Insight
工程技術，地產投資，信仰家園，時尚生活
做為海外華人研究的主要奠基開拓者，王賡武的研究方法和成果具有影響力。
在國際關係理論研究中，王賡武認為中國天下觀 念更有包容性，中國版圖的問題、主權的問題非常複雜，為避免狹隘民族的概念及政策的問題，主張古代中國向來有的天下觀，與民族國家的概念是矛盾的，但可以 和理想的國家之間互相照顧、互相支持秩序結合 。 澳大利亞首任駐華大使費思棻曾半開玩笑地說，王賡武可以當好中國總理。
王賡武祖籍江蘇泰州，1930年出生於印度尼 西亞泗水，旋即隨雙親遷居馬來西亞。1955年獲碩士學位。1957年獲英國倫敦大學博士學位。1957年起先後任馬來亞大學曆史係講師、教授兼係主任、 文學院院長。1968年任澳大利亞首都堪培拉的澳洲國立大學遠東曆史係主任與太平洋研究院院長。曾任澳洲人文科學院院長、亞洲曆史學家國際協會主席、澳中 理事會主席、香港演藝發展局主席等職。並任新加坡國立大學東亞研究所所長、《南洋學報》主編多年。
王賡武在1986年至1995年期間擔任香港大學校長。其前任者為黃麗鬆教授，繼任者為鄭耀宗教授。榮獲日本國福岡亞洲文化獎。
目前為中華民國中央研究院院士及新加坡國立大學特級教授。於2007年成為新加坡國立大學有史以來第三位任命為大學教授的學者.
中國和日本發生另一次戰爭的危險，在最近數星期敲響了警鍾。一些人把目前的狀況同第一次世界大戰前的情形相提並論。中國的強硬態度讓一些人想起了20世紀 初，自大的德國和日本及它們的帝國主義野心。這些都具誤導性。許多標題是要警告中國停止在南中國海和東海的行為，並遵守現有的國際體係——或像以前的德國 和日本一樣，被視為對國際秩序的威脅。
現代國際關係體係，是在上個世紀從其北大西洋基礎發展出來的。在其巔峰時期，英國、法國和美國主宰了體係。20世紀早期，德國兩次想要分享體係裏的權力。但它的挑戰被擊退，實力最終也在兩次世界大戰後被摧毀。
在亞洲，日本領導人嚐試從體係裏分一杯羹，讓他們可以主導亞洲與西太平洋島嶼，但最後同樣被打敗。今天，他們估計日本未來的地位，必須依賴同樣的國際體係，來對抗崛起的中國。
在1940年代後正在進行革命的俄國，可以說是嚐試破壞大西洋體係的另一個強國。在冷戰時期，它的努力遍及全球，但過度擴張最終削弱了它挑戰美國的能力。
今天，美國看來認為唯一有能力同它競爭的國家是中國，其他亞洲國家則多年來一直受到西方殖民地官員的影響。無論如何，去殖民地化後，沒有任何新興國家可以 像以前的德國或日本一樣行事。它們接受現有的國際體係，並樂意使用它來達到自己的目的。普遍的支持，讓體係可以聲稱它是普及全球的。
中國的傳統體係在亞洲是最後一個崩潰的。很幸運的，列強之間的對抗讓它免受肢解。中國的兩次革命——1911年及1949年——皆是受到歐洲模式的啟發， 讓中國走上參與西方所建立體係的道路。此外，1978年後，鄧小平巧妙地利用體係來幫助中國進行經濟改革，這造成中國自此以後對體係的高度依賴。
中國人現在發現，作為體係正式會員得付出高昂代價。在它提供的經濟利益背後，是一個引導今天的外交和戰略思維及行動的法律與分析架構。中國明智而有係統地 維護這個架構，但其重點主要是塑造一個讓中國可以發展的環境。沒有什麽證據顯示，中國會參與超越這個目標的活動。中國領導人認識到，他們沒有一個替代體係 來持續未來的發展。他們知道中國不是德國或日本，並仔細地研究如何避免重蹈它們的覆轍。然而，一些區域和區域外的分析家還是抱懷疑態度，擔心中國會走上德 國和日本擴張勢力的老路。
有鑒於此，中國必須重新考慮它對待目前國際體係的方式。國家自豪感和強烈的責任感，讓它必須維護其主權和中國的特性。但當國家也麵對貪汙、不公正、環境惡化和人民日益不滿情緒的國內問題時，要在和平的空間裏發展，可能會變得更加艱難。
從中國曆史來看，在內亂和外患都存在時，國家便有危險。中國可能比它預期的更早麵對同樣的情況。但這再也不是每一次個別處理與某個小鄰國的問題。中國領導人麵對的，是大多數國家願意接受的強有力及以法律為根本的體係。
直到現在，中國都能使用體係來滿足自己的利益。但體係要求的比中國願意付出的更多。遊戲要求中國遵守被定為通用的原則，其中有些是中國領導人還不能接受的。
這是中國麵對的挑戰。國際體係的監護人預計，崛起的中國將不願意更開放和自由，這意味著當中國更強大時，要讓它遵守他們的規則將更困難。不管適當與否，利用德國和日本為例子，可以幫助他們把中國描繪成對世界秩序的潛在威脅。
日本正是在這樣的情況下，加入對中國日益強大實力同樣感到擔憂的陣營，鼓勵美國的亞洲“重心”戰略或重新平衡。中國領導人知道這對中國形象和它在區域未來 角色構成的危險。若中國領導人和外交官不能反駁把中國列為德國和日本模式的作法，將會出現更多抑製中國的戰略，而這將打亂中國仍然需要的經濟發展。
區域麵對的問題，不是中國實力的崛起，或人們認為中國正在犯的錯誤，而是源自一些國家要中國遵守一個還需要美國來執行的體係的緊迫感。因此，重要的不隻是中國自身的主動，也要看美國願意做些什麽來賦予體係更多權利，及它對中國在世界維護其特殊地位的需要有多少了解。
原載《海峽時報》。作者是新加坡國立大學教授及李光耀公共政策學院董事會主席。葉琦保譯。
Getting China to play by the rules
THE danger of another Sino-Japanese war has set alarm bells ringing for the past several weeks. Comparisons have been made to the start of World War I. China's assertiveness has reminded some of upstart Germany or Japan and their imperial ambitions earlier in the 20th century. All these are misleading. What many of the headlines are trying to do is to warn China to back off from what it is doing in the South and East China seas and conform to the current international system - or be treated as a threat to world order the way Germany and Japan had been.
The modern system of international relations evolved during the past century from its base in the North Atlantic. At its peak, countries such as Britain, France and the United States dominated it. Earlier in the 20th century, Germany had twice wanted to share power in the system. But its challenges were repulsed and its power finally destroyed after two world wars.
In Asia, leaders in Japan tried to come up with their share of the system in order for them to dominate the Asian continent and the Western Pacific islands but they too were eventually defeated. Today, they calculate that their future place must depend on using the same global system to counter a rising China.
One could add revolutionary Russia after the 1940s as another power that also had a turn at trying to undermine the Atlantic system. Its efforts were global during the Cold War but its overreach ultimately undermined its ability to challenge the US.
Today, the US appears to think that the only country that has the capacity to compete with it is China. Other Asian countries are the products of years of tutelage under Western colonial officials. In any case, after decolonisation, none of the new nation states can act like Germany or Japan. They accept the existing international system and have readily used it to serve their own interests. Such support has strengthened the system's claim to universality.
China's traditional system was the last in Asia to fall. It was fortunate that rivalries among the Great Powers prevented it from being dismembered. Its two revolutions - in 1911 and 1949 - were both inspired by European models, and they put China on the road to participate in what the West had established. In addition, after 1978, Deng Xiaoping used the system cleverly to help China's economic reforms and this has ensured China's high level of dependence ever since.
The Chinese are now discovering that full membership of the system exacts a high price. Behind the economic benefits it provides is a structure of laws and analyses that guide diplomatic and strategic thinking and action today. China has been wise to attend to that structure systematically. But its focus has been largely on shaping an environment that will allow the country to develop. There is little evidence it would engage in activities that go beyond that goal. Chinese leaders realise that they do not have an alternative system to sustain future development. They know that their country is not Germany or Japan, and have carefully studied how to avoid the mistakes that led both to disaster. But there are analysts in the region and beyond who remain sceptical and still fear that China could follow the examples of the two expansionist powers.
Given such circumstances, China has to reconsider the way it handles the current international system. National pride and a deep sense of duty demand that it defend its right to remain sovereign and distinctively Chinese. But when the country is also beset by corruption, injustice, environmental degradation and growing discontent within, the struggle to develop in peace could become more difficult.
Chinese history has warned of dangers when both internal unrest or neiluan, and external turbulence, waihuan, are present. China may, sooner than it likes, face that condition again. But it is no longer a matter of dealing with smaller neighbours one at a time. What their leaders face is a powerful rule-based system that most countries are prepared to accept.
China has so far been able to use the system to serve its interests. But it is more demanding than what China has been ready to give in return. The game requires that it submit to principles that are being codified as universal, some of which Chinese leaders are not yet able to accept.
Here is China's challenge. The guardians of the international system project a rising China that is unwilling to be more open and free. They imply that when China becomes more powerful, it will be harder to make it play by their rules. Whether justified or not, using the German and Japanese analogies will help them suggest that China is a potential threat to world order.
It is in this context that Japan is joining those that are similarly concerned about China's rising power, to encourage the American pivot or rebalance in Asia. Chinese leaders are aware of this danger to its image and its future role in the region. If China's leaders and diplomats fail to counter the current efforts to paint the country onto the German and Japanese template, there will be even more strategies to contain China, strategies that would disrupt the economic progress it still needs.
The problem the region faces is not China's rise to power or even the mistakes that China is seen to be making. It stems from the sense of urgency among some countries to make China conform to a system that still needs American power to enforce its will. Thus it is not only China's own initiatives that really matter. It is also what the US is willing to do to further empower that system and how much it understands China's need to protect its distinctive place in the world.
The writer is a professor at the National University of Singapore, and chairman of the managing board of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
