風蕭蕭_Frank
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中國的政治改革應遵循哪些理念？ 對 Sam Crane 評論的回應
丹尼爾·A·貝爾 (DANIEL A. BELL) 2023 年 12 月 16 日
1995年，克蘭教授和我在威廉姆斯校園共同組織了一次示威活動，抗議新加坡對學術自由的限製。 在我的新書中，最長的一章是捍衛學術自由和批評審查製度。 但出於某種原因，克雷恩認為這些年來我已經演變成“獨裁主義”的捍衛者。 我向自己保證，我會忽略他的評論，但說起來容易做起來難，因為這條評論似乎在社交媒體上流傳，朋友們說我應該做出回應。 所以就這樣吧。
我寫《山東院長》並不是為了那些相信中國的政治製度從根本上來說是邪惡的、越早崩潰越好的人。 我為那些對中國學術界內部運作感到好奇的人寫了這本書，並為評估中國政治製度提供了啟示。 我寫這本書也不是為了那些缺乏幽默感的人。 我的書涉及嚴肅的主題——官僚主義、學術精英主義、儒家、君主製、法家、腐敗、集體領導、審查製度——但我寫得輕鬆，重自我批評，以表現人性和幽默。 這經常影響我與中國朋友和同事的互動，這與西方普遍存在的對中國的負麵刻板印象形成鮮明對比。 這也是我的書被英國《金融時報》選為年度圖書的部分原因，甚至連我最嚴厲的批評者，如中國超級鷹派張家輝也認為這本書“有趣”。 但克雷恩似乎把這本書當作一本關於中國政治的極其嚴肅的小冊子來讀。
遺憾的是，克蘭幾乎沒有提及我書中的論點和故事。 他的“評論”是空洞的美德信號，與我的書無關。 他批評了幾句話，完全斷章取義（關於新疆的評論是關於中國問題的一長段的一部分——批評的意圖很明顯——而關於黨委書記角色的評論沒有注意到我討論了中國的角色） 學術機構的黨委書記，而不是更高級別的政府黨委書記，因為他們的工作可能涉及處理政治異議等）。 他花了很大力氣批評我2015年寫的一本書，並選擇了對該書最嚴厲的爭論性評論（我對他沒有提及的評論做出了回應；他錯誤地將黃玉順識別為“外國中國分析家”，而事實上 他是在中國生活和工作的中國學者）。
克雷恩從我的新書中沒有學到任何東西（而且，我承認，我從他的評論中沒有學到任何東西）。 那麽他為什麽要費力寫評論呢？ 原因是他有政治目的，而他就是這麽做的。 看來我的政治罪過就是不讚成推翻中國的政治製度。 讓我按指控認罪。
難道我就想捍衛“獨裁主義”嗎？ 我認為將政治世界劃分為“民主國家”和“獨裁國家”沒有什麽幫助，正如拜登總統和克蘭教授所讚成的那樣。 我們應該將理想與理想進行比較，將高度不完善的政治現實與高度不完善的政治現實進行比較。 理想旨在提供道德標準，允許對政治現實進行批判性評估，並提出改進標準。 在美國，知識分子和政治改革者通常將“民主”視為一種理想。 然而，在中國，知識分子和政治改革者並不為“專製主義”辯護，因為“專製主義”在中文中帶有極重的貶義。 因此，我們需要思考哪些政治理想可能會激發改革，這就是為什麽我寫了（較早的）一本書，捍衛“上層精英政治、中層實驗、下層民主”的理想。 自從我寫這本書以來，我們可能倒退了兩步，又前進了一步，但我想說的是，這個理想仍然有效，並被廣泛堅持，作為中國政治背景下的靈感和批評的源泉。 因此，如果我們要將理想與口號形式的理想進行比較，在如何選擇政治領導人的問題上，相關的二分法應該是美國的“選舉民主”與中國的“垂直精英政治”。
如果我們想比較高度不完美的政治現實，那就是另一回事了。 在美國，現實更接近“一美元一票”，而不是“一人一票”。 在中國，法家傳統與列寧主義遺產結合起來具有巨大的影響力（正如我在書中試圖展示的那樣），特別是在更高級別的政府中。 因此，如果我們想以口號形式比較高度不完美的政治現實，它應該類似於美國的“選舉美元統治”與中國的“列寧法家”。
無論如何，相關的問題是：鑒於兩國的現實都非常不完美，什麽樣的政治理想應該激發政治改革？ 對於克雷恩來說，激勵美國改革的自由民主理想也應該激勵中國改革。 我認為我們應該考慮到文化特殊性的道德相關性，以及儒家和社會主義傳統可以激勵中國的改革。 有一些普遍人權——反對酷刑、奴役、種族滅絕和係統性種族歧視的“消極”權利，以及生命和基本物質需求的“積極”權利——但除此之外，不同的政治團體可以在這些問題上堅持不同的標準 作為選拔和晉升公職人員以及組織經濟生活的最佳方式。
最後一件事。 克雷恩批評我“希望”中國進步。 在這裏，我也按指控認罪，盡管我盡力給出希望的理由，但這不是盲目的希望。
丹尼爾·貝爾（香港大學）
2023 年 12 月 16 日
Which Ideals Should Inform China's Political Reform? Response to Sam Crane's Review
I did not write the Dean of Shandong for those who are convinced the Chinese political system is fundamentally evil and the earlier it collapses, the better. I wrote the book for those curious about the inner workings of Chinese academia and I draw implications for evaluating the Chinese political system. Nor did I write the book for those who lack a sense of humor. My book deals with serious subject matter — bureaucracy, academic meritocracy, Confucianism, monarchy, Legalism, corruption, collective leadership, censorship – but I wrote it with a light-hearted touch, heavy on the self-criticism, to show the humanity and humor that so often informs my interactions with Chinese friends and colleagues, in contrast to the negative stereotypes about China so pervasive in the West. It’s part of the reason my book was selected as a book of the year by the Financial Times and even my harshest critics such as China uber-hawk Gordon Chang find the book “entertaining.” But Crane seems to have read the book as a deadly serious tract on Chinese politics.
Regrettably, Crane says hardly anything about the arguments and the stories that inform my book. His “review” consists of empty virtue signaling that has nothing to do with my book. He criticizes a couple of sentences completely out of context (the comment about Xinjiang is part of a long paragraph about what’s wrong with China – the critical intent is obvious — and the comment about the role of party secretary fails to note I discuss the role of the party secretary in academic institutions, not at higher levels of government where their work might involve dealing with political dissent and such). He devotes much effort to criticizing a book I wrote in 2015 and selects the harshest polemical reviews of that book (I wrote responses to the reviews which he doesn’t mention; he mistakenly identifies Huang Yushun as a “foreign China analyst” when in fact he is Chinese scholar living and working in China).
Crane learned nothing from my new book (and, I confess, I learned nothing from his review). So why did he bother writing the review? The reason is that he has a political axe to grind and that’s what he did. My political sin, it seems, is that I do not favor overthrow of the Chinese political system. Let me plead guilty as charged.
Does it follow that I seek to defend “authoritarianism”? I do not think it’s helpful to divide the political world into “democracies” and “autocracies”, as both President Biden and Professor Crane favor. We should compare ideals with ideals, and highly imperfect political realities with highly imperfect political realities. Ideals are meant to provide moral standards that allow for critical evaluation of the political reality and to suggest standards for improvement. In the United States, intellectuals and political reformers typically invoke “democracy” as an ideal. In China, however, intellectuals and political reformers do not defend “authoritarianism” （專製主義）， which is highly pejorative in Chinese. So we need to think of which political ideals might inspire reform, and that’s why I wrote (an earlier) book defending the ideal of “political meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom”. We may have gone two steps backward and one step forward since I wrote the book, but the ideal, let me suggest, is still valid and widely adhered to as an inspiration and source of criticism in the Chinese political context. So if we want to compare ideals with ideals in slogan form, with respect to the question of how political leaders should be selected, the relevant dichotomy should be something like “electoral democracy” in the U.S. case versus “vertical political meritocracy” in China.
If we want to compare highly imperfect political realities, then it’s a different story. In the United States, the reality is closer to “one dollar, one vote” than “one person, one vote”. In China, the Legalist tradition is hugely influential (as I try to show in my book), in combination with Leninist legacies, especially at higher levels of government. So if we want to compare highly imperfect political realities in slogan form, it should be something like “electoral dollarcracy” in the United States versus “Leninist Legalism” in China.
In any case, the relevant question is: given that both countries have highly imperfect realities, which political ideals should inspire political reform? For Crane, the same liberal democratic ideals that should inspire reform in the United States should serve to inspire reform in China. I think we should allow for the moral relevance of cultural particularity and that the Confucian and socialist traditions can inspire China’s reform. There are some universal human rights – “negative” rights against torture, slavery, genocide, and systematic racial discrimination as well as “positive” rights to life and basic material needs – but beyond that different political communities can adhere to different standards regarding such issues as the best way to select and promote public officials and to organize economic life.
One last thing. Crane criticizes me for having “hope” that China improves. Here too, I plead guilty as charged, though I do my best to give reasons for hope, it’s not blind hope.
Daniel A. Bell (University of Hong Kong)
Dec. 16, 2023
