慕容青草的博客
哲學園地
正文
辯證法是康德在被稱為是哲學史上最具影響力的著作之一的《純粹理性批判》[1],[2]中討論的一個核心的一個內容，甚至可以認為該書的其它重點就是圍繞這辯證這個話題展開的。但是，非常奇怪地，與今天人們將辯證法與黑格爾哲學密切地聯係在一起形成鮮明對比的是，今天很少有人將康德的哲學與辯證法聯係在一起。甚至在談論那本傳世名著《純粹理性批判》時，也常有人不對其中的辯證觀進行探討。造成這種現象的原因主要是辯證的概念在康德的筆下與傳統的及現代的辯證概念相去甚遠。
首先，同亞力士多德一樣，康德給與傳統的辯證法非常負麵的評價：
古時的哲學家們將‘辯證’一詞用作一門科學或藝術的名字時賦予了這個詞匯各種不同的意思，但是他們對這個術語的實際的運用表明他們其實將它作為一個關於錯覺的邏輯的名字---就是這樣，僅此而已。在這個意義上，辯證是一套為無知甚至有目的之詭計製造出真理之煙幕的刁鑽技巧，它滑稽地模仿邏輯通常具有的方法上的縝密，並運用它的技術性的手段來美化每一種空洞的吹噓。
（英譯原文：
The
ancient philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when
using it as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term
shows that they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing
else. Dialectic in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air
of truth to ignorance and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping
the methodical thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its
technical paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
ancient philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when
using it as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term
shows that they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing
else. Dialectic in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air
of truth to ignorance and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping
the methodical thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its
technical paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
）
而且認為哲學的一個主要任務便是除去辯證法中由錯覺造成的影響：
既然總會有各種形而上學，就總會存在著純理性的辯證，這是因為辯證對於理性來說是很自然的。所以哲學的第一要務便是，通過堵住錯誤的源頭，來一勞永逸地除去辯證中的不良影響。
（英譯原文：
For there always
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
）
由此可見，雖然康德要堵住人們運用辯證時的錯誤的源頭意願是好的，但是他同樣沒有真正理解柏拉圖所倡導的辯證法的真諦。與亞裏士多德不同的是，康德把辯證法或者更確切地說是把人們在以辯證的名義或被認為是以辯證的名義進行表達時所表現出的一種邏輯模式稱為錯覺。
其實，人們熟知的錯誤地進行辯證表達的基本特點是評論一件事時似是而非，怎麽都有道理，給不出任何確定性的積極有效的信息來；把康德的錯覺說看作是對這種狀況的一種評語確實會得到人們的很大程度上的認同。康德進一步指出辯證所對應的錯覺是將主觀的內容作為客觀的道理強加給人們：
…我們這裏麵對的是一種很自然的無法避免的錯覺，它將主觀的原理作為客觀的強加給我們；一種由模仿有效的推理而得出的人造的錯覺。
（英譯原文：
…we
have here is a •natural
and inevitable illusion, trading on
subjective principles that it foists on us as objective; with an illusion •artificially created by something imitating a valid
inference.
)
have here is a •natural
and inevitable illusion, trading on
subjective principles that it foists on us as objective; with an illusion •artificially created by something imitating a valid
inference.
)
今天的大多數不喜歡辯證法的人應該也可以接受康德關於辯證產生錯覺的這種說法。如果人們在生活中見證的辯證表達都是符合客觀實際的，那麽他們就不會對辯證法感到反感了。但是這裏要注意到，康德這裏用的是“主觀原理”而不是“主觀認識”一詞，這是康德的理論開始偏離我們的一般生活經驗常識之處。康德認為造成這種錯覺的原因是人們進行理性思維所遵循的一些公理與法則具有客觀原理的外表：
這一類錯覺的產生原因是某些指導我們（主觀上作為人類知識的功能）進行理性思維的基本法則和公理具有客觀原理的外表。
…
也就是說，那些其實表示東西具有‘在認知的活動中，做X’的形式的法則卻表現為‘真實世界是Y’。這不是簡單地實際為主觀的看上去象客觀的；他們實際上為指導或命令卻看上去象提供信息的命題。
（英譯原文：
The cause of this kind of illusion is
the fact that certain basic •rules and maxims that tell us how to use our
reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge) have all the appearance
of being •objective principles. ·
…
the fact that certain basic •rules and maxims that tell us how to use our
reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge) have all the appearance
of being •objective principles. ·
…
That is, rules that really mean things
of the form ‘When engaged in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of
being of the form ‘The real world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really
subjective yet appear to be objective; but also they are really advice or commands,
yet they appear to be informative propositions·.
of the form ‘When engaged in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of
being of the form ‘The real world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really
subjective yet appear to be objective; but also they are really advice or commands,
yet they appear to be informative propositions·.
）
基於這個原因，康德認為辯證所對應的理性思維錯覺是難以逃避的：
這是一種難以防止的錯覺…就像天文學家無法防止月亮升起時看上去比較大一樣，盡管他知道那不是真的。
…
所以我們麵對的是：有一種自然而又無法避免的純粹理性的辯證。它不是一個業餘玩家可以無知地糊弄的，或者一個詭辯者刻意設計來讓人們的思考陷入困惑的。相反地，它是無法與人們的理性相分隔的；即便當它的虛假性被識破之後，它將繼續它對於理性的玩弄，繼續使理性暫時地犯需要不斷被糾正的錯誤。
（英譯原文：
This is an illusion that can no more be
prevented than. . . .an astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger
as it rises, even though he knows that it isn’t really.
prevented than. . . .an astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger
as it rises, even though he knows that it isn’t really.
…
So there we have it: there’s a natural and
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. It’s not something that a bungler might
get tangled in through ignorance, or something that a sophist has contrived so
as to confuse thinking people. Rather, it is inseparable from human reason;
even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, it will go on playing tricks
with reason, continually tricking it into momentary aberrations that have to be
corrected over and over again.
）
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. It’s not something that a bungler might
get tangled in through ignorance, or something that a sophist has contrived so
as to confuse thinking people. Rather, it is inseparable from human reason;
even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, it will go on playing tricks
with reason, continually tricking it into momentary aberrations that have to be
corrected over and over again.
）
康德對於產生辯證錯覺的原因的分析是基於將人的思維分為經驗性思維與非經驗性思維，也就是所謂的超驗的思維，而所謂的純粹理性就是不具備經驗內容的理性。他指出，造成辯證的錯覺的原因是人們將原本不屬於經驗範疇的邏輯運用於與經驗相關的知識領域中去，關於感性經驗與錯覺的關係康德一方麵他說：
……感覺是不會錯的 --- 不是因為它們正確地進行判斷而是因為它們根本不做判斷！
……
對於感覺的直接反映從不會引入錯誤，因為它從不會對任何事情做判斷，因而在完全遵守著理解定律的任何知識項目也不會有任何錯誤---除非受到外來的影響，自然力是不會偏離自己的規律的。
（英譯原文：
……the senses
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
……
A representation of the senses never
involves error, because it never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no
error, either, in any item of knowledge that completely accords with the laws
of understanding—a natural force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
involves error, because it never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no
error, either, in any item of knowledge that completely accords with the laws
of understanding—a natural force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
influenced from outside itself. . . .
）
但另一方麵他又專門對上述的論點做了一個注解：
當感性服從於理解而為理解提供材料時，它是真實的知識的來源。但是當同樣的感性影響理解應如何作業並決定理解所做出的判斷時，它是錯誤的基礎。
（英譯原文：
When sensibility is subordinated to
understanding, as providing the understanding with something to work on, it is
the source of real items of knowledge. But when that same sensibility
influences how the understanding works and dictates the judgments that it
makes,
understanding, as providing the understanding with something to work on, it is
the source of real items of knowledge. But when that same sensibility
influences how the understanding works and dictates the judgments that it
makes,
it’s the basis of error.
）
可見他指的是感覺所帶來的信息的原始性，強調它不具有應判斷而產生的錯誤。而後麵那個注解或許表明他並不排除直接的感性出錯的可能性，但也可能隻是要強調不能由感性來支配人的理解而應反之而已。至於為什麽試圖超驗地運用理性（即他所謂的將理性直接運用於經驗領域）會產生超驗錯覺，他做了如下的解釋：
它（理性）的對象是概念與判斷。因此，即便純粹理性想要關心客觀對象，它直接涉及到的也不會是客觀對象或關於對象的直覺，而是理解以及理解所做出的判斷，它們才是直接與感觀及其直覺打交道以建立起關於客觀對象的事實的。理解的（內在）統一性是可能的經驗的統一……使經驗成為可能不是理性的工作；這就剝奪了理性將任何綜合性的統一加在經驗上的任何機會……
……
正如理解可以被認為是運用法則來統一表觀的功能，理性可以被認為是運用原理來統一理解所依據的法則的功能。因此，理性從不直接應用於經驗或任何客觀物體。它所作用的是理解：它的角色是通過概念來將理解的複雜的知識網絡先驗地統一起來。
（英譯原文：
What it deals with are •concepts and
•judgments. Thus, even if pure reason does
•judgments. Thus, even if pure reason does
·somehow· concern itself with objects,
what it is immediately related to are not •objects and the intuition of them,
but rather •the understanding and its judgments, which do deal at first hand
with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about
their object. The unity of understanding is the unity of a possible experience
what it is immediately related to are not •objects and the intuition of them,
but rather •the understanding and its judgments, which do deal at first hand
with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about
their object. The unity of understanding is the unity of a possible experience
…… reason doesn’t have the job of
making experience possible; and that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience
any such synthetic unity…...
making experience possible; and that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience
any such synthetic unity…...
……
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its
role is to give an a priori unity by
means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
）
而《純粹理性批判》一書中最容易造成誤解的是，康德實際上把辯證一詞在同一本書裏既用於超驗思維產生的錯覺又用於幫助識別及克服錯覺的方法。他在對傳統的辯證法進行否定之後說：
這樣方法是配不上哲學之高貴的，因而我們不需要‘辯證’或任何其它的詞匯來為這樣一種壞東西命名。所以我寧可用‘辯證’這個名詞來表示對於前述的辯證錯覺的批判；這樣一種批判不屬於邏輯的一部分，這就是‘辯證’在本書中的意義。
…
所以超驗辯證法將用於揭示超驗判斷的錯覺，同時也幫助我們避免被它欺騙。
（英譯原文：
Such a
procedure is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need
‘dialectic’ or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the
noun ‘dialectic’ to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique
does count as part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in
the present work.
procedure is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need
‘dialectic’ or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the
noun ‘dialectic’ to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique
does count as part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in
the present work.
…
So the transcendental dialectic will
content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also
keeping us from being deceived by it.
content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also
keeping us from being deceived by it.
）
上麵這段話的真實意思恐怕要比它的字麵意思複雜許多。康德這裏要說的實際意思是他在《純粹理性批判》這本書中將用‘辯證’一詞來表示他所提出的方法，它是專門用來揭示傳統的辯證錯覺的根源從而幫助人們來對它加以克服的。換句話說，他提出了一種新的辯證法，是專門用來克服他所認為的與傳統的辯證意義相關的理性錯覺的。
雖然今天我們已不易找到古早時候人們是如何錯誤地用辯證法進行詭辯的例子，可以相信它應該與近代以來的模式差不多；至少它應該是具有那種典型的用一般的大道理代替具體的知識從而怎麽都對的特征，或者說是亞裏士多德所說的“而辯證法師則用他們的辯證法去擁抱一切，他們會講對一切都一樣的存在（dialecticians
embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things;）”那樣的特征。而康德所說的把不具備經驗內容的理性邏輯當作經驗性的知識來用這一點和我們所熟悉的用一般的大道理代替具體的知識的錯誤的辯證思維特征是吻合的，因為所謂的一般的大道理通常都是康德所說的不屬於感性領域的理性思維的內容，而康德在《純粹理性批判》一書中又指出的純粹理性總是以不受限製的一般性概念為目標的:
embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things;）”那樣的特征。而康德所說的把不具備經驗內容的理性邏輯當作經驗性的知識來用這一點和我們所熟悉的用一般的大道理代替具體的知識的錯誤的辯證思維特征是吻合的，因為所謂的一般的大道理通常都是康德所說的不屬於感性領域的理性思維的內容，而康德在《純粹理性批判》一書中又指出的純粹理性總是以不受限製的一般性概念為目標的:
所有這些都是按照理性自身的原理發生的---它自己的原理---給定任何一個通過理解而得到的具體知識項目，找出能夠是理解完全統一的無條件的一般結果。我們可以將這一邏輯公理作為純粹理性的原理---也就是，不將它僅僅當作告訴我們應該做什麽的命令，而是作為高所我們實際存在著什麽的結論---換言之，對於任何一個具體存在的事務它的條件一定存在。
(英譯原文：
All of this happens in accordance with
reason’s principle—its very own principle—Given any conditioned item of
knowledge obtained through the understanding, find the unconditioned whereby
the understanding can be completely unified. We may want to treat this logical
maxim as a principle of pure reason—i.e. ·to regard it not merely as •a command
that tells us what to do, but as •a statement saying that something is the
case—namely that for everything conditioned there
is a condition·.
reason’s principle—its very own principle—Given any conditioned item of
knowledge obtained through the understanding, find the unconditioned whereby
the understanding can be completely unified. We may want to treat this logical
maxim as a principle of pure reason—i.e. ·to regard it not merely as •a command
that tells us what to do, but as •a statement saying that something is the
case—namely that for everything conditioned there
is a condition·.
）
我們來看一個大家對之可以感覺非常熟悉的假想例子。路人甲做了一件事，路人乙對之評論道：“凡事都有兩個方麵，好的一麵和壞的一麵，這件事也一樣。”如果接下來，路人乙針對那件事的具體內容來具體分析哪些方麵或哪些意義上來說是好的及哪些方麵或哪些意義上來說是不好的，那麽就屬於是有意義的辯證評論；但是，如果路人乙的評論就到上麵那句話那裏打住了，或者雖然還有很多內容卻沒有一句是針對具體的內容來說明為什麽好及壞的，那就是構成了康德所說的辯證錯覺，或超驗錯覺，而原因顯然就是康德所說的用原不屬於經驗的理性內容作為經驗性的評論來用了。雖然實際思維是經驗與非經驗的複雜的混合體，康德對於思維元素的劃分所起到的積極作用是指出非經驗的部分成為錯覺的來源的可能形式。
如果康德對於他所謂的辯證錯覺的分析僅僅到這一層次而且再提供一些諸如本文上麵提到的路人甲乙這一類的相關例子的話，那麽對於我們認識並防範對於辯證法的錯誤運用確實會有很大幫助。但是，康德的分析並沒有在這裏打住，也沒有提供相關的例證，而是進一步將他分出的非經驗思維進一步分為一般非經驗性思維（或邏輯性非經驗性思維）與具有如下特殊意義的非經驗性思維（或先驗的思維）：
“超驗”這個術語並適用於所有的先驗知識，而隻適用於那些讓我們知道能夠以完全先驗的方式使用某些表現（直覺或概念）以及如何達到這一點。“超驗”的東西一定是關於某種先驗知識的可能性的……這樣一門學科應該被稱為“超驗邏輯”，因為它僅對理解與理性的規律感興趣，隻關心它們與客觀物體的先驗關係---不象一般的邏輯，一般邏輯對經驗的與純粹理性的知識都感興趣，不在它們之間做任何區別。
(英譯原文：
The term ‘transcendental’ does not apply
to all items
of a priori knowledge,
but only to ones through which we know that certain representations (intuitions
or concepts) can be
used in an entirely a priori way
and know how this
is so. Something is ‘transcendental’ only if it is about the possibility of a
certain kind of apriori knowledge……Such a
science would have to be called ‘transcendental logic’, because it deals merely
with the laws of understanding and of reason, attending only to their a priori dealings with
objects—unlike general logic, which attends to empirical as well as pure rational
knowledge, without marking any distinction between them.
to all items
of a priori knowledge,
but only to ones through which we know that certain representations (intuitions
or concepts) can be
used in an entirely a priori way
and know how this
is so. Something is ‘transcendental’ only if it is about the possibility of a
certain kind of apriori knowledge……Such a
science would have to be called ‘transcendental logic’, because it deals merely
with the laws of understanding and of reason, attending only to their a priori dealings with
objects—unlike general logic, which attends to empirical as well as pure rational
knowledge, without marking any distinction between them.
）
這或許對於思維哲學的發展有幫助，對於錯誤地運用辯證法的研究來說卻是偏了題，而康德在對他所認為的錯誤的辯證思維的分析中並沒有對上述特殊意義上的超驗現象與一般地將純粹理性的狀況區分開來。更確切地說，從他有限的舉例來看，他的分析主要是針對上麵的窄化了的非經驗的思維。當然，他對於非經驗性思維的細化分析的一些結果在幫助我們了解思維的一般特性的同時也確實可以幫助我們認識作為一般思維的特例的辯證思維。比如，他提出判斷分類以及相應的作為理解的對象的概念可以幫助我們認識一些可以被超驗地運用在思維中的先驗的內容，而這些內容既然會出現在一般的思維中就同樣會出現在我們日常感興趣的辯證思維之中。但是，雖然康德的分析能夠提供人們的一般思維特性的一些知識，卻偏離了對於造成我們日常所麵對的錯誤地運用辯證法的根本原因的探討。
另外，對於經驗與非經驗的複雜混合體的實際思維來說，經驗的內容同樣可能產生錯覺。除了諸如喝醉酒時候的感覺錯誤之外，數據本身就可能造成邏輯上的錯誤，比如“我們班最厲害的是麥克”這樣一句話是我們常見的一類可以被認為是錯覺的生活用語的一個例子，它可能指平時班裏沒人敢惹麥克，但並不等於他生病的時候或者一個人麵對一群人的時候或者被暗算的時候仍然是最厲害的。而如果要對“我們班最厲害的是麥克”進行思維元素的分解來判斷什麽部分產生錯覺，其實沒什麽意義，因為這句明顯是基於生活經驗的不嚴格的論斷的要害不在於它自身的經驗依據以及根據經驗進行的實用性的邏輯推論，而涉及到了實際的心理效果與邏輯思考的周全的問題。換句話說，我完全不需要了解康德的分析也可以指出這句話的問題，而即使我非常熟悉康德的分析也無法幫僅僅運用康德的分析來指出這句話的問題。當然，這句話雖屬於常見的一類生活用語，卻並沒有反映出我們日常所遇到的錯誤地運用辯證法的特征，這一事實本身也反映出康德的分析對於分析錯誤的辯證根源的缺陷，因為康德文章中除了複雜的例子外就是類似這樣的單句例子，他從未給出類似我上麵提到的路人甲乙的那樣的例子來。
不僅如此，康德在《純粹理性批判》中還可以說是相當莫名奇妙地說隻有三種純粹理性的錯覺：
純粹超驗理性概念可以說是我們對之毫無概念的東西，盡管這些概念是理性在自己內在的本性驅使之下創造出來的……理性的純粹概念的超驗（主觀）現實依賴於我們通過理性的推論得出這些概念。沒有經驗前提的理性推論將使我們從我們所知道的一些事情得出我們沒有概念的另一些內容來，而不可避免的錯覺導致我們認為它是客觀地真實。鑒於它們所得出的結論的特點，這樣的思維活動最好被稱為‘詭辯’而不是‘理性的推論’，盡管它們的起源使得它們可以擁有後者的頭銜，因為它們並非虛擬的也不是隨機產生的而是由理性的本性決定了的。它們不是人為的詭辯而是純粹理性自身的詭辯，因而即便是最聰明的人也無法免於這樣的詭辯。如果他非常努力地抵擋它，他或許可以免於犯下實際的錯誤；但是他將永遠無法擺脫那無止境地嘲笑他的錯覺。所以，這就是我們所麵對的：正正好三種理性的辯證的理性推論---恰好對應著它們的結論所產生的三種理性概念。
(1) ……
超驗謬誤推論
超驗謬誤推論
……
(2) ……純粹理性二律背反
……
(3) ……純粹理性之理想
(英譯原文：
The object of a purely transcendental
idea can be said to be something of which we have no concept, despite the idea’s
being something that reason is compelled by its own inherent nature to produce……The
transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure conceptsof reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a
necessary inference of reason. There will therefore beinferences of reason, having no empirical premises, throughwhich we infer from something we know something
elseof which we have no concept though an
inevitable illusionleads us to regard it as
objectively real. Because of the conclusions
they come to, these movements of the mind would
be better called ‘sophistical’ [vernünftelnde]
rather than‘inferences of reason’ though
their origin gives them some claim to the latter title,since they aren’t fictitious and have arisen not by chancebut from the very nature of reason.They are sophistries not of men but of pure
reason itself, and noteven the wisest of
men can free himself from them. If he works hard at it he may be able to guard himself
against actual error; but he’ll never be able to free himself from the illusion,
which unceasingly mocks and teases him. So there we have it: there are exactly
three kinds of dialectical inferences of reason—just as there are three ideas in
which their conclusions result.
idea can be said to be something of which we have no concept, despite the idea’s
being something that reason is compelled by its own inherent nature to produce……The
transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure conceptsof reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a
necessary inference of reason. There will therefore beinferences of reason, having no empirical premises, throughwhich we infer from something we know something
elseof which we have no concept though an
inevitable illusionleads us to regard it as
objectively real. Because of the conclusions
they come to, these movements of the mind would
be better called ‘sophistical’ [vernünftelnde]
rather than‘inferences of reason’ though
their origin gives them some claim to the latter title,since they aren’t fictitious and have arisen not by chancebut from the very nature of reason.They are sophistries not of men but of pure
reason itself, and noteven the wisest of
men can free himself from them. If he works hard at it he may be able to guard himself
against actual error; but he’ll never be able to free himself from the illusion,
which unceasingly mocks and teases him. So there we have it: there are exactly
three kinds of dialectical inferences of reason—just as there are three ideas in
which their conclusions result.
(1) ……
transcendental paralogism.
transcendental paralogism.
……
(2) ……antinomyofpure
reason.
reason.
……
(3) ……idealof pure reason.
）
就這樣，康德將他那原本涵蓋極廣的超驗錯覺分析局限於對他所提出的那三種著名的超驗錯覺的分析，而他的那些具體分析如黑格爾對其中一條的評論那樣“乏善可陳[3]”。其中，他對柏拉圖的理念進行了批判性的討論，認為柏拉圖的理念的主要意義是作為思維的理想原型，然後又提出他自己的與柏拉圖不同的理想概念並將之稱為Ideal以區別於被柏拉圖用作理念以及被用作一般的理性概念的Idea。
康德在《純粹理性批判》一書中對於辯證概念的這種脫離了現實中人們所熟悉的錯誤的辯證特征的處理，使得人們，至少是我們這個時代的人們很難將康德的討論與生活中所遇到的各種錯誤地運用辯證思維的現象聯係在一起。另一方麵，康德顯然沒有認識到柏拉圖正確地運用辯證法的意義，因此，他對辯證法的觀點是消極的，他所強調的隻是對應著傳統的辯證概念的思維之不可避免及其所帶有的錯覺性，而絲毫沒有觸及到傳統的辯證思維的積極意義。所以，雖然如我前麵給出的路人甲與路人乙的例子中所表現的，康德的分析確實可以幫助人們認識到當把作為純粹理性的大道理脫離了具體的實際示例進行運用時便會產生錯誤的辯證現象，但是，他的理論卻無法幫助人們認識辯證法之所以能夠存在的內在生命力，更無法幫助人們正確地運用辯證法。
康德將思維分成經驗與先驗部分的目的是為了更好地認識先驗的潛力。如他自己所說的：
關於主觀的探討對於我這裏的主要目的是有大意義的，但它不是最基本的部分，因為這裏的主要議題是：‘當理解與理性與經驗相分離後它們還能知道多少？以及它們這樣能夠知道什麽’
（英譯原文：
This ·subjective· inquiry matters a lot
for my main purpose, but it’s not an essential part of it, because the main
question
for my main purpose, but it’s not an essential part of it, because the main
question
is always: ‘How much can understanding
and reason know when they are cut loose from all experience? And what can
and reason know when they are cut loose from all experience? And what can
they
know in this way?’
know in this way?’
）
康德認為傳統的形而上學強調人們的知識要符合客觀物體導致他那個時期的哲學家們對於形而上學的各種困惑，因而他提出要改變那種基本的觀點而把形而上學建構在我們所認識的物體是要符合我們的知識體係這樣的認識前提之下：
直到現在我們一直假設我們的知識必須符合它們所表達的客觀物體；但是在那樣的基礎之上我們從未成功通過概念來先驗地學到任何東西---從未給我們的知識增加任何東西。所以讓我們換一個角度來試著將形而上學建立在這樣的假設上：物體必須符合我們的知識。那將更適合於我們需要的結果，也就是可以告訴我們關於客觀物提在我們接觸它們之前的確定信息的先驗知識。
（英譯原文：
Until now it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to the objects ·that
it is knowledge of ·;
but working on that basis we have never succeeded in learning anything—never added anything to our stock
of knowledge—in an a priori way
through concepts. So let us now ·change our tack· and experiment with doing metaphysics
on the basis of the assumption that the
objectsmust
conform to our knowledge. That would fit better
with the upshot that we want, namely a
priori knowledge of the objects that will tell
us something definite about them before they are given to us.
it is knowledge of ·;
but working on that basis we have never succeeded in learning anything—never added anything to our stock
of knowledge—in an a priori way
through concepts. So let us now ·change our tack· and experiment with doing metaphysics
on the basis of the assumption that the
objectsmust
conform to our knowledge. That would fit better
with the upshot that we want, namely a
priori knowledge of the objects that will tell
us something definite about them before they are given to us.
）
相應地，康德指出我們不可能知道客觀物體本身（things in themselves）是什麽樣的，我們知道的隻是物體的外在表現（appearance）而已。在這兩個方麵上康德是正確的，是得到現代心理學知識的肯定的。但是，康德在這個基礎上過於誇大先驗的作用卻是有失偏頗的。他之所以會那樣做是因為，他把形而上學看成是一個完全由理性構成的自容的知識體係：
形而上學是一個完全自容的通過理性進行思辨的知識體係；它翱翔於經驗的教導之上；它的是知識完全來源於單純的概念（而不象數學那樣是通過經概念加在大腦構造出的直覺之上）。
（英譯原文：
Metaphysics is a completely
self-contained speculative knowledge through reason; it soars above the
teachings of experience; its knowledge comes through mere concepts (and not,
like mathematics, through bringing
self-contained speculative knowledge through reason; it soars above the
teachings of experience; its knowledge comes through mere concepts (and not,
like mathematics, through bringing
concepts
to bear on ·mentally constructed· intuitions).
to bear on ·mentally constructed· intuitions).
）
同時，如本文前麵提到的，康德又認為理性隻與理解與判斷打交道而從不直接與經驗或任何客觀物體打交道的。因此，他就有必要將思維中的非經驗部分單獨分離出來作為形而上學的對象來進行研究。他這樣的觀點其實本身是有缺陷的。
康德在這裏混淆了幾個概念，那就是概念的客觀性與主觀的生成之間的不同，以及概念有意識的生成與無意識的生成之間的不同，還是遺傳的影響的因素。首先，因為我們首先有認識與思考的能力使得我們能夠認識物體，而我們所認識的都是物體的外在表現，這與康德的理論是一致的。這裏其實已經涉及到我們作為人的生理與心理的本性問題，其中就涉及到遺傳的因素。有些今天看來是先天的本能根據遺傳學的理論是人類祖先長期進化的結果，因此從遺傳進化的軌跡上來看，我們很難將今天的先驗的本能與曆史上的經驗完全分開，這一點顯然是康德沒有意識到的；即便是不考慮遺傳的因素，有些被他看來可以是被先驗地運用的概念，比如因果關係概念的建立也不一定就如他所說的是完全絲毫與經驗無關；雖然由於遺傳的原因而使得人類在嬰孩期可以很快就建立起因果的概念而其它動物則不行，但是，我們並無法完全從邏輯上嚴格地，如康德所說的那樣，徹底排除嬰孩在相對快速地建立起因果概念的過程中外界刺激所起的作用。
實際上，對於那些被認為是可以被先驗地運用的概念的意義其實是存在的特性，對它們的認識既是人的本能使然也是因為它們體現在客觀的特性之中。其實，並非所有的人，尤其是沒有接受過很多教育的人，能夠在未經解釋的情況就完全清楚地把握康德列出的那些可以被先驗地運用的概念的，難道你能否認他們具有人的基本能力嗎？而一旦他們學習了之後就可以正確地把握那些概念，那樣一來按照康德的劃分那些概念就不能被稱為先驗的，因為它們是通過學習得到的了。另外，人們在對於概念的學習或抽象生成的過程中很難將有意識的思維與無意識的思維明確分開，而大量的活動是在無意識的過程中完成的。很顯然，象康德那樣把反映客觀存在之間關係的概念與人的先驗本能硬拉在一起是不明智的。
鑒於此，不但如前所述用非經驗與經驗思維的對比來解釋辯證法相關的錯誤偏離了根本原因，而且由於康德對於經驗與非經驗的劃分本身就存在這合理性上的缺陷，將傳統辯證法有關的錯誤的產生歸於非經驗思維本身就不是一件很有意義的事情。。。
[1] Critique of Pure
Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
[3]黑格爾在《邏輯學》中提到，“康德對於純粹理性的二律背反的論述，當被仔細檢查時…實在不值得任何特別的誇獎（Kant's expositions in the antinomies of pure reason, when closely
examined…… do not indeed deserve any great praise）”
examined…… do not indeed deserve any great praise）”
網友：康德認為傳統的辯證意義對應的是一種錯覺：古時的哲學家們賦予了‘辯證’這個詞匯本意是辯論的技巧，這是古希臘智者學派的主要內容。也許康德說的也是這種辯證的意思。
本人：康德說古時人們賦予辯證很多意義，而他認為那些總起來說都與錯覺有關。亞裏士多德則認為辯證所批判而得到的結論都是哲學早已知道的。。但這都不是辯證的全意。。柏拉圖對辯證有很高的評價，他是對的，隻不過他沒說清楚，更沒指出康德提出的錯覺。亞裏士多德與康德也都對。一個複雜的話題:)
本人：不過有一點需要強調，那就是你的帖中暗示的將今天的辯證法與古時的截然區別開，那是錯誤的。當然，錯誤的原因很明顯：先是亞裏士多德批，再是康德加以區別，再是黑格爾又區別。但是他們那樣做是不對的盡管他們對辯證法所做的評述都是有道理的。
中國人認為中國的古哲學是辯證的卻不認為古希臘的是辯證的。。嗬嗬
本人上麵的第二個回帖被新浪刪了，不明白犯了他們的什麽禁忌。。。