強國對仲裁曆來置之不理

 

《觀察者網》

今日（7月12日），海牙國際仲裁法庭對菲律賓南海仲裁案作出非法無效的所謂最終裁決。對此，中華人民共和國政府及中華人民共和國外交部均發出聲明，重申中方不接受、不承認的立場。國家主席習近平也在會晤歐洲理事會主席、歐盟委員會主席時強調，南海諸島自古以來就是中國領土。

 

阿利森（Graham Allison）：

In ignoring an upcoming verdict on the South China Sea, Beijing is following well-established precedent by great powers

 

《觀察者網翻譯》

南海仲裁結果宣布 美國《外交》雜誌：大國從不接受國際仲裁，包括中國

 

而就在7月11日（美國時間），《外交》雜誌網站發表格拉漢姆·埃利森（Graham Allison）的文章，文中列舉了俄羅斯、英國、美國等例並表示，從未有過任何一個聯合國安理會常任理事國服從國際仲裁法庭有關海洋法的裁決。“如果中國拒絕接受南海仲裁案結果，它不過做了其他大國這幾十年一直在做的事”。當然，文章雖然持現實主義立場，講出了一定的道理，但文中將中美相提並論，顯然也是從美國的國際視野、道德觀念和霸權習慣出發，以己度人。文章混淆了中國維護自身領土主權的正義舉動，與美國一貫奉行的霸權主義。中國的崛起是和平崛起，絕不會走西方列強的老路，也絕不會出現文中所引修昔底德的名言：“強者為所欲為”。中國從來不是要拋棄國際法，我們不能接受的是對領土主權的無端仲裁，以及對國際法的濫用。

 

以下為觀察者網翻譯的文章全文。

 

本周，海牙國際仲裁法庭將公布菲律賓南海仲裁案結果。為了阻止中國將南海變成內水，菲律賓聲稱中國對九段線以內南海島嶼及淺灘的主權聲張無國際法依據。仲裁法庭的判決結果並無懸念：它必定偏向於菲律賓一方。美國及其盟友已開始批評中國對仲裁案的態度，中國早已宣布不會接受仲裁結果，而中國一位官員上周業已表示，仲裁結果“不過是一張廢紙”。

 

如果問中國是否應該聽我們的話，或者相反，中國會不會學我們的做法，那就感覺太不“美國”了。不過我們假設有人很大膽地問了上述問題，首先他們將發現的是，從未有過任何一個聯合國安理會常任理事國服從國際仲裁法庭有關海洋法的裁決。實際上，聯合國安理會五常從未接受任何一項有損其主權或國家利益的國際法庭裁決結果。因此，如果中國拒絕接受南海仲裁案結果，它不過做了其他大國這幾十年一直在做的事。

 

從菲律賓尋求上訴的那一天起，中國便論述稱國際仲裁法庭無權受理該案，因為此事有關“主權”問題——海洋法公約明文禁止就此問題發起仲裁。當國際仲裁法庭駁回了中國的反對，後者便拒絕參與聽證會並明確表示將無視仲裁法庭的判決結果。美國和其他國家批評了中國的這種姿態。但是，如果我們問問別的常任理事會在相同的情況下如何反應，得到的答案肯定不是我們想要的。

 

2013年，俄羅斯海軍在靠近俄羅斯海岸線的水域扣押荷蘭船隻，荷蘭將俄羅斯告上國際法庭。俄羅斯認為，法庭無權受理此案並拒絕出席聽證會。同時，俄羅斯也無視了國際法庭要求釋放荷蘭船員的要求。當國際仲裁法庭判定俄羅斯違反海洋法，並要求俄羅斯支付荷蘭賠償金時，俄羅斯也拒絕了。

 

英國首相卡梅倫預料到了菲律賓南海仲裁案的結果，他聲明道：“我們想鼓勵中國成為守法世界的一部分。我們想鼓勵所有人依法行事，服從判決。”不過他可能忘了，就在去年，國際仲裁法庭曾判決英國在紮格斯群島（Chagos Islands）單方設立海洋保護區一事違反了海洋法。英國政府無視該判決，且紮格斯群島的海洋保護區至今仍然存在。

 

美國從來沒有就《海洋法公約》而遭到起訴，這是因為，與中國不同，華盛頓根本就沒有批準這部國際法。因此，美國自然也就不受其束縛。相信在裁決案結果公布後，中國方麵一定會強調這一點。

 

與南海仲裁最為相近的一個案例便是1980年代發生的尼加拉瓜訴美國的仲裁案。與中國一樣，美方同樣強調國際法庭對尼加拉瓜案沒有管轄權。當國際法庭拒絕采納美國立場時，美國不僅沒有參加之後的庭審，而且還否決了其後國際法庭對所有涉美案件的裁判權，除非美國明確提出例外情況。如果中國照此辦理，中國極有可能會徹底退出海洋法公約，和美國一道成為非締約國。

 

在尼加拉瓜案中，當國際法庭支持尼加拉瓜主張並要求美國做出賠償的時候，美國斷然拒絕，並隨後否決了六項要求執行判決的安理會決議。對國際法庭的性質，時任美國駐聯合國代表的柯克帕特裏克曾做過一個精妙的總結：“半合法、半司法、半政治性的實體，對於其決定，涉事國家有時接受，有時卻又不接受。”

 

如果注意到聯合國常任理事國的行事方式就可以知道，對於現實主義者而言，海牙國際海事法庭及其姊妹——國際刑事法庭都隻是小國可以仰仗的手段。大國從來都不會承認這類法庭的司法權——除非大國認為，參與這類法庭對其較為有利。修昔底德（古希臘史學家——觀察者網注）的名言“強者為所欲為，弱者委曲求全”或許有些誇大其詞了，但仲裁庭終將感受到，中國作為一個大國，將會一如既往地按照大國的邏輯行事。

 

 

原文：

《外交官網站》Of Course China, Like All Great Powers, Will Ignore an International Legal Verdict

In ignoring an upcoming verdict on the South China Sea, Beijing is following well-established precedent by great powers.

Graham Allison, July 11, 2016

 

This week the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) will deliver its award in the Philippines’ case against China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. In a bid to thwart Beijing’s attempt to turn the South China Sea into its own virtual lake, Manila contends that China’s claim to exclusive sovereignty over all the islands and shoals within the nine-dashed line – which encompasses 86 percent of the Sea – has no basis in international law. There is not much suspense about what the tribunal will decide: it will almost certainly side with the Philippines. The United States and its allies have already started criticizing China for signaling in advance that it will ignore the court’s ruling, which one Chinese official derided last week as  “nothing more than a piece of paper.”

 

It may seem un-American to ask whether China should do as we say, or, by contrast, as we do. But suppose someone were bold enough to pose that question. The first thing they would discover is that no permanent member of the UN Security Council has ever complied with a ruling by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea. In fact, none of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have ever accepted any international court’s ruling when (in their view) it infringed their sovereignty or national security interests. Thus, when China rejects the Court’s decision in this case, it will be doing just what the other great powers have repeatedly done for decades.

 

From the day the Philippines went to court, China has argued that the PCA has no legitimate jurisdiction on this issue since it concerns “sovereignty” – which the text of the Law of the Sea treaty explicitly prohibits tribunals from addressing. When the Court rejected China’s objection, Beijing refused to participate in its hearings and made it clear that it will ignore the PCA’s ruling. The United States and others have criticized Beijing for taking this stance. But again, if we ask how other permanent members of the Security Council have acted in similar circumstances, the answer will not be one we like.

 

When the Netherlands sued Russia after the latter’s navy boarded and detained the crew of a Dutch vessel in waters off of the Russian coast in 2013, Moscow asserted that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter and refused to participate in the hearings. It also ignored a tribunal’s order that the crew be released while the dispute was being resolved. After the PCA ruled that Russia had violated the Law of the Sea and ordered Moscow to pay the Netherlands compensation, Russia refused.

 

Anticipating the Court’s ruling in the case brought by the Philippines, UK Prime Minister David Cameron proclaimed: “We want to encourage China to be part of that rules-based world. We want to encourage everyone to abide by these adjudications.”  Perhaps he had forgotten that just last year the PCA ruled that the UK had violated the Law of the Sea by unilaterally establishing a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Islands. The British government disregarded the ruling, and the Marine Protected Area remains in place today.

 

The United States has never been sued under the Law of the Sea because – unlike China – Washington has not ratified the international agreement and is thus not bound by its rules. Expect Chinese commentators to emphasize this point in the mutual recriminations that will follow the Court’s announcement.

 

The closest analogue to the Philippines case involving the United States arose in the 1980s when Nicaragua sued Washington for mining its harbors. Like China, the United States argued that the International Court of Justice did not have the authority to hear Nicaragua’s case. When the court rejected that claim, the United States not only refused to participate in subsequent proceedings, but also denied the Court’s jurisdiction on any future case involving the United States, unless Washington explicitly made an exception and asked the Court to hear a case. If China followed that precedent, it could withdraw from the Law of the Sea Treaty altogether – joining the United States as one of the world’s only nations not party to the agreement.

 

In the Nicaragua case, when the Court found in favor of Nicaragua and ordered the United States to pay reparations, the U.S. refused, and vetoed six UN Security Council resolutions ordering it to comply with the court’s ruling. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick aptly summed up Washington’s view of the matter when she dismissed the court as a “semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don’t.”

 

Observing what permanent members of the Security Council do, as opposed to what they say, it is hard to disagree with realist’s claim that the PCA and its siblings in The Hague – the International Courts of Justice and the International Criminal Court – are only for small powers. Great powers do not recognize the jurisdiction of these courts – except in particular cases where they believe it is in their interest to do so. Thucydides’ summary of the Melian mantra – “the strong do as they will; the weak suffer as they must” – may exaggerate. But this week, when the Court finds against China, expect Beijing to do as great powers have traditionally done.

 

Graham Allison is director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and author of the forthcoming book, “Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides’s Trap.”