慕容青草的博客
哲學園地
正文
我在上中學哲學課時用的課本上說哲學是關於世界觀和方法論的學問，這其實是西方近代哲學史上很多哲學家的共識，至今我也認為這種說法是成立的，隻不過世界觀的涵義不一定就是課本上所說的意思。另外也可以這樣來說，所謂方法論就是強調要用科學的方法（這裏的科學並不特指自然科學或實證主義的科學意義）來做事，因此哲學可以分為關於世界觀的學問以及所謂的科學性的哲學這兩部分。當然在最廣義的世界觀的前提下，所謂方法論本身就應該是世界觀的一部分或直接推論，所以哲學根本上來說就是關於世界觀的學問。但是，存在主義大師海德格爾顯然不喜歡上述任何一種說法，他花了很大的篇幅[1]論證了哲學不應該是關於世界觀的學問，而應該是單單地關於存在（being）的學問，或者說哲學就是本體論。
海德格爾對哲學的這一定義（及相關論述）有幾個妙處。首先，為了要改變“哲學是關於世界觀的學問”這個至少是自康德以來（海德格爾認為世界觀這個概念是康德提出的，其實這樣的說法是存在問題的）在人們心目中已經根深蒂固的觀念，並用哲學是關於存在的學問來取而代之，他不但需要重新界定哲學的對象，而且要把他新界定的哲學對象與人們心目中原有的哲學對象分離開。具體地說，他所采取的措施是：1）先論證世界觀包括的是雜七雜八的對象，而哲學根本不應該涉及雜七雜八的具體對象；2）指出存在一個不是雜七雜八的純物種，那就是他的（或者說黑格爾的）那個純存在；3）但是，考慮到哲學是世界觀這一觀念在人們心目中的根基，所以要想改變它的定義並不能隨意的指鹿為馬，還要對原有的觀念進一步否認。否則的話，考慮到世界觀一詞常被用來表示對甚至包括超自然概念在內的一切存在的認識，如果他隻是武斷地告訴大家哲學不應該涉及除了他的那個抽象的存在以外的內容的而不對世界觀進行重新定義的話，一旦人們確定了世界觀本身就包含了對於他所說的存在的認識，人家很容易會問他“憑什麽要聽你的把哲學窄化了？”所以他采取的另一個措施便是把世界觀的涵義窄化，使得它不包括他所說的那個抽象存在。在海德格爾那裏，世界觀是一個有著具體的界定的，甚至是有確定的結構的概念，而不是“包含了人們對客觀的一切認識”這樣一個最廣義的概念，因而對於抽象存在的認識就可以不在世界觀之內。
一般地，當我們想把兩個有著交集的概念分離開來，最基本的做法就是把兩者所涵蓋的範圍都窄化，從而使得兩個縮小了集合之間不再存在交集。而海德格爾做的正是這樣一件事。上麵的第1）步中他大大地窄化了自古希臘以來的傳統中的哲學概念，而第3）步中窄化了世界觀的涵義，從而首先使得哲學與世界觀脫離了關係，然後再通過上麵的第2）步確立了哲學就是關於他的（或者說黑格爾的）那個抽象存在的定義。但是，一個不論海德格爾如何重新定義世界觀，一個完全脫離了世界觀的哲學聽起來就有違人們的常識。為此，海德格爾作了一個很妙的補救：雖然對於抽象存在的認識不在世界觀的涵蓋之內，而且哲學就是研究這抽象存在的學問，但是哲學本身卻是世界觀的重要組成部分。也就是說世界觀不包含哲學研究的對象卻包含了哲學得出的結論，這就好比是一個包含整雞卻不包含雞毛的集合------這就是海德格爾的論證邏輯，而且大家好象也都沒有覺得這個邏輯有什麽不對勁的。德格爾為了做到上述幾點而進行的論述相當長，本文後麵有選擇地摘抄一些典型的相關的英譯文選段。反正經過了大段大段的論述和一係列的窄化措施之後，海德格爾對哲學做出了讓很多人認同的重新定義。我這裏不打算對以科學的名義來隨便改變常用詞匯的涵義這樣的做法進行深究，之所以把它提出來是因為有必要指出海德格爾得以宣稱哲學就是本體論的一個前提是要先窄化哲學和世界觀的涵義，並把關於他的那個抽象存在的認識排斥在世界觀之外。第二個妙處是把亞裏士多德[2]所說的第一哲學是“關於存在”的學問的說法用來支持他的“哲學就是關於存在的學問”的說法。這裏的關鍵還不在於把亞裏士多德的第一哲學與哲學這兩個表麵上看起來並不一樣的概念等同起來，因為我們知道亞裏士多德的第一哲學與後來的笛卡爾和黑格爾的第一哲學的意思並不完全一樣，它是與物理學和數學並列在一起作為哲學議題的，因此把它解釋為一般的哲學意義也不為過。但是，這裏的關鍵是亞裏士多德所說的存在的涵義與海德格爾這裏所說的存在的涵義並不完全等價。雖然亞裏士多德的“關於存在的學問”中的存在也不是具體的存在而是一般的抽象存在（being
qua being），但是海德格爾所說的存在是比亞裏士多德所說的抽象存在更抽象的黑格爾[3]的純存在（pure
being）。也正是因為這一改變，海德格爾才能鄭重其事地宣稱哲學就是本體論（亞裏士多德顯然不會同意這一點。實際上，從某種意義上來說黑格爾的純存在由於意義上的單純反而不具備亞裏士多德的抽象存在所具有的一般性了。當然這又牽涉到了如何看待存在的角度的問題了）。第三個妙處也是最關鍵的妙處就是幹脆把原本屬於認識的問題巧妙地轉化為關於基本存在的問題。他從這樣兩個方麵來做到這一點的：
1）他通過論述哲學是關於存在的學問來把哲學與源自古希臘的本體論（ontology）一匯等同起來。雖然古希臘的本體論是關於宇宙的基本存在的學問的意思，而海德格爾在論述“哲學是關於存在的學問”過程中所針對的都是他的那個抽象的一般（純）存在，是一個是從認識的角度推出的抽象概念，但是一旦把這兩者連在一起，海德格爾就已經將他所謂的關於（純）存在的學問塑造成了宇宙的基本存在（這種存在原本是一種宇宙構成的意義）層次上的問題了（因而也就把一般的讀者帶入了雲山霧罩之中了），與此同時他在“要明確哲學的意義”的名義下，將本體論的含義也在人們不知不覺中進行了改寫。
2）更妙的是他巧妙地直接了當地把人們的認識納入到本體存在之中而讓不知所以然的讀者們欣然地就接受了他這個原本屬於是人們的認識上的議題變成了聽上去是非常客觀的本體存在的議題。盡管他在這一點上的相關論述比較繁複，但是可以簡單地歸納為下麵這樣一個推導邏輯：
哲學是關於存在（being）的學問（這是他前麵已經論述了的），而一切存在（being）之所以有意義是因為一個叫做“大幸（Dasien）”的特殊存在（being），隻有有了這樣一個存在（a
being），一切存在才得以存在，所以“大幸”這一具體的存在就是關於抽象存在的本體論（也就是哲學）的基礎。而相應地，要想了解本體論（即哲學）的科學性，首先要向人們表明它是以（大幸這個）具體存在為基礎的並要指出這一基礎本身的特點（Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontical foundation and the characterisation of this foundation itself.）。
being），一切存在才得以存在，所以“大幸”這一具體的存在就是關於抽象存在的本體論（也就是哲學）的基礎。而相應地，要想了解本體論（即哲學）的科學性，首先要向人們表明它是以（大幸這個）具體存在為基礎的並要指出這一基礎本身的特點（Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontical foundation and the characterisation of this foundation itself.）。
而這裏所謂的大幸就是我們人類的自我意識和對世界的認識。。。。。。
你看，就這樣海德格爾就堂而皇之地把關於人們的認識納入到了（宇宙間）一切存在的基本的範疇之中，並由此將哲學定義為一個關於抽象存在而不是關於（對於一切存在的）認識的學問。（當然，那種抽象的存在也實在是貧瘠到了沒有多少油水可以擠的地步，所以他海德格爾很快也就隻有宣布哲學的死亡了，這是另話。）
。。。。。。
看了海德格爾這種對於語言文字的嫻熟玩弄之後我不禁隻能用一個字來表達自己的感慨：妙！
哲學作為一門學問一旦淪入文字遊戲那是人類文明的不幸。但實在不幸的是，哲學與文字詭辯之間的界限是很模糊，所以曆史上和現實中從布衣到專家達人都常把哲學的論述變成文字遊戲，更不幸的是這種遊戲的主導者常常是象海德格爾這樣的大師。
海德格爾對於西方近代哲學的一大影響恐怕就是把自古以來可能就存在於西方哲學界的皇帝的新衣鬧劇推向了一個前所未有的高潮，值得注意的是近幾年來這個高高的潮湧才傳到中國大陸，也在那裏興起了一股海德格爾熱。這股熱潮的基本特點就是人人都說海德格爾厲害，而他厲害的前提是人人都讀不懂海德格爾的哲學。妙啊！
其實，這種讀不懂而誇之的現象本身並不是一個很可怕的事。客觀地說，讀不懂而誇之是人們自古以來對於高深學問的普遍做法。雖然這種做法聽起來有些可笑，但實際上也很合理。這是因為真正高深的好學問並不容易懂，而那些學問之所以為高的一個特點是它們的切入點和方向都相當精準所以他們所涵蓋的道理往往會如一杯滿水一樣地四溢而使得即便不很懂的人也受益。這種現象發生在老子身上過，在亞裏士多德身上過，在黑格爾和其他一些大哲學家身上過（有機會的話可能還會就這個議題另寫一篇），當然，也發生在了海德格爾身上。
但是，並非所有的被不懂而誇之的學問都具有同等的價值，它們各自被誇的原因本身還可能會有很大的不同。與老子，亞裏士多德，及黑格爾相比，海德格爾的特點是他的學問中真正有價值的並不是他個人的首創。比如，他的存在的概念來自黑格爾，他的時間的概念（海德格爾的成名作就是他的“存在與時間”一書）其實還是來自黑格爾，因為黑格爾的第一哲學的出發點由三點構成：無（nothing），存在（being），和變化（becoming），而變化本身就含有了時間的概念；如果還想再往前推，人們還可以推到古希臘的赫拉克利特的那句“人不能兩次走進同一條河流”的名言，說的還是變化。沒有時間就沒有變化，而沒有變化人們也無法體會到時間。至於說海德格爾的“大幸（Dasien）”的概念與包括黑格爾以及他自己的老師胡塞爾還有海德格爾同時代的其他存在主義哲學家們關於人的意識和自我意識的獨特性概念一樣都是源自笛卡爾的“我思故我在”。
所以，海德格爾作品之高深恐怕主要是他所繼承的前人的理論之高深，這一點顯然與老子，亞裏士多德，黑格爾等人的高深不同。當然，海德格爾可能對前人的理論學得比較好，而且作了大量的論述。但是如果後人普遍認為海德格爾的理論很難懂，那可以說在很大程度上已經把他辛辛苦苦地作了大量的論述的功勞抹掉了。當然，或許在他的論述過程中對於自古以來就有的哲學的還原，建構，以及解構的方法有所發展（還有人說他是第一個提出解構的人因而是後現代解構主義的創始人），但是，至少海德格爾不是象老子，亞裏士多德，黑格爾那樣非常突出地提出了自己的很難在同時代裏找出相同點的觀點，學說和方法來。但是另一方麵，一部分由於海德格爾自身在思維或寫作文風上的問題（如本文所挑出的文字遊戲現象），一部分也由於人類的皇帝新衣情結卻使得海德格爾關於哲學的一些不正確的看法為世界哲學的發展帶來了無法忽視的負麵影響。因此，今天讓世界的哲學有所突破的關鍵不是一波接一波地上演讀不懂海德格爾仍推崇他的理論的皇帝新衣鬧劇，而恰恰是要對他所造成的一些負麵的影響有較清楚的認識。。。。。。
下麵是本文討論中所針對的海德格爾的論述的英譯文選段：
A world-view is not a matter of theoretical knowledge, either
in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained
in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a
coherent conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less
expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the
particular contemporary Dasein at any
given time. In this relationship to the Dasein the
world-view is a guide to it and a source of strength under pressure. Whether
the world-view is determined by superstitions and prejudices or is based purely
on scientific knowledge and experience or even, as is usually the case, is a
mixture of superstition and knowledge, prejudice and sober reason it all comes
to the same thing; nothing essential is changed.
in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained
in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a
coherent conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less
expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the
particular contemporary Dasein at any
given time. In this relationship to the Dasein the
world-view is a guide to it and a source of strength under pressure. Whether
the world-view is determined by superstitions and prejudices or is based purely
on scientific knowledge and experience or even, as is usually the case, is a
mixture of superstition and knowledge, prejudice and sober reason it all comes
to the same thing; nothing essential is changed.
。。。。。。
A world-view, as we saw, springs in every case from a
factical Dasein in accordance with its
factical possibilities, and it is what it is always for this particular Dasein. This in no way asserts a
relativism of world-views. What a world-view fashioned in this way says can be
formulated in propositions and rules which are related in their meaning to a
specific really existing world, to the particular factically existing Dasein. Every world-view and
life-view posits; that is to say, it is related being-ly to some being or
beings. It posits a being, something that is; it is positive. A world-view
belongs to each Dasein and, like this Dasein, it is always in fact
determined historically. To the world-view there belongs this multiple
positivity that it is always rooted in a Dasein which is
in such and such a way; that as such it relates to the existing world and
points to the factically existent Dasein. It is
just because this positivity - that is, the relatedness to beings, to world
that is, Dasein that is - belongs to the
essence of the world-view, and thus in general to the formation of the
world-view, that the formation of a world-view cannot be the task of
philosophy. To say this is not to exclude but to include the idea that
philosophy itself is a distinctive primal form of world-view. Philosophy can
and perhaps must show, among many other things, that something like a
world-view belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein.
Philosophy can and must define what in general constitutes the structure of a
world-view. But it can never develop and posit some specific world-view qua
just this or that particular one. Philosophy is not essentially the formation
of a world-view; but perhaps just on this account it has an elementary and
fundamental relation to all world-view formation, even to that which is not
theoretical but factually historical.
factical Dasein in accordance with its
factical possibilities, and it is what it is always for this particular Dasein. This in no way asserts a
relativism of world-views. What a world-view fashioned in this way says can be
formulated in propositions and rules which are related in their meaning to a
specific really existing world, to the particular factically existing Dasein. Every world-view and
life-view posits; that is to say, it is related being-ly to some being or
beings. It posits a being, something that is; it is positive. A world-view
belongs to each Dasein and, like this Dasein, it is always in fact
determined historically. To the world-view there belongs this multiple
positivity that it is always rooted in a Dasein which is
in such and such a way; that as such it relates to the existing world and
points to the factically existent Dasein. It is
just because this positivity - that is, the relatedness to beings, to world
that is, Dasein that is - belongs to the
essence of the world-view, and thus in general to the formation of the
world-view, that the formation of a world-view cannot be the task of
philosophy. To say this is not to exclude but to include the idea that
philosophy itself is a distinctive primal form of world-view. Philosophy can
and perhaps must show, among many other things, that something like a
world-view belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein.
Philosophy can and must define what in general constitutes the structure of a
world-view. But it can never develop and posit some specific world-view qua
just this or that particular one. Philosophy is not essentially the formation
of a world-view; but perhaps just on this account it has an elementary and
fundamental relation to all world-view formation, even to that which is not
theoretical but factually historical.
。。。。。。
The thesis that world-view formation does not belong to the
task of philosophy is valid, of course, only on the presupposition that
philosophy does not relate in a positive manner to some being qua this or that
particular being, that it does not posit a being. Can this presupposition that
philosophy does not relate positively to beings, as the sciences do, be
justified? What then is philosophy supposed to concern itself with if not with
beings, with that which is, as well as with the whole of what is? What is not,
is surely the nothing. Should philosophy, then, as absolute science, have the
nothing as its theme? What can there be apart from nature, history, God, space,
number? We say of each of these, even though in a different sense, that it is.
We call it a being. In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we
are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond all these beings there is
nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but
perhaps, as in the German idiom for "there is,"es gibt [literally, it gives],
still something else is given, something else which indeed is not but which
nevertheless, in a sense yet to be determined, is given. Even more. In the end
something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings
accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which,
to be sure, is not but which must be given if we are to experience and understand
any beings at all. We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we
understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though at first
roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then
the actual would remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality
means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we did not understand what
life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves
toward living beings. If we did not understand what existence and
existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein.
task of philosophy is valid, of course, only on the presupposition that
philosophy does not relate in a positive manner to some being qua this or that
particular being, that it does not posit a being. Can this presupposition that
philosophy does not relate positively to beings, as the sciences do, be
justified? What then is philosophy supposed to concern itself with if not with
beings, with that which is, as well as with the whole of what is? What is not,
is surely the nothing. Should philosophy, then, as absolute science, have the
nothing as its theme? What can there be apart from nature, history, God, space,
number? We say of each of these, even though in a different sense, that it is.
We call it a being. In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we
are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond all these beings there is
nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but
perhaps, as in the German idiom for "there is,"es gibt [literally, it gives],
still something else is given, something else which indeed is not but which
nevertheless, in a sense yet to be determined, is given. Even more. In the end
something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings
accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which,
to be sure, is not but which must be given if we are to experience and understand
any beings at all. We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we
understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though at first
roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then
the actual would remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality
means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we did not understand what
life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves
toward living beings. If we did not understand what existence and
existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein.
。。。。。。
[1]
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology，by Heidegger. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology，by Heidegger. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm.
[3] The
Science of Logic, by Hegel. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlconten.htm
Science of Logic, by Hegel. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlconten.htm
yfz9465:
謝謝你的來訪評論。。。你說我是誤讀，不知你的那個“不誤讀”是哪裏來的，我的這個你說的“誤讀”是這裏來的：“We assert now that being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy. This is not our own invention; it is a way of putting the theme which comes to life at the beginning of philosophy in antiquity, and it assumes its most grandiose form in Hegel's logic. ”---引自本博文第一篇參考文獻（海德格爾的原文英譯版）。。。。如果你覺得海德格爾這句話還不夠明確的話，到那篇參考文獻裏，還能找出很多相同的論斷來。。。。。。。所以，如果你的“不誤讀”也是來自海德格爾的原話的話，不妨拿來比較一下，也可以子（海德格爾）之矛攻子之盾。。。。。。。謝謝
實際上，康德，黑格爾（其它的先賢）都有與海德格爾相同的意思，但他們傾向自身特有的表述。這是因為每個人的意識習性不同，所以選擇的參照坐標也不同。對本體，這是言語道斷之處；卻是精神開啟之途。