sb5wh/i_have_a_problem_with_the_western_way_of_war/?
我目前正在閱讀維克多·戴維斯·漢森（Victor Davis Hanson）的《西方戰爭方式》一書，他一遍又一遍地聲稱，兩支軍隊在開闊的戰場上進行激戰的想法起源於希臘古典時期。
我之前讀過保羅·克裏瓦切克（Paul Kriwaczek）寫的《巴比倫：美索不達米亞和文明的誕生》，書中認為蘇美爾人和其他美索不達米亞城邦如烏爾和烏魯克會排列軍隊並互相衝鋒，就像希臘人所做的那樣。
我承認我隻讀了《TWWoW》的一章，但其中的主張一直困擾著我。 這是對漢森的公平解讀，還是獎學金已經繼續進行？
kasirzin u/kasirzin 2014 年 3 月 1 日 •9 歲。 前
戰爭方式和戰略文化的整個子領域確實有點混亂，有相當多的熱度和相對較少的啟發。 盡管如此，VDH 的基本論點仍然保留了一定的分量（至少，對於仍然要出版的攻擊它的書籍來說，有足夠的分量），部分原因是它是民族中心主義的，而且在某種程度上讓我們西方人自我感覺良好。 畢竟，如果歐洲（以及後來的美國）不是那麽獨特，他們怎麽會在軍事上取得如此出色的成績呢？ 不幸的是，許多關於文化和戰爭方式的討論確實往往會陷入刻板印象。
我目前正在讀一本書（大約讀了一半），該書反對 VDH 的論文，名為《危險的榮耀：西方軍事力量的崛起》，作者是約翰·弗朗斯。 在這裏，他將戰爭方式簡化為兩種基本模式：步兵的近距離衝突，這種衝突不是源自西方，而是源自農業城市社會（包括希臘，也包括美索不達米亞人和中國人），以及基於流動性和機動性的戰爭風格。 草原人民的戰爭。 除了這種簡化之外，他還確定了攻擊對手的三種方式：戰鬥、針對敵人經濟實力的破壞和圍攻。 他認為，在曆史的大部分時間裏，這兩種類型的戰爭大致處於平衡狀態。 由於蒙古人和奧斯曼人的成功（標誌著奧斯曼帝國在維也納麵前失敗的結束日期），草原戰爭從大約 1200 年到 1683 年取得了優勢。 他描述了草原戰爭如何主宰歐亞大陸和中東的大部分地區，因為這些地區的大部分地區都是草原人民可以進入的，並且擁有維持草原軍隊的聯係和資源。 歐洲作為世界最大大陸附近的山地半島，與這些事件隔絕，因為大型草原軍隊根本無法在那裏維持生計，從而導致出現一種截然不同的戰爭方式。 中國還成功地保持了自己的風格，這在很大程度上要歸功於它吸收入侵者的能力。
然而，即使在這種獨特的歐洲風格中，戰鬥仍然相對較少。 圍攻更加頻繁，部分原因是城市和堡壘標誌著對領土的控製，這是戰爭的巨大戰利品之一。 城市和堡壘意味著土地，因此也意味著財富和聲望。 在曆史上的大部分時間裏，經濟實力的破壞是歐洲戰爭的常態。 這比戰鬥的勝利或圍攻的勝利更容易實現。
我讀到了 1683 年，當時正值歐洲開始統治其他國家的風口浪尖。 盡管法國表示，由葡萄牙開始並由其他國家繼續進行的海上探險是歐洲人試圖繞過奧斯曼帝國所體現的草原的絕對力量，直接到達中國和印度的一個例子。 他還指出，歐洲人並沒有真正做好與當地人開戰的準備，而且在許多地方，他們必須與強大的對手作戰，因此他們很難取得進展。
VDH 的一些基本思想仍然很受歡迎，但學術界正在努力繼續前進。
ThoughtRiot1776 •9 年。 前
他的論文的大部分內容不也是公民的軍事角色以及希臘人如何進行儀式化的戰爭方式以限製損失和領土獲取嗎？
我讀這本書已經有一段時間了，但我很確定他比聲稱希臘人是第一個使用盾牆的人更深入。
。。。。。。。
The Western Way of War，Infantry Battle in Classical Greece
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/74938/the-western-way-of-war-by-victor-davis-hanson/9780307831552
Author Victor Davis Hanson
The Greeks of the classical age invented not only the central idea of Western politics--that the power of state should be guided by a majority of its citizens--but also the central act of Western warfare, the decisive infantry battle. Instead of ambush, skirmish, maneuver, or combat between individual heroes, the Greeks of the fifth century b.c. devised a ferocious, brief, and destructive head-on clash between armed men of all ages. In this bold, original study, Victor Davis Hanson shows how this brutal enterprise was dedicated to the same outcome as consensual government--an unequivocal, instant resolution to dispute.
The Western Way of War draws from an extraordinary range of sources--Greek poetry, drama, and vase painting, as well as historical records--to describe what actually took place on the battlefield. It is the first study to explore the actual mechanics of classical Greek battle from the vantage point of the infantryman--the brutal spear-thrusting, the difficulty of fighting in heavy bronze armor which made it hard to see, hear and move, and the fear. Hanson also discusses the physical condition and age of the men, weaponry, wounds, and morale.
This compelling account of what happened on the killing fields of the ancient Greeks ultimately shows that their style of armament and battle was contrived to minimize time and life lost by making the battle experience as decisive and appalling as possible. Linking this new style of fighting to the rise of constitutional government, Hanson raises new issues and questions old assumptions about the history of war.
Which Greeks in the Western Way of War?
https://defenceindepth.co/2021/10/21/which-greeks-in-the-western-way-of-war/
Dr Kevin Blachford, Defence Studies Department. King’s College London
The “Western way of war” (TWOW) is a concept that was most notably defined by the historian Victor Davis Hanson who viewed the Ancient Greeks and their form of decisive infantry battle as the wellspring of a unique Western tradition. It is an ideal of well drilled citizen-soldiers able to defeat the enemy in a decisive battle, with a clear distinction between war and peace in a free society. Central to this tradition of Western warfare is the idea that consensual governments are able to make use of direct force to overcome an adversary in a clear emphatic manner. The “shock and awe” and lethality of TWOW, with its reliance on better technology and decisive overwhelming force stands in contrast to the ambushes, skirmishes, or individual combat that are viewed as uncharacteristic of liberal Western states.
Today, this ideal of waging Western war continues to inspire debates about whether the US has lost the ‘art of killing’, or how the US is constrained by its Western ideals, with even a RUSI podcast dedicated to understanding this term, ‘the Western way of war’. Crucially, there is also increased concern that the ‘dragons and the snakes’ of non-Western powers have learned to overcome the Western advantages and approach to warfare. The British Ministry of Defence even raises concerns that ‘adversaries have studied the Western way of war’ and have learned to adapt with new capabilities. Uniting these concerns of a Western way of war in decline is the fear that the West’s military dominance is under threat and that rival powers will not play by the rules in seeking direct confrontation.
TWOW and its framework of Western exceptionalism stretching back to Ancient Greece is a poor guide to understanding contemporary challenges. Current trends in strategic literature all too often fall into essentialist arguments which focus on cultural differences to explain broad outcomes. This is particularly apparent with the cottage industry which has sprung up to explain hybrid warfare and ‘little green men’ as a uniquely Russian phenomenon based on flaws in the Russian national character and a culture of otherness among Russians. Creating such primordialist reasons to explain strategic behaviour simplifies history and exaggerates difference. Contrasting a rational West with focused overwhelming power against an irrational East reliant on cunning and deception creates ahistorical arguments based on questionable assumptions. The notion that the West fights in a distinct manner also raises troubling stereotypes, cliches, and is open to critiques of orientalism, as the following explains.
TWOW builds upon a mythologised view of a free polis with citizen-soldiers defending the liberal state which dates back to the classical age of antiquity. It therefore develops a moral narrative and ideological view of Western war which is not supported by the history of Ancient Greek warfare. This idealism of citizen-soldiers defending a free polis overlooks that there were often Greek mercenaries used by both the Greek city states and by their eastern Persian adversaries. But this is just one of the many historically problematic beliefs which underlie the concept of the West having a distinct way of war.
The idea that the West seeks direct confrontation in an overwhelming show of force may surprise the Ancient Greeks themselves who celebrated legendary heroes, such as Odysseus, for his cunning, sly and manipulative acts which confounded and surprised opponents. The belief that the West refrains from such forms of guile suggests that only Eastern powers are capable of using indirect force and trickery to gain an advantage. TWOW’s claim that the West seeks direct decisive battle then quietly overlooks that the unipolar era has seen the dominance of Western technology with drones and stealth bombers which are explicitly used to surprise an opponent and deceive adversaries. It is far from clear therefore, that there are any distinct cultural differences between a Western or Eastern approach to war.
Orientalist portrayals of Eastern war may focus on Sun Tzu’s masterful strategies of deception, or the honorable style of the Samurai warriors. A clear example of the Eastern way of war could be seen in the kamikaze pilots of the Japanese empire in the Second World War. The calm, measured self-sacrifice of kamikaze pilots to target areas of weakness at the cost of their own lives is seen as antithetical to a Western way of war. Yet, the slow onward march of Western troops across the fields of the First World War suggests interesting parallels of sacrifice, nonsensical acts of bravery and the loss of life against much stronger forms of defence.
Such historical examples challenge the notion of a Western and Eastern way of war as distinct and stable categories. TWOW approach builds upon an idealised history of classical antiquity as the wellspring of a unique Western tradition, but the less glamorous era of late antiquity and the ‘dark ages’ presents a more complicated picture. To understand declining power, the rise of new rivals and technological adaptation perhaps we should look not to the Ancient Greeks, but the Greek speaking Byzantines.
The history of the Byzantine empire shows that both different cultures and approaches to war can convene on similar tactics and strategies to face similar material and operational constraints. One example of this can be seen with the responses of the Byzantine empire and China’s Tang dynasty to the arrival of nomadic steppe warriors. Byzantium was the east Roman empire centred on Constantinople, which existed over 3,000 miles away from the Tang dynasty in China and yet both powers around the 6-7th centuries A.D faced considerable incursions by steppe nomads.
The large incursions of Türk cavalry forces during this era of late antiquity threatened to overwhelm the sedentary societies of both Byzantium and China. Nomadic warriors who were highly proficient in warfare that utilised horseback archery, fast raids, ambushes and tactics of feigned flight created a similar set of problems for defence despite the considerable distance between these two empires. The Chinese general Li Jing and the Byzantine manual of war, known as the strategikon, developed common themes in response to the nomadic ways of war. Both sought to exploit negotiations in order to attack the camps of the Türks and both saw the importance of defending baggage trains in hostile territory.
Equally, the Byzantines and Li Jing advocated having defensive troops to control positions on the battlefield, with separate troops for assault and moving forward. Most notably however, the Chinese and Byzantines each expressed concern for the order and the control of formations in order not to fall into the trap of the nomad’s feigned flight. The appearance of the nomadic steppe warriors created a new form of warfare which challenged the sedentary empires of China and Byzantium. In response to the tactics of steppe nomads each empire developed similar solutions focused on concentrating mass, protecting logistics and controlling disciplined formations. What this brief example suggests is that similar processes can develop due to material and strategic constraints, rather than explanations based on cultural differences.
Today, the rise of China and Russian revisionism is a reflection that the US and its allies have lost their post-Cold War dominance. Yet, to understand the rise of China, strategic debates continue to look to Ancient Greeks and Thucydides. It is Thucydides’ famous statement on the causes of the Peloponnesian war arising from the growing power of Athens and the fear this causes in Sparta, which has been summarized as the “Thucydides trap”. Ancient Greek history is therefore used to portray the US-China relationship as heading on a railroad to war. But the Greek speaking Byzantines faced their own great power rivalry with the Sasanid Persians. The Byzantine-Sasanid clash of empires was not a story of a rising and declining power leading to a great power war, but a more complicated story of a 400-year-old rivalry that saw the two sides develop a buffer zone between them across Mesopotamia.
The competition between these two empires created a system of two divided spheres of interests, which the Persian King referred to as the “two eyes” of the Earth. The division of the world into two competing visions of international order is a realistic possibility for today. The Thucydides trap presents an air of inevitability, but it is just as possible that the US and China will equally seek to create spheres of interest. Ancient Greek history and Thucydides can be useful guides to strategic debates but recognising the later Greek speaking Byzantines offers a reminder that we should avoid making grand claims and essentialist arguments based on a limited reading of cultural identity.
TWOW is a framework for myth-making about Western approaches to war which often begins with the Ancient Greeks and valorises an ideal of “the West” as a product of the classical world. The fall of Rome is largely viewed by the West as a cataclysmic event which ushered in a period of dark ages and the continuation of the Eastern empire as the Greek speaking Byzantines is therefore quietly forgotten. The empire of Byzantium does not fit neatly into the canon of “the West” and its historical lessons are neglected. But as this article has tried to briefly show, TWOW builds upon a simplistic approach of essentialist cultural differences. The history of Byzantine warfare presents a more complicated picture which unsettles the idea of a distinct Western approach to war. TWOW is a hubristic and historically flawed concept which needs to be left behind.
Greek Hoplites and the”Western Way of War”
https://sites.psu.edu/sarahreeseeportfolioeng202a/greek-hoplites-and-thewestern-way-of-war-2/
This short piece was written ,Spring 2012 for CAMS 180: Ancient Warfare, as my contribution to a group project defining a model by Victor Davis Hanson called the “Western Way of War” and analyzing how our current knowledge of the Greek Hoplites refutes or supports this hypothesis.
Western Way of War: What is it?
The “Western Way of War” is a popular model developed by Victor Davis Hanson describing the origins of modern European (or Western) warfare and battle etiquette.
According to Hanson, the Western Way of War is the traditional ideology that wars should be fought in short pre-arranged and decisive military clashes between armies without the use of deceptive war tactics. Guerrilla warfare and retreat are deemed cowardly, while honor and glory can be achieved only through direct confrontation with the enemy. Also, the Western definition of a successful or unsuccessful war rests entirely on its decisiveness, meaning a war can only be decided by having a distinct winner and a clear loser at its conclusion.
A prototypical “Western” army engages in duellistic “man-to-man battles”, usually with similarly armed individuals fighting it out in strict formation. Like the 18’th century British Regiments, whose reputations were built on battlefield gallantry, risking death and holding your ground to defeat your enemy according to the rules of combat is the definition of bravery by Western standards. Deviation from the rules is reserved for the inferior cowards and losers who have to “cheat” to win.
Origins of the Western Way of War:
Hanson states that these duellistic notions and attitudes towards warfare are unique to the west and date all the way back to the Classical Greek Hoplites. According to Hanson’s model, Hoplites engaged in a highly ritualized agonal system of warfare, which manifested itself in the phalanx. Hanson insists that the function, arrangement, and equipment of the Hoplite phalanx evolved to emphasize this ritualistic ideology which abhorred retreat and stressed joint action, cohesion and forward movement.
Arguments For the Western Way of War:
By interpreting phalanxes as extremely tight formations, and by interpreting the Hoplite Othismos “push” literally, Hanson’s Model of phalanx warfare seemingly explains certain unusual aspects of Hoplite equipment including the back-plates, butt spikes, and the concavity of the shields1.
More importantly, Hanson’s Model of ritualized Hoplite warfare may explain what is lacking from the phalanx, namely the overall use of projectiles. “This deliberate dependence on face-to-face killing at close range explains another universal object of disdain in Greek literature: those who fight from afar, the lightly equipped skirmisher or peltast, the javelin thrower, the slinger, and above all, the archer.”2 In the Iliad and to the Greeks, archery in itself is almost considered to be “cheating.” It is a war tactic which violates the honor-codes of man-to-man ordered combat. Any cowardly peasant can kill from a safe distance with a bow, but it requires a real man to fight up-close and personal.
According to Hanson, another duellistic attribute of Hoplite warfare which remained a “the Western Way of War” was its custom to hold pre-arranged battles in pre-determined locations. In his writings, Heroditus tells of a letter written to Xerxes by Mardonios (Xerxes’ cousin) on the procedures of Hoplite warfare, “these Greeks are accustomed to wage their wars among each other in the most senseless way…For as soon as they declare war on each other, they seek out the fairest and most level ground, and then go down there to do battle on it. Consequently, even the winners leave with extreme losses; I need not mention the conquered, since they are annihilated.” 3
Also, hundreds of years later Polybius contrasted the current Roman warfare with that of the ancient Greeks, “The ancients chose not to conquer their enemies by deception, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed their adversaries’ spirit in open battle. For this reason they agreed with each other not to use hidden missiles or those discharged from a distance against each other, and they considered only a hand-to-hand, pitched battle to be truly decisive. Therefore they declared wars and battles in advance, announcing when and where they were going to deploy. But now they say only a poor general does anything openly in war (13.3.2-6)” 4
Certainly these passages imply that the Greeks did not bother with diversionary or guerrilla tactics, and preferred a quicker more decisive form of battle not shared by their Eastern neighbors.
Arguments Against “The Western Way of War”
The idea that modern methods for waging war originated with the Classical Hoplites is probably neither completely true, nor completely false. The fact remains that there is still no evidence for “pure” Hoplite Warfare in the Archaic Era, meaning that we can still only infer from the later evidence we do have. Also, the writings of Polybius and Heroditus cannot be counted upon for complete accuracy, as one is for entertainment and the other was written hundreds of years later as a nostalgic longing for “the good old days”.
Also, Hanson’s Model of the Western Way of War, in calling the desire for decisiveness Western, simultaneously implies that Eastern or non-European warfare is the direct opposite. “It is this Western desire for a single, magnificent collision of infantry, for brutal killing with edged weapons on a battlefield between free men, that has baffled and terrified our adversaries from the non-Western world for more than 2,500 years.” 5 However, there is an essential flaw in portraying non-Westerners as engaging only in non-decisive and deceptive guerilla warfare. Near Eastern armies did not avoid pre-arranged decisive battles, as evidenced by accounts of the Battle of Megiddo (ca. 1479 B.C.), the Battle of Qarqar (853 B.C.), and the Battle of Til-Tuba (ca. 653 B.C.). If Hanson believes that this, “desire for an awesome clash of arms was first expressed in Greece at the beginning of the seventh century B.C…for the first time in European history… to find in a few short hours a decisive victory or utter defeat,” than decisive pre-arranged warfare was being practiced by Easterners almost 800 years prior to the Classical Hoplites. 6 The assumption that the Hoplites were original and unique in their desire to wage decisive pre-arranged warfare is totally inaccurate.
Furthermore, the idea that the Greeks did not utilize deception is also inherently false. From military maneuvers, to counter-intelligence and covert operations, the Greeks did not hesitate to use deception against their enemies. It seems the only time deception is considered cowardly, is when it is used against the Greeks. For example, at the Battle of Thermopylae the Greeks feigned retreats at various points, only to turn and slaughter the pursuing Persians, and at the Battle of Salamis Themistocles tricked Xerxes into believing they had surrendered, in order to block his own troops from retreating. In 396 B.C., “On his way to Syracuse, which was under Carthaginian blockade, the Spartan admiral Pharakidas captured nine or ten Carthaginian triremes, put his own men into them, and sailed past the Carthaginians, towing his own ships behind.” 7
In yet another instance, “Learning that the Thracians intended to attack his camp at night, Iphikrates left numerous fires (to give the impression the camp was still occupied) and hid his men, who attacked and defeated the attacking Thracians.” 8 Even in the Iliad, the Trojans are defeated by the Greeks through deception.
So, while pre-arranged decisive battles are neither original, nor unique to Western armies, and while the Hoplites certainly did not abstain from using deception, it is hard to tell what role the ancient Greeks had in shaping our modern Western ideas about how warfare should be waged. The attitudes revolving around what is or is not considered to be standard or honorable warfare has evolved significantly within the last 200 years, let alone the last 2,600 years.
1 Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), chap. 6.
I have a problem with The Western Way of War
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/2sb5wh/i_have_a_problem_with_the_western_way_of_war/?
I'm currently reading Victor Davis Hanson's book The Western Way of War and over and over again he claims that the idea of two armies clashing together in a pitched battle on an open field originated in Greek classical antiquity.
I was reading Babylon: Mesopotamia and the Birth of Civilization by Paul Kriwaczek before and in that book it is argued that the Sumerians and other Mesopotamian city states like Ur and Uruk would line their armies up and charge each other, just like the Greeks did.
I admit I have only got about a chapter into TWWoW but the claims made in it have been bothering me. Is this a fair reading of Hanson, or has the scholarship moved on?
The whole subfield of ways of war and strategic culture is a bit of a mess, really, with a rather lot of heat and relatively little illumination. That said, VDH's basic thesis still retains some weight (at least, sufficient weight for books still to be published attacking it), in part because it is ethnocentric, and moreover in a way that makes us in the west feel good about ourselves. After all, if Europe (and later the USA) weren't so unique, how did they end up doing so well for themselves militarily? A lot of discussion of culture and ways of war does tend to fall back upon stereotype, unfortunately.
