“美國應該為了台灣問題派美軍跑到西太平洋與解放軍作戰嗎？”對於這一問題，“The American Conservative ”說了這麽一句話：美國政客應該對美國人民負有責任。
美媒的這一題目很有意思：美國應該為了台灣去和中國作戰嗎？
美國“The American Conservative ”提醒道：台灣對中美兩國有著不同的含義，它對中國而言可要比美國重要得多。美國國內的一些觀察者總是認為，隻要美國明確戰時會“協防台灣”的承諾，就會發揮一個非常大的嚇阻效果，同時也能夠激發台軍的戰鬥意誌，這很有可能會讓解放軍“知難而退”。甚至還有美國的觀察者認為，隻要美國戰時真的介入的話，一定會取得台海之戰最後的勝利，因為美國的軍力確保了美國的獲勝。不過保守派雜誌對這種言論是嗤之以鼻，它在文章中直接表示：持這種觀點的觀察家是在做夢。因為近年來，解放軍的軍力可謂突飛猛進，並不弱於西太平洋的美軍。
美國“The American Conservative ”還提醒道：在打仗之前，美國政府應該審視一下成本、風險和收益。美國的政客們應該清楚一點：“保護台灣”、“協防台灣”不是美軍的義務，也不值得美國拿自己的未來去冒險。台海有事時，美國沒有必要介入，應該讓台軍自己去打。歸根到底，為了台灣問題去和中國作戰，這非常不符合美國選民的利益。
美媒的這篇文章主要談論的是戰時美軍該不該介入台海，一直以來，美國國內對此眾說紛紜，各有各有的觀點。不過從這篇文章所表達的意思看，顯然美軍不該去，認為這是在拿美國的未來做賭注。下麵就來看一下這篇文章到底是如何闡述的。
（一）美媒感受到了台海的火藥味
日前，美國“The American Conservative ”網站就當前的台海局勢以及未來台海有事時，美軍是否應該介入台海發表了一篇分析文章。這篇文章的題目很有意思：為大事件做準備：美國應該在台灣問題上與中國作戰嗎？隨後最底下出現了一行回答的小字：美國政客對美國人民負有責任。
首先來看一看這些話的含義。“為大事件做準備”，這句話說得有些耐人尋味，而這句話的後麵是美軍戰時是否應該介入台海。做一個綜合考量的話，“The American Conservative ”網站似乎已經感受到了台海越來越濃的火藥味。從直觀的角度看，當前的台海局勢顯然沒有2022年8月佩洛西竄台時那樣劍拔弩張，但媒體對局勢的判斷畢竟要比一般人有著更高的敏感性。
美媒感受到了台海的火藥味，現在的台海正處於一種敏感時期
而文章正文的開頭，“The American Conservative ”網站首先談到的就是島內2024選舉結果。或許“The American Conservative ”已經預感到這次的選舉結果可能真的是台海局勢的重要分水嶺，未來台海局勢可能會走向一個火藥味更濃的環境中。所以這也才有了戰時美軍是否應該介入台海，與解放軍進行直接作戰的談論。
這篇文章首先寫道：在1月13日，台灣島內選舉結果出爐，有著“台獨”思想的民進黨將在5月份之後繼續上台，而且這次贏得選舉的賴清德是一個“台獨”思想更加激進的人，其過往的言論讓很多人對他感到不放心。這次賴清德的“勝利”是非常脆弱的，他僅僅過了40%，距離最基本的半數民意差得很遠。此外，在台立法機構，民進黨時隔8年丟掉了掌控權，甚至連“第一大黨”的位置都沒保住。
從過去大陸對賴清德的政治定性看，這就是一個標準的“台獨”分子，大陸有著極高的警惕心。1月13日島內的選舉過後，外界普遍認為，大陸會在台海周邊有相應的軍事動作，甚至會向民進黨當局施加強大的軍事壓力。但從目前的情形看，這些都還未發生，或許大陸還在做觀察。但有一點可以肯定，現在大陸正陸續出手整治“台獨”，例如選後不久，瑙魯在毫無征兆的背景下突然發出了與台當局的“斷交”令，這讓民進黨當局感到猝不及防。
“The American Conservative ”在文章中寫道：從一個更加現實的角度看，當前兩岸畢竟還沒有走到刀兵相見的那一步。但有一點不容忽視，大陸對和平統一的耐心正在減弱。
事實上，在選舉之前，台灣島內也有媒體輿論做過一個預判：這次的選舉不僅對台灣而言是一個轉折點，對大陸而言，這很有可能是對台政策的一個轉折點，即如果說是民進黨繼續上台的話，那就意味著和平統一的可能性要變得更低，此時大陸很有可能會審視另一種國家統一政策。不過島內也有其他人對這種說法做保留，畢竟三個候選人都是不談“統”的，所以如果單從統一的角度看，其實三人誰上都一樣。而且島內學者趙春山還預測：2024年以後，大陸對台主要工作就是促統。
台灣是中國的台灣，統一是大勢所趨，“台獨”、“拖統”都是絕路
不過有一點需要注意：兩岸已經持續分離了70多年，這一時間是很漫長的，台灣也需要知道，和平統一雖然是大陸首要對台政策，但大陸的耐心是有限的，“拖統”注定是一條無法持續的絕路。
（二）美媒表示，認為美軍會在台海擊敗解放軍的言論完全是一種夢話
在這麽一種背景下，“The American Conservative ”在文章中開始討論“對台武統”，而其中一個最重要的問題是：一旦大陸決定“對台武統”的話，美軍是否會真的介入？
“The American Conservative ”在文章中寫道：群體思維主導著華盛頓在台灣問題上的立場。美國政治領導人不計代價地假設美國對台北的支持，但他們很少對此做詳細說明，拜登一直在嘴上說自己會支持台灣，會在戰時“協防”。但隨後他的幕僚又極力辯解，表示會繼續美國的“模糊”政策，這很令外界質疑，美國政府究竟是否對此達成了內部一致。而美國政治領導層的想法和基層選民的想法又出現了差異。大多數選民都是反對使用美軍“協防”台灣的。
該文章還提到：美國國內的一些政策研究者認為，隻要美國政府能夠明確自己會在戰時“協防台灣”的意圖，就能夠起到所謂的“嚇阻”作用，同時台軍的軍心也會受到振奮，戰時頑抗的心會非常大，他們心中想定，自己至少要撐到美軍的到來。甚至還有其他的觀察家認為，憑借美軍現有的軍力，如果美軍一旦決定介入的話，最後一定會“打贏”。
對於這一想法，該文章表示：不幸運的是，這些觀察家的想法是在做夢。中國的軍機正在突飛猛進地發展，目前中國海軍已經是世界第二強，他的海軍艦艇規模數量已經超越了美國海軍。更關鍵的一點是，美軍的軍力是全球性的，他不僅要關注西太平洋，還要顧及全球其他熱點地區。而解放軍的軍力投射主要集中在西太平洋，準確地說，是集中在中國周邊海域。北京在台海作戰有著自己的主場優勢，他可以依靠數十個大陸軍事基地直接在台海作戰，而美軍則需要把軍力做跨越太平洋式的遠程投送。
如果從這一層麵進行計算的話，中美兩國圍繞台海局勢展開的軍事較量，誰優誰劣恐怕最後要超出想象，至少美軍的實力沒有想象中的樂觀。
美軍的軍力需要覆蓋全球，美軍能夠向西太平洋部署多少軍力完全值得質疑
該文章還表示：一旦美國真的決定準備為台灣而與解放軍作戰的話，那結果將是非常可怕的。他引用了美國海軍戰爭學院研究員萊爾·戈德斯坦的警告：在整個西太平洋地區，尤其是在台海周邊，軍事力量的平衡已經出現了決定性的變化，如果美軍決定在戰時增援這個被圍困的島嶼的話，海軍和空軍要做好承受巨大損失的準備。美軍需要跨越6500海裏的大洋做遠程力量投送，北京的導彈可以很輕鬆地把美軍遠道而來的艦隊阻擊在台海之外。即使美軍最依賴的水下潛艇部隊恐怕也沒有那麽樂觀。
過去美國海軍總是認為自己的潛艇部隊是在台海周邊擊敗解放軍艦隊的關鍵，但他們忽視的另一個現實是，北京多年來一直在研究如何應對美軍的水下潛艇部隊，而且解放軍的水下潛艇部隊也正在飛速發展。如果美軍貿然介入台海戰事的話，這將是非常悲傷的一天，最可怕的後果就是核戰爭的訴諸，中美兩國都是擁核國家，盡管雙方一直都在強調避免使用核武器，一直在常規力量發力，但戰爭的進程是令人難以想象的。
不得不說，從美國研究人員的表態看，顯然，如果美軍貿然介入台海戰事的後果將是非常慘重的，它絕沒有西方觀察家所想象得那麽輕鬆。“The American Conservative ”還在這篇文章中做了一個相對細化的說明：根據美國國內智庫過往的推演，無論介入的最終結果是勝還是敗，美軍通常都會付出這麽一些代價：多艘航母沉沒，數百架飛機被擊落，數千名軍事人員喪生。
（三）美媒認為，美軍貿然介入台海不符合美國的國家利益
“The American Conservative ”還提醒道：美國的對手可不僅僅隻在亞太，歐洲、中東都有美國的對手存在。美軍如果因為為了台灣，而在西太平洋地區蒙受巨大軍事損失的話，在其他地區恐怕要麵臨一種非常大的軍事挑戰。
事實上這個給美國的提醒很大，現在俄羅斯可是還在歐洲作戰，目前俄烏戰場是一種僵持狀態，俄軍推不動，烏軍也推不動。而且由於地緣政治的原因，歐洲國家對烏克蘭的關注可要遠遠大於對台海的關注，這可是歐洲家門口的事。如果台海有事，美軍貿然想貿然介入的話，估計歐洲國家的意見將非常大，因為這會為烏克蘭戰場上的俄軍提供一個戰略機遇期，更直白地講：俄軍甚至會利用這麽一個機會在烏克蘭戰場上直接平推。
對美國而言，歐洲、亞太哪一個更重要呢？前者可是資本主義的大本營和發源地，而且縱觀冷戰後的美國對外軍事行動，能夠跟著美軍前往海外作戰的基本上都是歐洲國家，打阿富汗、打伊拉克、打利比亞，打敘利亞，基本上都是歐洲國家在跟著美軍打衝鋒。所以從這一點看的話，相信美國自己心目中有一杆秤：歐洲和台海，到底哪一個更重要。
對美國而言，歐洲可要比台海重要太多，這裏才是他的核心地緣利益所在
“The American Conservative ”還在文章中做了這麽一個提醒：如果美軍真的打算要介入台海，與解放軍作戰的話，他需要為龐大的軍費開支做好準備，武器的生產、人員傷亡撫恤，這些都需要巨大的財政開支。而當前美國的債務水平正在不斷攀升，正不斷接近新的債務紀錄。難道美國政府想通過削弱選民的社會福利項目，國內基建項目的方式來節省軍費，跑到台海為台灣打仗嗎？如果真是這樣的話，美國的選民可就有意見了，他們不可能在犧牲自己生活的背景下去為了大多數所不知道的台灣而打仗。
隨後“The American Conservative ”在文章中發出了這麽一個問題：台灣有什麽樣的利益值得美國去承擔這些巨大的風險和代價，甚至讓美國可能要賭上自己的未來。
從伊拉克戰爭之後，美國國內就開始思考這麽一個問題：打仗應該需要極其重要的利益。對中美兩國而言，台灣給他們所帶的利益各不相同，它對中國而言是國家領土主權問題，也是曆史問題，更事關中華民族的榮辱。從1895年甲午戰爭簽署《馬關條約》至今，除了1945年至1949年外，台灣就一直處於與大陸所分離的狀態，百年來，中國人希望台灣能夠回歸，這事關民族的曆史榮辱。所以毫無疑問，台灣絕對是中國的核心利益。
台灣是中國核心利益中的核心，它事關中國的國家統一和民族榮辱
但對美國卻並非如此，台灣從來都不是美國的核心利益，如果是美國是因為半導體的原因而準備“協防台灣”的話，華盛頓更應該清楚一點：如果美軍真的介入，擴大衝突，無論最終是誰獲勝，台灣島上的半導體恐怕都遭到巨大的損失，美國自己不是也發出過“毀台論”嗎，並直言要摧毀台灣島上的半導體工廠。
如果說是為了保證所謂的“第一島鏈”，讓台灣島成為阻止解放軍前進太平洋的軍事基地，美軍同樣也應該看到這麽一個現實：即使在台灣沒有回歸的背景下，解放軍已經大大擴大了其艦隊的地理範圍，山東艦編隊不是曾一度抵達過關島海域附近嗎？
如果是按照美國國內鷹派所說的那樣，如果不“協防台灣”的話，這會損害美國的聲譽，令盟國質疑美國的安全承諾，對美國失去信心。但他們更應該清楚一點：所謂的安全承諾是建立在正式的防務條約上的。而從1979年之後，美國和台當局沒有任何的軍事防務條約，就連一向“親台”的美國國會都沒有提過此事，何來的對台安全承諾問題。美國會為了日本、韓國的安全去打一場仗，但不會為了台灣去打仗。
此外，美國還應該清楚，自己的盟國沒有一個承諾會為台灣去作戰的。
如果從美國自己的利益去考慮的話，他應該關注美國的未來。中美兩國都是擁核國家，兩個核大國爆發直接衝突，即使雙方再想打一場常規戰爭的話，但後續的進程恐怕不是他們所能夠把控的。
美媒總結了一句：美軍的職責是保護美國，而不是台灣
這篇文章最後總結了一點：歸根結底，在台灣問題上與北京作戰不符合美國人民的利益，華盛頓應該代表美國人民行事，他的職責是保護美國人，而不是台灣人。
Preparing for the Big One: Should America Battle China Over Taiwan?
https://www.cato.org/commentary/preparing-big-one-should-america-battle-china-over-taiwan?
U.S. politicians' responsibility is to the American people.
By Doug Bandow Jan 25, 2024
Washington’s duty is to protect Americans, not Taiwanese, however sympathetic the latter’s cause. The U.S. should firmly rule out military intervention while pursuing other policies designed to dissuade China from loosing the uncertain furies of war.
Taiwanese voters have spoken, elevating Vice President Lai Ching‐?te to the presidency. By selecting a candidate from the independence‐?minded Democratic Progressive Party for the third time in a row, the island state’s 24 million people gave a collective uplifted middle finger to the People’s Republic of China, and especially President Xi Jinping.
Lai’s victory was modest: 40 percent of the vote in a three‐?way race, with the DPP losing its parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, the PRC exhibited its displeasure, issuing warnings against separatism and undertaking military operations nearby. More significant was China’s political counterattack, as the Pacific island nation of Nauru shifted its recognition from the Republic of China to the PRC, reducing Taipei’s diplomatic partners to just 12.
So far, this looks a bit like Kabuki theater—a seemingly intense battle in which no one gets hurt. Yet Beijing’s patience appears to be waning, with Xi insisting that the issue must be resolved and the People’s Liberation Army training to seize Taiwan if necessary.
Groupthink dominates Washington’s position on Taiwan. U.S. political leaders assume America’s support for Taipei irrespective of cost, which few detail. Indeed, President Joe Biden has repeatedly promised to fight for Taiwan (which his staff has equally often, but unconvincingly, repudiated). In contrast, a majority of Americans oppose the use of U.S. troops.
Some otherwise serious policymakers assume that the Chinese would scatter if Washington simply declared its intentions. Others figure the U.S. would have to win since America always wins, or at least is supposed to.
Unfortunately, such observers are living a dream.
China has been rapidly expanding its military forces and currently deploys the world’s second most powerful navy. The PRC has embarked upon a major nuclear build‐?up to shrink America’s advantage in this critical area. China concentrates its forces in Asia rather than dispersing them globally. Beijing can rely on scores of mainland military bases while Washington must project power across the Pacific Ocean.
Finally, Taiwan matters far more to the Chinese than the American people. One reason is history: Japan seized the islands in 1895 after defeating the Chinese Empire during what was known as the Century of Humiliation. Nationalistic Chinese want Taiwan back. Security is another important concern—little different than what animated Washington’s refusal to accept a Soviet military presence in Cuba in 1962.
Americans understandably sympathize with Taiwan. The Republic of China is a vibrant democracy, an outpost of liberty in the shadow of the world’s greatest despotism. Indeed, Beijing is moving backwards, with Xi Jinping looking more like Mao Zedong every day. Nevertheless, sympathy does not a casus belli make.
Especially when the costs of war would be so great. Any conflict would be very different from America’s recent Mideast fights. Defense Priority’s Lyle Goldstein, who long taught at the Naval War College, warned:
The military balance in the Western Pacific and especially around Taiwan has shifted decisively. U.S. Navy and Air Force units would face enormous losses in any attempt to reinforce the beleaguered island. Even the vaunted U.S. submarine force almost certainly could not prevail in such circumstances, since it has limited numbers and firepower. Moreover, Beijing has been working assiduously on decisive countermeasures to American submarines, including sea mines. Beijing would deploy its missile forces to easily gain vast superiority in the air, enabling an enormous mainland assault to go forward—spearheaded by heliborne infantry and commandos. The only thing worse than such a sad day would be either the utter defeat of American expeditionary forces at the lonely end of a 6,500 mile supply line, or the rather conceivable resort to nuclear war.
Although nothing is certain, the U.S. usually loses wargames of the potential conflict, and even victory, meaning Taiwan remains unconquered, comes at a heavy cost, with multiple carriers sunk, hundreds of aircraft downed, and thousands of military personnel killed. Moreover, escalation, including nuclear weapons, would be likely. The PRC would do whatever it thought necessary to prevent U.S. domination just off its coast. Washington would have to strike the Chinese mainland, which would force Beijing to in turn target American territory. Never have two major conventional combatants possessed nuclear weapons.
Even the minimum expected military losses, compounded by the significant economic harm, would undercut other American defense commitments. Proposals to accelerate military outlays ignore Washington’s rising debt burden, which is approaching record levels. Americans aren’t likely to slash social programs to protect Taiwan. Finally, even victory would be temporary, with China retreating to rearm and prepare for the next round, rather like Germany after its defeat in the First World War.
Is anything at stake with Taiwan worth incurring these costs and taking these risks?
Going to war should require an extremely important interest. Going to war against a powerful nuclear‐?armed state should require a truly vital or existential interest. None is present in Taiwan. The Taiwanese people deserve to decide their own political future, and virtually none identify with the PRC. Protecting that right, however, is neither an obligation of the U.S. nor worth risking America’s future.
Talk of democracy versus autocracy is meaningless boilerplate. Washington cares little about liberty when it overthrows democracies that it dislikes and embraces autocracies that it favors. Just watch President Joe Biden grovel before the Saudi royals. Freedom House ranks their loathsome regime even lower than the PRC. Anyway, democracy in America should be the highest priority for U.S. policymakers.
Nor is Taiwan’s dominant semiconductor chip industry reason for war, which would disrupt global supplies. China would blockade the island and combat could flatten the factories. Indeed, such facilities would not likely survive no matter who won. Washington probably would destroy them rather than allow them to fall into China’s hands. Fear of over‐?dependence on Taiwanese chip facilities should lead to production and supply diversification, not military intervention. (Oddly, former president Donald Trump equivocated on defending Taiwan because, he believes, it created its chip industry at America’s expense.)
U.S. officials also insist that Washington must preserve an autonomous Taiwan to inhibit Chinese naval operations further into the Pacific. Yet Beijing has greatly expanded its geographic reach without holding the island. Moreover, every time American policymakers announce that they want to protect Taipei to reinforce US domination of the Asia‐?Pacific, they intensify Chinese determination to regain Taiwan. It makes no sense to go to war with China to control a territory that is supposed to prevent China from starting a war.
Hawks who insist on fighting every war big and small to maintain “credibility” warn that America’s Pacific allies would lose confidence in Washington if it did not combat Beijing over Taiwan. Yet the U.S. formalizes security commitments with defense treaties. Congress has not done so with Taipei for a reason. All great powers set priorities and make choices, just as Washington is not defending Ukraine. In contrast, America proved its willingness to defend South Korea, at great cost.
Moreover, none of America’s allies have committed to go to war with the U.S. on Taiwan’s behalf. The treaties with Japan and South Korea are supposed to be “mutual.” These nations have much more at stake in Taiwan than does America. Why should Washington commit if they won’t? Indeed, constantly reassuring allies against every contingency discourages them from doing more for their own defense. Both Seoul and Tokyo have long lagged in defense efforts since they can rely on America. In practice, Washington promising to do more means they will do less.
Ultimately, it is not in the interests of the American people, on whose behalf Washington is supposed to operate, to battle Beijing over Taiwan. However, that doesn’t mean the U.S. shouldn’t do anything. To start, Americans should help arm Taipei. The latter needs to do a much better job defending itself, in both staffing its military and deploying the right weapons, especially anti‐?ship missiles. There is much that the Taiwanese should learn from the Russo‐?Ukraine war. The U.S. and Taipei should even have discreet discussions about the latter’s interest in possessing nuclear weapons. Proliferation is undesirable, but still might be the least bad option. Better nations at risk deter China than rely on America.
The U.S. also should work with allied and friendly states, in Asia and Europe especially, to prepare economic penalties should the PRC use force against Taiwan. This won’t be easy, given how such nations benefit from Chinese trade. Nevertheless, war in Northeast Asia would have catastrophic regional and global impacts. One study estimated the likely economic cost at $10 trillion. The best way to deter Chinese military action would be to ensure that the denizens of Zhongnanhai counted the cost before they embarked on war.
Finally, the U.S. should seek to reassure the PRC. That might seem counterintuitive, but few Chinese want to go to war. They hope to force Taiwan to agree to some form of unification without fighting. Despite his increasingly tough rhetoric, even Xi realizes that military failure would be catastrophic for China and him personally. His ongoing military purges suggest that he is not confident in the PLA. Nothing is foreordained.
However, warn three China scholars, war is more likely “if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence.… Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification or would allow the United States to restore something akin to a defense alliance with Taiwan. And if China comes to that conclusion, then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.”
Analysts broadly agree that a Taiwanese declaration of independence likely would trigger a Chinese military response. Unfortunately, Beijing appears to believe that recent behavior by both Taipei and Washington indicates that Taiwan’s objectives have shifted toward independence, with Washington’s support. In fact, several Chinese officials have told me that there is no returning to the status quo ante because they believe that means eventual separation. What matters is not what the U.S. and Taiwan intend, but what Beijing believes they intend.
Thus, it is essential not to stoke Chinese paranoia. Politicians determined to use Taiwan to score partisan points risk spurring a catastrophic conflict with horrendous consequences. The best hope to avoid war is to convince Beijing that the peaceful status quo remains in its interest. That requires convincing the PRC that the peaceful status quo truly is the status quo. Negotiations for the U.S., China, and Taiwan to all step back from political contention and military conflict might offer the best hope to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
Unfortunately, the Taiwanese people live in a bad neighborhood and must adapt to local realities, meaning a potentially aggressive China. This may be unfair, but life is unfair. Washington’s duty is to protect Americans, not Taiwanese, however sympathetic the latter’s cause. The U.S. should firmly rule out military intervention while pursuing other policies designed to dissuade China from loosing the uncertain furies of war.
