笨狼發牢騷
發發牢騷，解解悶，消消愁
此文原作羅伯特•卡普蘭（Robert D. Kaplan），觀察者網凱莉 譯自《國家利益》，原文附錄在下。
【注】卡普蘭的說法是美國是個共和國，現在成了民主，所以走下坡，這個說法支持中國的精英政治。我沒有驗證《觀察者》翻譯是否跟原文一致。
如果美國民主黨的溫和派不能以某種方式在初選中脫穎而出，明年11月的最終角逐在伊麗莎白•沃倫參議員和唐納德•特朗普總統之間展開，那麽美國自冷戰中期開始的逐步衰落過程將被暴露在世人眼前。那將是美國現代記憶裏首次沒有中間派政治候選人的選舉，美國民眾可能將被迫在粗鄙的民粹主義右派和激進的民粹主義左派之間進行選擇。
美國中間派在總統競選中麵臨困境這一事實，本身就是一個多麵性的悲劇故事的高潮。
上世紀七八十年代，美國總統黨內初選製度逐漸穩固下來，削弱了黨魁們在所謂“煙霧繚繞的房間（譯注：美國政治行話，指幕後權勢者邊抽雪茄邊進行政治決策的秘密集會）”裏的影響力，且迎合了各黨中派別情緒最濃重的人。前幾十年裏，黨魁們選擇的一向是穩妥、溫和的候選人，盡管他們不一定有鼓舞力，但通常是負責任的。可以說杜魯門、艾森豪威爾等總統都是黨魁幕後商議的結果。艾森豪威爾還在軍隊的時候就被共和黨黨魁發掘了。放在今天的選舉製度裏，他恐怕永遠出不了頭。盡管他是一位傑出的分析師、組織人（譯注：指一切以組織為重、失去個人身份的人）和戰爭英雄，但他並不是很有個人魅力，演講談不上有說服力，拍照也不是很上鏡。
1959年，蘇聯赫魯曉夫應美國總統艾森豪威爾之邀訪問美國
“煙霧繚繞的房間”聽起來有些汙濁，但它最符合美國國父們的精神——特別是詹姆斯•麥迪遜——他更希望美國實行共和製而不是民主製。在共和製下，民眾對國家的統治是間接的，必須借助他們幾年才能更換一次的精英階層。民主製則意味著民眾可以更直接地統治國家，他們慣常受到狂熱和激情的左右，而今天的社交媒體恰恰又放大了這種效應。正是在這些煙霧繚繞的房間裏，黨魁的暗箱操作和媒體的行業準則（媒體機構盡量秉持中立、追求客觀，綜合地考慮問題）合宜地融合的在一起，引導美國走過了冷戰並保存了其共和製。
回想冷戰結束後在不同環境下選出的總統：克林頓、小布什、奧巴馬和特朗普。再拿他們跟當年引領馬歇爾計劃的杜魯門、力排眾議避免與中蘇正麵交戰的艾森豪威爾、處理古巴導彈危機的肯尼迪，簽署民權法案的約翰遜，蘇聯解體後仍能在海灣戰爭中保持克製、把握限度的老布什進行比較，你就會明白我的意思。當然，約翰遜關於越南戰爭的悲劇性決定是個例外，這一點我下文會提到。
假設2016年大選提名程序仍然由黨魁操控，假設我們仍然處於印刷媒體時代，那麽傑布•布什州長可能以微弱優勢擊敗負麵新聞更多的希拉裏•克林頓參議員成為總統。這樣一來，他將被共和黨建製派一流的外交政策顧問團簇：理查德•哈斯、羅伯特•佐利克、梅根•奧沙利文等（譯注：以上分別是美國外交關係委員會主席、世界銀行前行長、原美國總統國家安全顧問）。他的執政方式會更像父親老布什而不是兄長小布什。他掌權後故事將變得乏味。他確實不是個能量很足的人，但美國社會、同盟體係以及世界地位都將比當下牢固得多，行為比當下明智得多。特朗普是大眾直接民主和數碼視頻時代新生事物共同催化的產物。同樣的因素可能會催生一個民主黨選手，在經濟和社會層麵引發激變，“媲美”特朗普在言行和作風上的失範。美國的國父們可能會震驚於我們在本質上怎麽從共和製變成了民主製。像傑布•布什這樣的人原本是要統治一個共和製國家的。
無論第二次世界大戰是多麽可怕，對美國來說都是非常有益的。美國政治的蛻化是從二戰之後開始的。在富蘭克林•羅斯福總統還未徹底帶美國走出大蕭條的時候，備戰建設給美國經濟帶來了快速啟動作用。1945年戰爭結束時，空中轟炸和地麵戰鬥摧毀了世界上除美國之外所有工業國家的基礎設施。它賦予了美國無法估量的優勢，這種優勢可以持續數十年。戰爭帶來的經濟社會活力，帶來了《退伍軍人權利法案》，創造了郊區財富平均的奇跡，也產生了新的廣大中產階級。公民權利、反猶主義的式微，以及太空計劃，最終都可以視為戰時奮鬥釋放出來的經濟活力和社會變革的衍生品。
越南打破了這個魔咒。越戰之前，美國人對政府和政府決策流程還是有一些信心的。畢竟，政府帶領我們度過了第二次世界大戰，創造了繁榮，還把人類帶入了太空。但越戰使左派知識分子和建製派媒體得勢，給予了他們可以高談闊論數十載的無限談資。伊拉克戰爭的重大損失更是給了這些媒體和知識分子又一波讓他們可以評頭品足的談資。美國已今非昔比，也不再會像以前那樣團結了。
耗時八年的伊拉克戰爭，美國士兵累計死亡4496人、傷病47541人
作為第二次世界大戰的延續，冷戰使美國政治保持了嚴明紀律。盡管它延長了美國的偉大時期，但越戰也動搖了其國本。如果我們在2000年大選時仍沉浸在冷戰中，如果我們仍然是由黨魁提名候選人的共和製，那麽共和黨的長老們可能會聚首並委婉地告訴老布什，他的兒子小布什並未完全作好出任總統的準備，他還需要更多的時間，積累更多經驗，比如先擔任內閣秘書之類。但隨著兩個超級大國不再處於隨時觸發核末日的對峙狀態，所有這些紀律和常識都消失了。需要擔心的因素少了，現在幾乎任何人都可以當總統。
由於不再需要像冷戰時期那樣保持警惕，極端黨爭盡管不利於美國外交，但似乎也不大要緊。美國國內政治不再“適可而止”，因為人們覺得美國不再需要一致對外了：畢竟大洋對麵的世界看上去比1989年以前危險性更低。因此，冷戰的結束預示著美國國家政治進入黨派激化時代。
當然，這些趨勢中有許多是相互重疊的，而且總是有例外：老布什通過了總統初選（這種選舉度製在1988年再次得到加強）；約翰•肯尼迪是電子媒體時代的最佳人選。吉米•卡特不是一個很好的冷戰總統，而巴拉克•奧巴馬也不是後冷戰時期特別糟糕的一任總統。盡管所有細節不可能同時滿足，但潛在的趨勢如同交響曲反複徘徊的節奏一般顯而易見。
最後，隨著第二次世界大戰所有大國的基礎設施逐步恢複、全球化落地生根，我們見證了全球範圍內發生的經濟和技術變革，它們動搖了美國的政治統一，並逐漸破壞了中間派。美國的中產階級從根本上被削弱，人民的生活變得更加岌岌可危。美國東西海岸那些風度翩翩的國際化精英更傾向於靠攏文化層次、收入水平與自己相近的歐亞精英，在情感上大大疏遠本國內陸同胞。從一種至關重要的心理層麵上說，美國社會的中堅力量不再像過去那樣忠誠，不管他們承不承認，他們的生活方式是全球化的。
精英群體在逐漸拋棄自己的國家，曾經與自由主義相得益彰的民族主義和愛國主義也被移交給了粗俗的民粹主義者，他們大多數人在精神上就是流氓無產階級。這樣一來， 2020年的大選可能麵臨著在兩個粗鄙的民粹主義者之間做出選擇。
對於媒體而言，衰落時代就是黃金時代，他們就是靠危機發家致富的。越戰、水門事件、伊拉克戰爭，到如今中間溫和派的徹底沒落，成就了一批又一批記者。當然，這些記者也隻是憑著良心在做本職工作。但他們的名氣和成果是和國家的繁榮程度、幸福指數呈反比的。
全程報道水門事件的《華盛頓郵報》記者鮑勃•伍德沃德和卡爾•伯恩斯伯
如同處理小規模遠征戰一樣，大眾社會能夠很好地處理全麵戰爭，因此第二次世界大戰拯救了我們。但對於死亡人數規模較大、不牽涉美國本土的普通家庭的中等規模戰爭，如朝鮮戰爭、越南戰爭和伊拉克戰爭，大眾社會就處理得欠妥。老天保佑，千萬別再打全麵戰爭！但除非有真正靠譜的溫和派領導民主黨，否則隻有非常根本性的大變局才足以扭轉美國半個多世紀以來的方向。
原文：
Why Trump vs. Warren in 2020 Would Prove America Is in Decline
If a moderate cannot somehow prevail in the Democratic primaries, and President Donald Trump faces Senator Elizabeth Warren in the November election, it will punctuate a process of slow and gradual American decline that began in the middle Cold War years. For the first time in modern memory, there would not be a candidate from the political center on any ticket.
If a moderate cannot somehow prevail in the Democratic primaries, and President Donald Trump faces Senator Elizabeth Warren in the November election, then it will punctuate a process of slow and gradual American decline that began in the middle Cold War years. For the first time in modern memory, there would not be a candidate from the political center on any ticket. But it is possible that we will face a choice between the vulgar, populist right and the radical, populist left.
The fact that the center is having difficulty in the presidential race represents the culmination of a tragic story with several facets.
The steady adoption of a primary system to select party nominees in the 1970s and 1980s was something that weakened the leverage of party bosses in so-called smoke-filled rooms and played to the most partisan emotions of each major party. For decades the bosses had selected safe, moderate candidates: not always inspiring but usually responsible. It was the bosses who essentially gave us Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and so on. Eisenhower was scouted by the bosses of the Republican party while he was still in uniform. The system we have today might never have selected him. Though an exceptional analyst, organization man, and war hero, Ike wasn’t especially charismatic. Neither was he an especially compelling speaker or photogenic.
Smoke-filled rooms may sound squalid, but they fulfilled the spirit of the Founders of the American Revolution, specifically James Madison, who preferred a republic; not a democracy. In a republic, the masses rule only indirectly, through an elite that they can change every few years. Democracy means more direct rule, given to rage and passions, nowadays amplified by social media. Here is where the filter of the party bosses and the discipline of the print-and-typewriter age – which encouraged complex, analytical thinking from media organs dedicated to centrist objectivity – conveniently merged to guide us through the Cold War and keep us a republic.
Now think of our post–Cold War presidents chosen under different circumstances: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. Compare them against Truman’s shepherding of the Marshall Plan; of Eisenhower’s avoidance of a hot war with China and the Soviet Union, despite much of the advice he was getting; of Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis; of Johnson’s Civil Rights Bill; of the elder Bush’s elegant restraint in the face of Soviet collapse and respect for limits in the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and you’ll see what I mean. Of course, President Lyndon Johnson’s tragic decisions on Vietnam were an exception – and I’ll get to that.
Had the party bosses been in charge of the 2016 nominating process, and were the print-and-typewriter age still regnant, Governor Jeb Bush would likely be president, having narrowly defeated Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate with more negatives than himself. He would have surrounded himself with first-rate foreign policy advisers from the Republican establishment: Richard Haass, Robert Zoellick, Meghan O’Sullivan, and so forth. He would have governed more like his father than his brother. Things would be so dull. So low energy! Yet, America, its alliances, and its posture in the world would be infinitely sturdier and wiser. Trump is where direct, mass democracy and the wonders of the digital-video age have led us. And these same factors may yet offer a Democratic opponent who threatens an economic and social upheaval to match Trump’s upheaval in manners and decency. The Founders would be horrified of how we have in spirit, stopped being a republic and have become a democracy. Someone like Jeb Bush was meant to govern the former.
The crumbling began after World War II, a war that however ghastly was very good for America. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was still having difficulties mastering the solution to the Great Depression when the buildup to war jumped-started the American economy. When the war ended in 1945, the infrastructure of every major industrial economy in the world – save for that of the United States – had been devastated by aerial bombardment and ground fighting. It gave us an immeasurable advantage that would last for decades. The economic and social dynamism created by the war led to the G. I. Bill, the subsequent equalizing miracle of the suburbs, and consequently a new and vast middle class. Civil Rights, the erosion of casual anti-Semitism, and the Space program were all ultimately offshoots of the economic energy and social changes unleashed by the war effort.
Vietnam broke the spell. Until Vietnam, Americans had implicit faith in government and its decision-making processes. After all, the government had led us through World War II, created prosperity, and put men in space. But Vietnam fortified the intellectual Left and the elite media establishment as we know them today, giving them unlimited oxygen that would last for decades; with a second booster-injection provided by the debacle of the Iraq War, which the media and the intellectuals ably reported and commented upon. The country would never again be the same, and never as united as it used to be.
The Cold War, being a tailpiece of World War II, had provided a large measure of political discipline, though, extending the period of American greatness, however, shaken the country was because of Vietnam. Had we still been immersed in the Cold War during the election campaign of 2000, and had we still been a republic with party bosses choosing the nominees, the Republican elders might have gathered to gently tell the elder Bush that his son George W. was not quite ready for high office yet, and needed more time and experience: as a cabinet secretary, perhaps. But with two superpowers no longer facing off against the backdrop of nuclear Armageddon, all such discipline and common sense were lost. Because there was less to fear, almost anyone could now become president.
And without the vigilance demanded by the Cold War, extreme partisanship that undermines foreign policy carried fewer consequences. Politics no longer stopped at the water’s edge because the perception was it didn’t need to: for the world across the oceans appeared less dangerous than before 1989. Thus, the end of the Cold War heralded a hyper-partisan age in national politics.
Of course, many of these trends overlapped and there were always exceptions: the elder Bush made it through the primaries, a system newly strengthened by 1988, and John F. Kennedy was pitch-perfect for an electronic media age. Jimmy Carter was not an especially good Cold War president and Barack Obama was not an especially bad post–Cold War one. But while the details do not all fit neatly together, the underlying trend, like the brooding rhythm of a symphony, is clear.
Finally, we have had economic and technological changes around the world, as the infrastructure of all the major World War II powers recovered and globalization took root: severing American political unity and destroying the center in the process. The American middle class was fundamentally weakened, peoples’ lives became more precarious, even as a stylish, global elite located on the two coasts - and much less emotionally loyal to their compatriots in the Heartland - took root and oriented itself to other culturally sophisticated and high-income earners in Europe and Asia. In a crucial psychological sense, America lost its previously loyal establishment, which now lives a global lifestyle, whether its members admit it or not.
And with the elite establishment in the process of deserting its own country, nationalism and patriotism—which used to fit perfectly with liberalism—have been handed over to crude populists, many of whom in spirit constitute a lumpen proletariat. The 2020 election may yet threaten a choice between one crude populist and another.
An age of decline constitutes a golden age for the media, which thrives and builds careers on crises. Vietnam, Watergate, Iraq, and now the stark weakening of the moderate center have constituted great boons to journalists’ careers. Journalists are merely doing their jobs conscientiously. But their very fame and productivity are inversely related to the health and happiness of the nation.
World War II saved us because mass societies handle total wars well; just as they do small expeditionary warfare. It is middle-sized wars—Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq—which involve death on a significant scale, but do not engage the nation beyond military families, that mass societies handle less well. Heaven forbid there should ever again be a total war! But unless a moderate with real credibility can carry the day for the Democrats, only something extraordinarily fundamental can reverse our direction: on-going now for over half a century.
