皮皮蝦
Will update later on.
政治經濟學屬於社會科學。社會科學的一個特點是不能重複驗證，所以也就很難證明一種經濟學觀點是正確的還是錯誤的。
美國大蕭條時期過去幾十年了，美國經濟學界仍然在爭論：羅斯福總統當年的新政是延長了經濟危機時間還是縮短了經濟危機時間。鄧小平的改革開放過去40年了，讚揚和批評鄧小平的兩組人勢不兩立。毛澤東去世四十多年了，讚美和批判毛的兩派人武鬥的心都有了。我不是想在這裏說毛和鄧的好壞，隻是想說明，我們對經濟學的看法，往往帶著我們自己的觀點。
最近關於中美經濟的文章比較多，當然也是各說各話。我最近看到一篇關於中美關係的文章，感覺有些道理，就編譯在這裏。文章源自巴倫周刊（Barron’s, 2019.04.04, By Michael Pettis)。
What the U.S. Gets Wrong About China—and Why That Spells Trouble
By Michael Pettis April 4, 2019 8:31 a.m. ET
China’s ferocious economic growth in recent years has transformed U.S.-China relations—largely for the worse.
中國最近幾年經濟的快速發展，改變了中美關係，兩國關係主要是朝著壞的方向發展。
The very difficult economic adjustment that China now faces will again change that relationship. Unfortunately, if history is a useful guide, it will take many years before policy makers in Washington recognize the changed circumstances and formulate an appropriate policy response.
中國現在麵臨的經濟調整的艱難，最終會改變中美關係。不幸的是，如果曆史經驗可以借鑒的話，美國華盛頓需要許多年時間來理解中國現在所麵臨的情況，從而調整未來美國對中國的政策。
Just a few years ago, it was almost impossible to find anyone who doubted the inexorable rise of China’s economy, eventually to become the world’s largest and most powerful. Today, however, more analysts, both inside and outside China, recognize that its relative rise economically may have already peaked, or soon will, and that its real economic performance has been seriously overstated by the gross-domestic-product data.
僅僅是幾年前，幾乎沒有人會懷疑，中國經濟的無情崛起將取代美國成為世界第一超級大國。今天，無論在中國國內還是國外，大部分人都認識到，中國經濟的相對強勢發展的頂峰即使還沒有過去，那麽也很快會過去。中國的實際經濟實力被表麵的國民總產值嚴重高估。
This won’t be the first time we got it so wrong, and as in every previous case—most obviously that of the Soviet Union in the 1960s and Japan in the 1980s—it will probably take many years for American perceptions to change. But in whatever way events actually unfold, the China of the near future will no longer be the aggressively rising China of American fears, and the sooner we recognize this change, the less likely we are to engage in useless and costly confrontation.
美國人的這種誤會不是第一次，以前曾經發生過。麵對上世紀六十年代的前蘇聯和八十年代的日本，美國人都犯了同樣的錯誤。但是，美國人需要許多年時間來認識到自己的錯誤。
不管中美關係怎麽發展，中國在不久的將來，不會像美國人擔心的那樣快速崛起。美國人越早認識到這一點，就越會減少對中國的圍堵。這種圍堵既沒有效果，成本還會很高。
The historical precedents for China tell a consistent story. Every country that enjoyed many years of an investment-driven economic “miracle” has faced the same difficult challenges that China now faces: how to resolve the deep demand imbalances and the ballooning debt that drove growth in its final stages. None have managed the transition without a significant, and probably inevitable, downgrading of longer-term economic, technological, and geopolitical prospects.
曆史先例告訴我們同樣的道理。每一個通過投資驅動的經濟“奇跡”都會麵臨同樣的挑戰，也就是中國正在麵臨的挑戰：怎樣解決在經濟發展的最後階段，產能和消費市場的不平衡和不斷增長的債務負擔？沒有一個國家能順利處理好這樣的挑戰而不導致長期的經濟衰退，及由此產生的科技和社會影響力的下降。
What can be certain is the China that emerges from this adjustment will be a very different country from the one we know today.
可以肯定的說，未來經過調整以後的中國，肯定會不同於我們現在知道的中國。
To understand the challenges that Beijing faces, it is helpful to understand the process that led to China’s current state. One of the biggest mistakes in understanding the nation’s development is to conflate the four decades since Deng Xiaoping began his historic reforms into a single, consistent growth model. It is much more useful to think about this period as consisting of four very different economic growth stages, the last of which, with great difficulty, we are only just entering.
要想理解中國麵臨的挑戰，我們首先需要明白中國怎麽走到當前的經濟階段的。理解中國經濟發展的最大失誤，就是把鄧小平主導的改革開放以來的所有經濟發展，作為一個單一的經濟發展模式。如果我們把過去幾十年的經濟發展，分為四個不同的經濟發展階段，那麽我們對現在中國麵臨的最後經濟發展階段，就會有更好的理解。
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?????? ???????????????The first stage began in political and economic crisis following the Cultural Revolution. By the end of the 1970s, China had lived through more than 40 years of Japanese conflict, civil war, and Maoist policies that had distorted its economy and left it underinvested. To prevent collapse, the economy had to be transformed in a way that eliminated the many constraints on Chinese economic productivity.
第一階段始於文革以後的1970年代。1970年代末，中國人民經曆了艱難的40年，其中包括日本侵略，國共內戰，和毛時代的各種政策。中國經濟被扭曲，基礎建設投入不夠。為了防止中國經濟崩潰，當時的經濟改革不可避免，阻礙經濟發展的條條框框必須被打破。
Deng’s reforms did just that, and they were immediately successful. In 1977, the last year of the old regime, China’s GDP shrank 1.7%, but over the next decade, it soared, with China experiencing only one year of growth below 7%. In that decade, Beijing relaxed laws preventing unplanned economic activity, freed workers and farmers from their work units, and reduced the role of central planning in favor of localized planning. These reforms unleashed an explosion of economic activity that generated tremendous wealth creation.
鄧小平的經濟改革做的正是這樣，並且立竿見影。1977年，中國舊體製的最後一年，中國經濟下降了1.7%。但是在接下來的10年裏，中國經濟發生了翻天覆地的變化，中國經濟隻有一年的增長率低於7%。在這10年裏，北京政府放鬆了計劃經濟，給工人和農民離開工作單位和農村的自由，減少了中央經濟計劃，讓地方政府自己做主。這些改革措施釋放了經濟活力，創造了巨大財富。
But it is really not until the next stage, beginning in the early 1990s, that we can speak about the Chinese growth model, itself a version of the investment-driven growth model practiced by Japan and others. Rather than just eliminate growth constraints, Beijing put into effect new policies that set off rapid growth and development, and, as they always do, these policies began to generate the imbalances that the current administration must resolve.
但是直到中國經濟發展的第二階段，始於1990年代初，我們才可以討論中國的經濟增長模式，即投資驅動的增長模式。這種增長模式以前日本和其它國家都試過。它不是通過取消限製經濟增長的約束（製度），而是引進新的投資政策來刺激經濟的增長和發展。跟其它國家一樣，這樣的政策會導致經濟發展不平衡，這就是中國政府需要解決的問題。
Among the most important of these imbalances is the extraordinarily low share of GDP retained by ordinary Chinese households. At 50%, this low share was not an accident. As in every other investment-driven growth “miracle” of the past century, the Chinese government forced up domestic savings and directed these savings into urgently needed investment. The most effective way of forcing up savings, i.e., forcing down consumption, is to repress the growth of household income relative to GDP by directly or indirectly taxing household wealth to subsidize government-directed investment.
這種經濟發展不平衡的最嚴重指標，就是民眾收入在國民總產值中的份額太低。中國民眾收入隻有50% GDP這種情況不是偶然的。 跟其它投資驅動的經濟增長奇跡一樣，政府強製民眾儲蓄，並把儲蓄投放到急需的投資項目。增加儲蓄，減少消費的有效措施，就是壓製民眾家庭收入的增長低於GDP的增長。政府通過各種稅收來補貼政府支持的投資，從而壓低民眾的收入在國內生產總值的份額。
This Beijing did, adopting a number of mechanisms pioneered by Japan. As the total value of Chinese goods and services soared, household income grew by still-enviable, but much lower, rates. The household share of total GDP consequently dropped every year to become, in the past decade, among the lowest ever.
北京的辦法，日本曾經實施過。過去幾十年，雖然中國國內生產總值上去了，家庭收入也增長了，但是家庭收入在國內生產總值的占比卻越來越低。家庭收入的GDP占比現在處於過去幾十年的最低位。
?There are two important consequences of this model. First, because consumption accounted for such a low share of demand for the goods and services China produced, investment had to make up a disproportionately large share of total Chinese demand. In fact, at nearly 50%, the investment share of China’s GDP exceeds that of any of the other countries that had followed this growth model.
Second, the relationship between Beijing and the country’s elite was transformed. Deng’s original reforms had been strongly opposed by the Communist Party elite during the first stage, mainly because the reforms undermined their control of economic behavior. It is part of his genius that he nonetheless managed to force through his vision of a transformed China.
這種經濟模式有兩個不良後果。第一，因為民眾的消費能力太低，政府必須通過投資來補償經濟增長。國內生產總值中50%的投資占比，超過其它任何采取類似經濟模式國家的投資占比。
第二，北京政府和國家精英階層的關係改變了。鄧在改革開放的早期階段，遭到了黨內精英階層的反對，因為改革剝奪了他們控製經濟的權力。鄧的改革成功，因為他的聰明手腕和改革開放的遠見。
During this second stage of growth, however, Beijing’s development policies created a powerful new group, heavily overlapping with the old elite, that strongly supported government policies and competed to accomplish the objectives set out by Beijing. The more successful they were, the more they were rewarded in the form of subsidies, with access to extraordinarily cheap credit quickly becoming the most profitable resource in China.
在經濟發展的第二階段，北京的發展政策產生了新的利益集團。這些利益集團跟鄧時期的精英集團大部分情況下是同一撥人。他們支持政府的政策，並爭相完成政府的目標。他們越成功，得到政府的獎勵越多。政府的獎勵以各種形式的補助和低息貸款發給他們。
The third stage of Chinese growth, which probably began early in the last decade, was characterized by continued rapid GDP growth driven by investment. This was, however, underpinned by even more rapid growth in debt.
中國經濟發展的第三階段，大概始於2000年代初， 標誌著國內生產總值的快速增長，但是同時也伴隨著債務的快速增長。
This, too, is typical of countries that have followed this growth model. Undeveloped economies are usually poor not because they are underinvested, but because their social, legal, financial, and economic institutions constrain their ability to absorb high levels of investment productively. Typically, they encourage or require individuals and businesses to behave in ways that are not socially or economically beneficial.
這也是這種經濟發展模式的典型結果。欠發達國家窮不是因為這些國家缺少投資來源，而是這些國家的社會，法律，金融和經濟機構的條條框框，限製了投資效率。典型的情況是，這些管理機構的規則讓投資不能產生相應的社會和經濟效益，這樣大家也就不願意來投資。
In the early 1990s, these constraints did not seem to matter. The country so badly lacked infrastructure and manufacturing capacity that the only important constraint on productive investment was the pace at which savings could grow. An unsophisticated financial system that chose investment projects for political or other noneconomic reasons was not a serious problem: The best financial system was simply the one that expanded most rapidly.
在1990年代初，這些條條框框問題不大。那個時候，國家急需基礎建設和生產能力的發展，條條框框產生的影響隻是賺錢的速度大小問題。那個時候選擇投資項目的金融係統雖然也關心政治性的和非合理的投資項目，但是問題不是很嚴重。那時發展最快的經濟模式就是最好的經濟模式。
But with its still-undeveloped social, legal, financial, and economic institutions, the amount of capital stock that businesses and workers in China could absorb productively was much lower than in advanced economies. Without substantial institutional reform, additional investment was unlikely to be economically justified, but these reforms were far too politically disruptive for Beijing to consider implementing them.
但是，在陳舊的社會，法律，金融和經濟框架下，現在能產生好的經濟效應的投資項目已經比不上發達國家了。如果沒有根本的機構改革，未來投資難以賺錢。如果要做大的體製改革，政府又不能接受。
Still, China’s very low consumption share meant that rapid GDP growth required rapid investment growth, and because China’s financial system was designed to expand credit as rapidly as possible, this is what it got. What is more, because the costs of investing in infrastructure or manufacturing capacity were heavily subsidized by hidden transfers from households, it was easy to miss the problem. Without mechanisms to constrain, or even to identify, wasted investment, China, like all of its predecessors, began allocating investment increasingly into unproductive projects, much like Japan’s famous “bridges to nowhere” two decades earlier.
同時，中國的低消費能力意味著GDP增長必須依賴於投資增長。中國的銀行係統對基礎建設投資項目是大開綠燈，而這些投資項目又通過壓低民眾收入來補貼，所以很多沒有經濟效益的投資項目在進行，正像日本當年修“哪裏也不通”的橋。
When this happens, the debt supporting the investment rises faster than the country’s debt-servicing capacity. With very high GDP growth rates needed to sustain employment and political stability, the gap between reported economic growth (i.e., GDP) and real economic growth widened, and, more worryingly, debt soared. Every country that has followed this model has suffered eventually from this unsustainable rise in debt, but in China debt rose faster than it ever has in history, leaving the country with an enormous burden of debt, equal by most estimates to more 300% of GDP.
這種投資項目的發展，就是債務增長速度超過國家的債務償還能力。為了維持民眾的就業率和政治穩定，政府必須要維持GDP的表麵增長速度。結果就是表麵經濟（GDP）增長速度和實際經濟增長速度（民眾消費能力）的差距越拉越大。現在中國的債務負擔，估計已經達到GDP的三倍，即300%。
Today, China urgently needs institutional reforms that both rechannel bank lending and change its legal and other institutions in ways that raise the productivity of Chinese businesses and workers. China must, in other words, begin the fourth stage of its growth period. It must rein in credit growth and, with it, investment growth, but if it is to prevent growth from collapsing, consumption must take up the slack. This requires redistributing large amounts of wealth from local elites and local governments to ordinary Chinese households.
當前，中國經濟必須進入第四增長階段。政府急需進行機構改革，保證銀行貸款和政府管理機製能產生經濟效益。為了防止經濟增長崩潰，民眾的消費必須跟上。民眾的消費能力必須來自中國的財富重新分配，就是把中國富人的錢和地方政府的資源，用來支持普通老百姓。
The historical precedents for such a transformation are grim. The only countries that have succeeded in redistributing wealth and power and rechanneling the financial system to such an extent without suffering political chaos have either been robust democracies, like the U.S. in the 1930s, or highly centralized autocracies, like China itself in the 1980s, and in both cases it took a crisis to force the change.
這種財富轉移的改革前景不太樂觀。曆史上成功完成財富和權力重新分配的案例包括，高度民主化的美國在1930年代的大蕭條時期的新政，和高度中央集權的中國在1980年代的經濟改革。這兩次變革，雖然避免了政治混亂（Political Chaos），但是也經曆了強製變革帶來的危機（Crisis）。
Will China pull it off? There are broadly three ways that China can manage its adjustment. The best way is if President Xi Jinping has been able temporarily to consolidate enough power to force through the necessary wealth transfers that raise household wealth quickly enough so that consumption can power growth as nonproductive investment is forced down. In this case, China’s share of global GDP—currently around 15% to 16%—will probably continue to rise, albeit more slowly than in the past, and the Chinese economy will end up with a much larger and more powerful household sector, more stable growth, and eventually a weaker government sector.
中國會完成這樣的財富重新分配的變革嗎？總的來說中國有三個途徑去完成這樣的變革。最好的辦法，習臨時取得足夠的權力來強製推行財富分配。沒有經濟效益的投資項目被強製下馬，取得財富的普通民眾的消費增長才能支持中國的經濟增長。這樣中國可以維持它在世界經濟中的份額（15%到16%之間）。未來中國經濟會有一個強大的家庭消費經濟和穩定的增長，政府的權力最後被減弱。
The sheer extent of the needed reforms make this an unlikely outcome. Still, it is not impossible: China managed an equally difficult transformation with Deng’s reforms in the 1980s.
這樣大規模的變革一般不會實現。但是也不是不可能，鄧在1980年代就做了這樣規模的艱難改革。
The second way is if Beijing is able to stabilize the debt burden with smaller but more-manageable wealth transfers to Chinese households. In that case, Chinese GDP growth will drop to well below half of current levels, although household income growth by a lot less. China’s share of global GDP would probably drop, even if not as precipitously as its predecessors, but it runs the risk, like Japan, of failing to resolve its debt burden and so suffering many years of stagnation.
第二種方案是中國通過小規模的財富轉移來穩定債務負擔。這種情況下中國的GDP增長速度可能會降到現在的一半水平，但是老百姓的收入增長不夠維持GDP增長。中國GDP在國際上的份額會下降，但是中國會麵臨日本那種沉重債務負擔和長期經濟停滯。
The third way is if Beijing is unable to gain control of credit growth in time and the economy runs up against debt-capacity limits, either in the form of a financial crisis, or by effectively monetizing new debt as it comes due. A crisis is very unlikely as long as the Chinese banking system remains closed and the regulators powerful, but either way Chinese GDP growth would drop sharply, to zero or even negative.
第三種情況，政府不能控製債務的持續增長，最後經濟發展到債務的極限。這種極限可以是金融危機的形式，也可以是政府印錢還債形式。隻要政府能夠嚴格控製銀行係統和經濟監管，危機一般不會發生。但是中國經濟增長可能變成零，甚至變成負數。
Each of these broadly different outcomes can occur in different ways, and clearly the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship will depend on how China manages its economic adjustment and how the U.S. manages its own high debt levels and income inequality. It will also depend on the outcome of the trade conflict, which will drag on for many years, far beyond President Donald Trump’s time in office.
以上的每一種方案都可能以不同的形式出現。其結果會受中美關係，中國的經濟調控能力，以及美國自身的高債務水平和美國民眾的收入不平衡等因素影響。中美貿易衝突會持續很多年，遠遠超過川普的總統任期。
The point, however, is that Washington is managing the relationship with an obsolete idea of China. To the extent that U.S. foreign policy concerning China is built around the need to contain a dangerously rising China, this policy will also soon become obsolete. China’s ferocious economic growth has ended, and very few serious economists, in or out of China, still think its high GDP growth rates accurately represent the performance of the underlying economy.
這裏需要指出的是，美國政府仍然在用過時的理念來處理中美關係。表現在美國仍然使用圍堵的戰略來抑製崛起的中國。中國經濟的猛烈發展勢頭已經到頂了。中國國內和國外的經濟學界，沒有幾個人認為中國的國內生產總值水平代表中國的真正經濟實力。真正經濟實力低得多。
The U.S. has always had a good relationship with China, and that relationship will eventually return, but probably not for many years.
中美兩國世代友好，這種友好關係最後仍然會回來，但是要在很多年以後。
One thing is certain. The adjustment period that has followed every growth miracle in history has always overturned expectations, especially the most seemingly obvious and widely accepted ones. It is safe to assume that it will happen again.
一件事是肯定的，每一個經濟增長奇跡後的調整期都會超越人們的想象，特別會偏離那些比較明顯的預測。這次中國的經濟調整，也會出乎大家的預料。
我前麵講了，經濟學家的觀點是難以驗證的，所以你不需要認可他的觀點。他的文章在中美貿易談判分裂前發表，應該還是有一定的預見性。我個人也認為，中美之間的矛盾，會持續很多年，並且將不局限在貿易方麵，期望大家有思想準備。
Michael Pettis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
